Buffett Partnership Letters 1962 to 1966
1962 年信件
1962 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
July 6, 1962
1962年7月6日
A Reminder:
提醒：
In my letter of January 24, 1962 reporting on 1961, I inserted a section entitled. “And a Prediction.” While I have no desire to inflict cruel and unusual punishment upon my readers, nevertheless, a reprinting of that section, in its entirety, may be worthwhile:
在我 1962年1月24日汇报1961年情况的信件中，插入了一个名为 “一个预测” 的章节。虽然我不想给读者带来残酷和不寻常的 “惩罚”，但全文重印该章节或许是有价值的：
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_And a Prediction_
_一个预测_
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
老读者（或许是我自夸了）可能会觉得，当我开始谈论预测时，就偏离了正轨。这是我一直回避的事情，通常情况下现在也依然如此。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don't have the faintest idea.
我当然不会预测未来一两年内整体商业形势或股市的走势，因为我完全没有头绪。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven't any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
我认为你可以十分确定，在未来十年里，会有几年股市大盘上涨 20% 或 25%，也会有几年下跌相同幅度，而大多数年份涨跌幅度介于两者之间。我不清楚这些情况出现的先后顺序，而且我认为这对长期投资者来说也并非至关重要。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
在任何较长的时间段内，我认为道琼斯指数很可能会通过股息和市值增长的综合作用，实现每年约 5% 至 7% 的复合增长率。尽管近年来市场表现有所不同，但任何期望股市大盘表现大幅优于这一水平的人，可能都会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm.
我们的工作是每年都要在业绩上超越道琼斯指数，而不必过于担心某一年的绝对业绩是正还是负。我会认为，在我们下跌 15% 而道琼斯指数下跌 25% 的年份，要比我们和道琼斯指数都上涨 20% 的年份好得多。我在与合伙人交谈时强调过这一点，看到他们不同程度地点头表示认同。
It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
对我来说，最重要的是你能完全理解我在这方面的推理，不仅在理智上认同，更要从心底里认同。
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
基于我运营方法中概述的原因，相对于道琼斯指数，我们表现最佳的年份很可能出现在市场下跌或平稳时期。因此，我们所追求的优势幅度可能会有很大差异。必然会有一些年份，我们的表现不如道琼斯指数，但如果从长期来看，我们每年平均能比它高出 10 个百分点，我就会认为结果是令人满意的。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten--no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year over-all gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
具体来说，如果某一年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得在未来十年里，很有可能会有这样一年 —— 没人知道是哪一年），我们的跌幅应该只有 15% 或 20%。如果当年市场基本持平，我们希望能上涨约 10 个百分点。如果市场上涨 20% 或更多，我们会努力跟上涨幅。如果多年来都保持这样的表现，那就意味着，如果道琼斯指数每年实现 5% 至 7% 的复合总涨幅，我希望我们的业绩能达到每年 15% 至 17%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won't all be!
上述预期听起来可能有些草率，从 1965 年或 1970 年的角度来看，这些预期无疑会显得非常草率。结果也可能证明我完全错了。然而，我觉得合伙人当然有权知道我在这方面的想法，尽管这项业务的性质决定了这类预期很可能存在误差。在任何一年里，实际表现的差异可能都相当大。1961 年就是如此，幸运的是，那次差异是积极的。但不可能每次都这么幸运！
The First Half of 1962:
1962 年上半年
Between yearend 1961 and June 30, 1962 the Dow declined from 731.14 to 561.28. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately $11.00 would have been received so that overall a loss of 21.7% would have been the result of investing in the Dow. For the statistical minded, Appendix A gives the results of the Dow by years since formation of the predecessor partnerships.
1961 年底至 1962 年 6 月 30 日期间，道琼斯指数从 731.14 点跌至 561.28 点。如果在此期间持有道琼斯指数成分股，大约会获得 11.00 美元的股息，因此投资道琼斯指数的总体损失为 21.7%。对于喜欢统计数据的人，附录 A 列出了自前期合伙公司成立以来道琼斯指数各年度的表现。
As stated above, a declining Dow gives us our chance to shine and pile up the percentage advantages which, coupled with only an average performance during advancing markets, will give us quite satisfactory long-term results. Our target is an approximately 1/2% decline for each 1% decline in the Dow and if achieved, means we have a considerably more conservative vehicle for investment in stocks than practically any alternative.
如前所述，道琼斯指数下跌为我们提供了展现优势的机会，让我们能积累百分比优势。在上涨市场中我们只要保持平均表现，长期来看就能取得相当令人满意的结果。我们的目标是道琼斯指数每下跌 1%，我们的跌幅约为 0.5%。如果能实现这一目标，那就意味着我们的股票投资工具比几乎任何其他选择都更加保守。
As outlined in Appendix B, showing combined predecessor partnership results, during the first half of 1962 we had one of the best periods in our history, achieving a minus 7.5% result before payments to partners, compared to the minus 21.7% overall result on the Dow. This 14.2 percentage points advantage can be expected to widen during the second half if the decline in the general market continues, but will probably narrow should the market turn upward. Please keep in mind my continuing admonition that six-months’ or even one-year’s results are not to be taken too seriously. Short periods of measurement exaggerate chance fluctuations in performance. While circumstances contributed to an unusually good first half, there are bound to be periods when we do relatively poorly. The figures for our performance involve no change in the valuation of our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company, although developments in recent months point toward a probable higher realization.
附录 B 展示了前期合伙公司的综合业绩。1962 年上半年，是我们历史上表现最好的时期之一，在向合伙人分配收益之前，业绩为负 7.5%，而道琼斯指数的总体业绩为负 21.7%。如果市场在下半年继续下跌，我们 14.2 个百分点的优势可能会进一步扩大；但如果市场回升，优势可能会缩小。请记住我一直的告诫，六个月甚至一年的业绩都不应被过度看重。短期的业绩衡量会夸大表现的偶然波动。虽然上半年的特殊情况带来了异常出色的表现，但肯定也会有我们表现相对较差的时期。我们的业绩数据并未考虑对邓普斯特制造公司控股权估值的变化，不过最近几个月的发展表明，最终实现的价值可能会更高。
Investment Companies during the First Half:
1962 年上半年投资公司表现
Past letters have stressed our belief that the Dow is no pushover as a yardstick for investment performance. To the extent that funds are invested in common stocks, whether the manner of investment be through investment companies, investment counselors, bank trust departments, or do-it-yourself, our belief is that the overwhelming majority will achieve results roughly comparable to the Dow. Our opinion is that the deviations from the Dow are much more likely to be toward a poorer performance than a superior one.
过去的信件中我一直强调，道琼斯指数作为衡量投资业绩的标准并非轻易就能超越。就资金投资于普通股而言，无论投资方式是通过投资公司、投资顾问、银行信托部门，还是个人自主投资，我认为绝大多数的投资业绩大致与道琼斯指数相当。而且我认为，与道琼斯指数相比，投资业绩更可能是逊于它，而非优于它。
To illustrate this point, we have continually measured the Dow and limited partners’ results against the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a program of common stock investment and the two largest closed-end investment companies. The tabulation in Appendix C shows the five -years’ results, and you will note the figures are extraordinarily close to those of the Dow. These companies have total assets of about $3.5 billion.
为了说明这一点，我们一直将道琼斯指数和有限合伙人的业绩，与两家最大的奉行普通股投资策略的开放式投资公司（共同基金）以及两家最大的封闭式投资公司进行对比。附录 C 中的表格展示了五年的业绩数据，你会注意到这些数据与道琼斯指数的非常接近。这些公司的总资产约为 35 亿美元。
In the interest of getting this letter out promptly, we are mailing it before results are available for the closed-end companies. However, the two mutual funds both did poorer than the Dow, with Massachusetts Investors Trust having a minus 23% overall performance, and Investors Stock Fund realizing a minus 25.4%. This is not unusual as witness the lead article in the WALL STREET JOURNAL of June 13, 1962 headed “Funds vs. Market.” Of the 17 large common stock funds studied, everyone had a record poorer than the Dow from the peak on the Dow of 734, to the date of the article, although in some cases the margin of inferiority was minor.
为了及时发出这封信，在封闭式投资公司的业绩数据出来之前，我们就开始邮寄信件了。不过，两家共同基金的表现都比道琼斯指数差，马萨诸塞投资者信托（Massachusetts Investors Trust）的总体业绩为负 23%，投资者股票基金（Investors Stock Fund）的总体业绩为负 25.4%。这并不罕见，1962 年 6 月 13 日《华尔街日报》一篇题为《基金与市场》的头条文章就可证明。在被研究的 17 家大型普通股基金中，从道琼斯指数达到 734 点的峰值到文章发表之日，每一家的业绩都比道琼斯指数差，尽管在某些情况下，差距较小。
Particularly hard hit in the first half were the so-called “growth” funds which, almost without exception, were down considerably more than the Dow. The three large “growth” (the quotation marks are more applicable now) funds with the best record in the preceding few years, Fidelity Capital Fund, Putnam Growth Fund, and Wellington Equity Fund averaged an overall minus 32.3% for the first half. It is only fair to point out that because of their excellent records in 1959-61, their overall performance to date isstill better than average, as it may well be in the future. Ironically, however, this earlier superior performance had caused such a rush of new investors to come to them that the poor performance this year was experienced by very many more holders than enjoyed the excellent performance of earlier years. This experience tends to confirm my hypothesis that investment performance must be judged over a period of time with such a period including both advancing and declining markets. There will continue to be both; a point perhaps better understood now than six months ago.
上半年受冲击特别严重的是所谓的 “成长型” 基金，几乎无一例外，它们的跌幅都远超道琼斯指数。在过去几年中业绩最佳的三只大型 “成长型”（现在 “成长型” 这个说法可能不太准确了）基金 —— 富达资本基金（Fidelity Capital Fund）、普特南成长基金（Putnam Growth Fund）和惠灵顿股票基金（Wellington Equity Fund），上半年的平均总体跌幅达到 32.3%。需要指出的是，由于它们在 1959 - 1961 年的出色业绩，到目前为止它们的总体表现仍优于平均水平，未来也很可能如此。具有讽刺意味的是，早期的卓越表现吸引了大量新投资者涌入，导致今年业绩不佳时，受影响的投资者数量远远多于享受过早期出色业绩的投资者。这一经历进一步证实了我的观点，即投资业绩必须在一个较长的时间段内进行评判，这个时间段应包括市场的上涨期和下跌期。市场涨跌的情况还会继续交替出现，这一点现在或许比六个月前更容易理解了。
In outlining the results of investment companies, I do so not because we operate in a manner comparable to them or because our investments are similar to theirs. It is done because such funds represent a public batting average of professional, highly-paid investment management handling a very significant $20 billion of securities. Such management, I believe, is typical of management handling even larger sums. As an alternative to an interest in the partnership, I believe it reasonable to assume that many partners would have investments managed similarly.
我之所以概述投资公司的业绩，并非因为我们的运营方式与它们类似，或者我们的投资与它们相似。而是因为这类基金代表了专业、高薪的投资管理行业的公开平均水平，这些机构管理着规模高达 200 亿美元的证券资产。我认为，这类投资管理机构的表现，代表了管理规模更大资金的机构的普遍水平。我认为可以合理假设，许多合伙人如果不投资我们的合伙公司，可能会选择将资金交给投资方式类似的机构管理。
Asset Values:
资产价值
The above calculations of results are before allocation to the General Partner and monthly payments to partners. Of course, whenever the overall results for the year are not plus 6% on a market value basis (with deficiencies carried forward) there is no allocation to the General Partner. Therefore, non-withdrawing partners have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first six months of 7.5% and partners who have withdrawn at the rate of 6% per annum have had a decrease in their market value equity during the first half of 10.5%. Should our results for the year be less than plus 6% (and unless there should be a material advance in the Dow, this is very probable) partners receiving monthly payments will have a decrease in their market value equity at December 31, 1962. This means that monthly payments at 6% on this new market equity next year will be on a proportionately reduced basis. For example, if our results were an overall minus 7% for the year, a partner receiving monthly payments who had a market value interest of $100,000 on January 1, 1962 would have an equity at December 31, 1962 of $87,000. This reduction would arise from the minus 7% result, or $7, 000 plus monthly payments of $500 for an additional $6,000. Thus, with $87,000 of market equity on January 1, 1963, monthly payments next year would be $435.00.
上述业绩计算是在向普通合伙人分配收益和向合伙人每月支付款项之前进行的。当然，只要某一年按市值计算的总体业绩未达到 6%（不足部分会结转至下一年），普通合伙人就不会获得分配。因此，在 1962 年上半年，未提款的合伙人其市值权益下降了 7.5%，而按每年 6% 的比例提款的合伙人，其市值权益在上半年下降了 10.5%。如果我们全年的业绩低于 6%（除非道琼斯指数大幅上涨，否则这种可能性很大），那么每月领取款项的合伙人在 1962 年 12 月 31 日的市值权益将会减少。这意味着，明年按这一新市值权益的 6% 进行的月度支付将相应减少。例如，如果我们全年的业绩为负 7%，一位在 1962 年 1 月 1 日市值权益为 10 万美元、每月领取款项的合伙人，到 1962 年 12 月 31 日时，其权益将变为 8.7 万美元。这一减少是由于负 7% 的业绩（即 7000 美元）加上每月 500 美元、总计 6000 美元的提款。因此，1963 年 1 月 1 日市值权益为 8.7 万美元时，明年每月的支付金额将为 435 美元。
None of the above, of course, has any applicability to advance payments received during 1962 which do not participate in profits or losses, but earn a straight 6%.
当然，上述情况不适用于 1962 年收到的预付款项，这些款项不参与利润或亏损分配，仅按 6% 的固定利率赚取收益。
APPENDIX A
附录 A
DOW-JONES INDUSTRIAL AVERAGE
道琼斯工业平均指数
| Year | Closing Dow | Change for Year | Dow Dividend | Overall Result from Dow | Percentage Result |
| 年份 | 道琼斯收盘点数 | 年度变化点数 | 道琼斯股息 | 道琼斯总体收益 | 百分比收益 |
| 1956 | 499.47 | – | – | – | – |
| 1957 | 435.69 | -63.78 | 21.61 | -42.17 | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 583.65 | 147.96 | 20.00 | 167.96 | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 679.36 | 95.71 | 20.74 | 116.45 | 20.0% |
| 1960 | 615.89 | 63.47 | 21.36 | 42.11 | -6.2% |
| 1961 | 731.14 | 115.25 | 22.61 | 137.86 | 22.4% |
| 6/30/62 | 561.28 | 169.86 | 11.00 Est. | -158.86 | -21.7% |
APPENDIX B
附录 B
PARTNERSHIP PERFORMANCE
合伙公司业绩
| Year | Partnership Result (1) | Limited Partners’ Results (2) |
| 年份 | 合伙公司业绩（1） | 有限合伙人业绩（2） |
| 1957 | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 6/30/62 | -7.5% | -7.5% |
(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partners.
注：（1）1957 - 1961 年数据为所有前期有限合伙公司全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人进行分配；
(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
注：（2）1957 - 1961 年数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩计算得出，已根据当前合伙协议考虑向普通合伙人的分配。
APPENDIX C
附录 C
YEARLY RESULTS
年度业绩
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（1） | 投资者股票基金（1） | 雷曼公司（2） | 三角大陆公司（2） |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% |
| 6/30/92 23.0% | -25.4% | N.A. | N.A. |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
注：（1）根据资产价值变化加上当年向登记在册持有人的分配计算得出；
(2) From Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual - 1962.
注：（2）数据来源于 1962 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》。
CUMULATIVE RESULTS
累积业绩
| Years | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托 | 投资者股票基金 | 雷曼公司 | 三角大陆公司 | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2 |
| 1957-61 | 71.4% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6 |
| 1957-6/30/62 | 31.9% | 32.0% | N.A. | N.A. | 37.0% | 160.5% |
1962 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
November 1, 1962
1962 年 11 月 1 日
TO MY PARTNERS FOR 1963:
致 1963 年合伙人
Here we go on the annual paper flurry. Two copies of an amended partnership agreement for 1963 are enclosed. The one with the General Provisions attached is to be kept by you and the other single-page agreement should be returned. There are no substantive changes of any sort from last year’s agreement. This amendment is merely to allow for a few new partners and in several places to reword in clearer (we hope) language provisions of the present agreement. Practically all of the rewording is in General Provision 5 (paragraph 7 in last year’s agreement). Rather than have a separate amending document, we have incorporated the changes into one complete document embodying the entire agreement.
又到了一年一度文件纷飞的时候。随信附上两份 1963 年修订后的合伙协议。附有一般条款的那份由你留存，另一份单页协议请寄回。与去年的协议相比，没有实质性的变化。此次修订仅是为了接纳几位新合伙人，并在一些地方用更清晰（我们希望如此）的语言重新表述现有协议的条款。实际上，大部分的措辞修改都在一般条款 5（去年协议的第 7 段）。为了避免单独的修订文件，我们将修改内容整合到了一份完整的协议文件中。
We are also enclosing two commitment letters (one for you–one to be returned) on which you are to indicate your wishes regarding additions or withdrawals at January 1st. We would like to have the agreement and the commitment letter back by December 1st. However, the commitment letter can be amended right up until the end of the year (not after) so if you should have a change of plans and you have already mailed us your commitment letter, all you have to do is get in touch with me, and I will make whatever changes you desire.
我们还附上了两份承诺书（一份给你留存，一份请寄回），你需要在上面注明 1 月 1 日时追加或撤回投资的意向。希望你能在 12 月 1 日前寄回协议和承诺书。不过，承诺书在年底前（不能超过年底）都可以修改。所以，如果你改变了计划，且已经把承诺书寄给我们，只需与我联系，我会按你的要求进行修改。
Any withdrawals will be paid immediately after January 1st. Any additions must reach us by January 10th, and should they be paid in during November, they will take on the status of advance payments and draw interest at the rate of 6% until yearend.
任何撤回的投资将在 1 月 1 日后立即支付。任何追加投资必须在 1 月 10 日前到账，如果在 11 月支付，将作为预付款处理，年底前按 6% 的利率计息。
Please be sure the signature on your partnership agreement is notarized. Partners in Omaha may obtain the notarization at our office if they wish. Also, be sure to let us know by an appropriate circle on the commitment letter whether you wish to receive monthly payments in 1963. In order to be sure everyone understands this, let me again state that these monthly payments are in no sense guaranteed earnings or anything of the sort. They represent a convenient form of regular withdrawal, which to the extent we earn better than 6% are payments from earnings, and to the extent we don’t, are payments from capital.
请确保你在合伙协议上的签名经过公证。奥马哈的合伙人如果愿意，可以在我们办公室进行公证。另外，请在承诺书上相应的位置圈选，告知我们你是否希望在 1963 年每月领取款项。为确保大家都理解这一点，我再次说明，这些月度支付款项绝非保证收益或类似的东西。它们只是一种方便的定期提款方式，如果我们的年收益超过 6%，这些款项来自收益；如果未达到 6%，则部分或全部来自本金。
Complete tax information for your 1962 return will be in your hands by January 20th. If you should need an estimate of your tax position before that time, let me know and I will give you a rough idea. We will also send out a short letter on taxes in late December.
1962 年纳税申报所需的完整税务信息将在 1 月 20 日前送达你手中。如果你在此之前需要预估纳税情况，请告知我，我会给你一个大致的估算。12 月下旬我们还会寄出一封关于税务的简短信件。
Having read this far, you are entitled to a report on how we have done to date in 1962. For the periodending October 31st, the Dow-Jones Industrials showed an overall loss, including dividends received, of approximately 16.8%. We intend to use the same method or valuing our controlling interest in Dempster Mill Manufacturing at this yearend that we did at the end of last year. This involved applying various discounts to the balance sheet items to reflect my opinion as to what could be realized on a very prompt sale. Last year this involved a 40% discount on inventories, a 15% discount on receivables, estimated auction value of fixed assets, etc., which led to an approximate value or $35.00 per share.
读到这里，你有权了解我们 1962 年至今的业绩情况。截至 10 月 31 日，道琼斯工业指数包括股息在内的总体损失约为 16.8%。今年年底，我们打算沿用去年年底评估邓普斯特磨坊制造公司控股权的方法。当时，我对资产负债表上的各项资产进行了不同程度的折扣，以反映我对快速出售时可实现价值的判断。去年，存货按 40% 折扣，应收账款按 15% 折扣，固定资产按预估拍卖价值计算，最终得出每股价值约为 35 美元。
The successful conversion of substantial portions of the assets of Dempster to cash, at virtually 100 cents on the dollar, has been the high point of 1962. For example, inventory of $4.2 million at last yearend will probably be about $1.9 million this yearend, reducing the discount on this item by about $920,000 (40% of $2.3 million reduction). I will give this story my full journalistic treatment in my annual letter. Suffice to say at this point that applying the same discounts described above will probably result in a yearend value of at least $50.00 per share. The extent of the asset conversion job can perhaps best be illustrated in a sentence by pointing out that whereas we had $166,000 of cash and $2,315,000 of liabilities at November 30, 1961 (Dempster fiscal yearend), we expect this year to have about $1 million in cash and investments (of the type the Partnership buys) against total liabilities of $250,000. Prospects for further improvement in this situation in 1963 appear good, and we expect a substantially expanded investment portfolio in Dempster next year.
1962 年的亮点是成功将邓普斯特的大量资产变现，几乎实现了全额价值。例如，去年年底 420 万美元的存货，今年年底可能降至 190 万美元左右，这使得该项资产的折扣减少了约 92 万美元（存货减少 230 万美元的 40%）。在年度信件中，我会详细讲述这个故事。目前可以说，按照上述同样的折扣方法计算，今年年底每股价值可能至少为 50 美元。资产变现工作的成效可以用一句话说明：1961 年 11 月 30 日（邓普斯特财年结束日），我们持有 16.6 万美元现金，负债 231.5 万美元；预计今年我们将持有约 100 万美元现金和投资（与合伙公司投资类型相同），而总负债仅 25 万美元。1963 年这种情况进一步改善的前景良好，我们预计明年邓普斯特的投资组合规模将大幅扩大。
Valuing Dempster at $50 per share, our overall gain (before any payments to partners) to October 31st for the Partnership has been 5.5%. This 22.3 percentage-points advantage over the Dow, if maintained until the end of the year, will be among the largest we have ever had. About 60% of this advantage was accomplished by the portfolio other than Dempster, and 40% was the result of increased value at Dempster.
将邓普斯特的股票估值为每股 50 美元，截至 10 月 31 日，合伙公司总体收益（在向合伙人支付任何款项之前）为 5.5% 。如果到年底我们仍能保持比道琼斯指数高 22.3 个百分点的优势，这将是我们有史以来最大的优势之一。这一优势约 60% 来自邓普斯特以外的投资组合，40% 来自邓普斯特的价值增长。
I want all partners and prospective partners to realize the results described above are distinctly abnormal and will recur infrequently, if at all. This performance is mainly the result of having a large portion of our money in controlled assets and workout situations rather than general market situations at a time when the Dow declined substantially. If the Dow had advanced materially in 1962, we could have looked very bad on a relative basis, and our success to date in 1962 certainly does not reflect any ability on my part to guess the market (I never try), but merely reflects the fact that the high prices of generals partially forced me into other categories or investment. If the Dow had continued to soar, we would have been low man on the totem pole. We fully expect to have years when our method of operation will not even match the results of the Dow, although obviously I don’t expect this on any long-term basis or I would throw in the towel and buy the Dow.
我希望所有合伙人及潜在合伙人明白，上述业绩极为反常，即便出现，也不会频繁。这样的业绩主要是因为在道琼斯指数大幅下跌时，我们的大量资金投资于控股资产和特殊投资机会，而非普通市场投资。如果 1962 年道琼斯指数大幅上涨，我们的相对表现可能会很糟糕。我们在 1962 年至今的成功，并不代表我有预测市场的能力（我从不尝试预测市场），只是因为普通股的高价迫使我转向其他投资类别。如果道琼斯指数继续飙升，我们可能会表现垫底。我们完全预料到，在某些年份，我们的投资方式甚至无法跑赢道琼斯指数，不过显然我不认为长期会如此，否则我就会放弃，转而投资道琼斯指数相关产品。
I’ll cut this sermon short with the conclusion that I certainly do not want anyone to think that the pattern of the last few years is likely to be repeated; I expect future performance to reflect much smaller advantages on average over the Dow.
我不再赘述，只想强调，我不希望任何人认为过去几年的模式会重演；我预计未来我们的业绩平均优势会比道琼斯指数小得多。
Each letter ends with the request that you let me know about anything that isn’t clear. Please be sure that you do this. We are all geared up with secretarial help, a new typewriter, etc., and we want to be sure that this letter and agreement are understood by all.
每封信结尾我都会请你告知我不清楚的地方，请务必照做。我们配备了秘书协助，还有新打字机等，希望确保大家都理解这封信和协议的内容。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB:bf
P/S: There are no prizes for being the last ones to get in the agreement and commitment letter, so please get to it as soon as possible. Remember the commitment letter can be amended by a postcard or a phone call–we are just trying to get the bulk of the work out of the way well before December 31st so we can concentrate on getting the audit, tax information, etc., out pronto at yearend.
附言：寄回协议和承诺书最晚的人可没有奖品，所以请尽快处理。记住，承诺书可以通过明信片或电话修改，我们只是想在 12 月 31 日前完成大部分工作，这样年底就能集中精力完成审计、税务信息等工作。 巴菲特合伙有限公司
1963 年信件
1963 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
January 18, 1963
1963 年 1 月 18 日
The Ground Rules
基本原则
Some partners have confessed (that’s the proper word) that they sometimes find it difficult to wade through my entire annual letter. Since I seem to be getting more long-winded each year, I have decided to emphasize certain axioms on the first pages. Everyone should be entirely clear on these points. To most of you this material will seem unduly repetitious, but I would rather have nine partners out of ten mildly bored than have one out of ten with any basic misconceptions.
一些合伙人坦言（这个词很恰当），有时他们觉得很难读完我的年度信件全文。鉴于我似乎一年比一年啰嗦，我决定在开头几页强调一些基本原则。每个人都应该清楚这些要点。对你们大多数人来说，这些内容可能显得过于重复，但我宁愿让十分之九的合伙人稍感厌烦，也不愿让十分之一的人存在基本误解。
- In no sense is any rate of return guaranteed to partners. Partners who withdraw one-half of 1% monthly are doing just that–withdrawing. If we earn more than 6% per annum over a period of years, the withdrawals will be covered by earnings and the principal will increase. If we don’t earn 6%, the monthly payments are partially or wholly a return of capital.
我们绝不向合伙人保证任何收益率。每月提取 0.5% 资金的合伙人，只是在提款。如果多年来我们的年收益率超过 6%，提款将从收益中支出，本金也会增加。如果收益率未达 6%，每月支付的款项则部分或全部来自本金。
- Any year in which we fail to achieve at least a plus 6% performance will be followed by a year when partners receiving monthly payments will find those payments lowered.
任何一年，只要我们的业绩未能至少达到 6% 的正收益，接下来一年，每月领取款项的合伙人会发现领取金额降低。
- Whenever we talk of yearly gains or losses, we are talking about market values; that is, how we stand with assets valued at market at yearend against how we stood on the same basis at the beginning of the year. This may bear very little relationship to the realized results for tax purposes in a given year.
我们所说的年度盈亏，都是按市值计算的，即年末资产市值与年初同口径市值的比较。这与特定年份纳税申报时的实际收益可能相差甚远。
- Whether we do a good job or a poor job is not to be measured by whether we are plus or minus for the year. It is instead to be measured against the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average, leading investment companies, etc. If our record is better than that of these yardsticks, we consider it a good year whether we are plus or minus. If we do poorer, we deserve the tomatoes.
判断我们工作好坏，不是看当年收益是正还是负，而是与道琼斯工业平均指数、主要投资公司等衡量的证券市场总体表现相比。如果我们的业绩优于这些基准，无论当年收益正负，我们都认为是好年份。反之，我们就该接受批评。
- While I much prefer a five-year test, I feel three years is an absolute minimum for judging performance. It is a certainty that we will have years when the partnership performance is poorer, perhaps substantially so, than the Dow. If any three-year or longer period produces poor results, we all should start looking around for other places to have our money. An exception to the latter statement would be three years covering a speculative explosion in a bull market.
虽然我更倾向于用五年时间来评估业绩，但我认为三年是评判业绩的最短期限。可以肯定的是，我们会有业绩比道琼斯指数差的年份，甚至可能差距很大。如果任何三年或更长时间的业绩都很差，我们都应该考虑把钱投到其他地方。不过，如果这三年处于牛市投机热潮期，则属例外。
- I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.
我不会预测股市大盘或商业波动。如果你认为我能做到，或者认为这对投资至关重要，那你就不应该加入合伙公司。
- I cannot promise results to partners. What I can and do promise is that:
我无法向合伙人承诺业绩，但我可以并确实承诺：
- Our investments will be chosen on the basis of value, not popularity;
1
我们选择投资基于价值，而非市场热度；
- That we will attempt to bring risk of permanent capital loss (not short-term quotational loss) to an absolute minimum by obtaining a wide margin of safety in each commitment and a diversity of commitments; and
1
我们会通过在每项投资中获取足够的安全边际和分散投资，将永久资本损失（而非短期股价波动损失）的风险降至最低；
- My wife, children and I will have virtually our entire net worth invested in the partnership.
1
我的妻子、孩子和我几乎将全部净资产都投入了合伙公司。
Our Performance in 1962
1962 年业绩
I have consistently told partners that we expect to shine on a relative basis during minus years for the Dow, whereas plus years of any magnitude may find us blushing. This held true in 1962.
我一直告诉合伙人，当道琼斯指数下跌时，我们的相对表现有望出色；而在道琼斯指数大幅上涨的年份，我们可能表现欠佳。1962 年正是如此。
Because of a strong rally in the last few months, the general market as measured by the Dow really did not have such a frightening decline as many might think. From 731 at the beginning of the year, it dipped to 535 in June, but closed at 652. At the end of 1960, the Dow stood at 616, so you can see that while there has been a good deal of action the past few years, the investing public as a whole is not too far from where it was in 1959 or 1960. If one had owned the Dow last year (and I imagine there are a few people playing the high flyers of 1961 who wish they had), they would have had a shrinkage in market value of 79.04 or 10.8%. However, dividends of approximately 23.30 would have been received to bring the overall results from the Dow for the year to minus 7.6%. Our own overall record was plus 13.9%. Below we show the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results for all full years of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.’s and predecessor partnerships’ activities:
由于过去几个月市场强劲反弹，以道琼斯指数衡量的大盘跌幅并没有很多人想象的那么可怕。从年初的 731 点跌至 6 月的 535 点，但年末收于 652 点。1960 年底，道琼斯指数为 616 点，所以可以看出，尽管过去几年市场波动较大，但总体而言，投资者的状况与 1959 年或 1960 年相比并没有太大变化。如果有人去年持有道琼斯指数成分股（我想，那些在 1961 年追逐热门股的人现在可能希望自己当初持有了），其市值会缩水 79.04 点，跌幅为 10.8% 。不过，大约 23.30 美元的股息会使道琼斯指数当年的总体收益变为负 7.6% 。我们的总体业绩为正 13.9% 。以下展示道琼斯指数、合伙公司（向普通合伙人分配前）以及巴菲特合伙有限公司和前期合伙公司所有完整年度有限合伙人的逐年业绩：
| Year | Overall Results from Dow | artnership Results (1) | Limited Partners Results (2) |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体收益 | 合伙公司业绩（1） | 有限合伙人业绩（2） |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
(1) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
注：（1）1957 - 1961 年数据为所有前期有限合伙公司全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人进行分配；
(2) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
注：（2）1957 - 1961 年数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩计算得出，已根据当前合伙协议考虑向普通合伙人的分配。
The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results in the same three categories, as well as the average annual compounded rate:
下表展示了上述三类业绩的累积或复合结果，以及平均年复合增长率：
| Year | Overall Results from Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners Results |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体收益 | 合伙公司业绩 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957-61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957-62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| Annual Compounded Rate 平均年复合增长率 | 8.3% | 26.0% | 21.1% |
My (unscientific) opinion is that a margin of ten percentage points per annum over the Dow is the very maximum that can be achieved with invested funds over any long period of years, so it may be well to mentally modify some of the above figures.
我（非科学的）观点是，长期来看，每年比道琼斯指数多 10 个百分点的收益是投资资金所能达到的最大优势，所以或许应该对上述部分数据进行适当调整。
Partners have sometimes expressed concern as to the effect of size upon performance. This subject was reflected upon in last year’s annual letter. The conclusion reached was that there were some situations where larger sums helped and some where they hindered, but on balance, I did not feel they would penalize performance. I promised to inform partners if my conclusions on this should change. At the beginning of 1957, combined limited partnership assets totaled $303,726 and grew to $7,178,500 at the beginning or 1962. To date, anyway, our margin over the Dow has indicated no tendency to narrow as funds increase.
合伙人有时会担心公司规模对业绩的影响。去年的年度信件讨论过这个问题，结论是在某些情况下，资金规模较大有帮助，而在另一些情况下则会有阻碍，但总体而言，我认为规模不会对业绩产生负面影响。我承诺过，如果我在这方面的结论发生变化，会告知合伙人。1957 年初，有限合伙公司的总资产为 303,726 美元，到 1962 年初增长至 7,178,500 美元。至少到目前为止，随着资金增加，我们与道琼斯指数的业绩优势并没有缩小的趋势。
Investment Companies
投资公司
Along with the results of the Dow, we have regularly included the tabulations on the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) following a common stock policy, and the two largest diversified closed end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage over $3 billion and are probably typical of most of the $20 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results parallel those of most bank trust departments and investment counseling organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
除了道琼斯指数的业绩，我们还定期列出两家奉行普通股投资策略的最大开放式投资公司（共同基金）以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩数据。这四家公司，即马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三角大陆公司和雷曼公司，管理着超过 30 亿美元的资产，可能代表了规模达 200 亿美元的投资公司行业的大多数情况。我认为，它们的业绩与大多数银行信托部门和投资咨询机构类似，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of approximately $7 million and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. Nevertheless, the public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates results slightly less favorable than the Dow. In no sense is this statement intended as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, I consider such average results virtually the only possible ones. Their merits lie in other than superior results.
以下列出这些数据，是为了说明道琼斯指数并非轻易就能超越的投资业绩指标。仅管理这四家公司的投资顾问团队，每年收取的费用就约 700 万美元，这只是整个行业费用的一小部分。然而，这些高薪专业人士的公开平均业绩却略逊于道琼斯指数。我这样说并非批评，在他们的机构框架内，管理着巨额资金，取得这样的平均业绩几乎是必然的。他们的优势并不在于卓越的业绩表现。
Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the companies mentioned above. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore feel they offer a meaningful test of performance.
我们的投资组合和运营方式与上述公司有很大差异。不过，大多数合伙人如果不投资我们的合伙公司，很可能会将资金投入业绩与投资公司相当的机构，因此我认为这些公司的业绩是衡量我们表现的有效参照。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri-Cont. (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（1） | 投资者股票基金（1） | 雷曼公司（2） | 三角大陆公司（2） | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -13.0% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
注：（1）根据资产价值变化加上当年向登记在册持有人的分配计算得出；
(2) From 1962 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-61. Estimated for 1962.
注：（2）1957 - 1961 年数据来源于 1962 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》，1962 年数据为估算值。
COMPOUNDED
按复利计算
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investor Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托 | 投资者股票基金 | 雷曼公司 | 三角大陆公司 | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957-58 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957-59 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957-60 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957-61 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957-62 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 48.6% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| Annual Compounded Rate 平均年复合增长率 | 7.5% | 7.4% | 6.8% | 8.1% | 8.3% | 21.1% |
The Joys of Compounding
复合增长的魔力
I have it from unreliable sources that the cost of the voyage Isabella originally underwrote for Columbus was approximately $30,000. This has been considered at least a moderately successful utilization of venture capital. Without attempting to evaluate the psychic income derived from finding a new hemisphere, it must be pointed out that even had squatter’s rights prevailed, the whole deal was not exactly another IBM. Figured very roughly, the $30,000 invested at 4% compounded annually would have amounted to something like $2,000,000,000,000 (that’s $2 trillion for those of you who are not government statisticians) by 1962. Historical apologists for the Indians of Manhattan may find refuge in similar calculations. Such fanciful geometric progressions illustrate the value of either living a long time, or compounding your money at a decent rate. I have nothing particularly helpful to say on the former point.
我从不可靠的渠道得知，伊莎贝拉最初资助哥伦布航海的费用约为 3 万美元。这至少被认为是对风险资本较为成功的运用。暂且不评估发现新大陆带来的精神收益，必须指出的是，即便按照 “先占先得” 的原则，这次投资也远不及投资 IBM。粗略计算一下，如果这 3 万美元以每年 4% 的复利投资，到 1962 年大约会增值到 2 万亿美元（如果不是政府统计人员，可能对这个数字没概念）。为曼哈顿印第安人进行历史辩护的人，或许能从类似计算中找到慰藉。这些夸张的几何级数增长，说明了长寿或者以合理利率进行复利投资的价值。关于前者，我没什么有用的建议。
The following table indicates the compounded value of $100,000 at 5%, 10% and 15% for 10, 20 and 30 years. It is always startling to see how relatively small differences in rates add up to very significant sums over a period of years. That is why, even though we are shooting for more, we feel that a few percentage points advantage over the Dow is a very worthwhile achievement. It can mean a lot of dollars over a decade or two.
下表展示了 10 万美元分别按 5%、10% 和 15% 的利率，投资 10 年、20 年和 30 年的复利价值。多年来，利率上相对较小的差异能累积成巨大的金额，总是令人惊讶。这就是为什么，尽管我们追求更高的收益，但仍认为比道琼斯指数多几个百分点的优势是非常了不起的成就。在一二十年的时间里，这可能意味着巨额财富。
| 期限 | 5% | 10% | 15% |
| 10 Years | $162,889 | $259,374 | $404,553 |
| 20 Years | $265,328 | $672,748 | $1,636,640 |
| 30 Years | $432,191 | $1,744,930 | $6,621,140 |
Our Method of Operation
我们的投资方式
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow, in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资渠道分为三类。这三类投资具有不同的表现特征，在任何一年，资金在它们之间的分配方式都会对我们相对于道琼斯指数的业绩产生重要影响。各类投资的实际占比在一定程度上是预先规划的，但很大程度上也受投资机会的影响，具有偶然性。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself .Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类是普遍被低估的证券（以下简称 “普通股”），对于这类投资，我们无法影响公司决策，也无法确定其估值何时会恢复正常。多年来，这一直是我们最大的投资类别，从中获得的收益比其他两类都多。我们通常会在五六只普通股上持有较大仓位（占总资产的 5% 至 10%），另外还会在十到十五只普通股上持有较小仓位。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any compelling reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. Combining this individual margin of safety with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
有时这些投资很快就能获利；但很多时候，需要数年时间。在买入时，很难找到它们价格上涨的充分理由。然而，正是因为缺乏吸引力，也没有能立即推动市场上涨的因素，它们的价格才非常低廉。投资者能以较低价格获得很高的价值。这种价值的大幅溢价为每笔交易提供了安全边际。将这种单个投资的安全边际与多元化投资相结合，就构成了一个极具吸引力的投资组合，兼具安全性和增值潜力。我们投资普通股时，并不期望赚取最后一分钱，通常在买入价和我们认为的私人所有者眼中的公允价值之间的某个中间价位卖出，就会感到很满足。
Many times generals represent a form of “coattail riding” where we feel the dominating stockholder group has plans for the conversion of unprofitable or under-utilized assets to a better use. We have done that ourselves in Sanborn and Dempster, but everything else equal we would rather let others do the work. Obviously, not only do the values have to be ample in a case like this, but we also have to be careful whose coat we are holding.
很多时候，投资普通股就像是 “搭便车”，我们认为控股股东有计划将无利可图或未充分利用的资产转化为更有效的用途。我们在桑伯恩地图公司（Sanborn）和邓普斯特公司都这么做过，但在其他条件相同的情况下，我们更愿意让别人去做这些工作。显然，在这种情况下，不仅资产价值要足够高，我们还得谨慎选择 “搭谁的便车”。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961. This is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market, and in 1962, not only did we not make any money out of our general category, but I am even doubtful if it did better than the Dow.
普通股在市场表现上往往与道琼斯指数高度相关。仅仅因为某只股票价格便宜，并不意味着它不会下跌。在市场突然下跌时，这类投资的跌幅很可能与道琼斯指数相当。但从长期来看，我相信普通股的表现会优于道琼斯指数，比如在 1961 年这样的大幅上涨年份。在我们的投资组合中，普通股在这类年份的表现最佳。当然，在市场下跌时，它也是最脆弱的。1962 年，我们不仅在普通股投资上没有盈利，我甚至怀疑其表现是否优于道琼斯指数。
Our second category consists of “work-outs. These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., I lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
第二类是 “特殊情况投资”。这类证券的财务回报取决于公司行为，而非证券买卖双方创造的供求因素。换句话说，这类投资有明确的时间表，我们能在合理误差范围内预测何时能获得多少收益，以及可能出现哪些影响因素。公司的合并、清算、重组、分拆等事件都能带来特殊情况投资机会。近年来，一个重要的投资机会来源是石油生产商向大型综合石油公司的出售交易。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow, or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year.
这类投资每年能产生相对稳定的收益，在很大程度上不受道琼斯指数走势的影响。显然，如果我们在某一年将大部分投资组合投入特殊情况投资，当道琼斯指数下跌时，我们的表现会非常出色；但如果市场大幅上涨，我们的表现可能会很差。
We were fortunate in that we had a good portion of our portfolio in work outs in 1962. As I have said before, this was not due to any notion on my part as to what the market would do, but rather because I could get more of what I wanted in this category than in the generals. This same concentration in work-outs hurt our performance during the market advance in the second half of the year.
1962 年，我们很幸运，投资组合中有很大一部分是特殊情况投资。我之前说过，这并非因为我对市场走势有先见之明，而是因为在这类投资中，我能找到更多符合要求的机会，比普通股投资机会更多。同样是因为这类投资过于集中，在下半年市场上涨时，我们的业绩受到了影响。
Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in five to ten of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio, since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. For instance, you will note when you receive our audit report, that we paid $75,000 of interest to banks and brokers during the year. Since our borrowing was at approximately 5%, this means we had an average of $1,500,000 borrowed from such sources. Since 1962 was a down year in the market, you might think that such borrowing would hurt results. However, all of our loans were to offset work-outs, and this category turned in a good profit for the year. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% per annum range. My self-imposed standard limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth, although something extraordinary could result in modifying this for a limited period of time.
多年来，特殊情况投资一直是我们的第二大投资类别。在任何时候，我们可能同时参与五到十个这类项目，有些刚刚开始，有些则已进入后期阶段。我认为可以用借款来对冲部分特殊情况投资组合，因为从最终结果和中期市场表现来看，这类投资的安全性很高。比如，当你收到审计报告时会发现，我们当年向银行和经纪商支付了 7.5 万美元利息。由于我们的借款利率约为 5%，这意味着我们平均从这些渠道借款 150 万美元。由于 1962 年是市场下跌年份，你可能认为借款会影响业绩。然而，我们所有借款都是为了对冲特殊情况投资，而这类投资在当年获得了可观的利润。排除借款带来的收益，特殊情况投资的年回报率通常在 10% 至 20% 之间。我给自己设定的借款上限是合伙公司净资产的 25%，不过在特殊情况下，这个限制可能会在短期内调整。
You will note on our yearend balance sheet (part of the audit you will receive) securities sold short totaling some $340,000. Most of this occurred in conjunction with a work-out entered into late in the year. In this case, we had very little competition for a period of time and were able to create a 10% or better profit (gross, not annualized) for a few months tie-up of money. The short sales eliminated the general market risk.
在我们的年终资产负债表（你将收到的审计报告的一部分）上，你会看到卖空证券的总额约为 34 万美元。这主要是在当年年末进行的一项特殊情况投资中产生的。在那段时间里，竞争较少，我们得以通过几个月的资金占用实现 10% 甚至更高的利润（毛利润，未年化）。卖空操作消除了一般市场风险。
The final category is I “control” situations, where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. Usually, it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company’s stock, and we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation.
最后一类是 “控股型投资”，即我们要么控制一家公司，要么持有大量股份并试图影响公司政策。这类投资显然应该以数年为周期来衡量。在某一年，它们可能不会产生任何收益，因为在我们收购股份的很长一段时间内，股价保持停滞通常对我们有利。这类投资与道琼斯指数的表现也没有太多关联。当然，有时我们买入一只普通股时，会考虑它是否有可能发展成为控股型投资。如果股价长期保持低位，这种情况很可能发生。但通常在我们获得公司大量股份之前，股价就会上涨，我们会在较高价位卖出，完成一次成功的普通股投资操作。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特制造公司
The high point of 1962 from a performance standpoint was our present control situation –73% owned Dempster Mill. Dempster has been primarily in farm implements (mostly items retailing for $1,000 or under), water systems, water well supplies and jobbed plumbing lines.
从业绩角度来看，1962 年的亮点是我们目前控股的邓普斯特磨坊制造公司，我们持有其 73% 的股份。邓普斯特主要经营农业机械（大多是零售价在 1000 美元以下的产品）、供水系统、水井设备以及管道产品的批发业务。
The operations for the past decade have been characterized by static sales, low inventory turnover and virtually no profits in relation to invested capital.
过去十年，该公司的经营特点是销售额停滞不前、库存周转率低，相对于投入的资本而言，几乎没有利润。
We obtained control in August, 1961 at an average price of about $28 per share, having bought some stock as low as $16 in earlier years, but the vast majority in an offer of $30.25 in August. When control of a company is obtained, obviously what then becomes all-important is the value of assets, not the market quotation for a piece of paper (stock certificate).
1961 年 8 月，我们以平均每股约 28 美元的价格获得了该公司的控制权，早些年我们曾以低至 16 美元的价格买入部分股票，但大部分股份是以 8 月份每股 30.25 美元的报价购入的。当获得一家公司的控制权后，显然最重要的就是资产的价值，而不是一张纸（股票凭证）的市场报价。
Last year, our Dempster holding was valued by applying what I felt were appropriate discounts to the various assets. These valuations were based on their status as non-earning assets and were not assessed on the basis of potential, but on the basis of what I thought a prompt sale would produce at that date. Our job was to compound these values at a decent rate. The consolidated balance sheet last year and the calculation of fair value are shown below. (000’s omitted)
去年，我们对持有的邓普斯特股票进行估值时，对各项资产进行了我认为合适的折价处理。这些估值是基于资产当时不盈利的状况，并非基于其潜在价值，而是基于我对当时快速出售所能获得价值的判断。我们的任务是以合理的利率使这些价值实现复利增长。以下是去年的合并资产负债表以及公允价值的计算。（单位：千美元，省略）
| Assets | Book Figure | Valued @ | Adjusted Valuation | Liabilities | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 资产 | 账面价值 | 估值比例 | 调整后估值 | 负债 | 金额 |
| Cash 现金 | $166 | 100% | $166 | Notes Payable 应付票据 | $1,230 |
| Accts. Rec. (net) 应收账款（净额） | $1,040 | 85% | $884 | Other Liabilities 其他负债 | $1,088 |
| Inventory 存货 | $4,203 | 60% | $2,522 | ||
| Ppd. Exp. etc. 预付费用等 | $82 | 25% | $21 | Total Liabilities 总负债 | $2,318 |
| Current Assets 流动资产 | $5,491 | $3,593 | Net Work per Books: 账面净资产： | $4,601 | |
| Cash Value Life ins., etc. 现金价值人寿保险等 | $45 | 100 Est. net auction value 100%（预估净拍卖价值） | $45 | Net Work as Adjusted to Quickly Realizable Values 调整为可快速变现价值后的净资产 | $2,120 |
| Net Plant Equipment 厂房及设备净值 | $1383 | $800 | |||
| Total Assets 总资产 | $6,919 | $4,438 | Shares outstanding 60,146 Adj. Value per Share 流通股 60146 股，调整后每股价值 | $35.25 |
Dempster’s fiscal year ends November 30th, and because the audit was unavailable in complete form, I approximated some of the figures and rounded to $35 per share last year.
邓普斯特的财年截止到 11 月 30 日，由于当时无法获得完整的审计报告，我对部分数据进行了估算，并将每股价值四舍五入到 35 美元。
Initially, we worked with the old management toward more effective utilization of capital, better operating margins, reduction of overhead, etc. These efforts were completely fruitless. After spinning our wheels for about six months, it became obvious that while lip service was being given to our objective, either through inability or unwillingness, nothing was being accomplished. A change was necessary.
起初，我们与原管理层合作，试图更有效地利用资本、提高运营利润率、降低管理费用等。但这些努力完全没有成效。在白费力气约六个月后，很明显，虽然他们口头上认同我们的目标，但由于能力不足或不愿意，没有取得任何实际成果。变革势在必行。
A good friend, whose inclination is not toward enthusiastic descriptions, highly recommended Harry Bottle for our type of problem. On April 17, 1962 I met Harry in Los Angeles, presented a deal which provided for rewards to him based upon our objectives being met, and on April 23rd he was sitting in the president’s chair in Beatrice.
一位不太会说溢美之词的好朋友，极力向我推荐哈里・博特尔（Harry Bottle）来解决我们的问题。1962 年 4 月 17 日，我在洛杉矶与哈里见面，提出了一项激励方案，根据目标完成情况给予他相应奖励。4 月 23 日，他就坐上了位于比阿特丽斯的公司总裁的位置。
Harry is unquestionably the man of the year. Every goal we have set for Harry has been met, and all the surprises have been on the pleasant side. He has accomplished one thing after another that has been labeled as impossible, and has always taken the tough things first. Our breakeven point has been cut virtually in half, slow-moving or dead merchandise has been sold or written off, marketing procedures have been revamped, and unprofitable facilities have been sold.
毫无疑问，哈里是年度最佳人物。我们为他设定的每一个目标都实现了，而且所有的结果都超出预期。他完成了一件又一件被认为不可能的事情，总是先从最棘手的问题入手。我们的盈亏平衡点几乎减半，滞销或积压的商品要么被售出，要么被核销，营销流程得到了改进，不盈利的业务也被出售。
The results of this program are partially shown in the balance sheet below, which, since it still represents non-earning assets, is valued on the same basis as last year. (000’s omitted)
以下资产负债表部分展示了这些措施的成果。由于这些资产仍未产生收益，因此估值方法与去年相同。（单位：千美元，省略）
| Assets | Book Figure | Valued @ | Adjusted Valuation | Liabilities | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 资产 | 账面价值 | 估值比例 | 调整后估值 | 负债 | |
| Cash 现金 | $60 | 100% | $60 | Notes payable 应付票据 | $0 |
| Marketable securities 有价证券 | $758 | Mrkt. 12/31/62 1962 年 12 月 31 日市值 | $834 | Other liabilities 其他负债 | $346 |
| Accts. Rec. (net) 应收账款（净额） | $796 | 85% | $676 | Total liabilities 总负债 | $346 |
| Inventory 存货 | $1,634 | 60% | $981 | ||
| Cash value life ins. 现金价值人寿保险 | $41 | 100% | $41 | Net Worth: Per Books 账面价值净资产： | $4,077 |
| Recoverable Income Tax 可收回所得税 | $170 | 100% | $170 | As Adjusted to quickly realizable values 调整为可快速变现价值后的净资产 | $3,125 |
| Ppd. Exp. etc. 预付费用等 | $14 | 25% | $4 | Add: proceeds from potential exercise of option to Harry Bottle 加上：给予哈里・博特尔的期权潜在行权收益 | $60 |
| Current Assets 流动资产 | $3,473 | $2,766 | Shares outstanding 流通股 | 60,146 | |
| Misc. Invest. 其他投资 | $5 | 100% | $5 | Add: shs. Potentially outstanding under option 2000 加上：期权潜在流通股 2000 股 | |
| Net Plant Equipment 厂房及设备净值 | $945 | Est. net auction value 预估净拍卖价值 | $700 | Total shs. 62,146 总流通股 62146 股 | |
| Total Assets 总资产 | $4,423 | $3,471 | Adjusted value per share 调整后每股价值 | $51.26 |
Three facts stand out: (1) Although net worth has been reduced somewhat by the housecleaning and writedowns ($550,000 was written out of inventory; fixed assets overall brought more than book value), we have converted assets to cash at a rate far superior to that implied in our year-earlier valuation. (2) To some extent, we have converted the assets from the manufacturing business (which has been a poor business) to a business which we think is a good business –securities. (3) By buying assets at a bargain price, we don’t need to pull any rabbits out of a hat to get extremely good percentage gains. This is the cornerstone of our investment philosophy: “Never count on making a good sale. Have the purchase price be so attractive that even a mediocre sale gives good results. The better sales will be the frosting on the cake.”
有三个事实值得关注：第一，尽管通过清理资产和减记（存货减记 55 万美元；固定资产整体售价高于账面价值），净资产有所减少，但我们将资产变现的速度远远超过了去年估值时的预期。第二，在一定程度上，我们将资产从制造业（这是一个表现不佳的行业）转移到了我们认为前景更好的证券投资领域。第三，通过以低价买入资产，我们无需依赖运气就能获得极高的回报率。这是我们投资理念的基石：“永远不要指望通过出色的卖出获利。确保买入价格足够诱人，这样即使是普通的卖出也能带来不错的收益。而出色的卖出则是锦上添花。”
On January 2, 1963, Dempster received an unsecured term loan of $1,250,000. These funds, together with the funds all ready “freed-up” will enable us to have a security portfolio of about $35 per share at Dempster, or considerably more than we paid for the whole company. Thus our present valuation will involve a net of about $16 per share in the manufacturing operation and $35 in a security operation comparable to that of Buffett Partnership, Ltd.
1963 年 1 月 2 日，邓普斯特获得了一笔 125 万美元的无担保定期贷款。这些资金加上已经 “释放” 的资金，将使邓普斯特的证券投资组合价值达到每股约 35 美元，这比我们收购整个公司的成本还要高。因此，我们目前对邓普斯特的估值相当于制造业业务每股净值约 16 美元，以及与巴菲特合伙有限公司类似的证券投资业务每股 35 美元。
We, of course, are devoted to compounding the $16 in manufacturing at an attractive rate and believe we have some good ideas as to how to accomplish this. While this will be easy if the business as presently conducted earns money, we have some promising ideas even if it shouldn’t.
当然，我们致力于以有吸引力的利率使制造业业务的 16 美元实现复利增长，并且相信我们有一些可行的方案来实现这一目标。如果目前的业务能够盈利，这将很容易实现；即便业务不盈利，我们也有一些颇具前景的想法。
It should be pointed out that Dempster last year was 100% an asset conversion problem and therefore, completely unaffected by the stock market and tremendously affected by our success with the assets. In 1963, the manufacturing assets will still be important, but from a valuation standpoint it will behave considerably more like a general since we will have a large portion of its money invested in generals pretty much identical with those in Buffett Partnership, Ltd. For tax reasons, we will probably not put workouts in Dempster. Therefore, if the Dow should drop substantially, it would have a significant effect on the Dempster valuation. Likewise, Dempster would benefit this year from an advancing Dow which would not have been the case most of last year.
需要指出的是，去年邓普斯特完全是一个资产转换问题，因此完全不受股市影响，而极大地受我们资产运作成功与否的影响。1963 年，制造业资产仍然重要，但从估值角度来看，它的表现将更像一只普通股，因为我们会将其大部分资金投资于与巴菲特合伙有限公司类似的普通股。出于税务方面的考虑，我们可能不会在邓普斯特进行特殊情况投资。因此，如果道琼斯指数大幅下跌，将会对邓普斯特的估值产生重大影响。同样，今年如果道琼斯指数上涨，邓普斯特也将受益，而去年大部分时间并非如此。
There is one final point of real significance for Buffett Partnership, Ltd. We now have a relationship with an operating man which could be of great benefit in future control situations. Harry had never thought of running an implement company six days before he took over. He is mobile, hardworking and carries out policies once they are set. He likes to get paid well for doing well, and I like dealing with someone who is not trying to figure how to get the fixtures in the executive washroom gold-plated.
对于巴菲特合伙有限公司而言，还有一点非常重要。我们现在与一位运营人才建立了良好的关系，这在未来的控股型投资中可能会带来巨大的好处。在接管邓普斯特之前，哈里从未想过要经营一家农机公司。他行动敏捷、勤奋努力，一旦制定了政策就会坚决执行。他希望因出色的工作获得丰厚的回报，而我也喜欢与那些不会想着给高管洗手间的固定装置镀金的人打交道。
Harry and I like each other, and his relationship with Buffett Partnership, Ltd. should be profitable for all of us.
哈里和我彼此欣赏，他与巴菲特合伙有限公司的合作关系对我们所有人来说都应该是有利可图的。
The Question of Conservatism
保守投资的问题
Because I believe it may be even more meaningful after the events of 1962 I would like to repeat this section from last year’s letter:
鉴于 1962 年的市场情况，我认为重复去年信件中的这部分内容可能更有意义：
“The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
“上述对我们各类投资领域的描述，或许能让你了解我们投资组合的保守程度。多年前，许多人认为购买中期或长期市政债券或政府债券是最保守的投资方式。但在很多情况下，这种策略导致了大幅的市场价值贬值，而且肯定无法维持或增加实际购买力。
“Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as in the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
由于意识到（或许是过度意识到）通货膨胀，现在许多人认为，几乎不考虑市盈率、股息率等因素购买蓝筹股就是保守投资。与债券投资的例子不同，由于无法事后诸葛亮，我认为这种投资方式充满风险。在我看来，猜测贪婪且反复无常的公众会给收益赋予多高的估值乘数，根本算不上保守投资。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism. “You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
仅仅因为很多人一时认同你的观点，并不意味着你就是正确的。仅仅因为重要人物认同你，也不意味着你就是正确的。在很多情况下，上述两个因素同时出现，就足以让一种投资行为被视为保守投资。但实际上，在众多交易中，只有当你的假设正确、事实准确、推理合理时，你才会是正确的。真正的保守投资只有通过知识和理性才能实现。”
I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
我还想补充一点，我们的投资组合不符合常规，这并不能证明我们比传统投资方式更保守或更不保守。这只能通过研究投资方法或评估投资结果来判断。
I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than ½ of 1% of total net assets and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course, this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为，评估我们投资方式保守程度的最客观标准，是看市场下跌时的业绩表现。最好是道琼斯指数大幅下跌的情况。我们在 1957 年和 1960 年相对温和的市场下跌中的表现，证实了我认为我们投资方式极为保守的观点。我欢迎任何合伙人提出评估保守程度的客观标准，看看我们的表现如何。我们从未遭受过超过总资产净值 0.5% 的实际损失，而且我们的总实现收益与总实现损失之比约为 100 比 1。当然，这反映出总体而言我们是在牛市中运营。然而，即使在这样的市场中，也有很多可能导致亏损的交易机会（你们自己可能也遇到过一些），所以我认为上述事实还是有一定意义的。
In 1962, we did realize a loss on one commitment or 1.0% and our ratio or realized gains to losses was only slightly over 3 to 1. However, compared to more conventional (often termed conservative which is not synonymous) methods of common stock investing, it would appear that our method involved considerably less risk. Our advantage over the Dow was all achieved when the market was going down; we lost a bit of this edge on the way up.
1962 年，我们在一项投资上确实遭受了 1.0% 的损失，实现收益与损失之比仅略高于 3 比 1。不过，与更传统（通常被称为保守，但并不准确）的普通股投资方式相比，我们的投资方式风险似乎要小得多。我们在市场下跌时获得了超越道琼斯指数的优势；在市场上涨过程中，我们的这一优势有所削弱。
The Usual Prediction
一如既往的预测
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two, since I don’t have the faintest idea.
我当然不会预测未来一两年内整体商业形势或股市的走势，因为我完全没有头绪。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years, there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25% a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor. If you will take the first table on page 3 and shuffle the years around, the compounded result will stay the same. If the next four years are going to involve, say, a +40%, -30%, +10% and –6%, the order in which they fall is completely unimportant for our purposes as long as we all are around at the end of the four years. Over a long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of the last decade, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
我认为你可以十分确定，在未来十年里，会有几年股市大盘上涨 20% 或 25%，也会有几年下跌相同幅度，而大多数年份涨跌幅度介于两者之间。我不清楚这些情况出现的先后顺序，而且我认为这对长期投资者来说也并非至关重要。如果你把第 3 页的第一张表格中的年份打乱顺序，复合结果不会改变。比如，如果未来四年的市场走势分别是上涨 40%、下跌 30%、上涨 10% 和下跌 6%，只要四年后我们都还在，那么这些涨跌出现的顺序对我们来说完全无关紧要。在任何较长的时间段内，我认为道琼斯指数很可能会通过股息和市值增长的综合作用，实现每年约 5% 的复合增长率。尽管过去十年市场表现有所不同，但任何期望股市大盘表现大幅优于这一水平的人，可能都会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%.
我们的工作是每年都要在业绩上超越道琼斯指数，而不必过于担心某一年的绝对业绩是正还是负。我会认为，在我们下跌 15% 而道琼斯指数下跌 25% 的年份，要比我们和道琼斯指数都上涨 20% 的年份好得多。
For the reasons outlined in our method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
基于我运营方法中概述的原因，相对于道琼斯指数，我们表现最佳的年份很可能出现在市场下跌或平稳时期。因此，我们所追求的优势幅度可能会有很大差异。必然会有一些年份，我们的表现不如道琼斯指数，但如果从长期来看，我们每年平均能比它高出 10 个百分点，我就会认为结果是令人满意的。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten –no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. It is certainly doubtful we could match a 20% or 25% advance from the December 31, 1962 level. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% per year.
具体来说，如果某一年市场下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得在未来十年里，很有可能会有这样一年 —— 没人知道是哪一年），我们的跌幅应该只有 15% 或 20%。如果当年市场基本持平，我们希望能上涨约 10 个百分点。如果市场上涨 20% 或更多，我们会努力跟上涨幅。从 1962 年 12 月 31 日的水平来看，我们能否实现 20% 或 25% 的涨幅还很难说。如果多年来都保持这样的表现，那就意味着，如果道琼斯指数每年实现 5% 的复合总涨幅，我希望我们的业绩能达到每年 15%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. Variations in any given year from the behavior described above would be wide, even if the long-term expectation was correct. Certainly, you have to recognize the possibility of substantial personal bias in such hopes.
上述预期听起来可能有些草率，从 1965 年或 1970 年的角度来看，这些预期无疑会显得非常草率。即使长期预期是正确的，在任何一年，实际表现与上述预期的差异也可能很大。当然，你必须认识到，这些预期可能存在个人主观因素。
Miscellaneous
其他事项
This year marked the transition from the office off the bedroom to one a bit (quite a bit) more conventional. Surprising as it may seem, the return to a time clock life has not been unpleasant. As a matter of fact, I enjoy not keeping track of everything on the backs of envelopes.
今年，我完成了办公室的搬迁，从卧室旁边的小空间搬到了一个更常规（大得多）的办公室。令人惊讶的是，回归朝九晚五的工作节奏并不让人讨厌。事实上，我很享受不再在信封背面记录各种事项的生活。
We are starting off this year with net assets of $9,405,400.00. At the start of 1962, Susie and I had three “nonmarketable security” investments of other than nominal size, and two of these have been sold. The third will be continued indefinitely. From the proceeds of the two sales, we have added to our partnership interest so that we now have an interest of $1,377,400.00. Also, my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, four cousins, five nieces and nephews have interests directly or indirectly totaling $893,600.00.
今年年初，我们的净资产为 9405400 美元。1962 年初，我和苏茜持有三项规模不小的 “非上市证券” 投资，其中两项已经出售。第三项会无限期持有。我们用这两项投资的收益增加了在合伙公司的份额，现在我们的份额价值达到 1377400 美元。此外，我的三个孩子、母亲、父亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫、岳父、三个姑姑、四个表亲、五个侄子侄女直接或间接持有合伙公司的份额，总价值为 893600 美元。
Bill Scott who has fit into our operation splendidly has an interest (with his wife) of $167,400.00; A very large portion of his net worth. So we are all eating our own cooking.
比尔・斯科特（Bill Scott）很好地融入了我们的团队，他和妻子在合伙公司的份额价值为 167400 美元，这占了他净资产的很大一部分。所以，我们都在 “吃自己做的饭”，与大家共担风险。
You will note from the auditor’s certificate that they made a surprise check during the year and this will be a continuing part of their procedure. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. again did an excellent job on the audit, meeting our rather demanding time schedules.
从审计师的证明中你会看到，他们在当年进行了一次突击检查，而且这将成为他们的常规工作。皮特・马威克・米切尔会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）在审计工作中再次表现出色，满足了我们苛刻的时间要求。
Susie was in charge of equipping the office which means we did not follow my “orange crate” approach to interior decorating. We have an ample supply of Pepsi on hand and look forward to partners dropping in.
苏茜负责办公室的装修布置，这意味着我们没有采用我那 “用橘子箱当家具” 的室内装饰风格。我们备有充足的百事可乐，期待合伙人来访。
Beth Feehan continues to demonstrate why she is the high priestess of the CPS (certified professional secretary, that is) group.
贝丝・费汉（Beth Feehan）继续证明了她为何是注册专业秘书群体中的佼佼者。
Partners did a wonderful job of cooperating in the return of agreements and commitment letters, and I am most appreciative of this. It makes life a lot easier. Enclosed you will find Schedule “A” to your partnership agreement. You will be receiving your audit and tax figures very soon, and if you have questions on any of this be sure to let me hear from you.
合伙人在寄回协议和承诺书方面配合得非常好，我对此深表感激。这让工作轻松了许多。随信附上你的合伙协议附表 A。你很快就会收到审计报告和税务数据，如果有任何疑问，请务必告诉我。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1963 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
July 10, 1963
1963 年 17 月 10 日
First Half Performance
上半年业绩表现
During the first half of 1963, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) advanced from 652.10 to 706.88. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of $10.66 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%.
1963 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）从 652.10 点上涨至 706.88 点。如果有人在这一时期持有道指成分股，将获得 10.66 美元的股息，这使得道指上半年的总回报率达到了 10.0%。
Our incantation has been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that devotes a portion of resources to control situations, and;(2) That our results relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media, will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in bubbling markets.
我们一直秉持的理念是：（1）短期业绩（少于三年）意义不大，尤其是对于像我们这样将部分资源投入到控制权交易情况的投资操作而言；（2）相对于道指和其他普通股投资方式，我们的业绩在市场下跌时会表现得更好，而在市场泡沫阶段，可能很难与这些投资方式的表现相匹敌。
Nevertheless, our first-half performance, excluding any change in Dempster valuation (and its valuation did change –I’m saving this for dessert later in the letter) was plus 14%. This 14% is computed on total net assets (not non-Dempster assets) and is after expenses, but before monthly payments (to those who take them) to partners and allocation to the General Partner. Such allocations are academic on an interim basis, but if we were also plus 14% at yearend, the first 6% would be allocated to partners according to their capital, plus three-quarters of the balance of 8% (14% -6%), or an additional 6%, giving the limited partners a plus 12% performance.
尽管如此，不考虑登普斯特公司估值的任何变化（其估值确实发生了变化 —— 我会在信的后面再谈这个有趣的部分），我们上半年的业绩回报率为 14%。这 14% 是基于净资产总额计算的（并非不包括登普斯特公司的资产），且已扣除费用，但尚未扣除每月向合伙人支付的款项（如果合伙人有此要求的话）以及向普通合伙人的分配。在中期来看，这些分配只是理论上的计算，但如果到年底我们的回报率仍为 14%，那么前 6% 将根据合伙人的出资比例进行分配，另外 8%（14% - 6%）的四分之三，即额外的 6%，有限合伙人的业绩回报率将达到 12%。
Despite the relatively pleasant results of the first half the admonitions stated two paragraphs earlier hold in full force. At plus 14% versus plus 10% for the Dow, this six months has been a less satisfactory period than the first half of 1962 when we were minus 7.5% versus minus 21.7% for the Dow. You should completely understand our thinking in this regard which has been emphasized in previous letters.
尽管上半年取得了相对不错的业绩，但在前两段中提到的告诫仍然完全适用。我们的回报率为 14%，而道指为 10%，这六个月的表现不如 1962 年上半年。在 1962 年上半年，我们的回报率为 - 7.5%，而道指为 - 21.7%。您应该完全理解我们在这方面的想法，这在之前的信件中也已强调过。
During the first half we had an average net investment in “generals” (long positions in generals minus short positions in generals) of approximately $5,275,000. Our overall gain from this net investment in generals (for a description of our investment categories see the last annual letter) was about $1,100,000 for a percentage gain from this category of roughly 21%. This again illustrates the extent to which the allocation of our resources among various categories affects short-term results. In 1962 the generals were down for the year and only an outstanding performance by both of the other two categories, “work-outs” and “controls,” gave us our unusually favorable results for that year.
上半年，我们在 “一般投资”（一般多头头寸减去一般空头头寸）方面的平均净投资额约为 527.5 万美元。我们从这一 “一般投资” 净投资中获得的总收益（关于我们的投资类别描述，请参阅上一份年度信函）约为 110 万美元，该类别的收益率约为 21%。这再次表明，我们在不同投资类别之间的资源配置对短期业绩的影响程度。1962 年，“一般投资” 全年表现不佳，正是另外两类投资 “套利投资” 和 “控制权投资” 的出色表现，才使我们在那一年取得了异常优异的业绩。
Now this year, our work-outs have done poorer than the Dow and have been a drag on performance, as they are expected to be in rising markets. While it would be very nice to be 100% in generals in advancing markets and 100% in work-outs in declining markets, I make no attempt to guess the course of the stock market in such a manner. We consider all three of our categories to be good businesses on a long-term basis, although their short-term price behavior characteristics differ substantially in various types of markets. We consider attempting to gauge stock market fluctuations to be a very poor business on a long-term basis and are not going to be in it, either directly or indirectly through the process of trying to guess which of our categories is likely to do best in the near future.
今年，我们的 “套利投资” 表现比道指差，并且对整体业绩产生了拖累，这在市场上涨时是预料之中的。虽然在市场上涨时 100% 投资于 “一般投资”，在市场下跌时 100% 投资于 “套利投资” 是非常理想的情况，但我不会试图以这种方式去猜测股市的走势。从长期来看，我们认为这三类投资都是不错的业务，尽管它们在不同类型市场中的短期价格表现特征有很大差异。我们认为，试图预测股市波动从长期来看是一项非常糟糕的业务，我们不会直接或间接地参与其中，也不会试图猜测我们的哪类投资在近期可能表现最佳。
Investment Companies
投资公司
Shown below are the usual statistics on a cumulative basis for the Dow and Buffett Partnership. Ltd. (including predecessor partnerships) as well as for the two largest open-end (mutual funds) and two largest closed-end investment companies following a diversified common-stock investment policy:
以下是按累计数据列出的道指、巴菲特合伙公司（包括前身合伙公司）以及遵循多元化普通股投资策略的两家最大的开放式（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的常规统计数据：
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数（Dow） | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（Mass.Inv.Trust (1)） | 投资者股票基金（Investors Stock (1)） | 三角大陆公司（Tri-Cont. (2)） |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | -11.4% | -12.4% | -2.4% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.9% | 26.4% | 29.2% | 30.0% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 52.3% | 37.8% | 42.5% | 40.9% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 42.9% | 36.4% | 41.6% | 44.8% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 74.9% | 71.3% | 76.9% | 77.4% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 61.6% | 54.5% | 53.2% | 59.7% |
| 1957 - 1963年6月30日 | 77.8% | 72.4% | 69.3% | 75.7% |
| 年复合增长率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 9.3% | 8.7% | 8.4% | 9.1% |
| 年份 | 雷曼公司（Lehman (2)） | 合伙公司（Partnership (3)） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners (4)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 24.7% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 34.8% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 38.2% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 70.8% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 46.2% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年6月30日 | 60.8% | 355.8% | 252.9% |
| 年复合增长率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 7.6% | 26.3% | 21.4% |
Footnotes :
脚注：
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year. (2) From 1963 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62. Estimated for first half 1963. (3) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner. (4) For 1957-61 computed on basis of preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to general partner based upon present partnership agreement.
（1）根据资产价值的变化以及当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配计算得出。 （2）数据来源于 1963 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中 1957 年至 1962 年的内容。1963 年上半年的数据为估算值。 （3）1957 年至 1961 年的数据包括所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的合并业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未扣除向合伙人的分配或向普通合伙人的分配。 （4）1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一栏合伙企业的业绩计算得出的，并考虑了根据当前合伙协议向普通合伙人的分配情况。
The results continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment advice has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue-chip stocks. This in no sense condemns these institutions or the investment advisers and trust departments whose methods, reasoning, and results largely parallel such investment companies. These media perform a substantial service to millions of investors in achieving adequate diversification, providing convenience and peace of mind, avoiding issues of inferior quality, etc. However, their services do not include (and in the great majority of cases, are not represented to include) the compounding of money at a rate greater than that achieved by the general market.
这些结果继续表明，那些收费最高且备受尊敬的投资建议，在与一个未经管理的蓝筹股指数的表现相匹配时存在困难。这绝不是在谴责这些机构或投资顾问以及信托部门，他们的方法、推理和业绩在很大程度上与这类投资公司类似。这些投资方式为数百万投资者在实现充分分散投资、提供便利和安心保障、避免劣质投资项目等方面提供了重要服务。然而，他们的服务并不包括（而且在绝大多数情况下，也并未声称包括）以高于总体市场的回报率实现资金的复利增长。
Our partnership’s fundamental reason for existence is to compound funds at a better-than-average rate with less exposure to long-term loss of capital than the above investment media. We certainly cannot represent that we will achieve this goal. We can and do say that if we don’t achieve this goal over any reasonable period excluding an extensive speculative boom, we will cease operation.
我们合伙企业存在的根本原因，是要以高于平均水平的回报率实现资金的复利增长，并且与上述投资方式相比，承担的长期资本损失风险更低。我们当然不能保证一定能实现这一目标。但我们可以且确实说过，如果在任何合理的时期内（不包括大规模的投机热潮时期）我们没有实现这一目标，我们将停止运营。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特制造公司
In our most recent annual letter, I described Harry Bottle as the “man of the year”. If this was an understatement.
在我们最近的年度信函中，我将哈里・博特尔（Harry Bottle）描述为 “年度风云人物”。如果说这还有所保留的话。
Last year Harry did an extraordinary job of converting unproductive assets into cash which we then, of course, began to invest in undervalued securities. Harry has continued this year to turn under-utilized assets into cash, but in addition, he has made the remaining needed assets productive. Thus we have had the following transformation in balance sheets during the last nineteen months:
去年，哈里在将无利可图的资产转化为现金方面做出了非凡的工作，随后我们当然开始将这些现金投资于被低估的证券。今年，哈里继续将未充分利用的资产转化为现金，但除此之外，他还使剩余的必要资产发挥了效益。因此，在过去的 19 个月里，我们的资产负债表发生了如下变化：
November 30, 1961 (000’s omitted)
1961 年 11 月 30 日（单位：千美元，省略）
| 资产 | 账面价值（Book Figure） | 估值比例（Valued @） | 调整后估值（Adjusted Valuation） | 负债（Liabilities） | 金额 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 现金（Cash） | 166美元 | 100% | 166美元 | 应付票据（Notes Payable） | 1230美元 |
| 应收账款（净额）（Accts. Rec. (net)） | 1040美元 | 85% | 884美元 | 其他负债（Other Liabilities） | 1088美元 |
| 存货（Inventory） | 4203美元 | 60% | 2522美元 | 总负债（Total Liabilities） | 2318美元 |
| 预付费用等（Ppd. Exp. Etc） | 82美元 | 25% | 21美元 | - | - |
| 流动资产（Current Assets） | 5491美元 | - | 3593美元 | 账面净资产（Net Worth: Per Books） | 4601美元 |
| 现金价值人寿保险等（Cash Value Life ins., etc） | 45美元 | 100% | 45美元 | 调整为可快速变现价值后的净资产（As adjusted to quickly realizable values） | 2120美元 |
| 厂房及设备净值（Net Plant & equipment） | 1383美元 | 预估净拍卖价值（Est. Net Auction Value） | 800美元 | - | - |
| 总资产（Total Assets） | 6919美元 | - | 4438美元 | 流通股60146股。调整后每股价值（Share outstanding 60,146. Adj. Value per Share） | 35.25美元 |
November 30, 1962 (000’s omitted)
1962 年 11 月 30 日（单位：千美元，省略）
| 资产 | 账面价值（Book Figure） | 估值比例（Valued @） | 调整后估值（Adjusted Valuation） | 负债（Liabilities） | 金额 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 现金（Cash） | 60美元 | 100% | 60美元 | 应付票据（Notes payable） | 0美元 |
| 有价证券（Marketable Securities） | 758美元 | 1962年12月31日市值（Mkt. 12/31/62） | 834美元 | 其他负债（Other liabilities） | 346美元 |
| 应收账款（净额）（Accts. Rec. (net)） | 796美元 | 85% | 676美元 | 总负债（Total liabilities） | 346美元 |
| 存货（Inventory） | 1634美元 | 60% | 981美元 | - | - |
| 现金价值人寿保险（Cash value life ins.） | 41美元 | 100% | 41美元 | 账面净资产（Net Worth: Per books） | 4077美元 |
| 可收回所得税（Recoverable income tax） | 170美元 | 100% | 170美元 | 调整为可快速变现价值后的净资产（As adjusted to quickly realizable values） | 3125美元 |
| 预付费用等（Ppd. Exp. Etc） | 14美元 | 25% | 4美元 | 加上：哈里·博特尔期权潜在行权收益（Add: proceeds from potential exercise of option to Harry Bottle） | 60美元 |
| 流动资产（Current Assets） | 3473美元 | - | 2766美元 | 流通股（Shares Outstanding）60146股 | 3185美元 |
| 其他投资（Misc. Invest.） | 5美元 | 100% | 5美元 | 加上：期权潜在流通股（Add: shs. Potentially outstanding under option）：2000股 | - |
| 厂房及设备净值（Net plant & equipment） | 945美元 | 预估净拍卖价值（Est. net auction value） | 700美元 | 总流通股（Total shs.）62146股，调整后每股价值（Adj. Value per Share） | 51.26美元 |
| 总资产（Total Assets） | 4423美元 | - | 3471美元 | - | - |
November 30, 1963 (000’s omitted)
1963 年 11 月 30 日（单位：千美元，省略）
| 资产 | 账面价值（Book Figure） | 估值比例（Valued @） | 调整后估值（Adjusted Valuation） | 负债（Liabilities） | 金额 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 现金（Cash） | 144美元 | 100% | 144美元 | 应付票据（已在1963年7月3日支付）（Notes payable (paid 7/3/63)） | 125美元 | |
| 有价证券（Marketable Securities） | 1772美元 | 1963年6月30日市值（Mkt. 6/30/63） | 2029美元 | 其他负债（Other liabilities） | 394美元 | |
| 应收账款（净额）（Accts. Rec. (net)） | 1262美元 | 85% | 1073美元 | 总负债（Total Liabilities） | 519美元 | |
| 存货（Inventory） | 977美元 | 60% | 586美元 | - | - | |
| 预付费用等（Ppd. Exp. Etc） | 12美元 | 25% | 3美元 | 账面净资产（Net Worth: Per books） | 4582美元 | |
| 流动资产（Current Assets） | 4167美元 | - | 3835美元 | 调整为可快速变现价值后的净资产（As adjusted to quickly realizable values） | 4028美元 | |
| 其他投资（Misc. Invest） | 62美元 | 100% | 62美元 | 流通股（Shares outstanding）62146股 | - | |
| 厂房及设备净值（Net plant & equip.） | 872美元 | 预估净拍卖价值（Est. net auction value） | 650美元 | 调整后每股价值（Adj. Value per share） | 64.81美元 | |
| 总资产（Total assets） | 5101美元 | - | 4547美元 | - | - |
I have included above the conversion factors we have previously used in valuing Dempster for B.P.L. purposes to reflect estimated immediate sale values of non-earning assets.
我已在上面列出了我们之前为了巴菲特合伙公司（B.P.L.）对登普斯特公司进行估值时所使用的换算系数，以反映非盈利资产的预计即时出售价值。
As can be seen, Harry has converted the assets at a much more favorable basis than was implied by my valuations. This largely reflects Harry’s expertise and, perhaps, to a minor degree my own conservatism in valuation.
如您所见，哈里在资产转换方面所基于的条件，比我之前估值时所隐含的条件要优惠得多。这在很大程度上体现了哈里的专业能力，或许也在一定程度上反映了我在估值时的保守态度。
As can also be seen, Dempster earned a very satisfactory operating profit in the first half (as well as a substantial unrealized gain in securities) and there is little question that the operating business, as now conducted, has at least moderate earning power on the vastly reduced assets needed to conduct it. Because of a very important-seasonal factor and also the presence of a tax carry forward, however, the earning power is not nearly what might be inferred simply by a comparison of the 11/30/62 and 6/30/63 balance sheets. Partly because of this seasonality, but more importantly, because of possible developments in Dempster before 1963 yearend, we have left our Dempster holdings at the same $51.26 valuation used at yearend 1962 in our figures for B.P.L’s first half. However, I would be very surprised if it does not work out higher than this figure at yearend.
同样可以看到，登普斯特公司在上半年取得了非常可观的营业利润（同时在证券投资方面也有大量未实现的收益），而且毫无疑问，就目前的经营状况而言，这家运营中的企业，在维持经营所需的大幅减少的资产基础上，至少具备适度的盈利能力。然而，由于一个非常重要的季节性因素，以及存在税收结转的情况，其盈利能力远非仅仅通过比较 1962 年 11 月 30 日和 1963 年 6 月 30 日的资产负债表就能推断出来的。部分是由于这种季节性因素，但更重要的是，由于在 1963 年底之前登普斯特公司可能会有一些新的发展情况，在我们计算 B.P.L. 上半年的数据时，我们对持有的登普斯特公司股份的估值仍保持在 1962 年底时的每股 51.26 美元。不过，如果到年底时的实际估值不高于这个数字，我会感到非常惊讶。
One sidelight for the fundamentalists in our group: B.P.L. owns 71.7% of Dempster acquired at a cost of $1,262,577.27. On June 30, 1963 Dempster had a small safe deposit box at the Omaha National Bank containing securities worth $2,028,415.25. Our 71.7% share of $2,028,415.25 amounts to $1,454,373.70. Thus, everything above ground (and part of it underground) is profit. My security analyst friends may find this a rather primitive method of accounting, but I must confess that I find a bit more substance in this fingers and toes method than in any prayerful reliance that someone will pay me 35 times next year’s earnings.
对于我们团队中的基本面分析派人士，这里有一个附带信息：B.P.L. 以 1,262,577.27 美元的成本收购了登普斯特公司 71.7% 的股份。1963 年 6 月 30 日，登普斯特公司在奥马哈国民银行有一个小型保险箱，里面存放的证券价值为 2,028,415.25 美元。我们在这 2,028,415.25 美元中所占的 71.7% 的份额价值为 1,454,373.70 美元。因此，所有明面上（甚至部分隐藏的）的收益都是利润。我的那些证券分析师朋友们可能会觉得这种会计核算方法相当原始，但我必须承认，相比于寄希望于有人会以明年收益的 35 倍价格收购我的股份，我觉得这种实实在在的计算方法更靠谱。
Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals
预付款项和预支提款
We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert the payment to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time of payment.
我们接受合伙人及潜在合伙人的预付款项，从收到款项之日起至当年年底，按 6% 的利率计算利息。虽然在年底时没有义务将预付款项转为合伙份额，但在支付款项时，通常应抱有这样的意向。
Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use US like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for unanticipated need for funds.
同样，我们允许合伙人在年底前从其合伙账户中提取不超过 20% 的资金，并从提款之日起至年底按 6% 的利率计息，年底时从其资本账户中扣除相应款项。同样，我们不希望合伙人把我们这里当作银行来使用，而是希望他们在遇到意外的资金需求时才使用提款权利。
The willingness to both borrow and lend at 6% may seem “un-Buffett-like.” We look at the withdrawal right as a means of giving some liquidity for unexpected needs and, as a practical matter, are reasonably sure it will be far more than covered by advance payments.
愿意以 6% 的利率进行借款和贷款，这可能看起来不太 “像巴菲特的风格”。我们把提款权利看作是一种为应对意外资金需求提供一定流动性的方式，而且实际上，我们相当确定预付款项的金额会远远超过预支提款的金额。
Why then the willingness to pay 6% for advance payment money when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? For example, in the first half we obtained a substantial six-month bank loan at 4%. The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner’s allocation is zero unless we do although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude in the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable. On June 30, 1963 we had advance withdrawals of $21,832.00 and advancepayments of $562,437.11.
那么，既然我们可以从商业银行以低得多的利率借款，为什么还愿意为预付款项支付 6% 的利息呢？例如，上半年我们获得了一笔大额的六个月期银行贷款，利率为 4%。答案是，我们预期从长期来看，我们的投资回报率会高于 6%（除非我们的回报率超过 6%，否则普通合伙人不会获得分配，不过在任何短期内能否达到 6% 的回报率在很大程度上是碰运气的事。此外，对于预计很快会成为我们股权资本一部分的资金，我在投资时可以采取与短期借款不同的态度。预付款项对我们还有一个额外的好处，就是可以将新资金的投资分散到全年，而不是在一月份一下子涌入大量资金。另一方面，我们的合伙人在短期美元安全投资中无法获得 6% 的回报率，所以我认为这对双方都有利。1963 年 6 月 30 日，我们的预支提款金额为 21,832.00 美元，预付款项金额为 562,437.11 美元。
Taxes
税务
There is some possibility that we may have fairly substantial realized gains this year. Of course, this may not materialize at all and actually does not have anything to do with our investment performance this year. I am an outspoken advocate of paying large amounts of income taxes – at low rates. A tremendous number of fuzzy, confused investment decisions are rationalized through so-called “tax considerations.”
今年我们有可能会实现相当可观的已实现收益。当然，这也完全有可能不会实现，而且实际上这与我们今年的投资业绩并无关联。我是一个直言不讳的倡导者，主张以低税率缴纳大量的所得税。有大量模糊不清、令人困惑的投资决策，都是通过所谓的 “税务考量” 来合理化的。
My net worth is the market value of holdings less the tax payable upon sale. The liability is just as real as the asset unless the value of the asset declines (ouch), the asset is given away (no comment), or I die with it. The latter course of action would appear to at least border on a Pyrrhic victory.
我的净资产是所持资产的市场价值减去出售资产时应缴纳的税款。这种负债与资产一样真实存在，除非资产价值下降（哎呀）、资产被赠送出去（不予置评），或者我带着资产离世。最后这种做法，看起来至少有点得不偿失。
Investment decisions should be made on the basis of the most probable compounding of after-tax net worth with minimum risk. Any isolation of low-basis securities merely freezes a portion of net worth at a compounding factor identical with the assets isolated. While this may work out either well or badly in individual cases, it is a nullification of investment management. The group experience holding various low basis securities will undoubtedly approximate group experience on securities as a whole, namely compounding at the compounding rate of the Dow. We do not consider this the optimum in after-tax compounding rates.
投资决策应该基于在风险最小的情况下，实现税后净资产最有可能的复利增长。仅仅孤立地持有低成本基数的证券，只会使一部分净资产的复利增长系数与所持有资产的情况相同。虽然在个别情况下，这种做法可能会有好的结果，也可能会有不好的结果，但这实际上是对投资管理的一种否定。持有各种低成本基数证券的群体经验，无疑会与整体证券投资的群体经验大致相近，也就是按照道琼斯指数的复利增长率增长。我们认为这并不是实现税后复利增长率最优的方式。
I have said before that if earnings from the partnership can potentially amount to a sizable portion of your total taxable income, the safe thing to do is to estimate this year the same tax you incurred last year. If you do this, you cannot run into penalties. In any event, tax liabilities for those who entered the partnership on 1/1/63 will be minimal because of the terms of our partnership agreement first allocating capital gains to those having an interest in unrealized appreciation.
我之前曾说过，如果合伙公司的收益有可能在您的应纳税总收入中占相当大的比例，稳妥的做法是今年估算的税额与去年缴纳的税额相同。如果您这样做，就不会面临罚款。无论如何，对于那些在 1963 年 1 月 1 日加入合伙公司的人来说，由于我们合伙协议的条款规定，资本利得首先分配给那些在未实现增值部分拥有权益的人，所以他们的税务负担会很轻。
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the partnership agreement, commitment letter for 1964, estimate of the 1963 tax situation, etc.
和往年一样，我们会在 11 月 1 日左右发出一封信函（致合伙人以及到那时已向我表示有兴趣成为合伙人的人），其中包含合伙协议的修正案、1964 年的承诺书、1963 年税务情况的估算等内容。
My closing plea for questions regarding anything not clear always draws a blank. Maybe no one reads this far. Anyway, the offer is still open.
我每次最后都恳请大家，如果有任何不明白的地方可以提问，但总是无人回应。也许没人读到这么后面吧。不管怎样，这个提议仍然有效。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1963 信件（三）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
November 6, 1963
1963 年 11 月 6 日
To My Partners for 1964:
亲爱的合伙人们：
Enclosed is the usual assortment of Thanksgiving reading material:
随信附上的是常见的感恩节阅读材料：
(1) Two copies of an amended partnership agreement for 1964. The one with the General Provisions attached is to be kept by you (exactly the same as last year) and the other single page agreement is to be signed, notarized and returned to us. Partners in Omaha may come in and obtain the notarization at our office.
（1）两份 1964 年经修订的合伙协议。那份附有总则的协议由你留存（与去年完全一样），另一份单页协议需签署、公证后寄回给我们。奥马哈的合伙人可以到我们办公室办理公证手续。
(2) A copy of that priceless treatise, “The Ground Rules,” I would like every partner to read this at least once a year, and it is going to be a regular item in my November package. Don’t sign the partnership agreement unless you fully understand the concepts set forth and are in accord with them – mentally and viscerally.
（2）一份无价的论述《基本规则》的副本。我希望每位合伙人每年至少读一次，而且以后每年 11 月我寄的资料里都会有这一项。在你没有完全理解协议中阐述的概念并从内心和情感上都认同之前，不要签署合伙协议。
(3) Two copies of the commitment letter for 1964, one to be kept by you and one returned to us. You may amend this commitment letter right up to midnight, December 31st, so get it back to us early, and if it needs to be changed, just let us know by letter or phone.
（3）两份 1964 年的承诺书，一份由你留存，一份寄回给我们。你可以在 12 月 31 日午夜之前修改这份承诺书，所以请尽早寄回给我们。如果需要修改，写信或打电话告知我们即可。
Any withdrawals will be paid immediately after January 1st. You may withdraw any amount you desire from $100 up to your entire equity. Similarly, additions can be for any amount and should reach us by January 10th. In the event you are disposing of anything, this will give you a chance to have the transaction in 1964 if that appears to be advantageous for tax reasons. If additions reach us in November, they take on the status of advance payments and draw interest at the rate of 6% until yearend. This is not true of additions reaching us in December.
任何撤资款项将在 1 月 1 日之后立即支付。你可以撤资任意金额，从 100 美元到你的全部权益份额都可以。同样，增资也可以是任意金额，且应在 1 月 10 日前告知我们。如果你在处置任何资产，若从税务角度看在 1964 年完成交易更有利，这会给你一个机会来完成该交易。如果增资款项在 11 月到达我们手中，这些款项将被视为预付款，并按 6% 的年利率计息至年底。12 月到达的增资款项则不享受此待遇。
Complete tax information for your 1963 return will be in your hands by January 25th. If you should need an estimate of your tax position before that time, let me know and I will give you a rough idea. We will also send out a short letter on taxes in late December.
关于你 1963 年纳税申报的完整税务信息将在 1 月 25 日前送到你手中。如果你在此之前需要估算你的纳税情况，请告诉我，我会给你一个大致的概念。我们也会在 12 月下旬寄出一封关于税务的简短信函。
At the end of October, the overall result from the Dow for 1963 was plus 18.8%. We have had a good year in all three categories, generals, work-outs and controls. A satisfactory sale on a going concern basis of Dempster Mill Manufacturing operating assets was made about a month ago. I will give the full treatment to the Dempster story in the annual letter, perhaps climaxed by some lyrical burst such as “Ode to Harry Bottle.” While we always had a built-in profit in Dempster because of our bargain purchase price, Harry accounted for several extra servings of dessert by his extraordinary job. Harry, incidentally, has made an advance payment toward becoming a limited partner in 1964– we consider this the beginning, not the end.
1963 年 10 月底，道琼斯指数全年整体涨幅为 18.8%。我们在普通股投资、套利交易和控制权投资这三个类别上都取得了不错的成绩。大约一个月前，我们成功地按持续经营的基础出售了登普斯特尔磨坊制造公司的经营性资产。我会在年度信函中详细讲述登普斯特尔公司的故事，也许会以诸如《致哈里・博特尔的颂歌》这样抒情的笔触作为高潮。由于我们当初以优惠的价格购入登普斯特尔公司的股份，所以一直都有潜在的利润，而哈里凭借其出色的工作为我们带来了额外的收益。顺便提一下，哈里已预付了款项，准备在 1964 年成为有限合伙人 —— 我们认为这只是开始，而非结束。
However, 1963 has not been all Dempster. While a great deal can happen the last two months and therefore interim results should not be taken too seriously, at the end of October the overall gain for the partnership was about 32%. Based on the allocation embodied in our agreement, this works out to plus 25 1/2% for the limited partners before monthly payments to those who take them. Of our approximate $3 million gain, something over $2 million came from marketable securities and a little less than $1 million from Dempster operating assets. The combined gain from our single best general and best work-out situation approximated the gain on the Dempster operating assets.
然而，1963 年并非只有登普斯特尔公司这一件事。虽然在最后两个月还可能发生很多事情，所以中期业绩不应被看得太重，但截至 10 月底，合伙企业的整体收益约为 32%。根据我们协议中的分配方式，在向那些领取月度收益的合伙人支付款项之前，有限合伙人的收益约为 25.5%。在我们约 300 万美元的收益中，超过 200 万美元来自有价证券，略低于 100 万美元来自登普斯特尔公司的经营性资产。我们在表现最佳的普通股投资和最佳套利交易这两项上的综合收益，大致与登普斯特尔公司经营性资产的收益相当。
You should be aware that if our final results relative to the Dow for 1963 are as favorable as on October 31st, I will regard it as an abnormal year. I do not consider a 13.2 percentage point margin to be in the cards on a long term basis. A considerably more moderate annual edge over the Dow will be quite satisfactory.
你应该知道，如果我们 1963 年相对于道琼斯指数的最终业绩和 10 月 31 日时一样出色，我会认为这是不同寻常的一年。我不认为从长期来看能保持 13.2 个百分点的优势。能在每年保持比道琼斯指数高出适度的比例，就相当令人满意了。
Cordially
诚挚的
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
P/S. Last year we announced there would be no prizes for the last ones to get the material back to us. This continues to be our policy. Save us some last minute scurrying by getting your agreement and commitment letter back pronto. Give Bill or me a call if we can be of any help. Thanks!
附言：去年我们宣布，最后寄回资料的人不会得到任何奖励。这一政策依然不变。请尽快将你的协议和承诺书寄回，免得我们在最后时刻手忙脚乱。如果我们能提供任何帮助，请致电比尔或我。谢谢！
1964 年信件
1964 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
January 18, 1964
1964 年 1 月 18 日
Our Performance in 1963
我们在 1963 年的业绩表现
1963 was a good year. It was not a good year because we had an overall gain of $3,637,167 or 38.7% on our beginning net assets, pleasant as that experience may be to the pragmatists in our group. Rather it was a good year because our performance was substantially better than that of our fundamental yardstick –the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). If we had been down 20% and the Dow had been down 30%, this letter would still have begun “1963 was a good year.” Regardless of whether we are plus or minus in a particular year, if we can maintain a satisfactory edge on the Dow over an extended period of time, our long term results will be satisfactory – financially as well as philosophically.
1963 年是个好年头。说这一年好，并非因为我们初始净资产实现了 3,637,167 美元的总收益，收益率达到 38.7%，尽管对于我们团队里的实用主义者来说，这样的成绩令人欣喜。这一年之所以好，是因为我们的业绩大幅优于我们的基本衡量标准 —— 道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）。即便我们亏损 20%，而道指下跌 30%，这封信开头仍会写 “1963 年是个好年头”。无论在特定年份里我们是盈利还是亏损，只要能在较长时间内持续保持相对道指的可观优势，那么从财务和理念的角度来看，我们的长期业绩都会令人满意。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results for all full years of BPL’s and predecessor partnerships’ activities:
为了让记录与时俱进，以下内容总结了道指逐年的表现、合伙企业在分配给普通合伙人之前的业绩，以及在巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）及其前身合伙企业存续期间的所有完整年度里有限合伙人的收益情况：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯指数总体收益（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙公司业绩（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.7% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year.
（1）基于道指年度价值变化，加上持有道指成分股在当年可获得的股息。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，包含了所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或分配给普通合伙人。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement.
（3）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，是根据合伙企业业绩的前一栏数据计算得出，并按照现行合伙协议向普通合伙人进行了分配。
One wag among the limited partners has suggested I add a fourth column showing the results of the general partner –let’s just say he, too, has an edge on the Dow.
有一位有限合伙人打趣说，我应该再加上第四栏，展示普通合伙人的业绩 —— 只能说，普通合伙人的业绩同样也优于道指。
The following table shows the cumulative or compounded results based on the preceding table:
下表展示了基于上述表格得出的累计或复合收益情况：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯指数总体收益（Overall Results From Dow） | 合伙公司业绩（Partnership Results） | 有限合伙人业绩（Limited Partners’ Results） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 年复合增长率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 10.0% | 27.7% | 22.3% |
It appears that we have completed seven fat years. With apologies to Joseph we shall attempt to ignore the biblical script. (I’ve never gone overboard for Noah’s ideas on diversification either.)
看起来我们已经度过了七个丰收的年头。在此向约瑟夫致歉，我们将尽量不去理会《圣经》里的预言。（我也从不完全认同诺亚关于分散投资的观点。）
In a more serious vein, I would like to emphasize that, in my judgment; our 17.7 margin over the Dow shown above is unattainable over any long period of time. A ten percentage point advantage would be a very satisfactory accomplishment and even a much more modest edge would produce impressive gains as will be touched upon later. This view (and it has to be guesswork – informed or otherwise) carries with it the corollary that we must expect prolonged periods of much narrower margins over the Dow as well as at least occasional years when our record will be inferior (perhaps substantially so) to the Dow.
更严肃地说，我想强调的是，在我看来，我们上述所展现出的相对于道指 17.7 个百分点的优势，在任何较长的时间段内都难以持续保持。能有 10 个百分点的优势就已经是非常出色的成绩了，即便优势比这小得多，也能带来相当可观的收益，这一点稍后会提及。这种观点（不管是否基于充分的信息，都只能算是一种猜测）意味着，我们必须预期到，在很长一段时间内，我们相对于道指的优势会大幅缩小，而且至少偶尔会出现我们的业绩不如（或许是大幅不如）道指的年份。
Much of the above sermon is reflected in “The Ground Rules” sent to everyone in November, but it can stand repetition.
上述大部分观点都已体现在 11 月寄给大家的《基本规则》里了，但还是值得再重复强调一下。
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp. and Lehman Corp. manage about $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $25 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the vast majority or other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）进行比较，这两家公司通常遵循将 95%-100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略，同时也与两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行对比。这四家公司分别是马萨诸塞投资者信托基金（Massachusetts Investors Trust）、投资者股票基金（Investors Stock Fund）、三大陆公司（Tri-Continental Corp.）和雷曼公司（Lehman Corp.），它们管理着约 40 亿美元的资金，并且很可能代表了整个规模达 250 亿美元的投资公司行业的典型情况。我认为，它们的业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩相符，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
The purpose or this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index or investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands’ annual fees of over $7 million, and this represents a very small fraction of the industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid talent indicates they achieved results slightly less favorable than the Dow.
下面的表格统计的目的在于说明，道指作为衡量投资成就的指标并非轻易就能超越。仅管理上述四家公司的投资顾问人才，每年收取的费用就超过 700 万美元，而这在整个行业中只是很小的一部分。这些高薪人才的整体表现显示，他们取得的业绩略逊于道指。
Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, most partners, as an alternative to their interest in the Partnership would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with investment companies, and I, therefore, feel they offer a meaningful standard of performance.
我们的投资组合和运营方式与表格中的投资公司有很大差异。然而，对于大多数合伙人而言，如果不选择投资于我们的合伙企业，他们很可能会将资金投入到那些业绩与投资公司相当的机构中。因此，我认为这些投资公司的业绩为我们提供了一个有意义的业绩参照标准。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度业绩
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票基金（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼公司（Lehman (2)） | 三角大陆公司（Tri-Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯指数（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.8% | 19.5% | 20.7% | 30.5% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化，加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1963 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-62; Estimated for 1963.
(2) 1957 年至 1962 年的数据来自《穆迪银行与金融手册（1963 年版）》；1963 年的数据为估算值。
COMPOUNDED
按复利计算
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资者信托（Mass. Inv. Trust） | 投资者股票基金（Investors Stock） | 雷曼公司（Lehman） | 三角大陆公司（Tri-Cont.） | 道琼斯指数（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 46.2% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 85.4% | 78.5% | 81.0% | 90.8% | 95.1% | 311.2% |
| 年复合增长率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 9.2% | 8.6% | 8.8% | 9.7% | 10.0% | 22.3% |
The Dow, of course, is an unmanaged index, and it may seem strange to the reader to contemplate the high priests of Wall Street striving vainly to surpass or even equal it. However, this is demonstrably the case. Moreover, such a failure cannot be rationalized by the assumption that the investment companies et al are handling themselves in a more conservative manner than the Dow. As the table above indicates, and as more extensive studies bear out, the behavior of common stock portfolio managed by this group, on average, have declined in concert with the Dow. By such a test of behavior in declining markets, our own methods of operation have proven to be considerably more conservative than the common stock component of the investment company or investment advisor group. While this has been true in the past, there obviously can be no guarantees about the future.
当然，道指是一个未经管理的指数，读者可能会觉得奇怪，华尔街的那些权威人士竟然徒劳地努力想要超越甚至达到它的水平。然而，事实确实如此。此外，不能以投资公司等机构的操作方式比道指更为保守来为这种失败找借口。正如上表所示，也正如更广泛的研究结果所证实的那样，这些机构管理的普通股投资组合的表现，平均而言，与道指的涨跌是一致的。通过在下跌市场中的这种表现测试，我们自己的操作方法已被证明比投资公司或投资顾问机构的普通股投资组合要保守得多。虽然过去一直如此，但显然无法保证未来也会这样。
The above may seem like rather strong medicine, but it is offered as a factual presentation and in no way as criticism. Within their institutional framework and handling the many billions of dollars involved, the results achieved are the only ones attainable. To behave unconventionally within this framework is extremely difficult. Therefore, the collective record of such investment media is necessarily tied to the record of corporate America. Their merits, except in the unusual case, do not lie in superior results or greater resistance to decline in value. Rather, I feel they earn their keep by the ease of handling, the freedom from decision making and the automatic diversification they provide, plus, perhaps most important, the insulation afforded from temptation to practice patently inferior techniques which seem to entice so many world-be investors.
上述内容可能听起来有些刺耳，但这只是对事实的陈述，绝无批评之意。在他们的机构框架内，管理着数百亿美元的资金，取得这样的结果也是唯一可行的。在这个框架内要采取非传统的操作方式是极其困难的。因此，这类投资机构的总体业绩必然与美国企业的业绩紧密相关。除了在特殊情况下，它们的优势并不在于取得优异的业绩或对价值下跌有更强的抵御能力。相反，我认为它们存在的价值在于易于管理、无需自行做决策，以及提供了自动分散投资的功能，或许最重要的是，它们能让投资者免受那些明显低劣的投资技巧的诱惑，而这些技巧似乎吸引了众多想成为投资高手的人。
The Joys of Compounding
复利的魅力
Now to the pulse-quickening portion of our essay. Last year, in order to drive home the point on compounding, I took a pot shot at Queen Isabella and her financial advisors. You will remember they were euchred into such an obviously low-compound situation as the discovery of a new hemisphere.
现在来谈谈我们文章中令人激动的部分。去年，为了让大家深刻理解复利的概念，我曾调侃过伊莎贝拉女王及其财务顾问。大家应该还记得，他们被忽悠着陷入了一个显然复利很低的投资项目，即发现新大陆。
Since the whole subject of compounding has such a crass ring to it, I will attempt to introduce a little class into this discussion by turning to the art world. Francis I of France paid 4,000 ecus in 1540 for Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa. On the off chance that a few of you have not kept track of the fluctuations of the ecu 4,000 converted out to about $20,000.
由于复利这个话题听起来有些粗俗，我将尝试从艺术领域引入一些高雅的元素来展开讨论。1540 年，法国的弗朗索瓦一世花了 4000 埃居买下了列奥纳多・达・芬奇的《蒙娜丽莎》。万一你们当中有人没留意埃居的汇率波动，4000 埃居大约相当于 2 万美元。
If Francis had kept his feet on the ground and he (and his trustees) had been able to find a 6% after-taxinvestment, the estate now would be worth something over $1,000,000,000,000,000.00. That’s $1 quadrillion or over 3,000 times the present national debt, all from 6%. I trust this will end all discussion in our household about any purchase or paintings qualifying as an investment.
如果弗朗索瓦一世脚踏实地，而且他（和他的受托人）能够找到一个税后收益率为 6% 的投资项目，那么这笔资产如今的价值将超过 1000000000000000 美元（100 万亿）。这可是 100 万亿美元，是美国目前国债的 3000 多倍，而这一切都源于 6% 的收益率。我相信这足以让我们打消任何认为购买画作可作为投资的念头。
However, as I pointed out last year, there are other morals to be drawn here. One is the wisdom of living a long time. The other impressive factor is the swing produced by relatively small changes in the rate of compound.
不过，正如我去年指出的，从这件事还能得出其他教训。一是长寿的好处。另一个令人印象深刻的因素是复利收益率的微小变化所带来的巨大影响。
Below are shown the gains from $100,000 compounded at various rates:
以下是 10 万美元在不同收益率下的复利收益情况：
| 4% | 8% | 12% | 16% | ||
| 10 | Years | $48,024 | $115,892 | $210,584 | $341,143 |
| 20 | Years | $119,111 | $366,094 | $864,627 | $1,846,060 |
| 30 | Years | $224,337 | $906,260 | $2,895,970 | $8,484,940 |
It is obvious that a variation of merely a few percentage points has an enormous effect on the success of a compounding (investment) program. It is also obvious that this effect mushrooms as the period lengthens. If, over a meaningful period of time, Buffett Partnership can achieve an edge of even a modest number of percentage points over the major investment media, its function will be fulfilled.
很明显，仅仅几个百分点的收益率差异，对复利（投资）项目的成功就有着巨大的影响。同样明显的是，随着时间的推移，这种影响会越来越大。如果在一段较长的时间内，巴菲特合伙公司能够相对于主要投资机构取得哪怕只是几个百分点的优势，我们的目标就算达成了。
Some of you may be downcast because I have not included in the above table the rate of 22.3% mentioned on page 3. This rate, of course, is before income taxes which are paid directly by you –not the Partnership. Even excluding this factor, such a calculation would only prove the absurdity of the idea of compounding at very high rates – even with initially modest sums. My opinion is that the Dow is quite unlikely to compound for any important length of time at the rate it has during the past seven years and, as mentioned earlier, I believe our margin over the Dow cannot be maintained at its level to date. The product of these assumptions would be a materially lower average rate of compound for BPL in the future than the rate achieved to date. Injecting a minus 30% year (which is going to happen from time to time) into our tabulation of actual results to date, with, say, a corresponding minus 40% for the Dow brings both the figures on the Dow and BPL more in line with longer range possibilities. As the compounding table above suggests, such a lowered rate can still provide highly satisfactory long term investment results.
你们当中有些人可能会感到沮丧，因为我没有在上面的表格中列入第 3 页提到的 22.3% 的收益率。当然，这个收益率是在所得税之前的，而所得税是由你们直接缴纳的，不是由合伙企业缴纳。即便不考虑这个因素，这样的计算也只能证明以极高的收益率进行复利计算是荒谬的，哪怕初始金额相对较小。我认为，道指在未来任何较长的时间段内都不太可能以过去七年的收益率进行复利增长，而且正如前面提到的，我相信我们相对于道指的优势无法维持在目前的水平。基于这些假设，巴菲特合伙公司未来的平均复利收益率将明显低于迄今为止所达到的水平。在我们对迄今为止实际业绩的计算中，加入一个收益率为负 30% 的年份（这种情况时不时会发生），假设道指相应地下跌 40%，这会使道指和巴菲特合伙公司的数据更符合长期的可能性。正如上面的复利表格所示，即使收益率降低，仍然可以带来非常令人满意的长期投资回报。
Our Method of Operation
我们的操作方法
At this point I always develop literary schizophrenia. On the one hand, I know that we have in the audience a number of partners to whom details of our business are interesting. We also have a number to whom this whole thing is Greek and who undoubtedly wish I would quit writing and get back to work.
在这个问题上，我总是会出现 “写作精神分裂症”。一方面，我知道在座的有一些合伙人对我们业务的细节很感兴趣。但也有一些合伙人对这些完全不了解，他们无疑希望我别再写了，赶紧回去工作。
To placate both camps, I am just going to sketch briefly our three categories at this point and those who are interested in getting their doctorate can refer to the appendix for extended treatment of examples.
为了安抚这两类人，我在此简要概述一下我们的三类投资项目，那些想要深入了解的人可以参考附录中关于具体例子的详细阐述。
Our three investment categories are not differentiated by their expected profitability over an extended period of time. We are hopeful that they will each, over a ten or fifteen year period, produce something like the ten percentage point margin over the Dow that is our goal. However, in a given year they will have violently different behavior characteristics, depending primarily on the type of year it turns out to be for the stock market generally. Briefly this is how they shape up:
我们的三类投资项目并不是根据它们在较长时期内的预期盈利能力来区分的。我们希望在十年或十五年的时间里，每一类投资项目都能实现比道指高出约 10 个百分点的收益率，这是我们的目标。然而，在特定的年份里，它们的表现特征会有很大差异，这主要取决于当年股票市场的总体情况。简单来说，它们的情况如下：
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“Generals” - A category of generally undervalued stocks, determined primarily by quantitative
standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation on the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But we demand value. The general group behaves very much in sympathy with the Dow and will turn in a big minus result during a year of substantial decline by the Dow. Contrarywise, it should be the star performer in a strongly advancing market. Over the years we expect it, of course, to achieve a satisfactory margin over the Dow.
“普通股投资（Generals）”：这是一类普遍被低估的股票，主要根据量化标准来筛选，但同时也会充分考虑质的因素。通常情况下，几乎没有迹象表明这些股票的市场表现会迅速改善。这些股票缺乏吸引力，也没有市场的追捧。它们的主要优势在于价格低廉，也就是说，对企业的整体估值大幅低于通过仔细分析得出的该企业对私人所有者的价值。我再次强调，虽然量化因素是首要且至关重要的，但质的因素也很关键。我们喜欢优秀的管理层，喜欢前景良好的行业，也喜欢在之前死气沉沉的管理层或股东群体中出现一定的 “变革”。但我们最看重的还是价值。普通股投资这一类别的表现与道指的走势密切相关，在道指大幅下跌的年份，这类投资的收益也会大幅亏损。相反，在市场强劲上涨时，它应该是表现突出的一类。当然，多年来我们期望它能相对于道指取得令人满意的优势。
“Workouts” - These are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or "inside information" pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. A friend refers to this as getting the last nickel after the other fellow has made the first ninety-five cents. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent annual rates of return. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline, it piles up a big edge for us; during bull markets, it is a drag on performance. On a long term basis, I expect it to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
“套利交易（Workouts）”：这类投资是有时间安排的证券。它们源于企业的活动，如企业出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在此类投资中，我们关注的并非有关这些发展的传闻或 “内幕消息”，而是公开宣布的此类活动。我们会等到能在报纸上看到相关消息时才行动。此类投资的风险主要不在于市场的整体走势（尽管有时在一定程度上也与之相关），而在于某些因素破坏了预期的发展，导致原本预期的情况无法实现。这些不利因素可能包括反垄断或其他政府的负面行动、股东的反对、税务裁决的延迟等。许多套利交易的毛利润看起来相当微薄。有个朋友形容这就像是别人赚了 95 美分后，我们去赚最后那 5 美分。然而，由于其收益的可预测性以及较短的持有期，能产生相当不错的年化收益率。与普通股投资相比，套利交易这一类别每年能产生更为稳定的绝对利润。在市场下跌的年份，它能为我们积累很大的优势；而在牛市中，它则会拖累整体业绩。从长期来看，我期望它能取得与普通股投资类似的相对于道指的优势。
“Controls” - These are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block or stock, controls develop from the general category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing price-wise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company's stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume some degree of, or perhaps complete, control of the company's activities; whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the management's capabilities. The general we have been buying the most aggressively in recent months possesses excellent management following policies that appear to make very good sense to us. If our continued buying puts us in a controlling position at some point in the future, we will probably remain very passive regarding the operation or this business.
“控制权投资（Controls）”：这类投资比较少见，但一旦出现，规模往往较大。除非我们一开始就大量购入某公司的股票，否则控制权投资通常是从普通股投资类别发展而来的。当某只被低估的股票在很长一段时间内价格都没有变化，使得我们能够买入该公司相当比例的股票时，就会产生控制权投资。此时，我们可能有能力对公司的经营活动施加一定程度的控制，甚至是完全控制。至于我们在这一点上是积极参与还是相对被动，取决于我们对公司未来的评估以及管理层的能力。最近几个月我们积极买入的一只普通股，其管理层执行的政策在我们看来非常明智。如果我们继续买入，在未来某个时候获得了对该公司的控制权，我们可能会在公司运营方面保持相对被动。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不想仅仅为了活跃而采取行动。在其他条件相同的情况下，我更愿意让别人去做事。然而，当为了优化资本配置而必须积极参与时，你可以放心，我们绝不会袖手旁观。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the marketplace.
无论是积极参与还是被动持有，在控制权投资中都应该有内在的利润。这类投资的必要条件是有一个有吸引力的买入价格。一旦获得控制权，我们投资的价值就取决于企业的价值，而不是市场上常常出现的不合理波动。
Our willingness and financial ability to assume a controlling position gives us two-way stretch on many purchases in our group of generals. If the market changes its opinion for the better, the security will advance in price. If it doesn't, we will continue to acquire stock until we can look to the business itself rather than the market for vindication of our judgment.
我们有意愿也有财力获取控制权，这使我们在买入普通股投资时具备了双重优势。如果市场对该股票的看法改善，其价格就会上涨。如果没有改善，我们会继续买入股票，直到我们可以依据公司本身而非市场来证明我们的判断。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, re-directing the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit-if it looks at all close, we pass.
控制权投资的业绩必须至少以几年为基础来衡量。合理的买入需要时间。如果需要的话，加强管理层、重新配置资本，或者进行令人满意的出售或合并等，这些因素都决定了这是一项需要以年来衡量而非以月来衡量的业务。因此，在控制权投资中，我们寻求较大的利润空间。如果看起来利润空间不大，我们就会放弃。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.
在买入阶段，控制权投资的走势在很大程度上与道指相关。在后期阶段，其表现更类似于套利交易。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among the three categories is largely determined by the accident or availability. Therefore, in a minus year for the Dow, whether we are primarily in generals or workouts is largely a matter of luck, but it will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one or many reasons why a single year’s performance is of minor importance and, good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
正如我过去提到的，我们投资组合在这三个类别之间的分配很大程度上取决于机会或可获得的投资项目。因此，在道指下跌的年份，我们主要投资于普通股还是套利交易，很大程度上是运气问题，但这对我们相对于道指的业绩表现有很大影响。这也是为什么单一年份的业绩重要性相对较小，无论好坏，都不应过于看重的众多原因之一。
If there is any trend as our assets grow, I would expect it to be toward controls which heretofore have been our smallest category. I may be wrong in this expectation - a great deal depends, of course, on the future behavior of the market on which your guess is as good as mine (I have none). At this writing, we have a majority of our capital in generals, workouts rank second, and controls are third.
随着我们资产的增长，如果说有什么趋势的话，我预计会更多地倾向于控制权投资，而在此之前，控制权投资一直是我们占比最小的类别。我的这个预期可能是错的，当然，这在很大程度上取决于未来市场的走势，对此你们的猜测和我的一样好（我没有什么猜测）。在写这封信时，我们的大部分资金投资于普通股，套利交易次之，控制权投资排在第三位。
Miscellaneous
杂项
We are starting off the year with net assets of $17,454,900. Our rapid increase in assets always raises the question of whether this will result in a dilution of future performance. To date, there is more of a positive than inverse correlation between size of the Partnership and its margin over the Dow. This should not be taken seriously however. Larger sums may be an advantage at some times and a disadvantage at others. My opinion is that our present portfolio could not be improved if our assets were $1 million or $5 million. Our idea inventory has always seemed to be 10% ahead of our bank account. If that should change, you can count on hearing from me.
今年年初，我们的净资产为 17,454,900 美元。我们资产的快速增长总是会引发一个问题，即这是否会导致未来业绩的稀释。到目前为止，合伙企业的规模与其相对于道指的优势之间更多呈现的是正相关，而非负相关。不过，这一点不应被过于当真。资金规模较大有时可能是优势，有时则可能是劣势。我认为，如果我们的资产是 100 万美元或 500 万美元，目前的投资组合也不会更好。我们的投资想法似乎总是比我们的资金储备多出 10%。如果这种情况发生变化，我肯定会告诉大家。
Susie and I have an investment of $2,392,900 in the Partnership. For the first time I had to withdraw funds in addition to my monthly payments, but it was a choice of this or disappointing the Internal Revenue Service. Susie and I have a few non-marketable (less than 300 holders) securities of nominal size left over from earlier years which in aggregate are worth perhaps 1% of our partnership interest. In addition we have one non-marketable holding of more material size of a local company purchased in 1960 which we expect to hold indefinitely. Aside from this all our eggs are in the BPL basket and they will continue to be. I can’t promise results but I can promise a common destiny. In addition, that endless stream of relatives of mine consisting of my three children, mother, father, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, four aunts four cousins and five nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL directly or indirectly totaling $1,247,190.
苏西和我在合伙企业中投资了 2,392,900 美元。我第一次除了每月支取的款项外还不得不额外支取资金，但这是无奈之举，否则就会让美国国税局不满意。苏西和我还有一些早年遗留下来的非上市证券（股东人数少于 300 人），规模较小，总计价值可能约占我们合伙权益的 1%。此外，我们还持有一家本地公司的非上市股份，规模相对较大，是 1960 年购入的，我们预计会无限期持有。除此之外，我们所有的资产都在巴菲特合伙公司（BPL），而且以后也会如此。我不能保证投资结果，但我可以保证我们命运与共。此外，我的众多亲属，包括我的三个孩子、父母、两个姐妹、两个姐夫（妹夫）、岳父、四个姑姑、四个表亲以及五个侄子侄女，他们直接或间接在巴菲特合伙公司的权益总计达 1,247,190 美元。
Bill Scott is also in with both feet, having an interest along with his wife or $237,400, the large majority or their net worth. Bill has done an excellent job and on several or our more interesting situations going into 1964, he has done the majority or the contact work. I have also shoved off on him as much as possible of the administrative work so if you need anything done or have any questions, don’t hesitate to ask for Bill if I’m not around.
比尔・斯科特也全身心投入其中，他和他妻子的权益总计为 237,400 美元，这占了他们净资产的绝大部分。比尔工作非常出色，在进入 1964 年的一些比较有意思的投资项目中，大部分的联络工作都是他完成的。我也尽可能地把行政工作交给他做，所以如果你有什么事情需要处理或有任何问题，如果我不在，就直接找比尔，不要犹豫。
Beth and Donna have kept an increasing work load flowing in an excellent manner. During December and January, I am sure they wish they had found employment elsewhere, but they always manage to keep a mountain of work ship-shape.
贝丝和唐娜出色地应对了日益增加的工作负担。在 12 月和 1 月，我相信她们有时希望能在其他地方找到工作，但她们总是能把堆积如山的工作处理得井井有条。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has done their usual excellent job of meeting a tough timetable. We have instructed them to conduct two surprise checks a year (rather than one as in past years) on our securities, cash, etc., in the future. These are relatively inexpensive, and I think make a good deal of sense in any financial organization.
皮特・马威克・米切尔会计师事务所一如既往地出色完成了艰巨的任务，按时完成了工作。我们已指示他们今后每年对我们的证券、现金等进行两次突击检查（过去是每年一次）。这样做成本相对较低，而且我认为在任何金融机构中这都是很有意义的做法。
Within the next week you will receive:
在接下来的一周内，你会收到：
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1963 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
（1）一封税务信函，提供了你申报 1963 年联邦所得税所需的所有巴菲特合伙公司的信息。这封信函是唯一与税务相关的重要文件。
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1963, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
（2）皮特・马威克・米切尔会计师事务所出具的 1963 年审计报告，阐述了巴菲特合伙公司的运营情况和财务状况，以及你自己的资本账户情况。
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/64. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
（3）一封由我签署的信函，说明你在 1964 年 1 月 1 日时在巴菲特合伙公司的权益状况。这个数据与审计报告中的数据一致。
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
（4）合伙协议的附表 A，列出了所有合伙人的名单。
Let me know if anything needs clarifying. As we grow, there is more chance of missing letters, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if it appears we might have erred. Our next letter will be about July 15th summarizing the first half.
如果有任何需要澄清的地方，请告诉我。随着我们的发展，出现遗漏信件、名字被忽略、数字颠倒等情况的可能性会增加，所以如果我们可能出错了，请及时提出。我们的下一封信预计在 7 月 15 日左右发出，总结上半年的情况。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
APPENDIX
附录
TEXAS NATIONAL PETROLEUM
得克萨斯国家石油公司（Texas National Petroleum）
This situation was a run-of-the-mill workout arising from the number one source of workouts in recent years – the sellouts of oil and gas producing companies.
这是一个普通的套利交易案例，其源于近年来套利交易的首要来源 —— 油气生产公司的出售。
TNP was a relatively small producer with which I had been vaguely familiar for years.
得克萨斯国家石油公司是一家规模相对较小的生产商，多年来我对它一直略有耳闻。
Early in 1962 I heard rumors regarding a sellout to Union Oil of California. I never act on such information, but in this case it was correct and substantially more money would have been made if we had gone in at the rumor stage rather than the announced stage. However, that’s somebody else’s business, not mine.
1962 年初，我听到了有关该公司将被加利福尼亚联合石油公司（Union Oil of California）收购的传闻。我从不依据此类消息采取行动，但在这个案例中，传闻是准确的。如果我们在传闻阶段就介入，而不是在消息宣布阶段才行动，本可以赚到更多的钱。不过，那是别人的行事方式，不是我的风格。
In early April, 1962, the general terms of the deal were announced. TNP had three classes of securities outstanding:
1962 年 4 月初，这笔交易的大致条款被公布。得克萨斯国家石油公司有三类流通证券：
(1) 6 1/2% debentures callable at 104 1/4 which would bear interest until the sale transpired and at that time would be called. There were $6.5 million outstanding of which we purchased $264,000 principal amount before the sale closed.
（1）利率为 6.5% 的可赎回债券，赎回价格为 104.25 美元，在公司出售交易完成前这些债券会一直计息，届时将被赎回。该债券发行总额为 650 万美元，在交易结束前我们购入了本金 26.4 万美元的债券。
(2) About 3.7 million shares of common stock of which the officers and directors owned about 40%. The proxy statement estimated the proceeds from the liquidation would produce $7.42 per share. We purchased 64,035 shares during the six months or so between announcement and closing.
（2）约 370 万股普通股，公司高管和董事持有其中约 40% 的股份。委托投票说明书估计，清算所得收益将达到每股 7.42 美元。在消息宣布到交易结束的大约六个月时间里，我们购入了 64,035 股普通股。
(3) 650,000 warrants to purchase common stock at $3.50 per share. Using the proxy statement estimate of $7.42 for the workout on the common resulted in $3.92 as a workout on the warrants. We were able to buy 83,200 warrants or about 13% of the entire issue in six months.
（3）65 万份认股权证，可按每股 3.5 美元的价格购买普通股。根据委托投票说明书对普通股套利收益每股 7.42 美元的估计，认股权证的套利收益为 3.92 美元。在六个月的时间里，我们成功购入了 83,200 份认股权证，约占发行总量的 13%。
The risk of stockholder disapproval was nil. The deal was negotiated by the controlling stockholders, and the price was a good one. Any transaction such as this is subject to title searches, legal opinions, etc., but this risk could also be appraised at virtually nil. There were no anti-trust problems. This absence of legal or anti-trust problems is not always the case, by any means.
股东反对这笔交易的风险几乎为零。该交易是由控股股东协商达成的，而且交易价格很合理。任何此类交易都需要进行产权调查、获取法律意见等，但在这个案例中，这些风险实际上也几乎为零。此外，不存在反垄断问题。当然，绝非所有此类交易都不存在法律或反垄断方面的问题。
The only fly in the ointment was the obtaining of the necessary tax ruling. Union Oil was using a standard ABC production payment method of financing. The University of Southern California was the production payment holder and there was some delay because of their eleemosynary status.
唯一美中不足的是，需要获得必要的税务裁定。加利福尼亚联合石油公司采用了标准的 ABC 生产支付融资方式。南加州大学（University of Southern California）是生产支付的持有者，由于其慈善机构的身份，导致了一些延误。
This posed a new problem for the Internal Revenue Service, but we understood USC was willing to waive this status which still left them with a satisfactory profit after they borrowed all the money from a bank. While getting this ironed out created delay, it did not threaten the deal.
这给美国国税局（Internal Revenue Service）带来了一个新问题，但我们了解到南加州大学愿意放弃其慈善机构身份，而且在从银行借入所有资金后，他们仍能获得可观的利润。虽然解决这个问题导致了一些延误，但并没有对交易构成威胁。
When we talked with the company on April 23rd and 24th, their estimate was that the closing would take place in August or September. The proxy material was mailed May 9th and stated the sale “will be consummated during the summer of 1962 and that within a few months thereafter the greater part of the proceeds will be distributed to stockholders in liquidation.” As mentioned earlier, the estimate was $7.42 per share.Bill Scott attended the stockholders meeting in Houston on May 29th where it was stated they still expected to close on September 1st.
4 月 23 日和 24 日，我们与该公司沟通时，他们估计交易将在 8 月或 9 月完成。委托投票材料于 5 月 9 日寄出，其中表明出售 “将在 1962 年夏天完成，并且在那之后的几个月内，大部分收益将作为清算款项分配给股东”。如前所述，预计收益为每股 7.42 美元。比尔・斯科特（Bill Scott）于 5 月 29 日参加了在休斯顿举行的股东大会，会上表示他们仍预计 9 月 1 日完成交易。
The following are excerpts from some of the telephone conversations we had with company officials in ensuing months:
以下是在随后几个月里我们与该公司官员的一些电话交谈摘要：
1
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On June 18th the secretary stated "Union has been told a favorable IRS ruling has been formulated but must be passed on by additional IRS people. Still hoping for ruling in July.”
6 月 18 日，公司秘书称：“联合石油公司已被告知美国国税局已拟定了有利的裁定，但还必须由国税局的其他人员审核通过。仍希望能在 7 月得到裁定结果。”
On July 24th the president said that he expected the IRS ruling “early next week.”
7 月 24 日，公司总裁表示，他预计美国国税局的裁定 “将于下周初” 下达。
On August 13th the treasurer informed us that the TNP, Union Oil, and USC people were all in Washington attempting to thrash out a ruling.
8 月 13 日，公司财务主管告知我们，得克萨斯国家石油公司、加利福尼亚联合石油公司以及南加州大学的相关人员都在华盛顿，试图敲定一项裁定。
On September 18th the treasurer informed us "No news, although the IRS says the ruling could be ready by next week.”
9 月 18 日，公司财务主管告知我们：“没有新消息，不过美国国税局表示裁定可能下周就能准备好。”
The estimate on payout was still $7.42.
对支付收益的估计仍为每股 7.42 美元。
The ruling was received in late September, and the sale closed October 31st. Our bonds were called November 13th. We converted our warrants to common stock shortly thereafter and received payments on the common of $3.50 December 14, 1962, $3.90 February 4, 1963, and 15 cent on April 24, 1963. We will probably get another 4 cent in a year or two. On 147,235 shares (after exercise of warrants) even 4 cent per share is meaningful.
9 月下旬，终于收到了裁定，交易于 10 月 31 日完成。我们持有的债券于 11 月 13 日被赎回。此后不久，我们将认股权证转换为普通股，并分别于 1962 年 12 月 14 日收到每股 3.50 美元、1963 年 2 月 4 日收到每股 3.90 美元以及 1963 年 4 月 24 日收到每股 0.15 美元的款项。我们可能在一两年内还会收到每股 0.04 美元的款项。对于 147,235 股（行使认股权证后的股份数量）来说，即使每股只有 0.04 美元也是很可观的。
This illustrates the usual pattern: (1) the deals take longer than originally projected; and (2) the payouts tend to average a little better than estimates. With TNP it took a couple of extra months, and we received a couple ofextra percent.
这个案例说明了常见的模式：（1）交易完成的时间比最初预计的要长；（2）实际支付的收益往往比估计的略高。对于得克萨斯国家石油公司的这笔交易，多花了几个月的时间，而我们获得的收益比预计的高出了几个百分点。
The financial results of TNP were as follows:
得克萨斯国家石油公司交易的财务结果如下：
(1) On the bonds we invested $260,773 and had an average holding period of slightly under five months. We received 6 ½% interest on our money and realized a capital gain of $14,446. This works out to an overall rate of return of approximately 20% per annum.
（1）在债券投资方面，我们投入了 260,773 美元，平均持有期略短于五个月。我们获得了 6.5% 的利息收益，并实现了 14,446 美元的资本利得。这相当于年化总收益率约为 20%。
(2) On the stock and warrants we have realized capital gain of $89,304, and we have stubs presently valued at $2,946. From an investment or $146,000 in April, our holdings ran to $731,000 in October. Based on the time the money was employed, the rate or return was about 22% per annum.
（2）在股票和认股权证投资方面，我们实现了 89,304 美元的资本利得，目前持有的剩余股份价值为 2,946 美元。从 4 月投入的 146,000 美元，到 10 月时我们的持股价值达到了 731,000 美元。根据资金投入的时间计算，年化收益率约为 22%。
In both cases, the return is computed on an all equity investment. I definitely feel some borrowed money is warranted against a portfolio of workouts, but feel it is a very dangerous practice against generals.
在这两种情况下，收益率都是基于全部股权的投资计算得出的。我明确认为，针对套利交易投资组合借入一定资金是可行的，但对于普通股投资而言，借入资金是非常危险的做法。
We are not presenting TNP as any earth-shaking triumph. We have had workouts which were much better and some which were poorer. It is typical of our bread-and-butter type of operation. We attempt to obtain all facts ossible, continue to keep abreast of developments and evaluate all of this in terms of our experience. We certainly don’t go into all the deals that come along – there is considerable variation in their attractiveness. When a workout falls through, the resulting market value shrink is substantial. Therefore, you cannot afford many errors, although we fully realize we are going to have them occasionally.
我们并不是说对得克萨斯国家石油公司的投资是多么了不起的成就。我们有过比这更好的套利交易，也有过更差的。这是我们常规套利业务的典型案例。我们试图获取尽可能多的事实信息，持续关注事态发展，并根据我们的经验对所有情况进行评估。当然，我们不会参与所有出现的交易，因为这些交易的吸引力差异很大。当一笔套利交易失败时，其市场价值会大幅缩水。因此，我们不能犯太多错误，尽管我们完全清楚偶尔还是会犯错。
DEMPSTER MILL MFG.
登普斯特尔磨坊制造公司（Dempster Mill Mfg.）
This situation started as a general in 1956. At that time the stock was selling at $18 with about $72 in book value of which $50 per share was in current assets (Cash, receivables and inventory) less all liabilities. Dempster had earned good money in the past but was only breaking even currently.
1956 年，对这家公司的投资最初属于普通股投资类别。当时，该公司股票的售价为每股 18 美元，而账面价值约为每股 72 美元，其中每股 50 美元为流动资产（现金、应收账款和存货）减去所有负债后的净值。登普斯特尔公司过去曾盈利颇丰，但当时仅能实现收支平衡。
The qualitative situation was on the negative side (a fairly tough industry and unimpressive management), but the figures were extremely attractive. Experience shows you can buy 100 situations like this and have perhaps 70 or 80 work out to reasonable profits in one to three years. Just why any particular one should do so is hard to say at the time of purchase, but the group expectancy is favorable, whether the impetus is from an improved industry situation, a takeover offer, a change in investor psychology, etc.
从质的方面来看，情况并不乐观（所处行业竞争相当激烈，管理层表现也不出色），但从数据上看，其吸引力极大。经验表明，你可以买入 100 只类似这样的股票，其中大概有 70 到 80 只能够在一到三年内实现合理的利润。在买入时很难说某一只股票为什么会盈利，但从整体预期来看是有利的，无论是因为行业形势改善、收到收购要约，还是投资者心理变化等因素。
We continued to buy the stock in small quantities for five years. During most or this period I was a director and was becoming consistently less impressed with the earnings prospects under existing management. However, I also became more familiar with the assets and operations and my evaluation of the quantitative factors remained very favorable.
在五年的时间里，我们持续少量购入该公司股票。在这段时间的大部分时间里，我担任公司董事，并且越来越对现有管理层下的盈利前景感到失望。然而，我也对公司的资产和运营更加熟悉，并且对其量化因素的评估仍然非常乐观。
By mid-1961 we owned about 30% or Dempster (we had made several tender offers with poor results), but in August and September 1961 made, several large purchases at $30.25 per share, which coupled with a subsequent tender offer at the same price, brought our holding to over 70%. Our purchases over the previous five years had been in the $16-$25 range.
到 1961 年中期，我们持有登普斯特尔公司约 30% 的股份（我们曾进行过几次要约收购，但效果不佳）。但在 1961 年 8 月和 9 月，我们以每股 30.25 美元的价格进行了几次大量购入，并随后以同样的价格进行了要约收购，使我们的持股比例超过了 70%。在之前的五年里，我们的购入价格在 16 美元到 25 美元之间。
On assuming control, we elevated the executive vice president to president to see what he would do unfettered by the previous policies. The results were unsatisfactory and on April 23, 1962 we hired Harry Bottle as president.
在获得控制权后，我们将执行副总裁提升为总裁，想看看他在不受之前政策束缚的情况下会有怎样的表现。结果并不令人满意，于是在 1962 年 4 月 23 日，我们聘请了哈里・博特尔（Harry Bottle）担任总裁。
Harry was the perfect man for the job. I have recited his triumphs before and the accompanying comparative balance sheets speak louder than any words in demonstrating the re-employment of capital.
哈里是这份工作的完美人选。我之前曾讲述过他取得的成就，而随附的资产负债表对比数据比任何言语都更能有力地证明资本的重新配置所带来的成效。
| 1961年11月30日 | 1963年7月31日（未经审计） | |
|---|---|---|
| 现金（Cash） | 166,000美元 | 89,000美元 |
| 美国政府证券 - 成本价（US Gov’t Securities – at cost） | 289,000美元 | |
| 其他可交易证券 - 市值（超过成本价）（Other marketable securities – at market (which exceeds cost)） | 2,049,000美元 | |
| 现金及证券总计（Total Cash and Securities） | 166,000美元 | 2,436,000美元 |
| 应收账款（净额）（Accounts receivable (net)） | 1,040,000美元 | 864,000美元 |
| 存货（Inventory） | 4,203,000美元 | 890,000美元 |
| 预付费用等（Prepaid expenses, etc.） | 82,000美元 | 12,000美元 |
| 流动资产（Current Assets） | 5,491,000美元 | 4,202,000美元 |
| 其他资产（Other Assets） | 45,000美元 | 62,000美元 |
| 厂房及设备净值（Net Plant and Equipment） | 1,383,000美元 | 862,000美元 |
| 资产总计（Total Assets） | 6,919,000美元 | 5,126,000美元 |
| 应付票据（Notes Payable） | 1,230,000美元 | |
| 其他负债（Other Liability） | 1,088,000美元 | 274,000美元 |
| 负债总计（Total Liabilities） | 2,318,000美元 | 274,000美元 |
| 净值 1961年11月30日 60,146股 1963年7月31日 62,146股（Net worth 60,146 shs. 11/30/61 62,146 shs. 7/31/63） | 4,601,000美元 | 4,852,000美元 |
| 负债及净值总计（Total liabilities and net worth） | 6,919,000美元 | 5,126,000美元 |
Harry:
哈里：
(1) took the inventory from over $4 million (much of it slow moving) to under $1 million reducing carrying costs and obsolescence risks tremendously;
（1）将存货从 400 多万美元（其中很多是滞销品）削减至 100 万美元以下，极大地降低了持有成本和存货过时的风险；
(2) correspondingly freed up capital for marketable security purchases from which we gained over $400,000
（2）相应地释放出资金用于购买有价证券，我们从中获利超过 40 万美元；
(3) cut administration and selling expense from $150,000 to $75,000 per month;
（3）将管理费用和销售费用从每月 15 万美元削减至 7.5 万美元；
(4) cut factory overhead burden from $6 to $4.50 per direct labor hour;
（4）将工厂制造费用从每直接人工工时 6 美元削减至 4.5 美元；
(5) closed the five branches operating unprofitably (leaving us with three good ones) and replaced them with more productive distributors;
（5）关闭了五家不盈利的分支机构（留下了三家运营良好的），并替换为更具生产力的经销商；
(6) cleaned up a headache at an auxiliary factory operation at Columbus, Nebraska;
（6）解决了内布拉斯加州哥伦布市一家辅助工厂运营中令人头疼的问题；
(7) eliminated jobbed lines tying up considerable money (which could be used profitably in securities) while producing no profits;
（7）剔除了那些占用大量资金（这些资金本可用于证券投资获取利润）却无法产生盈利的代销产品线；
(8) adjusted prices of repair parts, thereby producing an estimated $200,000 additional profit with virtually no loss of volume; and most important;
（8）调整了维修零部件的价格，在几乎不影响销量的情况下，估计额外增加了 20 万美元的利润；而最重要的是；
(9) through these and many other steps, restored the earning capacity to a level commensurate with the capital employed.
（9）通过上述以及许多其他措施，使公司的盈利能力恢复到与所投入资本相称的水平。
In 1963, the heavy corporate taxes we were facing (Harry surprised me by the speed with which he had earned up our tax loss carry-forward) coupled with excess liquid funds within the corporation compelled us to either in some way de-incorporate or to sell the business.
1963 年，我们面临着高额的公司税（哈里迅速实现盈利，用完了我们的税务亏损结转额度，这让我感到惊讶），再加上公司内部有多余的流动资金，这迫使我们要么以某种方式将公司转为非公司制企业，要么出售公司业务。
We set out to do either one or the other before the end of 1963. De-incorporating had many problems but would have, in effect, doubled earnings for our partners and also eliminated the problem of corporate capital gain tax on Dempster securities.
我们打算在 1963 年底之前采取其中一种方式。将公司转为非公司制企业存在许多问题，但实际上，这会使我们合伙人的收益翻倍，同时也能消除登普斯特尔公司证券的公司资本利得税问题。
At virtually the last minute, after several earlier deals had fallen through at reasonably advanced stages, a sale of assets was made. Although there were a good many wrinkles to the sale, the net effect was to bring approximately book value. This, coupled with the gain we have in our portfolio of marketable securities, gives us a realization of about $80 per share. Dempster (now named First Beatrice Corp. - we sold the name to the new Co.) is down to almost entirely cash and marketable securities now. On BPL’s yearend audit, our First Beatrice holdings were valued at asset value (with securities at market) less a $200,000 reserve for various contingencies.
几乎在最后时刻，在之前的几笔交易在相当后期阶段都失败之后，我们成功出售了公司资产。尽管这笔交易有不少曲折，但最终的净效果是使我们获得了大致相当于账面价值的收益。再加上我们在有价证券投资组合上获得的收益，每股收益约为 80 美元。登普斯特尔公司（现在名为第一比阿特丽斯公司 —— 我们把公司名称卖给了新公司）现在几乎全部是现金和有价证券。在巴菲特合伙公司的年终审计中，我们持有的第一比阿特丽斯公司的股份按资产价值估值（证券按市值计算），减去了 20 万美元的各种或有事项准备金。
I might mention that we think the buyers will do very well with Dempster. They impress us as people of ability and they have sound plans to expand the business and its profitability. We would have been quite happy to operate Dempster on an unincorporated basis, but we are also quite happy to sell it for a reasonable price. Our business is making excellent purchases – not making extraordinary sales.
我想提一下，我们认为买家接手登普斯特尔公司后会经营得很好。他们给我们的印象是很有能力的人，并且他们有合理的计划来拓展业务和提高盈利能力。如果能以非公司制的形式经营登普斯特尔公司，我们会很乐意，但以合理的价格出售它，我们也同样高兴。我们的业务重点是进行出色的收购，而不是进行非凡的出售。
Harry works the same way I do – he likes big carrots. He is presently a limited partner of BPL, and the next belt-tightening operation we have, he’s our man.
哈里的做事方式和我一样，他喜欢丰厚的回报。他目前是巴菲特合伙公司的有限合伙人，下次我们再有需要精简业务的项目，他就是我们要找的人。
The Dempster saga points up several morals:
登普斯特尔公司的传奇故事给我们带来了几点启示：
(1) Our business is one requiring patience. It has little in common with a portfolio of high-flying glamour stocks and during periods of popularity for the latter, we may appear quite stodgy.
（1）我们的业务需要耐心。这与那些备受追捧的热门魅力股投资组合几乎没有共同之处，在后者受到市场青睐的时期，我们可能显得相当古板。
It is to our advantage to have securities do nothing price wise for months, or perhaps years, why we are buying them. This points up the need to measure our results over an adequate period of time. We suggest three years as a minimum.
在我们买入股票的数月甚至数年时间里，股票价格没有任何波动对我们是有利的。这凸显了在足够长的时间内衡量我们投资成果的必要性。我们建议至少以三年为一个期限。
(2) We cannot talk about our current investment operations. Such an open-mouth policy could never improve our results and in some situations could seriously hurt us. For this reason, should anyone, including partners, ask us whether we are interested in any security, we must plead the “5th Amendment.”
（2）我们不能谈论当前的投资操作。这种口无遮拦的做法永远无法提升我们的投资业绩，在某些情况下还可能严重损害我们的利益。因此，如果有人，包括合伙人，询问我们是否对某只证券感兴趣，我们必须援引 “美国宪法第五修正案”（保持沉默）。
1964 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
July 8, 1964
1964 年 7 月 8 日
First Half Performance
上半年业绩表现
The whole family is leaving for California on June 23rd so I am fudging a bit on this report and writing it June 18th. However, for those of you who set your watches by the receipt of our letters. I will maintain our usual chronological symmetry in reporting, leaving a few blanks which Bill will fill in after the final June 30th figures are available.
我们全家将于 6 月 23 日前往加利福尼亚州，所以我在 6 月 18 日就开始写这份报告了，稍微提前了一些时间。不过，对于那些根据收到我们信件的时间来对表的人来说，我会在报告中保持惯常的时间顺序，留一些空白处，等 6 月 30 日的最终数据出来后，比尔会把它们填上。
During the first half of 1964 the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “DOW”) advanced from 762.95 to 831.50. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.40 would have been received, bringing the overall return from the Dow during the first half to plus 10.0%. As I write this on June 18th, it appears that our results will differ only insignificantly from those of the Dow. I would feel much better reporting to you that the Dow had broken even, and we had been plus 5%, or better still, that the Dow had been minus 10%, and we had broken even. I have always pointed out, however, that gaining an edge on the Dow is more difficult for us in advancing markets than in static or declining ones.
1964 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）从 762.95 点上涨到 831.50 点。如果在此期间持有道指成分股，大约可获得 14.40 的股息，这使得道指上半年的总体回报率达到了 10.0%。在我 6 月 18 日写这封信时，看起来我们的业绩与道指的差异微乎其微。要是能向你们汇报说道指基本持平，而我们上涨了 5%，或者更好的情况是，道指下跌了 10%，而我们保持不亏不赚，那我心里会好受得多。不过，我一直都指出，与在市场平稳或下跌的情况下相比，在上涨的市场中我们要跑赢道指难度更大。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner and the limited partners’ results:
为了使记录与时俱进，以下内容总结了道指的表现、合伙企业在分配给普通合伙人之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的收益情况：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964年上半年 | 10.9% | 12.0% | 10.5% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative results） | 116.1% | 521.0% | 354.4% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual compounded rate） | 10.8% | 27.6% | 22.2% |
(See next page for footnotes to table.)
（表格注释见下页。）
Footnotes to preceding table:
前表注释：
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）基于道琼斯指数年度价值变化，加上持有道琼斯指数成分股在当年可获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙企业运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，包含了所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或分配给普通合伙人。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing forallocation to the general partner based up on the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，是根据合伙企业业绩的前一栏数据计算得出，考虑了按照现行合伙协议向普通合伙人进行的分配，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
Buying activities during the first half were quite satisfactory. This is of particular satisfaction to me since I consider the buying end to be about 90% of this business. Our General category now includes three companies where B.P.L. is the largest single stockholder. These stocks have been bought and are continuing to be bought at prices considerably below their value to a private owner. We have been buying one of these situations for approximately eighteen months and both of the others for about a year. It would not surprise me if we continue to do nothing but patiently buy these securities week after week for at least another year, and perhaps even two years or more.
上半年的买入操作相当令人满意。这让我特别高兴，因为我认为投资业务中买入环节大约占 90% 的重要性。我们的普通股投资类别中现在包含了三家公司，在这三家公司里，巴菲特合伙公司（B.P.L.）是最大的单一股东。这些股票是以大幅低于其对私人所有者价值的价格买入的，并且我们还在继续买入。其中一家公司的股票我们已经买入了大约 18 个月，另外两家也买了大概一年时间。如果我们接下来至少一年，甚至可能两年或更长时间里，只是耐心地每周持续买入这些股票，而股价没有任何变化，我也不会感到惊讶。
What we really like to see in situations like the three mentioned above is a condition where the company is making substantial progress in terms of improving earnings, increasing asset values, etc., but where the market price of the stock is doing very little while we continue to acquire it. This doesn’t do much for our short-term performance, particularly relative to a rising market, but it is a comfortable and logical producer of longer-term profits. Such activity should usually result in either appreciation of market prices from external factors or the acquisition by us of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. Either alternative suits me.
对于上述提到的这三家公司这样的投资情况，我们真正希望看到的是，公司在提高盈利、增加资产价值等方面取得显著进展，但在我们持续买入股票的过程中，其市场价格却几乎没有变动。这对我们的短期业绩没有太大帮助，尤其是在市场上涨的情况下，但从长期来看，这是一种令人安心且符合逻辑的获取利润的方式。这样的操作通常会带来两种结果，要么由于外部因素导致市场价格上涨，要么我们能以优惠的价格获得公司的控制权。这两种情况我都乐于接受。
It is important to realize, however, that most of our holdings in the General category continue to be securities which we believe to be considerably undervalued, but where there is not the slightest possibility that we could have a controlling position. We expect the market to justify our analyses of such situations in a reasonable period of time, but we do not have the two strings to our bow mentioned in the above paragraph working for us in these securities.
然而，重要的是要认识到，我们在普通股投资类别中持有的大多数股票，我们认为它们仍然被大幅低估，但我们根本没有可能获得这些公司的控制权。我们期望市场能在合理的时间内证明我们对这些股票的分析是正确的，但对于这些股票，我们没有上段中提到的那两种优势。
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95%-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $28 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown below. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）进行比较，这两家公司通常遵循将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略，同时也与两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行对比。这四家公司分别是马萨诸塞投资者信托基金（Massachusetts Investors Trust）、投资者股票基金（Investors Stock Fund）、三大陆公司（Tri-Continental Corp.）和雷曼公司（Lehman Corp.），它们管理着超过 40 亿美元的资金，并且很可能代表了整个规模达 280 亿美元的投资公司行业的典型情况。它们的业绩如下所示。我认为，它们的业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩相符，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三元控制（2）（Tri-Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964年上半年 | 11.0% | 9.5% | 9.6% | 8.6% | 10.9% | 10.5% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative Results） | 105.8% | 95.5% | 98.2% | 105.1% | 116.1% | 354.4% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 10.1% | 9.4% | 9.6% | 10.1% | 10.8% | 22.2% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）根据资产价值的变化，加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1964 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for first half 1964.
（2）1957 年至 1963 年的数据来自《穆迪银行与金融手册（1964 年版）》。1964 年上半年的数据为估算值。
These figures continue to show that the most highly paid and respected investment management has difficulty matching the performance of an unmanaged index of blue chip stocks. The results of these companies in some ways resemble the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when it falls, back goes the duck. SPCA or no SPCA, I think the duck can only take the credit (or blame) for his own activities. The rise and fall of the lake is hardly something for him to quack about. The water level has been of great importance to B.P.L’s performance as the table on page one indicates. However, we have also occasionally flapped our wings.
这些数据继续表明，那些薪酬最高且备受尊敬的投资管理机构，在与一个未经管理的蓝筹股指数的业绩比拼中也面临困难。这些公司的业绩在某些方面就像一只鸭子在池塘里的活动。当水位（市场）上升时，鸭子随之上升；当水位下降时，鸭子也跟着下降。不管有没有防止虐待动物协会（SPCA），我认为这只鸭子只能对自己的行为负责（无论是功是过）。湖水的涨落可不是它能吹嘘的资本。正如第一页的表格所示，市场水位对巴菲特合伙公司（B.P.L.）的业绩有着重要影响。不过，我们偶尔也会拍拍翅膀（主动采取行动）。
I would like to emphasize that I am not saying that the Dow is the only way of measuring investment performance in common stocks. However, I do say that all investment managements (including self-management) should be subjected to objective tests, and that the standards should be selected a priori rather than conveniently chosen retrospectively.
我想强调的是，我并不是说道琼斯指数是衡量普通股投资业绩的唯一方式。然而，我确实认为所有的投资管理（包括自我管理）都应该接受客观的检验，而且检验标准应该事先选定，而不是事后为了方便而随意挑选。
The management of money is big business. Investment managers place great stress on evaluating company managements in the auto industry, steel industry, chemical industry, etc. These evaluations take enormous amounts of work, are usually delivered with great solemnity, and are devoted to finding out which companies are well managed and which companies have management weaknesses. After devoting strenuous efforts to objectively measuring the managements of portfolio companies, it seems strange indeed that similar examination is not applied to the portfolio managers themselves. We feel it is essential that investors and investment managements establish standards of performance and, regularly and objectively, study their own results just as carefully as they study their investments.
资金管理是一项庞大的业务。投资经理们非常重视对汽车行业、钢铁行业、化工行业等公司管理层的评估。这些评估需要耗费大量的精力，通常都是郑重其事地进行，目的是找出哪些公司管理良好，哪些公司存在管理缺陷。在费尽心思客观衡量投资组合中各公司的管理层之后，却不对投资组合经理自身进行类似的审视，这确实很奇怪。我们认为，投资者和投资管理机构必须制定业绩标准，并定期、客观地研究自己的投资成果，就像他们仔细研究自己的投资项目一样。
We will regularly follow this policy wherever it may lead. It is perhaps too obvious to say that our policy of measuring performance in no way guarantees good results–it merely guarantees objective evaluation. I want to stress the points mentioned in the “Ground Rules” regarding application of the standard–namely that it should be applied on at least a three-year basis because of the nature of our operation and also that during a speculative boom we may lag the field. However, one thing I can promise you. We started out with a 36-inch yardstick and we’ll keep it that way. If we don’t measure up, we won’t change yardsticks. In my opinion, the entire field of investment management, involving hundreds of billions of dollars, would be more satisfactorily conducted if everyone had a good yardstick for measurement of ability and sensibly applied it. This is regularly done by most people in the conduct of their own business when evaluating markets, people, machines, methods, etc., and money management is the largest business in the world.
无论结果如何，我们都会定期遵循这一原则。或许无需多言，我们衡量业绩的原则并不能保证取得好的结果，它只是确保进行客观的评估。我想强调一下《基本规则》中提到的关于应用该标准的要点，即由于我们业务的性质，至少应该以三年为一个周期来应用这个标准，而且在投机热潮期间，我们的业绩可能会落后于市场。不过，我可以向你们保证一件事。我们一开始就用的是 36 英寸的标准尺（衡量标准），而且我们会一直保持不变。如果我们达不到标准，我们也不会改变标准。在我看来，如果每个人都有一个良好的衡量能力的标准，并合理地应用它，那么涉及数万亿美元的整个投资管理领域的运作将会更加令人满意。在评估市场、人员、机器、方法等方面时，大多数人在经营自己的业务时都会定期这样做，而资金管理是世界上最大的业务领域。
Taxes
税务
We entered 1964 with net unrealized gains of $2,991,090 which is all attributable to partners belonging during 1963. Through June 30th we have realized capital gains of $2,826,248.76 (of which 96% are long term) so it appears very likely that at least all the unrealized appreciation attributable to your interest and reported to you in our letter of January 25, 1964, (item 3) will be realized this year. I again want to emphasize that this has nothing to do with how we are doing. It is possible that I could have made the above statement, and the market value of your B.P.L. interest could have shrunk substantially since January 1st, so the fact that we have large realized gains is no cause for exultation. Similarly when our realized gains are very small there is not necessarily any reason to be discouraged. We do not play any games to either accelerate or defer taxes. We make investment decisions based on our evaluation of the most profitable combination of probabilities. If this means paying taxes I’m glad the rates on long-term capital gains are as low as they are.As previously stated in our most recent tax letter of April 1, 1964 the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1964 as your actual tax was for 1963. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
进入 1964 年时，我们有 2,991,090 美元的未实现净收益，这些收益都归属于 1963 年时的合伙人。截至 6 月 30 日，我们已实现资本利得 2,826,248.76 美元（其中 96% 为长期资本利得），所以很有可能至少所有在 1964 年 1 月 25 日的信件（第 3 项）中向你们报告的、归属于你们权益的未实现增值部分，今年都会实现。我想再次强调，这与我们的投资表现如何毫无关系。有可能我刚说完上面这番话，而自 1 月 1 日以来你们在巴菲特合伙公司的权益市值却大幅缩水，所以我们实现了大量资本利得这一事实并不值得欣喜。同样，当我们实现的资本利得非常小时，也没有必要感到气馁。我们不会为了加速或推迟纳税而耍任何手段。我们根据对最有可能实现盈利的组合的评估来做出投资决策。如果这意味着要纳税，我很高兴长期资本利得税率能像现在这么低。正如我们在 1964 年 4 月 1 日最近的税务信函中所说，在进行中期估算时，稳妥的做法是按照 1963 年的实际纳税额来估算 1964 年的纳税额。如果你们遵循这个程序，就不会受到任何处罚。
The tax liability for partners who entered January 1st will, of course, be quite moderate, as it always is in the first year for any partner. This occurs because realized capital gains are first attributed to old partners having an interest in unrealized appreciation. This, again, of course, has nothing to do with economic performance. All limited partners, new and old, (except for Bill Scott, Ruth Scott and Susan Buffett per paragraph five of the Partnership Agreement) end up with exactly the same results. As usual, net ordinary income for all partners is nominal to date.
当然，对于 1 月 1 日加入的合伙人来说，他们的税务负担会相当适度，这对于任何新合伙人的第一年来说都是如此。这是因为已实现的资本利得首先会归属于那些拥有未实现增值权益的老合伙人。当然，这同样与经济业绩无关。所有新老有限合伙人（除了比尔・斯科特、露丝・斯科特和苏珊・巴菲特，根据合伙协议的第五段规定）最终的结果都是完全一样的。和往常一样，到目前为止，所有合伙人的净普通收入都很少。
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest, to us by that time in becoming partners) with the amendment to the Partnership Agreement, Commitment Letter for 1965, estimate or the 1964 tax situation, etc. In the meantime, keep Bill busy this summer clearing up anything in this letter that comes out fuzzy.
和往年一样，我们会在 11 月 1 日左右发出一封信函（给合伙人以及那些届时向我们表示有兴趣成为合伙人的人），内容包括合伙协议的修正案、1965 年的承诺书、1964 年税务情况的估算等。在此期间，如果这封信中有任何不清楚的地方，就多让比尔在这个夏天忙碌一下来解答吧。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1965 年信件
1965 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
January 18, 1965
1965 年 1 月 18 日
Our Performance in 1964
我们在 1964 年的业绩表现
Although we had an overall gain of $4,846,312.37 in 1964, it was not one of our better years as judged by our fundamental yardstick, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”). The overall result for BPL was plus 27.8% compared to an overall plus 18.7% for the Dow. The overall result for limited partners was plus 22.3%. Both the advantage of 9.1 percentage points on a partnership basis and 3.6 points by the limited partners were the poorest since 1959, which was a year of roughly comparable gains for the Dow.
尽管 1964 年我们实现了总计 4,846,312.37 美元的收益，但以我们的基本衡量标准道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）来评判，这并非我们表现较好的年份之一。巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的总体收益率为 27.8%，而道指的总体收益率为 18.7%。有限合伙人的总体收益率为 22.3%。无论是从合伙公司整体来看 9.1 个百分点的优势，还是有限合伙人 3.6 个百分点的优势，都是自 1959 年以来最小的，而 1959 年道指的涨幅与 1964 年大致相当。
Nevertheless, I am not depressed. It was a strong year for the general market, and it is always tougher for us to outshine the Dow in such a year. We are certain to have years when the Dow gives us a drubbing and, in some respects, I feel rather fortunate that 1964 wasn’t the year. Because of the problems that galloping markets pose for us, a Dow repeat in 1965 of 1964 results would make it most difficult for us to match its performance, let alone surpass it by a decent margin.
不过，我并不感到沮丧。这一年整体市场表现强劲，在这样的年份里，我们要超越道指总是更加困难。我们肯定会遇到被道指远远甩在后面的年份，从某种程度上来说，我觉得很庆幸 1964 年不是那样的一年。由于市场快速上涨给我们带来的种种问题，如果 1965 年道指再次出现 1964 年那样的表现，我们将极难与其业绩相匹敌，更不用说大幅超越它了。
To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partner’s results:
为了让记录与时俱进，以下内容总结了道指逐年的表现、合伙企业在分配给普通合伙人之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的收益情况：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）基于道琼斯指数年度价值变化，加上持有道琼斯指数成分股在当年可获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙企业运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，包含了所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或分配给普通合伙人。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）1957 年至 1961 年的数据，是根据合伙企业业绩的前一栏数据计算得出，考虑了按照现行合伙协议向普通合伙人进行的分配，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
按累计或复利计算，结果如下：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（Overall Results From Dow） | 合伙业绩（Partnership Results） | 有限合伙人业绩（Limited Partners’ Results） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 42.9% | 140.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 94.9% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 1964年 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 11.1% | 27.7% | 22.3% |
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95-100% invested in common stock, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corporation, and Lehman Corporation, manage about $4.5 billion, are owned by about 550,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $30 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们定期将我们的业绩与两家最大的开放式投资公司（共同基金）进行比较，这两家公司通常遵循将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略，同时也与两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行对比。这四家公司分别是马萨诸塞投资者信托基金（Massachusetts Investors Trust）、投资者股票基金（Investors Stock Fund）、三大陆公司（Tri-Continental Corporation）和雷曼公司（Lehman Corporation），它们管理着约 45 亿美元的资金，由大约 55 万名股东持有，并且很可能代表了整个规模达 300 亿美元的投资公司行业的典型情况。我认为，它们的业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩相符，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
The purpose of this tabulation, which is shown below, is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of over $8 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly-paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.
下面的表格统计的目的在于说明，道琼斯指数作为衡量投资成就的指标并非轻易就能超越。仅管理上述四家公司的投资顾问人才，每年收取的费用就超过 800 万美元，而这在专业投资管理行业中只是很小的一部分。这些高薪且备受尊敬的专业人才的整体表现显示，他们的业绩略逊于道琼斯指数这个未经管理的指数。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度业绩
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）根据资产价值的变化，加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1964 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-63. Estimated for 1964.
（2）1957 年至 1963 年的数据来自《穆迪银行与金融手册（1964 年版）》。1964 年的数据为估算值。
COMPOUNDED
按复利计算
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 46.2% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 85.4% | 78.5% | 80.8% | 88.9% | 94.9% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 1964年 | 114.9% | 104.0% | 105.4% | 112.7% | 131.3% | 402.9% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 10.0% | 9.3% | 9.4% | 9.9% | 11.1% | 22.3% |
The repetition of these tables has caused partners to ask: “Why in the world does this happen to very intelligent managements working with (1) bright, energetic staff people, (2) virtually unlimited resources, (3) the most extensive business contacts, and (4) literally centuries of aggregate investment experience?” (The latter qualification brings to mind the fellow who applied for a job and stated he had twenty years of experience -which was corrected by the former employer to read “one year’s experience -twenty times.”)
反复看到这些表格后，合伙人不禁问道：“为什么会出现这种情况呢？这些非常聪明的管理团队，拥有（1）聪明且精力充沛的员工，（2）几乎无限的资源，（3）最广泛的商业人脉，以及（4）累计起来足有数百年的投资经验呀。”（最后一点让人想起那个求职的人，他声称自己有二十年的经验，而他的前雇主却纠正说‘是一年的经验重复了二十次’。）
This question is of enormous importance, and you would expect it to be the subject of considerable study by investment managers and substantial investors. After all, each percentage point on $30 billion is $300 million per year. Curiously enough, there is practically nothing in the literature of Wall Street attracting this problem, and discussion of it is virtually absent at security analyst society meetings, conventions, seminars, etc. My opinion is that the first job of any investment management organization is to analyze its own techniques and results before pronouncing judgment on the managerial abilities and performance of the major corporate entities of the United States.
这个问题至关重要，人们会期望投资经理和大额投资者对其进行深入研究。毕竟，300 亿美元的资金，每一个百分点就意味着每年 3 亿美元。奇怪的是，华尔街的文献中几乎没有探讨这个问题的内容，在证券分析师协会的会议、大会、研讨会等场合，也几乎听不到关于这个问题的讨论。我认为，任何投资管理机构的首要任务，是在对美国主要企业实体的管理能力和业绩做出评判之前，先分析自身的投资技巧和业绩成果。
In the great majority of cases the lack of performance exceeding or even matching an unmanaged index in no way reflects lack of either intellectual capacity or integrity. I think it is much more the product of: (1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is “safe” and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.
在绝大多数情况下，业绩未能超越甚至与一个未经管理的指数持平，绝不能说明这些机构缺乏智力或诚信。我认为，这更多是以下因素的结果：（1）群体决策 —— 我或许有些偏见，认为对于任何规模的群体而言，要让所有成员真正参与决策，并做出杰出的投资管理决策，几乎是不可能的；（2）希望与其他备受尊敬的大型机构的投资策略（在一定程度上）以及投资组合保持一致；（3）一种制度框架，在这种框架下，达到平均水平是 “安全” 的，而独立行动所带来的个人回报，与这种行动所伴随的总体风险完全不成比例；（4）坚持某些不合理的分散投资做法；最后且重要的是，（5）惯性思维。
Perhaps the above comments are unjust. Perhaps even our statistical comparisons are unjust. Both our portfolio and method of operation differ substantially from the investment companies in the table. However, I believe both our partners and their stockholders feel their managements are seeking the same goal - the maximum long-term average return on capital obtainable with the minimum risk of permanent loss consistent with a program of continuous investment in equities. Since we should have common goals, and most partners, as an alternative to their interest in BPL, would probably have their funds invested in media producing results comparable with these investment companies, I feel their performance record is meaningful in judging our own results.
也许上述评论有失公允。也许就连我们的统计对比也是不公正的。我们的投资组合和操作方法与表格中的投资公司有很大差异。然而，我相信我们的合伙人和这些投资公司的股东都认为，这些公司的管理层追求的目标是一致的 —— 在持续投资股票的计划中，以最低的永久性损失风险，获取最大的长期平均资本回报率。由于我们的目标应该是一致的，而且大多数合伙人如果不投资于巴菲特合伙公司（BPL），很可能会将资金投入到那些业绩与这些投资公司相当的机构中，所以我认为这些投资公司的业绩记录对于评判我们自己的业绩是有意义的。
There is no question that an important service is provided to investors by investment companies, investment advisors, trust departments, etc. This service revolves around the attainment of adequate diversification, the preservation of a long-term outlook, the ease of handling investment decisions and mechanics, and most importantly, the avoidance of the patently inferior investment techniques which seem to entice some individuals. All but a few of the organizations do not specifically promise to deliver superior investment performance although it is perhaps not unreasonable for the public to draw such an inference from their advertised emphasis on professional management.
毫无疑问，投资公司、投资顾问、信托部门等为投资者提供了一项重要服务。这项服务围绕着实现充分的分散投资、保持长期的投资视野、便于做出投资决策和操作，以及最重要的是，避免那些明显低劣的投资技巧，而这些技巧似乎对某些个人很有吸引力。几乎所有这些机构都没有明确承诺会提供卓越的投资业绩，尽管公众从这些机构对专业管理的宣传中得出这样的推断也并非毫无道理。
One thing I pledge to you as partners - just as I consider the previously stated performance comparison to be meaningful now, so will I in future years, no, matter what tale unfolds. Correspondingly, I ask that you, if you do not feel such a standard to be relevant, register such disagreement now and suggest other standards which can be applied prospectively rather than retrospectively.
作为合伙人，我向你们承诺一件事 —— 就像我认为之前所说的业绩对比现在是有意义的一样，在未来的岁月里，无论发生什么情况，我都会坚持这一点。相应地，我也请求你们，如果你们认为这样的标准不相关，请现在就提出不同意见，并提出其他可以前瞻性应用而非事后应用的标准。
One additional thought - I have not included a column in my table for the most widely-used investment advisor in the world - Bell management. People who watch their weight, golf scores, and fuel bills seem to shun quantitative evaluation of their investment management skills although it involves the most important client in the world - themselves. While it may be of academic interest to evaluate the management accomplishments of Massachusetts Investors Trust or Lehman Corporation, it is of enormous dollars-and-cents importance to evaluate objectively the accomplishments of the fellow who is actually handling your money - even if it’s you.
还有一个想法 —— 我在表格中没有列出世界上使用最广泛的投资顾问 ——“自我管理”（指投资者自己管理资金）这一栏。那些关注自己体重、高尔夫球得分和燃油费用的人，似乎却回避对自己投资管理能力进行量化评估，尽管这涉及到世界上最重要的客户 —— 他们自己。虽然评估马萨诸塞投资者信托基金或雷曼公司的管理成就可能具有学术意义，但客观评估实际管理你资金的人的成就（即使这个人就是你自己），在金钱方面却具有极其重要的意义。
The Question of Conservatism
关于保守性的问题
In looking at the table of investment company performance, the question might be asked: “Yes, but aren’t those companies run more conservatively than the Partnership?” If you asked that question of the investment company managements, they, in absolute honesty, would say they were more conservative. If you asked the first hundred security analysts you met, I am sure that a very large majority of them also would answer for the investment companies. I would disagree. I have over 90% of my net worth in BPL, and most of my family have percentages in that area, but of course, that only demonstrates the sincerity of my view - not the validity of it.
在查看投资公司业绩表格时，可能会有人问：“没错，但是那些公司的运作难道不比巴菲特合伙公司更保守吗？” 如果你向投资公司的管理层提出这个问题，他们会非常诚实地说，他们更保守。如果你问你遇到的前一百位证券分析师，我相信绝大多数人也会认为投资公司更保守。但我不同意这种观点。我的净资产超过 90% 都投资在巴菲特合伙公司，我的大多数家人在这方面的投资比例也差不多，但这当然只能说明我观点的真诚，而不能证明其正确性。
It is unquestionably true that the investment companies have their money more conventionally invested than we do. To many people conventionality is indistinguishable from conservatism. In my view, this represents erroneous thinking. Neither a conventional nor an unconventional approach, per se, is conservative.
毫无疑问，投资公司的资金投资方式比我们的更传统。对很多人来说，传统与保守难以区分。但在我看来，这种想法是错误的。无论是传统的还是非传统的投资方式，本身都不能等同于保守。
Truly conservative actions arise from intelligent hypotheses, correct facts and sound reasoning. These qualities may lead to conventional acts, but there have been many times when they have led to unorthodoxy. In some corner of the world they are probably still holding regular meetings of the Flat Earth Society.
真正保守的行动源自明智的假设、正确的事实和合理的推理。这些因素可能会导致采取传统的行动，但也有很多时候会导致采取非传统的行动。在世界的某个角落，可能仍然有 “地球是平的” 协会在定期举行会议呢。
We derive no comfort because important people, vocal people, or great numbers of people agree with us. Nor do we derive comfort if they don’t. A public opinion poll is no substitute for thought. When we really sit back with a smile on our face is when we run into a situation we can understand, where the facts are ascertainable and clear, and the course of action obvious. In that case - whether other conventional or unconventional - whether others agree or disagree - we feel - we are progressing in a conservative manner.
重要人物、有影响力的人物或很多人赞同我们的观点，我们不会因此感到欣慰。他们不赞同，我们也不会因此感到沮丧。民意调查不能替代思考。当我们遇到一种我们能够理解的情况，事实清晰可查，行动方案显而易见时，我们才会真正面带微笑、从容以对。在那种情况下 —— 无论我们的做法是传统还是非传统 —— 无论别人是否赞同 —— 我们都觉得我们是以一种保守的方式在前进。
The above may seem highly subjective. It is. You should prefer an objective approach to the question. I do. My suggestion as to one rational way to evaluate the conservativeness of past policies is to study performance in declining markets. We have only three years of declining markets in our table and unfortunately (for purposes of this test only) they were all moderate declines. In all three of these years we achieved appreciably better investment results than any of the more conventional portfolios.
上述观点可能看起来非常主观。确实如此。你可能更倾向于用客观的方法来探讨这个问题。我也是。我认为评估过去投资策略保守性的一个合理方法，是研究在市场下跌时期的业绩表现。在我们的表格中，只有三年是市场下跌的年份，而且不幸的是（仅就这个测试而言），这三年的市场跌幅都比较温和。在这三年里，我们所取得的投资业绩都明显好于任何更传统的投资组合。
Specifically, if those three years had occurred in sequence, the cumulative results would have been:
具体来说，如果这三年是连续出现的，累计结果将会是：
| Tri-Continental Corp.（三大陆公司） | -9.7% |
| Dow（道指） | -20.6% |
| Mass. Investors Trust（马萨诸塞投资信托公司） | -20.9% |
| Lehman Corp.（雷曼公司） | -22.3% |
| Investors Stock Fund（投资者股票基金） | -24.6% |
| Limited Partners（合伙人有限公司） | +45.0% |
We don’t think this comparison is all important, but we do think it has some relevance. We certainly think it makes more sense than saying “We own (regardless of price) A.T. &T., General Electric, IBM and General Motors and are therefore conservative.” In any event, evaluation of the conservatism of any investment program or management (including self-management) should be based upon rational objective standards, and I suggest performance in declining markets to be at least one meaningful test.
我们并不认为这种比较是至关重要的，但确实认为它有一定的相关性。我们当然觉得，这比那种 “我们持有（无论价格如何）美国电话电报公司（A.T. &T.）、通用电气（General Electric）、国际商业机器公司（IBM）和通用汽车（General Motors）的股票，所以我们的投资是保守的” 说法更有意义。无论如何，对任何投资项目或管理（包括自我管理）的保守性评估都应该基于合理客观的标准，我认为在市场下跌时期的业绩表现至少是一项有意义的测试。
The Joys of Compounding
复利的魅力
Readers of our early annual letters registered discontent at a mere recital of contemporary investment experience, but instead hungered for the intellectual stimulation that only could be provided by a depth study of investment strategy spanning the centuries. Hence, this section.
我们早期年度信函的读者对仅仅讲述当下的投资经历表示不满，他们渴望能从对跨越数个世纪的投资策略的深入研究中获得智力上的启发。因此，就有了这一部分内容。
Our last two excursions into the mythology of financial expertise have revealed that purportedly shrewd investments by Isabella (backing the voyage of Columbus) and Francis I (original purchase of Mona Lisa) bordered on fiscal lunacy. Apologists for these parties have presented an array of sentimental trivia. Through it all, our compounding tables have not been dented by attack.
我们在前两次对金融专业知识的 “神话” 探讨中发现，伊莎贝拉（资助哥伦布航海）和弗朗索瓦一世（最初购买《蒙娜丽莎》）所谓的精明投资，在财政方面近乎疯狂。为这些人辩护的人提出了一系列无关紧要的情感因素。但自始至终，我们的复利计算表格并未因这些反驳而受到影响。
Nevertheless, one criticism has stung a bit. The charge has been made that this column has acquired a negative tone with only the financial incompetents of history receiving comment. We have been challenged to record on these pages a story of financial perspicacity which will be a bench mark of brilliance down through the ages.
然而，有一种批评还是让我们有些在意。有人指责这部分内容带有消极的基调，只对历史上那些在金融方面无能的人进行了评论。有人向我们提出挑战，要求在这些页面上记录一个展现金融智慧的故事，使其成为古往今来卓越智慧的一个标杆。
One story stands out. This, of course, is the saga of trading acumen etched into history by the Manhattan Indians when they unloaded their island to that notorious spendthrift, Peter Minuit in 1626. My understanding is that they received $24 net. For this, Minuit received 22.3 square miles which works out to about 621,688,320 square feet. While on the basis of comparable sales, it is difficult to arrive at a precise appraisal, a $20 per square foot estimate seems reasonable giving a current land value for the island of $12,433,766,400 ($12 1/2 billion). To the novice, perhaps this sounds like a decent deal. However, the Indians have only had to achieve a 6 1/2% return (The tribal mutual fund representative would have promised them this.) to obtain the last laugh on Minuit. At 6 1/2%, $24 becomes $42,105,772,800 ($42 billion) in 338 years, and if they just managed to squeeze out an extra half point to get to 7%, the present value becomes $205 billion.
有一个故事格外突出。当然，这就是 1626 年曼哈顿的印第安人将他们的岛屿卖给那个臭名昭著的挥霍者彼得・米纽特（Peter Minuit）时所展现出的交易智慧的传奇故事。据我所知，他们净得 24 美元。为此，米纽特得到了 22.3 平方英里的土地，大约相当于 621,688,320 平方英尺。虽然根据类似的土地交易很难得出精确的估值，但每平方英尺 20 美元的估值似乎是合理的，这样算来该岛屿目前的土地价值为 12,433,766,400 美元（125 亿美元）。对于外行来说，这听起来或许是一笔不错的交易。然而，印第安人只需获得 6.5% 的回报率（部落的共同基金代表可能会向他们承诺这个回报率），就能让米纽特笑不出来。按 6.5% 的回报率计算，24 美元在 338 年后将变成 42,105,772,800 美元（420 亿美元），如果他们能设法再多挤出半个百分点，达到 7% 的回报率，那么现在的价值将变成 2050 亿美元。
So much for that.
关于这个故事就说到这里。
Some of you may view your investment policies on a shorter term basis. For your convenience, we include our usual table indicating the gains from compounding $100,000 at various rates:
你们当中有些人可能会从更短的期限来考虑自己的投资策略。为了方便起见，我们像往常一样附上一个表格，展示 10 万美元在不同回报率下的复利收益情况：
| 4% | 8% | 12% | 16% | |
| 10 年 | $48,024 | $115,892 | $210,584 | $341,143 |
| 20 年 | $119,111 | $366,094 | $864,627 | $1,846,060 |
| 30 年 | $224,337 | $906,260 | $2,895,970 | $8,484,940 |
This table indicates the financial advantages of:
这张表格表明了以下几方面的财务优势：
(1) A long life (in the erudite vocabulary of the financial sophisticate this is referred to as the Methusalah Technique)
（1）长寿（用金融行家的高深词汇来讲，这被称为玛士撒拉策略，玛士撒拉是《圣经》中活到 969 岁的长寿者）
(2) A high compound rate
（2）高复利回报率
(3) A combination of both (especially recommended by this author)
（3）两者兼具（这是作者特别推荐的方式）
To be observed are the enormous benefits produced by relatively small gains in the annual earnings rate. This explains our attitude which while hopeful of achieving a striking margin of superiority over average investment results, nevertheless, regards every percentage point of investment return above average as having real meaning.
需要注意的是，年均收益率相对微小的提升就能带来巨大的收益。这就解释了我们的态度，虽然我们希望能取得远超平均投资业绩的显著优势，但我们也认为，每一个高于平均水平的投资回报率百分点都具有切实的意义。
Our Goal
我们的目标
You will note that there are no columns in the preceding table for the 27.7% average of the Partnership during its eight-year lifespan or the 22.3% average of the limited partners. Such figures are nonsensical for the long term for several reasons: (Don’t worry about me “holding back” to substantiate this prophecy.)
你会注意到，在前面的表格中，没有列出合伙企业在其八年存续期内 27.7% 的平均收益率，也没有列出有限合伙人 22.3% 的平均收益率。从长期来看，这些数字是没有意义的，原因有以下几点：（别担心我是在 “有所保留” 以证实这个预言。）
(1) Any significant sums compounded at such rates take on national debt proportions at alarming speed.
（1）任何数额较大的资金以这样的收益率进行复利增长，都会以惊人的速度达到国债规模。
(2) During our eight-year history a general revaluation of securities has produced average annual rates of overall gain from the whole common stock field which I believe unattainable in future decades. Over a span of 20 or 30 years, I would expect something more like 6% - 7% overall annual gain from the Dow instead of the 11.1% during our brief history. This factor alone would tend to knock 4 points or so off of our annual compounding rate. It would only take a minus 20.5% year in 1965 for the Dow to bring it down to a 7% average figure for the nine years. Such years (or worse) should definitely be expected from time to time by those holding equity investments. If a 20% or 30% drop in the market value of your equity holdings (such as BPL) is going to produce emotional or financial distress, you should simply avoid common stock type investments. In the words of the poet - Harry Truman – “If you can’t stand the heat, stay out of the kitchen. It is preferable, of course, to consider the problem before you enter the “kitchen.”
（2）在我们八年的历史中，证券的普遍重新估值使得整个普通股领域的年均总收益率达到了一定水平，我认为在未来几十年里，这个水平是无法实现的。在 20 到 30 年的时间跨度内，我预计道琼斯指数的年均总收益率（当然包括股息）更可能在 6% 到 7% 左右，而不是在我们短暂的历史中达到的 11.1%。仅这一个因素就可能使我们的年均复利收益率降低 4 个百分点左右。如果 1965 年道琼斯指数下跌 20.5%，那么九年的平均收益率就会降至 7%。那些持有股票投资的人肯定应该预料到，时不时会出现这样的年份（或者更糟的情况）。如果你的股票投资（比如在巴菲特合伙公司的投资）市值下跌 20% 或 30% 会让你在情绪上或经济上感到困扰，那么你就应该避免投资普通股类的项目。用诗人 —— 哈里・杜鲁门的话来说：“如果你受不了热，就别待在厨房里。当然，最好在你进入‘厨房’之前就考虑好这个问题。”
(3) We do not consider it possible on an extended basis to maintain the 16.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow of the Partnership or the 11.2 percentage point edge enjoyed by the limited partners. We have had eight consecutive years in which our pool of money has out-performed the Dow, although the profit allocation arrangement left the limited partners short of Dow results in one of those years. We are certain to have years (note the plural) when the Partnership results fall short of the Dow despite considerable gnashing of teeth by the general partner (I hope not too much by the limited partners). When that happens our average margin of superiority will drop sharply. I might say that I also think we will continue to have some years of very decent margins in our favor. However, to date we have benefited by the fact that we have not had a really mediocre (or worse) year included in our average, and this obviously cannot be expected to be a permanent experience.
（3）我们认为，从长期来看，合伙企业不可能一直保持相对于道琼斯指数 16.6 个百分点的优势，有限合伙人也不可能一直保持 11.2 个百分点的优势。我们已经连续八年使我们的资金池表现优于道琼斯指数，尽管在其中一年，利润分配安排使得有限合伙人的收益低于道琼斯指数的表现。我们肯定会有（注意是复数形式）合伙企业业绩低于道琼斯指数的年份，尽管普通合伙人会为此咬牙切齿（我希望有限合伙人不要太难过）。当这种情况发生时，我们的平均优势幅度将会急剧下降。我可以说，我也认为我们还会有一些年份能取得相当不错的优势幅度。然而，到目前为止，我们受益于这样一个事实，即我们的平均数据中还没有包含真正平庸（或更糟）的年份，显然这不可能一直持续下去。
So what can we expect to achieve? Of course, anything I might say is largely guesswork, and my own investment philosophy has developed around the theory that prophecy reveals far more of the frailties of the prophet than it reveals of the future.
那么我们能期望实现什么呢？当然，我所说的很大程度上都是猜测，而且我自己的投资理念是基于这样一种理论发展而来的，即预言更多地揭示了预言者的弱点，而不是未来的情况。
Nevertheless, you, as partners, are entitled to know my expectations, tenuous as they may be. I am hopeful that our longer term experience will unfold along the following basis:
尽管如此，作为合伙人，你们有权知道我的期望，尽管这些期望可能很不确定。我希望我们的长期业绩能基于以下几点发展：
(1) An overall gain from the Dow (including dividends, of course) averaging in the area of 7% per annum, exhibiting customarily wide amplitudes in achieving this average – say, on the order or minus 40% to plus 50% at the extremes with the majority of years in the minus 10% to plus 20% range;
（1）道琼斯指数的总体收益（当然包括股息）平均每年在 7% 左右，在实现这个平均值的过程中通常会有很大的波动幅度 —— 比如说，极端情况下在下跌 40% 到上涨 50% 之间，而大多数年份在下跌 10% 到上涨 20% 的范围内；
(2) An average advantage of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner - again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks; and
（2）在分配给普通合伙人之前，巴菲特合伙公司平均每年比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点 —— 同样，优势幅度也会有很大波动，在糟糕的年份可能比道琼斯指数低 10 个百分点，而在一切顺利的时候可能比道琼斯指数高 25 个百分点；
(3) The product of these two assumptions gives an average of 17% to BPL or about 14% to limited partners. This figure would vary enormously from year to year; the final amplitudes, of course, depending, on the interplay of the extremes hypothesized in (1) and (2).
（3）基于以上两个假设，巴菲特合伙公司的平均收益率为 17% 左右，有限合伙人约为 14%。这个数字每年会有很大的差异；最终的波动幅度当然取决于（1）和（2）中所假设的极端情况之间的相互作用。
I would like to emphasize that the above is conjecture, perhaps heavily influenced by self-interest, ego, etc. Anyone with a sense of financial history knows this sort of guesswork is subject to enormous error. It might better be left out of this letter, but it is a question frequently and legitimately asked by partners. Long-rangeexpectable return is the primary consideration of all of us belonging to BPL, and it is reasonable that I should be put on record, foolish as that may later make me appear. My rather puritanical view is that any investment manager, whether operating as broker, investment counselor, trust department, Investment Company, etc., should be willing to state unequivocally what he is going to attempt to accomplish and how he proposes to measure the extent to which he gets the job done.
我想强调的是，以上内容只是推测，可能在很大程度上受到自身利益、自负等因素的影响。任何对金融历史有所了解的人都知道，这种猜测很可能会有很大的误差。也许这部分内容本不该写在这封信里，但这是合伙人经常合理提出的一个问题。长期预期回报是我们所有巴菲特合伙公司合伙人的首要考虑因素，我把自己的想法记录下来是合理的，尽管这可能会让我以后看起来很愚蠢。我相当正统的观点是，任何投资经理，无论是以经纪人、投资顾问、信托部门还是投资公司等身份开展业务，都应该愿意明确说明他打算实现什么目标，以及他打算如何衡量自己完成目标的程度。
Our Method of Operation
我们的操作方法
In past annual letters I have always utilized three categories to describe investment operations we conduct. I now feel that a four-category division is more appropriate. Partially, the addition of a new section - “Generals Relatively Undervalued” - reflects my further consideration of essential differences that have always existed to a small extent with our “Generals” group. Partially, it reflects the growing importance of what once was a very small sub-category but is now a much more significant part of our total portfolio. This increasing importance has been accompanied by excellent results to date justifying significant time and effort devoted to finding additional opportunities in this area. Finally, it partially reflects the development and implementation of a new and somewhat unique investment technique designed to improve the expectancy and consistency of operations in this category. Therefore, our four present categories are:
在过去的年度信函中，我一直用三类投资来描述我们所开展的投资业务。现在我觉得分为四类更为合适。新增 “相对低估的普通股（Generals - Relatively Undervalued）” 这一类，一方面反映了我对 “普通股（Generals）” 类别中一直存在的、虽细微但本质差异的进一步思考；另一方面，也反映了曾经非常小的一个子类别如今在我们总投资组合中变得越来越重要。到目前为止，这个类别重要性的提升伴随着出色的业绩表现，这证明我们在这个领域投入大量时间和精力去寻找更多机会是值得的。最后，这在一定程度上反映了一种新的、 somewhat unique（有点独特的）投资技巧的发展和应用，旨在提高该类别投资操作的预期收益和稳定性。因此，我们现在的四类投资如下：
- “Generals -Private Owner Basis” - a category of generally undervalued stocks, determined by quantitative standards, but with considerable attention also paid to the qualitative factor. There is often little or nothing to indicate immediate market improvement. The issues lack glamour or market sponsorship. Their main qualification is a bargain price; that is, an overall valuation of the enterprise substantially below what careful analysis indicates its value to a private owner to be. Again, let me emphasize that while the quantitative comes first and is essential, the qualitative is important. We like good management - we like a decent industry - we like a certain amount of “ferment” in a previously dormant management or stockholder group. But, we demand value.
基于私人所有者视角的普通股（Generals - Private Owner Basis）：这是一类普遍被低估的股票，主要根据量化标准来确定，但也会充分关注质的因素。通常情况下，几乎没有迹象表明这些股票的市场表现会立即改善。这些股票缺乏吸引力，也没有市场的追捧。它们的主要优势在于价格低廉，也就是说，对企业的整体估值大幅低于通过仔细分析得出的该企业对私人所有者的价值。我再次强调，虽然量化因素是首要且至关重要的，但质的因素也很关键。我们喜欢优秀的管理层 —— 我们喜欢前景良好的行业 —— 我们喜欢在之前死气沉沉的管理层或股东群体中出现一定的 “变革”。但是，我们最看重的还是价值。
Many times in this category we have the desirable “two strings to our bow” situation where we should either achieve appreciation of market prices from external factors or from the acquisition of a controlling position in a business at a bargain price. While the former happens in the overwhelming majority of cases, the latter represents an insurance policy most investment operations don’t have. We have continued to enlarge the positions in the three companies described in our 1964 midyear report where we are the largest stockholder. All three companies are increasing their fundamental value at a very satisfactory rate, and we are completely passive in two situations and active only on a very minor scale in the third. It is unlikely that we will ever take a really active part in policy-making in any of these three companies, but we stand ready if needed.
在这类投资中，很多时候我们处于理想的 “双保险” 境地，即我们要么能因外部因素实现市场价格上涨，要么能以优惠的价格获得对企业的控制权。虽然在绝大多数情况下是前者发生，但后者是大多数投资操作所不具备的一种保障。我们继续增持了 1964 年年中报告中提到的三家公司的股份，在这三家公司中我们是最大的股东。这三家公司都以非常令人满意的速度在提升其基础价值，其中两家公司我们完全采取被动策略，在第三家公司我们也仅在很小的程度上积极参与。我们不太可能在这三家公司中的任何一家真正积极地参与决策制定，但如果有需要，我们随时准备这么做。
- “Generals -Relatively Undervalued” - this category consists of securities selling at prices relatively cheap compared to securities of the same general quality. We demand substantial discrepancies from current valuation standards, but (usually because of large size) do not feel value to a private owner to be a meaningful concept. It is important in this category, of course, that apples be compared to apples - and not to oranges, and we work hard at achieving that end. In the great majority of cases we simply do not know enough about the industry or company to come to sensible judgments -in that situation we pass.
相对低估的普通股（Generals - Relatively Undervalued）：这一类别的证券与同等质量的其他证券相比，售价相对较低。我们要求当前估值与标准估值之间存在较大差异，但（通常由于公司规模较大）不认为对私人所有者的价值是一个有意义的概念。当然，在这一类投资中，重要的是要进行同类比较 —— 而不是把苹果和橙子相比较，我们努力做到这一点。在绝大多数情况下，我们对相关行业或公司了解得不够多，无法做出合理的判断 —— 在这种情况下，我们就会放弃投资。
As mentioned earlier, this new category has been growing and has produced very satisfactory results. We have recently begun to implement a technique, which gives promise of very substantially reducing the risk from an overall change in valuation standards; e.g. I we buy something at 12 times earnings when comparable or poorer quality companies sell at 20 times earnings, but then a major revaluation takes place so the latter only sell at 10 times.
如前所述，这个新的类别一直在发展，并且已经产生了非常令人满意的结果。我们最近开始应用一种技巧，这种技巧有望大幅降低因估值标准整体变化而带来的风险；例如，当可比的或质量更差的公司股票市盈率为 20 倍时，我们以 12 倍市盈率买入某只股票，但随后市场进行了重大的重新估值，使得那些股票的市盈率降至 10 倍。
This risk has always bothered us enormously because of the helpless position in which we could be left compared to the “Generals -Private Owner” or “Workouts” types. With this risk diminished, we think this category has a promising future.
这种风险一直让我们非常困扰，因为与 “基于私人所有者视角的普通股（Generals - Private Owner）” 或 “套利交易（Workouts）” 类型的投资相比，我们可能会处于无助的境地。随着这种风险的降低，我们认为这个类别有很好的发展前景。
- “Workouts” - these are the securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity - sell-outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc. In this category we are not talking about rumors or “inside information” pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk pertains not primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in to a degree), but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected development does not materialize. Such killjoys could include anti-trust or other negative government action, stockholder disapproval, withholding of tax rulings, etc. The gross profits in many workouts appear quite small. It’s a little like looking for parking meters with some time left on them. However, the predictability coupled with a short holding period produces quite decent average annual rates of return after allowance for the occasional substantial loss. This category produces more steady absolute profits from year to year than generals do. In years of market decline it should usually pile up a big edge for us; during bull markets it will probably be a drag on performance. On a long-term basis, I expect the workouts to achieve the same sort of margin over the Dow attained by generals.
套利交易（Workouts）：这类投资是有时间安排的证券。它们源于企业的活动，如企业出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在此类投资中，我们关注的并非有关这些发展的传闻或 “内幕消息”，而是公开宣布的此类活动。我们会等到能在报纸上看到相关消息时才行动。此类投资的风险主要不在于市场的整体走势（尽管有时在一定程度上也与之相关），而在于某些因素破坏了预期的发展，导致原本预期的情况无法实现。这些不利因素可能包括反垄断或其他政府的负面行动、股东的反对、税务裁决的延迟等。许多套利交易的毛利润看起来相当微薄。这有点像寻找那些还剩一些停车时间的停车计时器（意思是利润虽小但可把握）。然而，由于其收益的可预测性以及较短的持有期，在考虑到偶尔出现的重大损失后，仍能产生相当不错的年均收益率。与普通股投资相比，套利交易这一类别每年能产生更为稳定的绝对利润。在市场下跌的年份，它通常应该能为我们积累很大的优势；而在牛市中，它可能会拖累整体业绩。从长期来看，我期望套利交易能取得与普通股投资类似的相对于道指的优势。
- “Controls” - these are rarities, but when they occur they are likely to be of significant size. Unless we start off with the purchase of a sizable block of stock, controls develop from the general - private owner category. They result from situations where a cheap security does nothing pricewise for such an extended period of time that we are able to buy a significant percentage of the company’s stock. At that point we are probably in a position to assume a degree of or perhaps complete control of the company’s activities. Whether we become active or remain relatively passive at this point depends upon our assessment of the company’s future and the managements capabilities.
控制权投资（Controls）：这类投资比较少见，但一旦出现，规模往往较大。除非我们一开始就大量购入某公司的股票，否则控制权投资通常是从 “基于私人所有者视角的普通股” 类别发展而来的。当某只被低估的股票在很长一段时间内价格都没有变化，使得我们能够买入该公司相当比例的股票时，就会产生控制权投资。此时，我们可能有能力对公司的经营活动施加一定程度的控制，甚至是完全控制。至于我们在这一点上是积极参与还是相对被动，取决于我们对公司未来的评估以及管理层的能力。
We do not want to get active merely for the sake of being active. Everything else being equal, I would much rather let others do the work. However, when an active role is necessary to optimize the employment of capital, you can be sure we will not be standing in the wings.
我们不想仅仅为了活跃而采取行动。在其他条件相同的情况下，我更愿意让别人去做事。然而，当为了优化资本配置而必须积极参与时，你可以放心，我们绝不会袖手旁观。
Active or passive, in a control situation there should be a built-in profit. The sine qua non of this operation is an attractive purchase price. Once control is achieved, the value of our investment is determined by the value of the enterprise, not the oftentimes irrationalities of the market place.
无论是积极参与还是被动持有，在控制权投资中都应该有内在的利润。这类投资的必要条件是有一个有吸引力的买入价格。一旦获得控制权，我们投资的价值就取决于企业的价值，而不是市场上常常出现的不合理波动。
Any of the three situations where we are now the largest stockholders mentioned under Generals - Private Owner could, by virtue of the two-way stretch they possess, turn into controls. That would suit us fine, but it also suits us if they advance in the market to a price more in line with intrinsic value enabling us to sell them, thereby completing a successful generals - private owner operation.
在 “基于私人所有者视角的普通股” 类别中提到的我们目前作为最大股东的三家公司中的任何一家，都有可能凭借其具备的 “双保险” 特性转变为控制权投资。这对我们来说很好，但如果它们在市场上的价格上涨到更符合其内在价值的水平，使我们能够出售它们，从而完成一次成功的 “基于私人所有者视角的普通股” 投资操作，这对我们来说也同样不错。
Investment results in the control category have to be measured on the basis of at least several years. Proper buying takes time. If needed, strengthening management, redirecting the utilization of capital, perhaps effecting a satisfactory sale or merger, etc., are also all factors that make this a business to be measured in years rather than months. For this reason, in controls, we are looking for wide margins of profit -if it appears at all close, we quitclaim.
控制权投资的业绩必须至少以几年为基础来衡量。合理的买入需要时间。如果需要的话，加强管理层、重新配置资本，或者进行令人满意的出售或合并等，这些因素都决定了这是一项需要以年来衡量而非以月来衡量的业务。因此，在控制权投资中，我们寻求较大的利润空间 —— 如果看起来利润空间不大，我们就会放弃。
Controls in the buying stage move largely in sympathy with the Dow. In the later stages their behavior is geared more to that of workouts.
在买入阶段，控制权投资的走势在很大程度上与道指相关。在后期阶段，其表现更类似于套利交易。
You might be interested to know that the buyers of our former control situation, Dempster Mill Manufacturing, seem to be doing very well with it. This fulfills our expectation and is a source of satisfaction. An investment operation that depends on the ultimate buyer making a bum deal (in Wall Street they call this the “Bigger Fool Theory”) is tenuous indeed. How much more satisfactory it is to buy at really bargain prices so that only an average disposition brings pleasant results.
你可能有兴趣知道，我们之前拥有控制权的登普斯特尔磨坊制造公司（Dempster Mill Manufacturing）的买家，似乎经营得非常好。这符合我们的预期，也让我们感到满意。一项依赖于最终买家做亏本交易的投资操作（在华尔街，他们称之为 “更大的傻瓜理论”）确实是不可靠的。以真正优惠的价格买入，这样即使只是以一般的处置方式也能带来不错的结果，这是多么令人满意的事情啊。
As I have mentioned in the past, the division of our portfolio among categories is largely determined by the accident of availability. Therefore, in any given year the mix between generals, workouts, or controls is largely a matter of chance, and this fickle factor will have a great deal to do with our performance relative to the Dow. This is one of many reasons why single year’s performance is of minor importance and good or bad, should never be taken too seriously.
正如我过去提到的，我们投资组合在各个类别之间的分配很大程度上取决于可获得的投资机会。因此，在任何给定的年份里，普通股、套利交易或控制权投资之间的组合很大程度上是偶然的，而这个变化无常的因素将对我们相对于道琼斯指数的业绩表现产生很大影响。这也是为什么单一年份的业绩重要性相对较小，无论好坏，都不应过于看重的众多原因之一。
To give an example of just how important the accident of division between these categories is, let me cite the example of the past three years. Using an entirely different method of calculation than that used to measure the performance of BPL in entirety, whereby the average monthly investment at market value by category is utilized, borrowed money and office operating expenses excluded, etc., (this gives the most accurate basis for intergroup comparisons but does not reflect overall BPL results) the generals (both present categories combined), workouts, and the Dow, shape up as follows:
为了说明这些类别之间的分配偶然性有多重要，让我举一个过去三年的例子。使用一种与衡量巴菲特合伙公司整体业绩完全不同的计算方法，即按类别计算每月的平均投资市值，排除借入资金和办公室运营费用等（这为类别间的比较提供了最准确的基础，但并不反映巴菲特合伙公司的整体业绩），“普通股（将目前的两个相关类别合并计算）”、“套利交易” 和 “道琼斯指数” 的情况如下：
| Year | Generals | Workouts | Dow |
| 年份 | 综合部门 | 整改业务部门 | 道琼斯指数 |
| 1962 | -1.0% | 14.6% | -8.6% |
| 1963 | 20.5% | 30.6% | 18.4% |
| 1964 | 27.8% | 10.3% | 16.7% |
Obviously the workouts (along with controls) saved the day in 1962, and if we had been light in this category that year, our final result would have been much poorer, although still quite respectable considering market conditions during the year. We could just as well have had a much smaller percentage of our portfolio in workouts that year; availability decided it, not any notion on my part as to what the market was going to do. Therefore, it is important to realize that in 1962 we were just plain lucky regarding mix of categories.
显然，在 1962 年，整改业务部门（以及控制措施）拯救了局面。如果那一年我们在这个类别上表现不佳，最终业绩会差得多，尽管考虑到当年的市场情况，整体业绩仍然相当不错。同样，那年我们投资组合中整改业务部门的占比本可能低得多，而这一比例的高低决定了业绩，当时我们并没有特别关注市场走向。因此，重要的是要认识到，在 1962 年，我们在这些类别组合方面纯粹是运气好 。
In 1963 we had one sensational workout which greatly influenced results, and generals gave a good account of themselves, resulting in a banner year. If workouts had been normal, (say, more like 1962) we would have looked much poorer compared to the Dow. Here it wasn’t our mix that did much for us, but rather excellent situations.
1963 年，我们有一项极为出色的整改业务，这极大地影响了最终业绩，同时综合部门也表现良好，使这一年成为业绩辉煌的一年。如果整改业务表现正常（比如更接近 1962 年的水平），与道琼斯指数相比，我们的业绩会逊色许多。在这一年，对我们起关键作用的不是投资组合类别，而是绝佳的市场形势。
Finally, in 1964 workouts were a big drag on performance. This would be normal in any event during a big plus year for the Dow such as 1964, but they were even a greater drag than expected because of mediocre experience. In retrospect it would have been pleasant to have been entirely in generals, but we don’t play the game in retrospect.
最后，在 1964 年，整改业务严重拖累了整体业绩。在像 1964 年这样道琼斯指数大幅上涨的年份，这种情况无论如何都算是正常的，但由于经验不足，拖累程度比预期更严重。事后看来，如果当年全部投资于综合部门会很不错，但我们不能事后诸葛。
I hope the preceding table drives home the point that results in a given year are subject to many variables - some regarding which we have little control or insight. We consider all categories to be good businesses and we are very happy we have several to rely on rather than just one. It makes for more discrimination within each category and reduces the chance we will be put completely out of operation by the elimination of opportunities in a single category.
我希望前面的表格能让人深刻理解，某一年的业绩会受到许多变量的影响，其中一些变量我们几乎无法控制或预见。我们认为所有投资类别都是不错的业务，很高兴我们有多种业务可以依赖，而不是仅靠一种。这使得我们可以在每个类别中进行更细致的筛选，并降低因某一个类别机会消失而导致我们完全无法运营的风险。
Taxes
税收
We have had a chorus of groans this year regarding partners’ tax liabilities. Of course, we also might have had a few if the tax sheet had gone out blank.
今年，合伙人对税务负担怨声载道。当然，即便税单是空白的，我们可能也会有一些抱怨。
More investment sins are probably committed by otherwise quite intelligent people because of “tax considerations” than from any other cause. One of my friends - a noted West Coast philosopher maintains that a majority of life’s errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do. This is certainly the case when an emotionally supercharged element like taxes enters the picture (I have another friend -a noted East Coast philosopher who says it isn’t the lack of representation he minds -it’s the taxation).
在投资领域，那些在其他方面相当聪明的人，可能因为 “税务考量” 而犯下的投资错误，比其他任何原因都要多。我的一位朋友，一位著名的西海岸哲学家认为，人生中大多数错误都是因为忘记了自己真正想要做什么。当像税收这样容易让人情绪激动的因素掺杂进来时，情况更是如此（我还有一位朋友，一位著名的东海岸哲学家说，他在意的不是没有代表权，而是税收本身）。
Let’s get back to the West Coast. What is one really trying to do in the investment world? Not pay the least taxes, although that may be a factor to be considered in achieving the end. Means and end should not be confused, however, and the end is to come away with the largest after-tax rate of compound. Quite obviously if two courses of action promise equal rates of pre-tax compound and one involves incurring taxes and the other doesn’t the latter course is superior. However, we find this is rarely the case.
让我们回到西海岸的观点。在投资领域，人们真正想要实现的是什么？不是缴纳最少的税，尽管这可能是实现最终目标时需要考虑的一个因素。然而，手段和目标不应混淆，目标是实现最大的税后复合收益率。很明显，如果两种投资方式的税前复合收益率相同，一种需要缴税，另一种不需要，那么后者更优。但实际上，我们发现这种情况很少出现。
It is extremely improbable that 20 stocks selected from, say, 3000 choices are going to prove to be the optimum portfolio both now and a year from now at the entirely different prices (both for the selections and the alternatives) prevailing at that later date. If our objective is to produce the maximum after-tax compound rate, we simply have to own the most attractive securities obtainable at current prices, And, with 3,000 rather rapidly shifting variables, this must mean change (hopefully “tax-generating” change).
从 3000 只股票中选出 20 只，要想让它们在现在和一年后的不同价格（无论是所选股票还是其他股票）下都成为最优投资组合，这几乎是不可能的。如果我们的目标是实现最大的税后复合收益率，我们就必须持有在当前价格下最具吸引力的证券。而且，鉴于 3000 个快速变化的变量，这必然意味着要进行调整（希望是能 “产生税收” 的调整）。
It is obvious that the performance of a stock last year or last month is no reason, per se, to either own it or to not own it now. It is obvious that an inability to “get even” in a security that has declined is of no importance. It is obvious that the inner warm glow that results from having held a winner last year is of no importance in making a decision as to whether it belongs in an optimum portfolio this year.
显然，一只股票去年或上个月的表现本身，并不能成为现在持有或不持有的理由。同样明显的是，无法在股价下跌的证券上 “回本” 并不重要。去年持有一只盈利股票带来的内心满足感，对于决定今年这只股票是否属于最优投资组合也毫无意义。
If gains are involved, changing portfolios involves paying taxes. Except in very unusual cases (I will readily admit there are some cases), the amount of the tax is of minor importance if the difference in expectable performance is significant. I have never been able to understand why the tax comes as such a body blow to many people since the rate on long-term capital gain is lower than on most lines of endeavor (tax policy indicates digging ditches is regarded as socially less desirable than shuffling stock certificates).
如果涉及盈利，调整投资组合就需要缴税。除非在极特殊的情况下（我承认确实存在一些特殊情况），如果预期业绩差异显著，那么税额其实并不重要。我一直无法理解，为什么税收对很多人来说是如此沉重的打击，因为长期资本利得税率比大多数行业的税率都低（税收政策表明，社会认为挖沟渠不如倒腾股票有价值）。
I have a large percentage of pragmatists in the audience so I had better get off that idealistic kick. There are only three ways to avoid ultimately paying the tax: (1) die with the asset - and that’s a little too ultimate for me even the zealots would have to view this “cure” with mixed emotions; (2) give the asset away - you certainly don’t pay any taxes this way, but of course you don’t pay for any groceries, rent, etc., either; and (3) lose back the gain if your mouth waters at this tax-saver, I have to admire you -you certainly have the courage of your convictions.
我的听众中有很多实用主义者，所以我最好别再讲那些理想化的观点了。只有三种方法可以最终避免缴税：（1）去世时仍持有资产 —— 但这对我来说太极端了，即使是狂热分子对这种 “解决办法” 也会心情复杂；（2）捐赠资产 —— 这样当然不用缴税，但当然也没钱支付食品杂货、房租等费用了；（3）如果因为想避税而把盈利亏回去，我不得不佩服你 —— 你肯定对自己的信念很有勇气。
So it is going to continue to be the policy of BPL to try to maximize investment gains, not minimize taxes. We will do our level best to create the maximum revenue for the Treasury -at the lowest rates the rules will allow.
所以，英国塑料有限公司（BPL）将继续秉持努力实现投资收益最大化，而非税收最小化的政策。我们会尽最大努力，按照法规允许的最低税率，为财政部创造最大的税收收入。
An interesting sidelight on this whole business of taxes, vis-à-vis investment management, has appeared in the last few years. This has arisen through the creation of so-called “swap funds” which are investment companies created by the exchange of the investment company’s shares for general market securities held by potential investors. The dominant sales argument has been the deferment (deferment, when pronounced by an enthusiastic salesman, sometimes comes very close phonetically to elimination) of capital gains taxes while trading a single security for a diversified portfolio. The tax will only finally be paid when the swap fund’s shares are redeemed. For the lucky ones, it will be avoided entirely when any of those delightful alternatives mentioned two paragraphs earlier eventuates.
在过去几年里，与投资管理相关的税收领域出现了一个有趣的现象。这源于所谓 “互换基金” 的创立，这类投资公司是通过用投资公司的股份交换潜在投资者持有的普通市场证券而设立的。其主要的销售卖点是，在将单一证券换成多元化投资组合时，可以延迟缴纳（当热情的销售人员说起 “延迟” 时，发音有时听起来很像 “免除”）资本利得税，只有在赎回互换基金的股份时才最终缴税。对于幸运的人来说，如果出现前两段提到的那些令人愉快的情况之一，就可以完全避免缴税。
The reasoning implicit in the swapee’s action is rather interesting. He obviously doesn’t really want to hold what he is holding or he wouldn’t jump at the chance to swap it (and pay a fairly healthy commission - usually up to $100,000) for a grab-bag of similar hot potatoes held by other tax-numbed investors. In all fairness, I should point out that after all offerees have submitted their securities for exchange and had a chance to review the proposed portfolio they have a chance to back out but I understand a relatively small proportion do so.
互换基金参与者的行为背后的逻辑相当有趣。显然，他们并不真想持有自己现有的证券，否则就不会急于抓住这个互换的机会（还得支付一笔可观的佣金，通常高达 10 万美元），去换取其他被税收困扰的投资者持有的类似烫手山芋的证券组合。公平地说，我应该指出，在所有参与者提交证券进行交换，并有机会查看提议的投资组合后，他们有机会退出，但据我所知，真正退出的人相对较少。
There have been twelve such funds (that I know of) established since origination of the idea in 1960, and several more are currently in the works. The idea is not without appeal since sales totaled well over $600 million. All of the funds retain an investment manager to whom they usually pay 1/2 of 1% of asset value. This investment manager faces an interesting problem; he is paid to manage the fund intelligently (in each of the five largest funds this fee currently ranges from $250,000 to $700,000 per year), but because of the low tax basis inherited from the contributors of securities, virtually his every move creates capital gains tax liabilities. And, of course, he knows that if he incurs such liabilities, he is doing so for people who are probably quite sensitive to taxes or they wouldn’t own shares in the swap fund in the first place.
自 1960 年这个想法诞生以来，已经成立了 12 只这样的基金（据我所知），目前还有几只正在筹备中。这个想法并非没有吸引力，因为其总销售额远远超过 6 亿美元。所有这些基金都聘请了一位投资经理，通常支付资产价值 0.5% 的费用。这位投资经理面临一个有趣的问题：他受雇来明智地管理基金（目前在五只最大的基金中，这笔费用每年在 25 万美元到 70 万美元之间），但由于从证券捐赠者那里继承的低税基，几乎他的每一个举动都会产生资本利得税负债。而且，他当然知道，如果产生这样的负债，他面对的是那些可能对税收非常敏感的人，否则他们一开始就不会购买互换基金的股份。
I am putting all of this a bit strongly, and I am sure there are some cases where a swap fund may be the best answer to an individual’s combined tax and investment problems. Nevertheless, I feel they offer a very interesting test-tube to measure the ability of some of the most respected investment advisors when they are trying to manage money without paying (significant) taxes.
我这么说有点夸张了，我相信在某些情况下，互换基金可能是解决个人税收和投资综合问题的最佳方案。尽管如此，我认为它们为衡量一些备受尊敬的投资顾问在试图不缴纳（大量）税款的情况下管理资金的能力，提供了一个非常有趣的 “试验场”。
The three largest swap funds were all organized in 1961, and combined have assets now of about $300 million. One of these, Diversification Fund, reports on a fiscal year basis which makes extraction of relevant data quite difficult for calendar year comparisons. The other two, Federal Street Fund and Westminster Fund (respectively first and third largest in the group) are managed by investment advisors who oversee at least $2 billion of institutional money.
三只最大的互换基金都是在 1961 年成立的，目前总资产约为 3 亿美元。其中一只，多元化基金，按照财政年度报告，这使得提取相关数据用于日历年比较相当困难。另外两只，联邦街基金和威斯敏斯特基金（分别是该类基金中规模第一和第三大的），由管理至少 20 亿美元机构资金的投资顾问管理。
Here’s how they shape up for all full years of existence:
以下是它们自成立以来各完整年度的业绩情况：
| 年份（Year） | 联邦街（Federal Street） | 威斯敏斯特（Westminster） | 道琼斯（Dow） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1962年 | -19.0% | -22.5% | -7.6% |
| 1963年 | 17.0% | 18.7% | 20.6% |
| 1964年 | 13.8% | 12.3% | 18.7% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 2.6% | 1.1% | 9.8% |
This is strictly the management record. No allowance has been made for the commission in entering and any taxes paid by the fund on behalf of the shareholders have been added back to performance.
这纯粹是管理业绩记录。未计入建仓时的佣金，并且基金代表股东支付的所有税款已加回到业绩中。
Anyone for taxes?
还有人想聊聊税收吗？
Miscellaneous
杂项
In the December 21st issue of AUTOMOTIVE NEWS it was reported that Ford Motor Co. plans to spend $700 million in 1965 to add 6,742,000 square feet to its facilities throughout the world. Buffett Partnership, Ltd., never far behind, plans to add 227 1/4 square feet to its facilities in the spring of 1965.
据 12 月 21 日的《汽车新闻》报道，福特汽车公司计划在 1965 年投入 7 亿美元，在全球范围内将其设施面积增加 674.2 万平方英尺。巴菲特合伙公司也不甘落后，计划在 1965 年春季将办公面积增加 227.25 平方英尺。
Our growth in net assets from $105,100 (there’s no prize for guessing who put in the $100) on May 5, 1956 when the first predecessor limited partnership.(Buffett Associates, Ltd. ) was organized, to $26,074,000 on 1/1/65 creates the need for an occasional reorganization in internal routine. Therefore, roughly contemporaneously with the bold move from 682 to 909 ¼ square feet, a highly capable is going to join our organization with responsibility for the administrative (and certain other) functions. This move will particularly serve to free up more of Bill Scott’s time for security analysis which is his forte. I’ll have more to report on this in the midyear letter.
从 1956 年 5 月 5 日首个前身有限合伙企业（巴菲特联合有限公司）成立时的 105,100 美元净资产（猜中谁投入了那 100 美元可没有奖品哦），到 1965 年 1 月 1 日的 26,074,000 美元，我们净资产的增长使得偶尔需要对内部日常事务进行重组。因此，在大胆地将办公面积从 682 平方英尺扩大到 909.25 平方英尺的差不多同一时间，一位能力很强的人将加入我们公司，负责行政（以及其他一些）事务。这一举措将特别有助于让比尔・斯科特腾出更多时间进行他擅长的证券分析工作。我会在年中信里对此作更多说明。
Bill (who continues to do a terrific job) and his wife have an investment in the Partnership of $298,749, a very large majority of their net worth. Our new associate (his name is being withheld until his present employer has replaced him), along with his wife and children, has made an important investment in the Partnership. Susie and I presently have an interest of $3,406,700 in BPL which represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card Co., a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders. Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother , two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-Law, four aunts, four cousins and six nieces and nephews, have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $1,942,592. So we all continue to eat home cooking.
比尔（他一直工作得非常出色）和他的妻子在合伙公司的投资为 298,749 美元，这占了他们净资产的很大一部分。我们的新同事（在他现在的雇主找到接替者之前暂不透露其姓名），连同他的妻子和孩子，也对合伙公司进行了重要投资。苏西和我目前在英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的权益为 3,406,700 美元，这几乎是我们的全部净资产，不过我们还继续持有中陆标签卡片公司的股份，这是一家本地公司，我在 1960 年购入股份，当时它的股东还不到 10 人。此外，我的亲属，包括三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫 / 妹夫、岳父、四个姑姑 / 姨妈、四个表亲以及六个侄子 / 侄女，直接或间接地在 BPL 拥有权益，总计 1,942,592 美元。所以我们都还是 “自家吃饭”（意为都与合伙公司利益紧密相连）。
We continue to represent the ultimate in seasonal businesses –open one day a year. This creates real problems in keeping the paper flowing smoothly, but Beth and Donna continue to do an outstanding job of coping with this and other problems.
我们仍然是季节性业务的极致代表 —— 一年只 “营业” 一天。这确实给文件处理的顺畅进行带来了问题，但贝丝和唐娜在处理这个问题以及其他事务方面仍然表现出色。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell has distinguished itself in its usual vital role of finding out what belongs to whom. We continue to throw impossible deadlines at them –and they continue to perform magnificently. You will note in their certificate this year that they have implemented the new procedure whereby they now pounce on us unannounced twice a year in addition to the regular yearend effort.
毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell ）在查明资产归属这一至关重要的工作中表现出色。我们不断给他们设定几乎不可能完成的截止日期，而他们依然出色地完成任务。你会在他们今年的报告中注意到，他们实施了新的程序，除了常规的年终审计外，现在还会每年两次在未事先通知的情况下对我们进行检查。
Finally -and most sincerely -let me thank you partners who cooperate magnificently in getting things to us promptly and properly and thereby maximize the time we can spend working where we should be -by the cash register. I am extremely fortunate in being able to spend the great majority of my time thinking about where our money should be invested, rather than getting bogged down in the minutiae that seems to overwhelm so many business entities. We have an organizational structure which makes this efficiency a possibility, and more importantly, we have a group of partners that make it a reality. For this, I am most appreciative and we are all wealthier.
最后，也是最诚挚地，我要感谢各位合伙人，你们积极配合，及时且恰当地向我们提供所需信息，从而让我们能最大限度地把时间花在该做的工作上 —— 进行投资相关工作。我非常幸运，能够把大部分时间花在思考资金该投向何处，而不是陷入那些似乎让许多企业不堪重负的琐碎事务中。我们的组织结构使这种高效成为可能，更重要的是，有你们这群合伙人让它成为现实。对此，我深表感激，而且我们也都因此更富有了。
Our past policy has been to admit close relatives of present partners without a minimum capital limitation. This year a flood of children, grandchildren, etc., appeared which called this policy into question; therefore, I have decided to institute a $25,000 minimum on interests of immediate relatives of present partners.
我们过去的政策是允许现有合伙人的近亲加入，且没有最低资金限制。今年一下子来了很多子女、孙辈等，这让这项政策受到质疑。因此，我决定对现有合伙人直系亲属的投资设定 25,000 美元的最低限额。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
在接下来的两周内，你将收到：
(1) A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1964 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
（1）一封税务信函，提供你填写 1964 年联邦所得税申报表所需的英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的所有信息。就税务目的而言，这封信函是唯一重要的文件。
(2) An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1964, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL as well as your own capital account.
（2）毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）出具的 1964 年审计报告，阐述英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的运营情况、财务状况以及你的资本账户情况。
(3) A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 111165. This is identical with the figure developed in the audit.
（3）一封我签署的信函，说明截至 1965 年 1 月 1 日你在英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的权益状况。该数据与审计报告中的数据一致。
(4) Schedule “A” to the partnership agreement listing all partners.
（4）合伙协议的附件 A，列出所有合伙人。
Let Bill or me know if anything needs clarifying. Even with our splendid staff our growth means there is more chance of missing letters, overlooked instructions, a name skipped over, a figure transposition, etc., so speak up if you have any question at all that we might have erred. My next letter will be about July 15th” summarizing the first half of this year.
如果有任何需要澄清的地方，请告知比尔或我。尽管我们的员工很出色，但随着公司的发展，出现遗漏信件、忽略指示、漏掉名字、数字录入错误等情况的可能性也增加了。所以，如果你觉得我们可能出错了，有任何疑问都请提出来。我的下一封信大约会在 7 月 15 日发出，总结今年上半年的情况。
Cordially,
诚挚问候，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1965 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
July 9, 1965
1965 年 7 月 9 日
Warren E. Buffett, General Partner
沃伦・E・巴菲特，普通合伙人
William Scott
威廉・斯科特
John M. Harding
约翰・M・哈丁
First Half Performance:
上半年业绩：
During the first half of 1965, the Dow Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter call the “Dow”) declined from 874.13 to 868.03. This minor change was accomplished in a decidedly non-Euclidian manner. The Dow instead took the scenic route, reaching a high of 939.62 on May 14th. Adding back dividends on the Dow of 13.49 gives an overall gain through ownership of the Dow for the first half of 7.39 or 0.8%.
在 1965 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）从 874.13 点降至 868.03 点。这一微小变化是以一种明显非欧几里得式的方式发生的（意即变化过程曲折 ）。道指实际上走了一条曲折的路线，在 5 月 14 日曾涨至 939.62 点的高位。将道指 13.49 点的股息加回计算，上半年持有道指成分股的总体收益为 7.39 点，收益率为 0.8%。
We had one of our better periods with an overall gain, before allocation to the general partner, of 10.4% or a 9.6 percentage point advantage over the Dow. To bring the record up to date, the following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the limited partners’ results:
我们迎来了表现较好的时期之一，在向普通合伙人分配收益之前，总体收益为 10.4%，比道指高出 9.6 个百分点。为了更新记录，以下总结了道指逐年的表现、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配收益之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的收益情况：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965年上半年 | 0.8% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative results） | 133.2% | 682.4% | 449.7% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual compounded rate） | 10.5% | 27.4% | 22.2% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(1) 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957 - 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人进行分配。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 对于 1957 - 1961 年，根据前一栏的合伙公司业绩计算，考虑按照当前合伙协议向普通合伙人进行分配，但未扣除有限合伙人每月的提款。
Our constant admonitions have been: (1) that short-term results (less than three years) have little meaning, particularly in reference to an investment operation such as ours that may devote a portion of resources to control situations; and, (2) that our results, relative to the Dow and other common-stock-form media usually will be better in declining markets and may well have a difficult time just matching such media in very strong markets.
我们一直以来的告诫是：(1) 短期业绩（少于三年）意义不大，尤其是对于像我们这样可能将部分资源投入到控制权相关业务的投资运作来说；(2) 相对于道琼斯指数和其他常见的股票投资方式，我们的业绩在市场下跌时通常会更好，而在市场非常强劲时，可能很难与它们持平。
With the latter point in mind, it might be imagined that we struggled during the first four months of the half to stay even with the Dow and then opened up our margin as it declined in May and June. Just the opposite occurred. We actually achieved a wide margin during the upswing and then fell at a rate fully equal to the Dow during the market decline.
考虑到后一点，可能有人会认为我们在上半年的前四个月努力与道琼斯指数持平，然后在五、六月份指数下跌时拉开差距。但实际情况恰恰相反。实际上，我们在市场上涨期间拉开了较大差距，然后在市场下跌时与道琼斯指数跌幅相同。
I don’t mention this because I am proud of such performance – on the contrary, I would prefer it if we had achieved our gain in the hypothesized manner. Rather, I mention it for two reasons: (1) you are always entitled to know when I am wrong as well as right; and, (2) it demonstrates that although we deal with probabilities and expectations, the actual results can deviate substantially from such expectations, particularly on a short-term basis. As mentioned in the most recent annual letter, our long-term goal is to achieve a ten percentage point per annum advantage over the Dow. Our advantage of 9.6 points achieved during the first six months must be regarded as substantially above average. The fortitude demonstrated by our partners in tolerating such favorable variations is commendable. We shall most certainly encounter periods when the variations are in the other direction.
我提及此事并非因为我对这样的表现感到自豪 —— 相反，如果我们是以假设的方式取得收益，我会更满意。我提到它有两个原因：(1) 无论我是对是错，你们都有权知晓；(2) 这表明，尽管我们依据概率和预期进行投资，但实际结果可能与预期有很大偏差，尤其是在短期内。正如最近的年度信函中提到的，我们的长期目标是每年比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点。上半年我们实现的 9.6 个百分点的优势必须被视为远高于平均水平。我们的合伙人在面对如此有利的差异时所展现出的坚毅值得称赞。当然，我们肯定也会遇到差异朝着相反方向发展的时期。
During the first half, a series of purchases resulted in the acquisition of a controlling interest in one of the situations described in the “General Private Owner” section of the last annual letter. When such a controlling interest is acquired, the assets and earning power of the business become the immediate predominant factors in value. When a small minority interest in a company is held, earning power and assets are, of course, very important, but they represent an indirect influence on value which, in the short run, may or may not dominate the factors bearing on supply and demand which result in price.
在上半年，通过一系列收购，我们获得了上年度信函中 “一般私人所有者” 部分所描述的一家公司的控股权。当获得控股权后，该企业的资产和盈利能力立即成为价值评估的主要因素。当持有一家公司的少数股权时，盈利能力和资产当然也非常重要，但它们对价值的影响是间接的，在短期内，这种影响可能主导也可能不主导影响供求关系进而决定价格的因素。
When a controlling interest is held, we own a business rather then a stock, and a business valuation is appropriate. We have carried our controlling position at a conservative valuation at midyear and will reevaluate it in terms of assets and earning power at yearend. The annual letter, issued in January, 1966, will carry a full story on this current control situation. At this time it is enough to say that we are delighted with both the acquisition cost and the business operation, and even happier about the people we have managing the business.
当持有控股权时，我们拥有的是一家企业，而不仅仅是一只股票，此时对企业进行估值是合适的。我们在年中以保守估值记录了我们的控股地位，并将在年末根据资产和盈利能力对其进行重新评估。1966 年 1 月发布的年度信函将详细介绍当前这一控股情况。目前可以说的是，我们对收购成本和企业运营都很满意，对管理企业的团队更是满意。
Investment Companies:
投资公司：
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp., manage over $4 billion and are probably typical of most of the $30 billion investment company industry. Their results are shown in the following table. My opinion is that this performance roughly parallels that of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们定期将我们的业绩与两家遵循通常 95% - 100% 投资于普通股政策的最大开放式投资公司（共同基金），以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行对比。这四家公司，即马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三大陆公司和雷曼公司，管理着超过 40 亿美元的资产，它们可能是整个 300 亿美元投资公司行业中大多数公司的典型代表。它们的业绩如下表所示。我认为，这种业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩相符，这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.7% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 14.0% | 13.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965年上半年 | 0.0% | -0.6% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.8% | 9.3% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative Results） | 114.9% | 102.8% | 111.7% | 115.4% | 133.2% | 449.7% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 9.4% | 8.7% | 9.2% | 9.5% | 10.5% | 22.2% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化以及当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配来计算。
(2) From 1965 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for first half 1965.
(2) 1957 年至 1964 年的数据来自 1965 年版的《穆迪银行与金融手册》。1965 年上半年的数据为估算值。
Last year I mentioned that the performance of these companies in some ways resembles the activity of a duck sitting on a pond. When the water (the market) rises, the duck rises; when if falls, back goes the duck. The water level was virtually unchanged during the first half of 1965. The ducks, as you can see from the table, are still sitting on the pond.
去年我提到，这些公司的业绩在某些方面就像一只坐在池塘里的鸭子。当水位（市场行情）上升时，鸭子随之上升；当水位下降时，鸭子也跟着下降。1965 年上半年，水位实际上没有变化。从表格中可以看到，这些 “鸭子” 仍然待在池塘里。
As I mentioned earlier in the letter, the ebb of the tide in May and June also substantially affected us. Nevertheless, the fact we had flapped our wings a few times in the preceding four months enabled us to gain a little altitude on the rest of the flock. Utilizing a somewhat more restrained lexicon, James H. Lorie, director of the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in Security Prices was quoted in the May 25, 1965, WALL STREET JOURNAL as saying: “There is no evidence that mutual funds select stocks better than by the random method.”
正如我在信的前面提到的，五、六月份市场行情的回落也对我们产生了重大影响。尽管如此，在前四个月我们奋力扑腾了几下翅膀，这使我们相对于其他 “鸭群” 稍微飞高了一点。1965 年 5 月 25 日的《华尔街日报》援引芝加哥大学证券价格研究中心主任詹姆斯・H・洛里较为克制的说法：“没有证据表明共同基金挑选股票的能力比随机挑选的方法更好。”
Of course, the beauty of the American economic scene has been that random results have been pretty darned good results. The water level has been rising. In our opinion, the probabilities are that over a long period of time, it will continue to rise, though, certainly not without important interruptions. It will be our policy, however, to endeavor to swim strongly, with or against the tide. If our performance declines to a level you can achieve by floating on your back, we will turn in our suits.
当然，美国经济形势的美妙之处在于，随机挑选的结果往往相当不错。水位一直在上升。在我们看来，从长期来看，水位很可能会继续上升，不过肯定会有重要的波动期。然而，无论顺流还是逆流，我们的策略都是努力奋力游进。如果我们的业绩下降到你只需随波逐流就能达到的水平，我们就会放弃。
Advance Payments and Advance Withdrawals:
预付款和预提款：
We accept advance payments from partners and prospective partners at 6% interest from date of receipt until the end of the year. While there is no obligation to convert such advance payments to a partnership interest at the end of the year, this should be the intent at the time it is paid to us.
我们接受合伙人及潜在合伙人的预付款，从收到款项之日起至当年年底按 6% 的利率计息。虽然没有义务在年底将这些预付款转为合伙权益，但在支付预付款时，应该有这样的意向。
Similarly, we allow partners to withdraw up to 20% of their partnership account prior to yearend and charge them 6% from date of withdrawal until yearend when it is charged against their capital account. Again, it is not intended that partners use us like a bank, but that they use the withdrawal right for a truly unexpected need for funds. Predictable needs for funds such as quarterly federal tax payments should be handled by a beginning-of-the-year reduction in capital rather than through advance withdrawals from B.P.L. during the year. The withdrawal privilege is to provide for the unanticipated.
同样，我们允许合伙人在年底前提取其合伙账户中最多 20% 的资金，并从提款之日起至年底按 6% 的利率计息，该利息将从他们的资本账户中扣除。同样，我们不希望合伙人把我们当成银行，而是希望他们在真正遇到意外资金需求时才使用提款权。像季度联邦税款支付这样可预见的资金需求，应该通过年初减少资本来解决，而不是在当年从英国塑料有限公司（B.P.L.）预提款。提款特权是为应对意外情况而设立的。
The willingness to borrow (through advance payments) and lend (through advance withdrawals) at the same 6% rate may sound downright “un-Buffettlike”. (You can be sure it doesn’t start my adrenaline flowing.) Certainly such a no-spread arbitrage is devoid of the commercial overtones an observer might impute to the preponderance of our transactions. Nevertheless, we think it makes sense and is in the best interest of all partners.
愿意以相同的 6% 利率借款（通过预付款）和放贷（通过预提款），这听起来可能完全 “不像巴菲特的风格”。（你可以肯定这不会让我热血沸腾。）当然，这种没有利差的套利行为缺乏观察者可能会认为我们大多数交易中所具有的商业意味。不过，我们认为这是合理的，并且符合所有合伙人的最大利益。
The partner who has a large investment in indirect ownership of a group of liquid assets should have some liquidity present in his partnership interest other than at yearend. As a practical matter, we are reasonably certain that advance withdrawals will be far more than covered by advance payments. For example, on June 30, 1965, we had $98,851 of advance withdrawals and $652,931 of advance payments.
在间接持有一批流动资产方面有大量投资的合伙人，除了在年底之外，其合伙权益中应该有一定的流动性。实际上，我们相当确定预提款的金额会远远低于预付款的金额。例如，在 1965 年 6 月 30 日，我们的预提款为 98,851 美元，而预付款为 652,931 美元。
Why then the willingness to pay 6% for the net of advance payments over advance withdrawals when we can borrow from commercial banks at substantially lower rates? The answer is that we expect on a long-term basis to earn better than 6% (the general partner’s allocation is zero unless we do) although it is largely a matter of chance whether we achieve the 6% figure in any short period. Moreover, I can adopt a different attitude regarding the investment of money that can be expected to soon be a part of our equity capital than I can on short-term borrowed money. The advance payments have the added advantage to us of spreading the investment of new money over the year, rather than having it hit us all at once in January. On the other hand, 6% is more than can be obtained in short-term dollar secure investments by our partners, so I consider it mutually profitable.
那么，既然我们可以从商业银行以低得多的利率借款，为什么还愿意为预付款超过预提款的净额支付 6% 的利息呢？答案是，我们预期从长期来看能获得高于 6% 的收益（如果达不到，普通合伙人的分配为零），尽管在任何短期内我们能否达到 6% 的收益水平在很大程度上是个概率问题。此外，对于预计很快会成为我们股权资本一部分的资金的投资，我可以采取与短期借款不同的态度。预付款对我们还有一个额外的好处，就是可以将新资金在一年中逐步进行投资，而不是在一月份一次性涌入。另一方面，6% 的利率高于我们的合伙人在短期美元安全投资中所能获得的收益，所以我认为这对双方都有利。
Miscellaneous:
杂项：
The bold expansion program to 909 ¼ square feet described in the annual letter was carried off without a hitch (the Pepsi’s never even got warm).
年度信函中描述的将办公面积大胆扩大到 909.25 平方英尺的计划顺利实施（百事可乐甚至都没来得及变温，意为一切顺利，没有波折 ）。
John Harding joined us in April and is continuing the record whereby all the actions in the personnel field have been winning ones.
约翰・哈丁在 4 月份加入了我们，延续了我们在人事方面所有举措都很成功的记录。
As in past years, we will have a letter out about November 1st (to partners and those who have indicated an interest to me by that time in becoming partners) with the commitment letter for 1966, estimate of the 1965 tax situation, etc.
和往年一样，我们将在 11 月 1 日左右发出一封信函（给合伙人以及到那时向我表示有兴趣成为合伙人的人），其中包括 1966 年的承诺书、1965 年税务情况的预估等内容。
Cordially,
诚挚问候，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1965年信件（三）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
November 1, 1965
1965 年 11 月 1 日
To My Partners for 1966:
致 1966 年的各位合伙人：
Enclosed are:
随信附上：
(1) Two copies or the commitment letter for 1966, one to be kept by you and one returned to us. You may amend the commitment letter right up to midnight, December 31st. So get it back to us early, and if it needs to be changed, just let us know by letter or phone. Commitment letters become final on December 31st. Every year I get a number or calls in the first week in January expressing a desire to add to the January 1st capital. THIS CAN’T BE DONE.
（1）两份 1966 年的承诺书，一份由您留存，一份交回给我们。您可以在 12 月 31 日午夜前修改这份承诺书。所以请尽早将其交回给我们，如果需要更改，只需通过信件或电话告知我们即可。承诺书在 12 月 31 日起正式生效。每年 1 月的第一周，我都会接到不少电话，有人表示希望在 1 月 1 日增加投入的资本。但 这是做不到的 。
(2) A copy of our ever-popular “The Ground Rules.” It is essential that we see eye-to-eye on the matters covered therein. If you have different views - fine, yours may be better - but you shouldn’t be in the partnership. Please particularly note Ground Rule 7. This has been added this year reflecting a moderate shift in my attitude over a period of time. It represents a decidedly unconventional (but logical in myopinion when applied to our operation) approach and is therefore specifically called to your attention.
（2）一份我们广受欢迎的《基本规则》。在其中所涵盖的事项上，我们达成共识至关重要。如果您有不同意见 —— 也没关系，您的意见或许更好 —— 但您就不适合留在合伙公司里。请特别注意《基本规则》的第 7 条。这是今年新增的内容，反映了一段时间以来我态度的适度转变。它代表了一种绝对非传统的（但在我看来，应用于我们的业务时是合乎逻辑的）方法，因此特意提请您注意。
Any withdrawals will be paid January 5th. You may withdraw any amount you desire from $100 up to your entire equity. Similarly, additions can be for any amount and should reach us by January 10th. In the event you are disposing of anything, this will give you a chance to have the transaction in 1966 if that appears to be advantageous for tax reasons. If additions reach us in November, they take on the status of advance payments and draw 6% interest until yearend. This is not true of additions reaching us in December.
任何提款都将在 1 月 5 日支付。您可以提取 100 美元至您全部权益范围内的任意金额。同样，增加投入的金额也可以是任意数额，并且应在 1 月 10 日前到达我们手中。如果您要处置任何资产，从税务角度看若有利，这将使您有机会在 1966 年完成该交易。如果在 11 月增加投入资金，这些资金将被视为预付款，并在年底前按 6% 计息。12 月增加投入的资金则不享受此待遇。
The partnership owns a controlling interest in Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a publicly-traded security. As mentioned in my midyear letter, asset values and earning power are the dominant factors affecting the valuation of a controlling interest in a business. Market price, which governs valuation of minority interest positions, is of little or no importance in valuing a controlling interest. We will value our position in Berkshire Hathaway at yearend at a price halfway between net current asset value and book value. Because of the nature of our receivables and inventory this, in effect, amounts to valuation of our current assets at 100 cents on the dollar and our fixed assets at 50 cents on the dollar. Such a value in my opinion is fair to both adding and withdrawing partners. It may be either of lower than market value at the time.
本合伙公司持有伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）的控股权，这是一家公开交易的证券。正如我在年中信函中提到的，资产价值和盈利能力是影响对一家企业控股权估值的主要因素。决定少数股权头寸估值的市场价格，在对控股权进行估值时几乎没有重要性，或者说根本不重要。我们将在年底对我们在伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的持股进行估值，估值价格取当前资产净值和账面价值的中间值。由于我们应收账款和存货的性质，实际上，这相当于按 100% 的价值对流动资产进行估值，按 50% 的价值对固定资产进行估值。在我看来，这样的估值对增加投入和提款的合伙人都是公平的。这个估值可能高于或低于当时的市场价值。
As I write this, we are orbiting in quite satisfactory fashion. Our margin over the Dow is well above average, and even those Neanderthal partners who utilize such crude yardsticks as net profit would find performance satisfactory. This is all, of course, subject to substantial change by yearend.
写这封信时，我们的运作状况相当令人满意。我们相对于道琼斯指数的优势远高于平均水平，即使是那些使用净利润等粗略衡量标准的 “老派” 合伙人，也会对业绩感到满意。当然，到年底这一切很可能会发生重大变化。
If anything needs clarification, call or write John Harding who is in charge of “de-confusing” partners. The tax situation is about as reported in the August letter, but if you would like John to make the calculation for you, he will be glad to do it.
如果有任何需要澄清的地方，请致电或写信给约翰・哈丁，他负责为合伙人 “答疑解惑”。税务情况与 8 月份信函中所报告的大致相同，但如果您希望约翰为您进行计算，他将很乐意效劳。
Cordially,
诚挚问候，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
P/S: We are continuing our “no prize” policy for the last ones to get their commitment letters back to us. It will make things easier for us if you get it back pronto. If you want to make changes later (before January lst), just give us a call, and we’ll amend it for you.
附言：对于最后才把承诺书交回给我们的人，我们继续实行 “没有奖励” 的政策。如果您能尽快交回，对我们来说会更方便。如果您之后（1 月 1 日前）想做更改，只需给我们打个电话，我们会为您修改。
1966 年信件
1966 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
January 20, 1966
1966 年 1 月 20 日
Our Performance in 1965
我们 1965 年的业绩表现
Our War on Poverty was successful in 1965.
1965 年，我们的 “脱贫之战” 大获成功。
Specially, we were $12,304,060 less poor at the end of the year.
具体而言，到年底时，我们的财富增加了 12304060 美元。
Last year under a section in the annual letter entitled “Our Goal” (please particularly note it was not headed “Our Promise”), I stated we were trying to achieve “… An average advantage (relative to the Dow) of ten percentage points per annum for BPL before allocation to the general partner again with large amplitudes in the margin from perhaps 10 percentage points worse than the Dow in a bad year to 25 percentage points better when everything clicks.”
去年，在年度信函中一个名为 “我们的目标”（请注意，标题并非 “我们的承诺”）的部分，我曾表示，我们正努力实现 “…… 在向普通合伙人分配收益之前，英国塑料有限公司（BPL）每年相对于道琼斯指数平均有 10 个百分点的优势。不过，这一优势幅度波动很大，在表现糟糕的年份可能比道琼斯指数低 10 个百分点，而在一切顺利的年份则可能高出 25 个百分点”。
My fallibility as a forecaster was quickly demonstrated when the first year fell outside my parameters. We achieved our widest margin over the Dow in the history of BPL with an overall gain of 47.2% compared to an overall gain (including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Dow) of 14.2% for the Dow. Naturally, no writer likes to be publicly humiliated by such a mistake. It is unlikely to be repeated.
作为预测者，我刚一开口就暴露了自己的不靠谱。第一年的实际情况就超出了我所设定的范围。我们取得了英国塑料有限公司（BPL）成立以来相对于道琼斯指数的最大优势，总体收益率达到 47.2%，而道琼斯指数（包含持有道琼斯指数成分股应获得的股息）的总体收益率仅为 14.2%。自然，没有作者愿意因这样的错误而当众出丑。这种情况不太可能再次发生。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
以下是道琼斯指数的逐年表现、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配（超出 6% 部分的四分之一）收益之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的收益情况总结：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965年 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人进行分配。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）对于 1957 年至 1961 年，根据前一栏的合伙公司业绩计算，考虑按照当前合伙协议向普通合伙人进行分配，但未扣除有限合伙人每月的提款。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
从累计或复利的角度来看，结果如下：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（Overall Results From Dow） | 合伙业绩（Partnership Results） | 有限合伙人业绩（Limited Partners’ Results） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 1964年 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 1965年 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 11.4% | 29.8% | 23.9% |
After last year the question naturally arises, “What do we do for an encore?” A disadvantage of this business is that it does not possess momentum to any significant degree. If General Motors accounts for 54% of domestic new car registrations in 1965, it is a pretty safe bet that they are going to come fairly close to that figure in 1966 due to owner loyalties, dealer capabilities, productive capacity, consumer image, etc. Not so for BPL. We start from scratch each year with everything valued at market when the gun goes off. Partners in 1966, new or old, benefit to only a very limited extent from the efforts of 1964 and 1965. The success of past methods and ideas does not transfer forward to future ones.
在经历了去年的情况后，自然而然会产生这样一个问题：“我们接下来要怎么做才能再创佳绩呢？” 我们这一行的一个劣势在于，它在很大程度上并不具备持续的发展动力。如果通用汽车在 1965 年占国内新车注册量的 54%，那么由于客户忠诚度、经销商能力、生产能力、消费者印象等因素，在 1966 年，他们很可能会接近这一占比。但英国塑料有限公司（BPL）可不是这样。每年新的投资开始时，我们都要从零起步，所有资产都按照当时的市场价值来计算。无论是新加入还是老的合伙人，在 1966 年从 1964 年和 1965 年的努力中获得的益处都非常有限。过去的方法和理念取得了成功，但这并不能延续到未来的投资中。
I continue to hope, on a longer-range basis, for the sort of achievement outlined in the “Our Goal” section of last year’s letter (copies still available). However, those who believe 1965 results can be achieved with any frequency are probably attending weekly meetings of the Halley’s Comet Observers Club. We are going to have loss years and are going to have years inferior to the Dow - no doubt about it. But I continue to believe we can achieve average performance superior to the Dow in the future. If my expectation regarding this should change, you will hear immediately.
从长远来看，我依然希望能实现去年信中 “我们的目标” 部分所概述的那种成就（仍有信件副本可供查阅）。然而，那些认为 1965 年的业绩还能频繁出现的人，大概是每周都去参加哈雷彗星观测者俱乐部的活动（意思是这种想法不切实际，就像期待哈雷彗星频繁出现一样 ）。我们肯定会有亏损的年份，也肯定会有业绩不如道琼斯指数的年份 —— 这一点毫无疑问。但我仍然相信，未来我们的平均业绩能够超过道琼斯指数。如果我对此的预期有所改变，我会立刻告知大家。
Investment Companies
投资公司
We regularly compare our results with the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being typically 95% - 100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies. These four companies, Massachusetts Investors Trust, Investors Stock Fund, Tri-Continental Corp., and Lehman Corp. manage over $5 billion, are owned by about 600,000 shareholders, and are probably typical of most of the $35 billion investment company industry. My opinion is that their results roughly parallel those of the overwhelming majority of other investment advisory organizations which handle, in aggregate, vastly greater sums.
我们定期将我们的业绩与两家通常遵循 95% 至 100% 投资于普通股政策的最大开放式投资公司（共同基金），以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司进行对比。这四家公司，即马萨诸塞投资者信托、投资者股票基金、三大陆公司和雷曼公司，管理着超过 50 亿美元的资产，由大约 60 万名股东持有，它们可能是整个 350 亿美元投资公司行业中大多数公司的典型代表。我认为，它们的业绩大致与绝大多数其他投资顾问机构的业绩相当，而这些机构管理的资金总额要大得多。
The purpose of this tabulation is to illustrate that the Dow is no pushover as an index of investment achievement. The advisory talent managing just the four companies shown commands annual fees of about $10 million and this represents a very small fraction of the professional investment management industry. The public batting average of this highly paid and widely respected talent indicates performance a shade below that of the Dow, an unmanaged index.
制作这个表格的目的是想说明，道琼斯指数作为衡量投资业绩的指标，可不是那么容易超越的。仅管理上述四家公司的投资顾问人才，每年收取的费用约为 1000 万美元，而这在整个专业投资管理行业中只是很小的一部分。这些高薪且备受尊敬的专业人士的整体业绩表明，他们的表现略逊于道琼斯指数这个无需管理的指数。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度业绩
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.7% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965年 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
（1）根据资产价值的变化，再加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配来计算。
(2) From 1965 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-64. Estimated for 1965.
（2）1957 年至 1964 年的数据取自 1965 年版的《穆迪银行与金融手册》。1965 年的数据为估算值。
COMPOUNDED
按照复利计算
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958年 | 26.4% | 29.2% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959年 | 37.8% | 42.5% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.3% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960年 | 36.4% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.9% | 107.2% |
| 1957 - 1961年 | 71.3% | 76.9% | 70.8% | 77.4% | 74.9% | 181.6% |
| 1957 - 1962年 | 54.5% | 53.2% | 46.2% | 59.7% | 61.6% | 215.1% |
| 1957 - 1963年 | 85.4% | 78.5% | 80.8% | 88.9% | 94.9% | 311.2% |
| 1957 - 1964年 | 114.9% | 104.0% | 105.4% | 112.7% | 131.3% | 402.9% |
| 1957 - 1965年 | 136.8% | 124.0% | 145.3% | 138.4% | 164.1% | 588.5% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 10.1% | 9.4% | 10.5% | 10.1% | 11.4% | 23.9% |
A number of the largest investment advisory operations (managing, in some cases, well into the billions of dollars) also manage investment companies partly as a convenience for smaller clients and partly as a public showcase. The results of these funds roughly parallel those of the four funds on which we report.
许多大型投资顾问机构（在某些情况下，管理的资金高达数十亿美元）也管理着投资公司，部分原因是为小客户提供便利，部分原因是将其作为一个面向公众的展示窗口。这些基金的业绩与我们所分析的那四只基金的业绩大致相当。
I strongly believe in measurement. The investment managers mentioned above utilize measurement constantly in their activities. They constantly study changes in market shares, profit margins, return on capital, etc. Their entire decision-making process is geared to measurement - of managements, industries, comparative yields, etc. I am sure they keep score on their new business efforts as well as the profitability of their advisory operation. What then can be more fundamental than the measurement, in turn, of investment ideas and decisions? I certainly do not believe the standards I utilize (and wish my partners to utilize) in measuring my performance are the applicable ones for all money managers. But I certainly do believe anyone engaged in the management of money should have a standard of measurement, and that both he and the party whose money is managed should have a clear understanding why it is the appropriate standard, what time period should be utilized, etc.
我坚信衡量的重要性。上述投资经理在他们的工作中一直都在运用各种衡量指标。他们不断研究市场份额的变化、利润率、资本回报率等等。他们整个决策过程都围绕着对管理层、行业、相对收益率等方面的衡量。我相信他们不仅会关注新业务拓展的成果，也会关注其投资顾问业务的盈利能力。那么，对于投资理念和决策的衡量，还有什么比这更基础的呢？我当然不认为我用来（并且希望我的合伙人也用）衡量自己业绩的标准适用于所有的资金管理者。但我确实认为，任何从事资金管理的人都应该有一个衡量标准，并且他和资金的所有者都应该清楚地理解为什么这个标准是合适的，应该采用怎样的时间段来进行衡量等等。
Frank Block put it very well in the November-December 1965 issue of the Financial Analysts Journal. Speaking of measurement of investment performance he said,” …However, the fact is that literature suffers a yawning hiatus in this subject. If investment management organizations sought always the best performance, there would be nothing unique in careful measurement of investment results. It does not matter that the customer has failed to ask for a formal presentation of the results. Pride alone should be sufficient to demand that each or us determine objectively the quality of his recommendations. This can hardly be done without precise knowledge of the outcome. Once this knowledge is in hand, it should be possible to extend the analysis to some point at which patterns of weakness and strength begin to assert themselves. We criticize a corporate management for failure to use the best of tools to keep it aware of the progress of a complicated industrial organization. We can hardly be excused for failure to provide ourselves with equal tools to show the efficiency of our own efforts to handle other people’s money. …Thus, it is our dreary duty to report that systems of performance measurement are not automatically included in the data processing programs of most investment management organizations. The sad fact is that some seem to prefer not to know how well or poorly they are doing.
弗兰克・布洛克（Frank Block）在 1965 年 11 月至 12 月的《金融分析师杂志》（Financial Analysts Journal）上说得非常好。谈到投资业绩的衡量时，他说：“…… 然而，事实上，在这个主题上，相关文献存在着巨大的空白。如果投资管理机构始终追求最佳业绩，那么仔细衡量投资结果就没什么特别的了。客户没有要求正式展示投资结果这一点并不重要。仅出于自尊，我们每个人都应该客观地评估自己建议的质量。如果不确切了解结果，这几乎是不可能做到的。一旦掌握了这些信息，就应该能够将分析深入到一定程度，从而开始发现自身的优势和劣势所在。我们批评企业管理层没有使用最佳工具来了解一个复杂工业组织的进展情况。如果我们自己在管理他人资金时，没有使用同样的工具来展示我们工作的效率，那我们也难辞其咎。…… 因此，我们不得不遗憾地指出，大多数投资管理机构的数据处理程序中并没有自动包含业绩衡量体系。令人遗憾的是，有些人似乎更愿意不知道自己做得有多好或多差。”
Frankly, I have several selfish reasons for insisting that we apply a yardstick and that we both utilize the same yardstick. Naturally, I get a kick out of beating par - in the lyrical words of Casey Stengel, “Show me a good loser, and I’ll show you a loser.” More importantly, I insure that I will not get blamed for the wrong reason (having losing years) but only for the right reason (doing poorer than the Dow). Knowing partners will grade me on the right basis helps me do a better job. Finally, setting up the relevant yardsticks ahead of time insures that we will all get out of this business if the results become mediocre (or worse). It means that past successes cannot cloud judgment of current results. It should reduce the chance of ingenious rationalizations of inept performance. (Bad lighting has been bothering me at the bridge table lately.) While this masochistic approach to measurement may not sound like much of an advantage, I can assure you from my observations of business entities that such evaluation would have accomplished a great deal in many investment and industrial organizations.
坦率地说，我坚持我们要使用一个衡量标准，并且我们都使用同一个标准，有几个自私的原因。自然，我喜欢在业绩上超过标准 —— 用凯西・施滕格尔（Casey Stengel）富有诗意的话来说，“给我看看一个输得起的人，我就给你看看一个失败者。” 更重要的是，我确保自己不会因为错误的原因（出现亏损年份）而受到指责，而只会因为正确的原因（表现比道琼斯指数差）而被指责。知道合伙人会以正确的标准来评价我，这有助于我把工作做得更好。最后，提前设定相关的衡量标准可以确保，如果业绩变得平庸（或更差），我们都会退出这项业务。这意味着过去的成功不会影响对当前业绩的判断。这应该会减少为糟糕业绩进行巧妙辩解的可能性。（最近在打桥牌时，糟糕的灯光一直困扰着我。）虽然这种自虐式的衡量方法听起来似乎没什么好处，但根据我对商业实体的观察，我可以向你保证，这样的评估在许多投资和工业机构中会大有裨益。
So if you are evaluating others (or yourself!) in the investment field, think out some standards - apply them -interpret them. If you do not feel our standard (a minimum of a three-year test versus the Dow) is an applicable one, you should not be in the Partnership. If you do feel it is applicable, you should be able to take the minus years with equanimity in the visceral regions as well as the cerebral regions -as long as we are surpassing the results of the Dow.
所以，如果你在投资领域评估他人（或你自己！），想出一些标准 —— 应用它们 —— 解读它们。如果你认为我们的标准（与道琼斯指数相比，至少进行三年的测试）不适用，你就不应该留在合伙公司。如果你认为它是适用的，那么只要我们的业绩超过道琼斯指数，你就应该能够在内心和理智上平静地接受业绩不佳的年份。
The Sorrows of Compounding
复利的困扰
Usually, at this point in my letter, I have paused to modestly attempt to set straight the historical errors of the last four or five hundred years. While it might seem difficult to accomplish this in only a few paragraphs a year, I feel I have done my share to reshape world opinion on Columbus, Isabella, Francis I, Peter Minuit and the Manhattan Indians. A by-product of this endeavor has been to demonstrate the overwhelming power of compound interest. To insure reader attention I have entitled these essays “The Joys of Compounding. “ The sharp-eyed may notice a slight change this year.
通常，在我写的信的这个部分，我会停下来，谦逊地试图纠正过去四五百年里的历史错误。虽然一年只用几段话似乎很难做到这一点，但我觉得我已经尽了自己的一份力，来重塑世人对哥伦布、伊莎贝拉、弗朗索瓦一世、彼得・米纽特和曼哈顿印第安人的看法。这项努力的一个副产品是展示了复利的巨大力量。为了吸引读者的注意，我把这些文章命名为《复利的乐趣》。目光敏锐的人可能会注意到今年有一点变化。
A decent rate (better we have an indecent rate) of compound -plus the addition of substantial new money has brought our beginning capital this year to $43,645,000. Several times in the past I have raised the question whether increasing amounts of capital would harm our investment performance. Each time I have answered negatively and promised you that if my opinion changed, I would promptly report it.
一个不错的（要是能有个更好的就更好了）复利率，再加上大量新资金的注入，使我们今年的初始资本达到了 43,645,000 美元。过去我曾多次提出这样一个问题：不断增加的资金是否会损害我们的投资业绩？每次我的回答都是否定的，并向你们承诺，如果我的看法改变了，我会及时告知。
I do not feel that increased capital has hurt our operation to date. As a matter of fact, I believe that we have done somewhat better during the past few years with the capital we have had in the Partnership than we would have done if we had been working with a substantially smaller amount. This was due to the partly fortuitous development of several investments that were just the right size for us -big enough to be significant and small enough to handle.
到目前为止，我认为增加的资金并没有损害我们的业务。事实上，我相信，与使用少得多的资金相比，在过去几年里，我们用合伙公司现有的资金取得了更好的业绩。部分原因是一些投资项目的偶然发展，这些项目的规模正适合我们 —— 大到足以产生重大影响，小到足以轻松应对。
I now feel that we are much closer to the point where increased size may prove disadvantageous. I don’t want to ascribe too much precision to that statement since there are many variables involved. What may be the optimum size under some market and business circumstances can be substantially more or less than optimum under other circumstances. There have been a few times in the past when on a very short-term basis I have felt it would have been advantageous to be smaller but substantially more times when the converse was true.
我现在觉得，我们已经非常接近这样一个节点：资金规模的进一步扩大可能会带来不利影响。我不想对这个说法过于精确，因为其中涉及许多变量。在某些市场和商业环境下的最佳规模，在其他环境下可能会比最佳规模大得多或小得多。过去有几次，在非常短的时期内，我觉得资金规模小一些会更有利，但更多的时候情况恰恰相反。
Nevertheless, as circumstances presently appear, I feel substantially greater size is more likely to harm future results than to help them. This might not be true for my own personal results, but it is likely to be true for your results.
然而，就目前的情况来看，我认为资金规模大幅扩大更有可能损害未来的业绩，而不是带来帮助。这对我个人的业绩来说可能不成立，但对你们的业绩来说很可能是这样。
Therefore, unless it appears that circumstances have changed (under some conditions added capital would improve results) or unless new partners can bring some asset to the Partnership other than simply capital, I intend to admit no additional partners to BPL.
因此，除非情况发生变化（在某些情况下，增加资金会改善业绩），或者除非新合伙人能为合伙公司带来除资金以外的其他资产，否则我不打算再接纳新的合伙人加入英国塑料有限公司（BPL）。
The only way to make this effective is to apply it across-the-board and I have notified Susie that if we have any more children, it is up to her to find some other partnership for them.
要使这一措施有效，唯一的办法就是全面实施。我已经通知苏西（Susie），如果我们再有孩子，她得为他们找其他的合伙公司。
Because I anticipate that withdrawals (for taxes, among other reasons) may well approach additions by present partners and also because I visualize the curve of expectable performance sloping only very mildly as capital increases, I presently see no reason why we should restrict capital additions by existing partners.The medically oriented probably will interpret this entire section as conclusive evidence that an effective antithyroid pill has been developed.
因为我预计（出于纳税等原因的）提款很可能会接近现有合伙人的增资，而且我预计随着资金增加，预期业绩曲线只会略微下滑，所以目前我认为没有理由限制现有合伙人增加资金。那些从医学角度看问题的人可能会把这整个部分解读为已经研制出有效抗甲状腺药物的确凿证据（意思是作者之前担心资金增加的态度现在有所缓和，就像服用了抗甲状腺药物使情绪平静下来一样 ）。
Trends in Our Business
我们业务的发展趋势
Last year I discussed our various categories of investments. Knowing the penalties for cruel and unusual punishments, I will skip a rehash of the characteristics of each category, but merely refer you to last year’s letter. However, a few words should be said to bring you up to date on the various segments of the business, and perhaps to give you a better insight into their strengths and weaknesses.
去年我讨论了我们的各类投资。考虑到残酷和不寻常惩罚的后果（这里是一种幽默的说法，意思是不想重复让人厌烦 ），我就不再赘述每一类投资的特点了，你可以参考去年的信。不过，还是应该说几句，让你了解一下业务各个部分的最新情况，也许能让你更好地了解它们的优势和劣势。
The “Workout” business has become very spasmodic. We were able to employ an average of only about $6 million during the year in the Workout section, and this involved only a very limited number of situations. Although we earned about $1,410,000 or about 23 ½% on average capital employed (this is calculated on an all equity basis - borrowed money is appropriate in most Workout situations, and we utilize it, which improves our rate of return above this percentage), over half of this was earned from one situation. I think it unlikely that a really interesting rate of return can be earned consistently on large sums of money in this business under present conditions. Nevertheless, we will continue to try to remain alert for the occasional important opportunity and probably continue to utilize a few of the smaller opportunities where we like the probabilities.
“整改业务”（Workout）变得非常不稳定。在这一年里，我们在整改业务部分平均只能投入约 600 万美元，而且涉及的项目非常有限。尽管我们在平均投入的资金上获得了约 141 万美元的收益，收益率约为 23.5%（这是按全部股权计算的 —— 在大多数整改业务情况下，借款是合适的，我们也会利用借款，这会使我们的回报率高于这个百分比），但其中一半以上的收益来自一个项目。我认为，在目前的情况下，要想在这项业务中持续地从大量资金中获得真正可观的回报率是不太可能的。不过，我们会继续留意偶尔出现的重要机会，并且可能会继续利用一些我们认为有成功可能性的较小机会。
The “Generals-Private Owner Basis” category was very good to us in 1965. Opportunities in this area have become more scarce with a rising Dow, but when they come along, they are often quite significant. I mentioned at the start of last year that we were the largest stockholder of three companies in this category. Our largest yearend 1964 investment in this category was disposed of in 1965 pursuant to a tender offer resulting in a realized gain for BPL of $3,188,000. At yearend 1964 we had unrealized appreciation in this investment of $451,000. Therefore, the economic gain attributable to 1965 for this transaction was only $2,737,000 even though the entire tax effect fell in that year. I mention these figures to illustrate how our realized gain for tax purposes in any year bears no necessary relationship to our economic gain.
“综合类 - 私人所有者视角”（Generals-Private Owner Basis）这一类投资在 1965 年对我们来说表现非常好。随着道琼斯指数的上涨，这一领域的机会变得越来越少，但一旦出现，往往都非常重要。去年年初我提到，我们是这一类中三家公司的最大股东。1965 年，根据一项收购要约，我们处置了 1964 年底在这一类投资中最大的一笔投资，为英国塑料有限公司（BPL）实现了 318.8 万美元的收益。1964 年底，这项投资的未实现增值为 45.1 万美元。因此，尽管这笔交易的全部税务影响都发生在 1965 年，但该交易在 1965 年的经济收益仅为 273.7 万美元。我提到这些数字是为了说明，我们在任何一年出于税务目的实现的收益，与我们的经济收益不一定有必然联系。
The fundamental concept underlying the Generals-Private Owner category is demonstrated by the above case. A private owner was quite willing (and in our opinion quite wise) to pay a price for control of the business which isolated stock buyers were not willing to pay for very small fractions of the business. This has been a quite common condition in the securities markets over many years, and although purchases in this category work out satisfactorily in terms of just general stock market behavior, there is the occasional dramatic profit due to corporate action such as the one above.
上述案例体现了 “综合类 - 私人所有者视角” 这一类别背后的基本理念。一个私人所有者非常愿意（而且在我们看来非常明智）为获得企业的控制权支付一个价格，而那些零散的股票买家却不愿意为获得企业的一小部分股权支付这样的价格。多年来，这在证券市场上一直是一种很常见的情况。尽管从一般的股票市场表现来看，这一类别的投资都取得了令人满意的结果，但偶尔也会因为企业的一些行动（比如上述案例）而获得可观的利润。
The “Control” section of our business received a transfer member from our “Private Owner” category. Shares in Berkshire Hathaway had been acquired since November 1962 on much the same line of reasoning as prevailed in the security mentioned above. In the case of Berkshire, however, we ended up purchasing enough stock to assume a controlling position ourselves rather than the more usual case of either selling our stock in the market or to another single buyer.
我们业务中的 “控制权”（Control）部分接收了一个从 “私人所有者”（Private Owner）类别转过来的成员。自 1962 年 11 月以来，我们收购伯克希尔・哈撒韦（Berkshire Hathaway）的股票，其背后的推理与上述提到的证券大致相同。然而，在伯克希尔的案例中，我们最终购买了足够多的股票，从而自己获得了控股权，而不是像更常见的情况那样，要么在市场上出售我们的股票，要么卖给另一个单一买家。
Our purchases of Berkshire started at a price of $7.60 per share in 1962. This price partially reflected large losses incurred by the prior management in closing some of the mills made obsolete by changing conditions within the textile business (which the old management had been quite slow to recognize). In the postwar period the company had slid downhill a considerable distance, having hit a peak in 1948 when about $29 1/2 million was earned before tax and about 11,000 workers were employed. This reflected output from 11 mills.
我们从 1962 年开始以每股 7.60 美元的价格收购伯克希尔的股票。这个价格在一定程度上反映了前任管理层在关闭一些因纺织行业形势变化而过时的工厂时所遭受的巨大损失（而旧管理层对此认识得相当迟缓）。在战后时期，该公司的业绩大幅下滑，1948 年达到顶峰，当时税前盈利约 2950 万美元，员工约 11000 人。这反映了 11 家工厂的产出。
At the time we acquired control in spring of 1965, Berkshire was down to two mills and about 2,300 employees. It was a very pleasant surprise to find that the remaining units had excellent management personnel, and we have not had to bring a single man from the outside into the operation. In relation to our beginning acquisition cost of $7.60 per share (the average cost, however, was $14.86 per share, reflecting very heavy purchases in early 1965), the company on December 31, 1965, had net working capital alone (before placing any value on the plants and equipment) of about $19 per share.
1965 年春天我们获得控制权时，伯克希尔只剩下两家工厂和约 2300 名员工。令人非常惊喜的是，剩下的工厂拥有优秀的管理人员，我们无需从外部引入任何一个人来参与运营。与我们最初每股 7.60 美元的收购成本（不过，平均成本为每股 14.86 美元，这反映了 1965 年初的大量购买）相比，1965 年 12 月 31 日，该公司仅净营运资本（在对工厂和设备不进行任何估值的情况下）就约为每股 19 美元。
Berkshire is a delight to own. There is no question that the state of the textile industry is the dominant factor in determining the earning power of the business, but we are most fortunate to have Ken Chace running the business in a first-class manner, and we also have several of the best sales people in the business heading up this end of their respective divisions.
拥有伯克希尔是一件令人愉快的事情。毫无疑问，纺织行业的状况是决定该企业盈利能力的主要因素，但我们非常幸运，有肯・蔡斯（Ken Chace）以一流的方式管理着企业，而且我们还有几位该行业最优秀的销售人员负责各自部门的销售工作。
While a Berkshire is hardly going to be as profitable as a Xerox, Fairchild Camera or National Video in a hypertensed market, it is a very comfort able sort of thing to own. As my West Coast philosopher says, “It is well to have a diet consisting of oatmeal as well as cream puffs.”
虽然在极度繁荣的市场中，伯克希尔不太可能像施乐（Xerox）、仙童相机（Fairchild Camera）或国家视频（National Video）那样盈利丰厚，但拥有它是一件让人安心的事情。就像我那位西海岸的哲学家朋友说的：“既有燕麦片又有奶油泡芙的饮食才是好的饮食。”
Because of our controlling interest, our investment in Berkshire is valued for our audit as a business, not as a marketable security. If Berkshire advances $5 per share in the market, it does BPL no good - our holdings are not going to be sold. Similarly, if it goes down $5 per share, it is not meaningful to us. The value of our holding is determined directly by the value of the business. I received no divine inspiration in that valuation of our holdings. (Maybe the owners of the three wonder stocks mentioned above do receive such a message in respect to their holdings -I feel I would need something at least that reliable to sleep well at present prices.) I attempt to apply a conservative valuation based upon my knowledge of assets, earning power, industry conditions, competitive position, etc. We would not be a seller of our holdings at such a figure, but neither would we be a seller of the other items in our portfolio at yearend valuations –otherwise, we would already have sold them.
由于我们拥有控股权，在审计时，我们对伯克希尔的投资是作为一项业务来估值的，而不是作为一种可交易的证券。如果伯克希尔的股价每股上涨 5 美元，对英国塑料有限公司（BPL）没有好处 —— 我们的持股不会出售。同样，如果股价每股下跌 5 美元，对我们来说也没有意义。我们持股的价值直接由企业的价值决定。在对我们的持股进行估值时，我没有得到任何神启（也许上述提到的那三只神奇股票的所有者确实会从他们的持股中得到这样的信息 —— 以目前的股价来看，我觉得我至少需要一些同样可靠的东西才能睡个好觉）。我试图根据我对资产、盈利能力、行业状况、竞争地位等方面的了解，采用一种保守的估值方法。按照这样的估值，我们不会出售我们的持股，但同样，我们也不会按照年底的估值出售我们投资组合中的其他资产 —— 否则，我们早就把它们卖掉了。
Our final category is “Generals-Relatively Undervalued.” This category has been growing in relative importance as opportunities in the other categories become less frequent.
我们的最后一类投资是 “综合类 - 相对低估”（Generals-Relatively Undervalued）。随着其他类别的投资机会越来越少，这一类别的相对重要性一直在增加。
Frankly, operating in this field is somewhat more ethereal than operating in the other three categories, and I’m just not an ethereal sort. Therefore, I feel accomplishments here are less solid and perhaps less meaningful for future projections than in the other categories. Nevertheless, our results in 1965 were quite good in the “Relatively Undervalued” group, partly due to implementation of the technique referred to in last year’s letter which serves to reduce risk and potentially augment gains. It should reduce risk in any year, and it definitely augmented the gains in 1965. It is necessary to point out that results in this category were greatly affected for the better by only two investments.
坦率地说，在这个领域的操作比在其他三个类别中的操作更虚幻一些，而我并不是一个喜欢虚幻事物的人。因此，我觉得在这里取得的成果不像在其他类别中那样坚实，对于未来的预测来说，也许也没有那么重要。尽管如此，我们在 “相对低估” 类别中的投资在 1965 年取得了相当不错的业绩，部分原因是采用了去年信中提到的技术，该技术有助于降低风险，并有可能增加收益。它在任何一年都应该能降低风险，而且在 1965 年确实增加了收益。有必要指出的是，这一类别的业绩之所以大幅提升，主要得益于两项投资。
Candor also demands I point out that during 1965 we had our worst single investment experience in the history of BPL on one idea in this group.
出于坦诚，我也必须指出，1965 年，在这一类别的一个投资想法上，我们遭遇了英国塑料有限公司（BPL）有史以来最糟糕的单一投资经历。
Overall, we had more than our share of good breaks in 1965. We did not have a great quantity of ideas, but the quality, with the one important exception mentioned above, was very good and circumstances developed which accelerated the timetable in several. I do not have a great flood of good ideas as I go into 1966, although again I believe I have at least several potentially good ideas of substantial size. Much depends on whether market conditions are favorable for obtaining a larger position.
总体而言，1965 年我们的运气比应得的要好。我们没有很多好的投资想法，但除了上述提到的那个重要例外，这些想法的质量都非常好，而且情况的发展加速了几个项目的进程。进入 1966 年，我没有大量的好想法，不过我再次相信，我至少有几个潜在的、规模较大的好想法。很大程度上取决于市场条件是否有利于获得更大的持仓。
All in all, however, you should recognize that more came out of the pipeline in 1965 than went in.
不过，总的来说，你应该认识到，1965 年我们从投资渠道中获得的成果比投入的要多。
Diversification
投资多元化
Last year in commenting on the inability of the overwhelming majority of investment managers to achieve performance superior to that of pure chance, I ascribed it primarily to the product of: “(1) group decisions - my perhaps jaundiced view is that it is close to impossible for outstanding investment management to come from a group of any size with all parties really participating in decisions; (2) a desire to conform to the policies and (to an extent) the portfolios of other large well-regarded organizations; (3) an institutional framework whereby average is “safe” and the personal rewards for independent action are in no way commensurate with the general risk attached to such action; (4) an adherence to certain diversification practices which are irrational; and finally and importantly, (5) inertia.”
去年，在谈到绝大多数投资经理无法取得优于纯粹随机投资的业绩时，我将其主要归因于以下几点：“（1）群体决策 —— 我或许有些偏见的看法是，对于任何规模的群体而言，要想让所有成员真正参与决策并实现卓越的投资管理，几乎是不可能的；（2）想要与其他大型且备受推崇的机构的投资策略以及（在一定程度上）投资组合保持一致的愿望；（3）一种制度框架，在这种框架下，达到平均水平是‘安全’的，而采取独立行动所获得的个人回报，与这种行动所伴随的一般风险完全不相称；（4）坚持某些不合理的多元化投资做法；最后且重要的是，（5）惰性。”
This year in the material which went out in November, I specifically called your attention to a new Ground Rule reading, “7. We diversify substantially less than most investment operations. We might invest up to 40% of our net worth in a single security under conditions coupling an extremely high probability that our facts and reasoning are correct with a very low probability that anything could drastically change the underlying value of the investment.”
去年 11 月发出的材料中，我特别提醒你注意一条新的基本规则：“7. 我们的多元化程度比大多数投资机构要低得多。在我们对事实的判断和推理极有可能正确，且几乎不存在任何因素能大幅改变投资内在价值的情况下，我们可能会将高达 40% 的净资产投入到单一证券中。”
We are obviously following a policy regarding diversification which differs markedly from that of practically all public investment operations. Frankly, there is nothing I would like better than to have 50 different investment opportunities, all of which have a mathematical expectation (this term reflects the range of all possible relative performances, including negative ones, adjusted for the probability of each - no yawning, please) of achieving performance surpassing the Dow by, say, fifteen percentage points per annum. If the fifty individual expectations were not intercorelated (what happens to one is associated with what happens to the other) I could put 2% of our capital into each one and sit back with a very high degree of certainty that our overall results would be very close to such a fifteen percentage point advantage.
显然，我们在投资多元化方面所遵循的策略，与几乎所有公开的投资机构的策略都截然不同。坦率地说，我最希望的就是能有 50 个不同的投资机会，且所有这些机会在数学期望上（这个术语反映了所有可能的相对业绩范围，包括负业绩，并根据每种情况的概率进行了调整 —— 请别打哈欠）都能实现每年超越道琼斯指数 15 个百分点的表现。如果这 50 个投资机会的预期之间没有相关性（即一个机会的结果与另一个机会的结果没有关联），我可以将我们 2% 的资金投入到每个机会中，然后高枕无忧，因为可以非常确定我们的总体业绩将非常接近实现超越道琼斯指数 15 个百分点的优势。
It doesn’t work that way.
但实际情况并非如此。
We have to work extremely hard to find just a very few attractive investment situations. Such a situation by definition is one where my expectation (defined as above) of performance is at least ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. Among the few we do find, the expectations vary substantially. The question always is, “How much do I put in number one (ranked by expectation of relative performance) and how much do I put in number eight?” This depends to a great degree on the wideness of the spread between the mathematical expectation of number one versus number eight.” It also depends upon the probability that number one could turn in a really poor relative performance. Two securities could have equal mathematical expectations, but one might have .05 chance of performing fifteen percentage points or more worse than the Dow, and the second might have only .01 chance of such performance. The wider range of expectation in the first case reduces the desirability of heavy concentration in it.
我们必须非常努力地去寻找，才能找到为数不多的几个有吸引力的投资机会。从定义上来说，这样的机会是指我对其业绩的预期（如上述定义）至少是每年比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点。在我们找到的为数不多的机会中，预期差异很大。问题总是在于，“我应该在排名第一（根据相对业绩预期排名）的投资机会中投入多少资金，又该在排名第八的机会中投入多少呢？” 这在很大程度上取决于排名第一和排名第八的投资机会在数学期望上的差距有多大。这也取决于排名第一的投资机会出现相对表现非常糟糕的可能性。两种证券可能具有相同的数学期望，但其中一种可能有 0.05 的概率表现比道琼斯指数差 15 个百分点或更多，而另一种出现这种情况的概率可能只有 0.01。在第一种情况下，预期范围更广，这就降低了大量集中投资于该证券的吸引力。
The above may make the whole operation sound very precise. It isn’t. Nevertheless, our business is that of ascertaining facts and then applying experience and reason to such facts to reach expectations. Imprecise and emotionally influenced as our attempts may be, that is what the business is all about. The results of many years of decision-making in securities will demonstrate how well you are doing on making such calculations - whether you consciously realize you are making the calculations or not. I believe the investor operates at a distinct advantage when he is aware of what path his thought process is following.
上述内容可能会让整个投资操作听起来非常精确。但实际上并非如此。尽管如此，我们的工作就是确定事实，然后运用经验和推理来分析这些事实，从而得出预期。尽管我们的尝试可能并不精确，还会受到情感因素的影响，但这就是投资工作的本质。多年来在证券投资方面的决策结果，将证明你在进行这类计算时的能力如何 —— 无论你是否有意识地意识到自己在进行计算。我相信，当投资者清楚自己的思维过程遵循的是什么路径时，他就具有明显的优势。
There is one thing of which I can assure you. If good performance of the fund is even a minor objective, any portfolio encompassing one hundred stocks (whether the manager is handling one thousand dollars or one billion dollars) is not being operated logically. The addition of the one hundredth stock simply can’t reduce the potential variance in portfolio performance sufficiently to compensate for the negative effect its inclusion has on the overall portfolio expectation.
有一点我可以向你保证。如果基金的良好业绩哪怕只是一个次要目标，那么任何包含 100 只股票的投资组合（无论基金经理管理的资金是 1000 美元还是 10 亿美元）在运作上都是不合理的。增加第 100 只股票，并不能充分降低投资组合业绩的潜在波动，以弥补将其纳入投资组合对整体预期产生的负面影响。
Anyone owning such numbers of securities after presumably studying their investment merit (and I don’t care how prestigious their labels) is following what I call the Noah School of Investing - two of everything. Such investors should be piloting arks. While Noah may have been acting in accord with certain time-tested biological principles, the investors have left the track regarding mathematical principles. (I only made it through plane geometry, but with one exception, I have carefully screened out the mathematicians from our Partnership.)
任何在研究了这些证券的投资价值后（我不在乎这些证券的名头有多响亮）还持有如此多证券的投资者，都遵循着我所说的 “诺亚式投资法则”—— 每种证券都买两份。这样的投资者应该去驾驶方舟。虽然诺亚的行为可能符合某些经过时间考验的生物学原则，但这些投资者却违背了数学原则。（我只学过平面几何，但除了一个人之外，我都仔细地把数学家排除在我们的合伙公司之外了。）
Of course, the fact that someone else is behaving illogically in owning one hundred securities doesn’t prove our case. While they may be wrong in overdiversifying, we have to affirmatively reason through a proper diversification policy in terms of our objectives.
当然，其他人不合理地持有 100 只证券这一事实，并不能证明我们的观点是正确的。虽然他们在过度多元化方面可能是错误的，但我们必须根据我们的目标，积极地推导出一个合理的多元化投资策略。
The optimum portfolio depends on the various expectations of choices available and the degree of variance in performance which is tolerable. The greater the number of selections, the less will be the average year-to-year variation in actual versus expected results. Also, the lower will be the expected results, assuming different choices have different expectations of performance.
最优的投资组合取决于可选择的各种投资机会的预期，以及可容忍的业绩波动程度。选择的投资机会数量越多，实际业绩与预期业绩之间的年度平均差异就会越小。而且，假设不同的投资机会有不同的业绩预期，那么预期业绩也会越低。
I am willing to give up quite a bit in terms of leveling of year-to-year results (remember when I talk of “results,” I am talking of performance relative to the Dow) in order to achieve better overall long-term performance. Simply stated, this means I am willing to concentrate quite heavily in what I believe to be the best investment opportunities recognizing very well that this may cause an occasional very sour year - one somewhat more sour, probably, than if I had diversified more. While this means our results will bounce around more, I think it also means that our long-term margin of superiority should be greater.
为了实现更好的整体长期业绩，我愿意在一定程度上放弃年度业绩的稳定性（记住，当我谈到 “业绩” 时，我说的是相对于道琼斯指数的表现）。简单来说，这意味着我愿意将大量资金集中投资于我认为是最佳的投资机会，同时也清楚地认识到这可能会偶尔导致业绩非常糟糕的年份 —— 可能比我进行更多元化投资时的糟糕年份更差。虽然这意味着我们的业绩波动会更大，但我认为这也意味着我们的长期优势应该会更大。
You have already seen some examples of this. Our margin versus the Dow has ranged from 2.4 percentage points in 1958 to 33.0 points in 1965. If you check this against the deviations of the funds listed on page three, you will find our variations have a much wider amplitude. I could have operated in such a manner as to reduce our amplitude, but I would also have reduced our overall performance somewhat although it still would have substantially exceeded that of the investment companies. Looking back, and continuing to think this problem through, I feel that if anything, I should have concentrated slightly more than I have in the past. Hence, the new Ground Rule and this long-winded explanation.
你已经看到了一些这样的例子。我们相对于道琼斯指数的优势范围从 1958 年的 2.4 个百分点到 1965 年的 33.0 个百分点。如果你将这与第三页所列基金的偏差进行对比，就会发现我们的业绩波动幅度要大得多。我本可以采取一种降低波动幅度的操作方式，但那样也会在一定程度上降低我们的整体业绩，尽管业绩仍会大幅超过那些投资公司。回顾过去，并继续思考这个问题，我觉得如果要说有什么不同的话，我应该比过去更加集中投资一些。因此，才有了这条新的基本规则以及这番冗长的解释。
Again let me state that this is somewhat unconventional reasoning (this doesn’t make it right or wrong - it does mean you have to do your own thinking on it), and you may well have a different opinion - if you do, the Partnership is not the place for you. We are obviously only going to go to 40% in very rare situations - this rarity, of course, is what makes it necessary that we concentrate so heavily, when we see such an opportunity. We probably have had only five or six situations in the nine-year history of the Partnership where we have exceeded 25%. Any such situations are going to have to promise very significantly superior performance relative to the Dow compared to other opportunities available at the time. They are also going to have to possess such superior qualitative and/or quantitative factors that the chance of serious permanent loss is minimal (anything can happen on a short-term quotational basis which partially explains the greater risk of widened year-to-year variation in results). In selecting the limit to which I will go in anyone investment, I attempt to reduce to a tiny figure the probability that the single investment (or group, if there is intercorrelation) can produce a result for our total portfolio that would be more than ten percentage points poorer than the Dow.
我再次声明，这是一种有些非传统的推理方式（这并不意味着它是对是错 —— 这只是意味着你必须自己思考这个问题），你很可能有不同的观点 —— 如果你有，那么这个合伙公司可能不适合你。显然，我们只有在极少数情况下才会将 40% 的资金投入到单一投资中 —— 当然，正因为这种情况极为罕见，所以当我们看到这样的机会时，才需要如此集中地投资。在合伙公司九年的历史中，我们可能只有五六次将超过 25% 的资金投入到单一投资中。任何这样的投资机会，相对于当时的其他投资机会而言，都必须有望在业绩上显著超越道琼斯指数。它们还必须具备卓越的定性和 / 或定量因素，以使遭受严重永久性损失的可能性降至最低（从短期报价的角度来看，任何情况都有可能发生，这在一定程度上解释了业绩年度波动增大所带来的更高风险）。在确定对任何一项投资的投资上限时，我试图将单一投资（或者如果存在相关性的一组投资）导致我们的总投资组合业绩比道琼斯指数差 10 个百分点以上的概率降至极低水平。
We presently have two situations in the over 25% category - one a controlled company, and the other a large company where we will never take an active part. It is worth pointing out that our performance in 1965 was overwhelmingly the product of five investment situations. The 1965 gains (in some cases there were also gains applicable to the same holding in prior years) from these situations ranged from about $800,000 to about $3 1/2 million. If you should take the overall performance of our five smallest general investments in 1965, the results are lackluster (I chose a very charitable adjective).
目前，我们有两项投资的占比超过了 25%—— 一项是对一家公司的控股投资，另一项是对一家大型公司的投资，在这家公司我们永远不会积极参与管理。值得指出的是，1965 年我们的业绩在很大程度上得益于五个投资项目。1965 年，这些项目的收益（在某些情况下，之前年份对同一持仓也有收益）从约 80 万美元到约 350 万美元不等。如果你看一下我们 1965 年五项最小规模的常规投资的总体业绩，结果会很平淡（我选了一个很委婉的形容词）。
Interestingly enough, the literature of investment management is virtually devoid of material relative to deductive calculation of optimal diversification.All texts counsel “adequate” diversification, but the ones who quantify “adequate” virtually never explain how they arrive at their conclusion. Hence, for our summation on overdiversification, we turn to that eminent academician Billy Rose, who says, “You’ve got a harem of seventy girls; you don’t get to know any of them very well.”
有趣的是，投资管理方面的文献几乎没有关于最优多元化投资的演绎计算的内容。所有的文献都建议进行 “适当的” 多元化投资，但那些对 “适当” 进行量化的人几乎从不解释他们是如何得出结论的。因此，对于过度多元化投资的总结，我们引用杰出学者比利・罗斯（Billy Rose）的话，他说：“你有一个由 70 个女孩组成的后宫；但你对她们中的任何一个都了解不深。”
Miscellaneous
杂项
Last year we boldly announced an expansion move, encompassing an additional 227 1/4 square feet. Older partners shook their heads. I feel that our gain from operations in 1965 of $12,304,060 indicates that we did not overextend ourselves. Fortunately, we didn’t sign a percentage lease. Operationally, things have never been running more smoothly, and I think our present setup unquestionably lets me devote a higher percentage of my time to thinking about the investment process than virtually anyone else in the money management business. This, of course, is the result of really outstanding personnel and cooperative partners.
去年，我们大胆宣布了一项扩张举措，增加了 227.25 平方英尺的办公面积。老合伙人对此摇头。我认为，1965 年我们从业务运营中获得的 12304060 美元的收益表明，我们并没有过度扩张。幸运的是，我们没有签订按比例计算租金的租约。从运营角度来看，一切从未像现在这样顺利，而且我认为，我们目前的架构无疑让我能够将比几乎任何其他资金管理行业的人更高比例的时间，用于思考投资过程。这当然要归功于非常出色的员工和合作的合伙人。
John Harding has taken complete charge of all administrative operations with splendid results. Bill Scott continues to develop detailed information on investments which substantially enhances our net profit figure. Beth Feehan, Donna Walter and Elizabeth Hanon (who joined us in November) have all handled large work loads (secretary’s note -Amen!) accurately and efficiently.
约翰・哈丁（John Harding）全面负责所有行政运营工作，取得了出色的成果。比尔・斯科特（Bill Scott）继续深入研究投资方面的详细信息，这大幅提高了我们的净利润。贝丝・费汉（Beth Feehan）、唐娜・沃尔特（Donna Walter）和伊丽莎白・哈农（Elizabeth Hanon，她于 11 月加入我们）都准确高效地处理了大量工作（秘书注：阿门！）。
The above people, their spouses (one apiece) and children have a combined investment in the Partnership of over $600,000. Susie and I have an investment of $6,849,936, which should keep me from slipping away to the movies in the afternoon. This represents virtually our entire net worth, with the exception of our continued holding of Mid-Continent Tab Card, a local company into which I bought in 1960 when it had less than 10 stockholders.
上述这些人、他们的配偶（每人一位）和孩子在合伙公司的总投资超过 60 万美元。苏西（Susie）和我投资了 6849936 美元，这应该能让我不会在下午溜去看电影。这几乎是我们的全部净资产，不过我们还继续持有中陆标签卡片公司（Mid-Continent Tab Card）的股份，这是一家本地公司，我在 1960 年购入股份，当时它的股东还不到 10 人。
Additionally, my relatives, consisting of three children, mother, two sisters, two brothers-in-law, father-in-law, three aunts, two uncles, five cousins, and six nieces and nephews have interests in BPL, directly or indirectly, totaling $2,708,233. So don’t get any ideas about voting a change in the Partnership name.
此外，我的亲属，包括三个孩子、母亲、两个姐妹、两个姐夫 / 妹夫、岳父、三个姑姑、两个叔叔、五个表亲以及六个侄子 / 侄女，直接或间接地在英国塑料有限公司（BPL）拥有权益，总计 2708233 美元。所以，别想着投票改变合伙公司的名字了。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. has done the customary excellent job of expediting the audit and tax information. This requires great effort and ability, and they supply both. This year a computer was brought to bear on our problems, and naturally, I was a little worried someone else would come out as the general partner. However, it all worked quite smoothly.
毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）一如既往地出色完成了加快审计和提供税务信息的工作。这需要巨大的努力和能力，而他们两者兼具。今年，我们借助计算机来处理问题，自然地，我有点担心会有其他人成为普通合伙人。不过，一切都进行得很顺利。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
在接下来的两周内，你将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1965 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- 一封税务信函，提供你填写 1965 年联邦所得税申报表所需的英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的所有信息。就税务目的而言，这封信函是唯一重要的文件。
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1965, setting forth the operations and financialposition of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
- 毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）出具的 1965 年审计报告，阐述英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的运营情况、财务状况以及你的资本账户情况。
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on 1/1/66. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封我签署的信函，说明截至 1966 年 1 月 1 日你在英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的权益状况。该数据与审计报告中的数据一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. It is difficult to anticipate all of the questions you may have and if there is anything that is confusing, I want to hear about it. For instance, we received an excellent suggestion last year from a partner regarding the presentation of the reconciliation of personal capital accounts.
如果这封信中或今年内出现的任何内容需要澄清，请告诉我。很难预料你可能会有哪些问题，如果有任何令人困惑的地方，我希望能了解到。例如，去年我们收到了一位合伙人关于个人资本账户对账报告呈现方式的极好建议。
My next letter will be about July 15th, summarizing the first ha1f of this year.
我的下一封信大约会在 7 月 15 日发出，总结今年上半年的情况。
Cordially,
诚挚问候，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1966 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042-4110
电话 042-4110
July 12, 1966
1966 年 7 月 12 日
First Half Performance
上半年业绩表现
During the first half of 1966, the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) declined from 969.26 to 870.10. If one had owned the Dow during this period, dividends of approximately 14.70 would have been received, reducing the overall loss of the Dow to about 8.7%.
在 1966 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）从 969.26 点降至 870.10 点。如果在此期间持有道指成分股，大约可获得 14.70 点的股息，这使得道指的总体跌幅减少到约 8.7%。
It is my objective and my hope (but not my prediction!) that we achieve over a long period of time, an average yearly advantage of ten percentage points relative to the Dow. During the first half we did considerably better than expected with an overall gain of approximately 8.2%. Such results should be regarded as decidedly abnormal. I have previously complimented partners on the good-natured tolerance they display in shrugging off such unexpected positive variances. The nature of our business is such that over the years, we will not disappoint the many of you who must also desire a test of your capacity for tolerance of negative variances.
我的目标和期望（但并非预测！）是，在很长一段时间内，我们能够实现相对于道指平均每年 10 个百分点的优势。上半年，我们的表现比预期好得多，总体收益约为 8.2%。这样的结果应被视为绝对的异常情况。我之前曾称赞过各位合伙人，他们以良好的心态容忍了这些意外的正向偏差。我们的业务性质决定了，多年下来，我们也不会让你们中许多人失望，因为你们肯定也想检验一下自己容忍负向偏差的能力。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
以下是道指的逐年表现、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配收益之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的收益情况总结：
| 年份（Year） | 道琼斯总体业绩（1）（Overall Results From Dow (1)） | 合伙业绩（2）（Partnership Results (2)） | 有限合伙人业绩（3）（Limited Partners’ Results (3)） |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965年 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966年上半年 | -8.7% | 8.2% | 7.7% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative Results） | 141.1% | 1028.7% | 641.5% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 9.7% | 29.0% | 23.5% |
- Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
- 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
- For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
- 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙企业全年运营的综合业绩，已扣除所有费用，但未向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人进行分配。
- For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
- 对于 1957 年至 1961 年，根据前一栏的合伙公司业绩计算，考虑按照当前合伙协议向普通合伙人进行分配，但未扣除有限合伙人每月的提款。
Even Samson gets clipped occasionally. If you had invested $100.000 on January 1 equally among -
即使是参孙（《圣经》中的大力士，后头发被剪去而失去力量）偶尔也会受挫。如果你在 1 月 1 日将 10 万美元平均投资于以下公司：
a. the world’s largest auto company (General Motors); a. 世界上最大的汽车公司（通用汽车公司）； b. the world’s largest oil company (Standard of New Jersey); b. 世界上最大的石油公司（新泽西标准石油公司）； c. the world’s largest retailing company (Sears Roebuck); c. 世界上最大的零售公司（西尔斯罗巴克公司）； d. the world’s largest chemical company (Dupont); d. 世界上最大的化工公司（杜邦公司）； e. the world’s largest steel company (U.S. Steel); e. 世界上最大的钢铁公司（美国钢铁公司）； f. the world’s largest stockholder-owned insurance company (Aetna); f. 世界上最大的由股东所有的保险公司（安泰保险公司）； g. the world’s largest public utility (American Telephone & Telegraph); g. 世界上最大的公共事业公司（美国电话电报公司）； h. the world’s largest bank (Bank of America); h. 世界上最大的银行（美国银行）；
your total portfolio (including dividends received) would have been worth $83,370 on June 30 for a loss of 16.6%. The total market value on January 1 of these eight giants was well over $100 billion. Everyone of them was selling lower on June 30.
那么到 6 月 30 日，你的投资组合总值（包括收到的股息）将为 83,370 美元，亏损 16.6%。这八家巨头公司在 1 月 1 日的总市值远远超过 1000 亿美元。到 6 月 30 日，它们的股价都有所下跌。
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the next page we bring up to date our regular comparison with the results of the two largest open-end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95-100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
在下一页，我们将更新我们定期进行的对比，对象是两家通常遵循 95% 至 100% 投资于普通股政策的最大开放式投资公司（共同基金），以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩。
YEARLY RESULTS
年度业绩
| 年份（Year） | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1）（Mass. Inv. Trust (1)） | 投资者股票（1）（Investors Stock (1)） | 雷曼（2）（Lehman (2)） | 三大陆公司（2）（Tri - Cont. (2)） | 道琼斯（Dow） | 有限合伙人（Limited Partners） |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957年 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958年 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959年 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960年 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961年 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962年 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963年 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.7% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964年 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965年 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966年上半年 | -7.9% | -7.9% | -1.0% | -5.2% | -8.7% | 7.7% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative Results） | 118.1% | 106.3% | 142.8% | 126.9% | 141.1% | 641.5% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 8.6% | 7.9% | 9.8% | 9.0% | 9.7% | 23.5% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化，再加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配来计算。
(2) From 1966 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1965. Estimated for first half of 1966.
(2) 1957 年至 1965 年的数据取自 1966 年版的《穆迪银行与金融手册》。1966 年上半年的数据为估算值。
Proponents of institutional investing frequently cite its conservative nature. If “conservative” is interpreted to mean “productive of results varying only slightly from average experience” I believe the characterization is proper. Such results are almost bound to flow from wide diversification among high grade securities. Since, over a long period, “average experience” is likely to be good experience, there is nothing wrong with the typical investor utilizing this form of investment medium.
机构投资的支持者常常提及它的保守性质。如果 “保守” 被理解为 “产生的投资结果与平均水平的偏差很小”，我认为这样的描述是恰当的。这样的结果几乎必然来自于在高等级证券中进行广泛的多元化投资。因为从长期来看，“平均水平的投资结果” 很可能是不错的结果，所以对于一般投资者而言，采用这种投资方式并没有什么问题。
However, I believe that conservatism is more properly interpreted to mean “subject to substantially less temporary or permanent shrinkage in value than total experience”. This simply has not been achieved, as the record of the four largest funds (presently managing over $5 billion) illustrates. Specifically, the Dow declined in 1957, 1960, 1962 and the first half of 1966. Cumulating the shrinkage in the Dow during the three full year periods produces a decline of 20.6%. Following a similar technique for the four largest funds produces declines of 9.7%, 20.9%, 22.3% and 24.6%. Including the interim performance for the first half of 1966 results in a decline in the Dow of 27.5% and for the funds declines of 14.4%, 23.1%, 27.1% and 30.6%. Such funds (and I believe their results are quite typical of institutional experience in common stocks) seem to meet the first definition of conservatism but not the second one.
然而，我认为 “保守” 更确切的解释应该是 “相比总体投资经验，其价值出现大幅的短期或永久性缩水的可能性要小得多”。但从四大基金（目前管理着超过 50 亿美元的资金）的记录来看，这一点并未实现。具体而言，道琼斯指数在 1957 年、1960 年、1962 年以及 1966 年上半年出现了下跌。将道琼斯指数在这三个完整年度期间的跌幅累计起来，达到了 20.6%。用同样的方法计算四大基金的跌幅，分别为 9.7%、20.9%、22.3% 和 24.6%。如果算上 1966 年上半年的中期表现，道琼斯指数的跌幅为 27.5%，而这些基金的跌幅分别为 14.4%、23.1%、27.1% 和 30.6%。这样的基金（而且我认为它们的业绩相当能代表机构在普通股投资方面的经验）似乎符合 “保守” 的第一种定义，但不符合第二种定义。
Most investors would climb a rung intellectually if they clearly delineated between the above two interpretations of conservatism. The first might be better labeled “conventionalism” - what it really says is that “when others are making money in the general run of securities, so will we and to about the same degree; when they are losing money, we’ll do it at about the same rate.” This is not to be equated with “when others are making it, we’ll make as much and when they are losing it, we will lose less.” Very few investment programs accomplish the latter -we certainly don’t promise it but we do intend to keep trying. (I have always felt our objectives should be somewhat loftier than those Herman Hickman articulated during the desperate years when Yale was losing eight games a season. Said Herman, “I see my job as one of keeping the alumni sullen but not mutinous.”)
如果大多数投资者能清楚地区分上述两种对 “保守” 的解释，那么他们在认知上就能更上一层楼。第一种解释或许更适合被称为 “因循守旧”—— 它实际上表达的是 “当其他人在一般的证券投资中赚钱时，我们也会赚，而且赚得差不多；当他们赔钱时，我们也会以差不多的速度赔钱”。这与 “当其他人赚钱时，我们赚得一样多；当他们赔钱时，我们赔得更少” 不能等同。很少有投资项目能做到后者 —— 我们当然不能保证做到这一点，但我们确实打算不断尝试。（我一直觉得我们的目标应该比赫尔曼・希克曼（Herman Hickman）在耶鲁大学每个赛季输掉八场比赛的艰难时期所阐述的目标更高远一些。赫尔曼曾说：“我认为我的工作是让校友们心中不满但不至于造反。”）
Hochschild, Kohn & Co.
霍赫希尔德・科恩公司（Hochschild, Kohn & Co.）
During the first half we, and two 10% partners, purchased all of the stock of Hochschild, Kohn & Co., a privately owned Baltimore department store. This is the first time in the history of the Partnership that an entire business has been purchased by negotiation, although we have, from time to time, negotiated purchase of specific important blocks of marketable securities. However, no new principles are involved. The quantitative and qualitative aspects of the business are evaluated and weighed against price, both on an absolute basis and relative to other investment opportunities. HK (learn to call it that - I didn’t find out how to pronounce it until the deal was concluded) stacks up fine in all respects.
在上半年，我们以及两位持股 10% 的合伙人，购买了霍赫希尔德・科恩公司（Hochschild, Kohn & Co.）的全部股份，这是一家位于巴尔的摩的私人百货公司。这是合伙公司历史上首次通过谈判收购一整家企业，尽管我们之前也不时地通过谈判购买一些重要的可交易证券。不过，这其中并没有涉及新的原则。我们会对这家企业的定量和定性方面进行评估，并将其与价格进行权衡，既从绝对价值的角度，也从与其他投资机会相比较的角度来考虑。霍赫希尔德・科恩公司（简称为 HK，学着这么叫吧 —— 直到交易完成我才知道该怎么发音）在各个方面都表现出色。
We have topnotch people (both from a personal and business standpoint) handling the operation. Despite the edge that my extensive 75 cents an hour experience at the Penney’s store in Omaha some years back gives us (I became an authority on the Minimum Wage Act), they will continue to run the business as in the past. Even if the price had been cheaper but the management had been run-of-the-mill, we would not have bought the business.
我们有一流的人才（无论是从个人素养还是业务能力方面来看）来管理公司的运营。尽管多年前我在奥马哈的彭尼百货（Penney’s）商店每小时 75 美分的丰富工作经验（我还成了《最低工资法》方面的权威）让我们有一定优势，但他们仍会像过去一样经营这家公司。即使价格更便宜，但如果管理层平庸，我们也不会收购这家企业。
It is impossible to avoid some public notice when a business with several thousand employees is acquired. However, it is important that you do not infer the degree of financial importance to BPL from its news value to the public. We have something over $50 million invested, primarily in marketable securities, of which only about 10% is represented by our net investment in HK. We have an investment of over three times this much in a marketable security where our ownership will never come to public attention. This is not to say an HK is not important - a 10% holding definitely is. However, it is not as significant relative to our total operation as it would be easy to think. I still prefer the iceberg approach toward investment disclosure.
当收购一家拥有数千名员工的企业时，很难不引起公众的注意。然而，重要的是，你不能从它对公众的新闻价值来推断它对英国塑料有限公司（BPL）的财务重要性程度。我们大约有 5000 多万美元的投资，主要投资于可交易证券，其中我们在霍赫希尔德・科恩公司的净投资只占大约 10%。我们在一只可交易证券上的投资是这个数额的三倍多，而且我们对这只证券的持有永远不会引起公众的注意。这并不是说霍赫希尔德・科恩公司不重要 ——10% 的持股肯定是重要的。然而，相对于我们的整体业务来说，它并不像人们可能轻易认为的那么重要。我仍然倾向于像冰山一样，对投资情况有所保留地披露。
It is my intention to value HK at yearend at cost plus our share of retained earnings since purchase. This policy will be followed in future years unless there is a demonstrable change in our position relative to other department stores or in other objective standards of value. Naturally we wouldn’t have purchased HK unless we felt the price was quite attractive. Therefore, a valuation policy based upon cost may somewhat undervalue our holdings. Nevertheless, it seems the most objective figure to apply. All of our investments usually appear undervalued to me - otherwise we wouldn’t own them.
我打算在年底时，按照成本加上自收购以来我们在留存收益中所占的份额来对霍赫希尔德・科恩公司进行估值。除非我们相对于其他百货公司的地位或其他客观的价值标准出现明显变化，否则未来几年我们都会遵循这一政策。当然，如果我们不觉得价格极具吸引力，就不会收购霍赫希尔德・科恩公司。因此，基于成本的估值政策可能会在一定程度上低估我们的持股价值。不过，这似乎是最客观的估值方式。在我看来，我们所有的投资通常都被低估了 —— 否则我们也不会持有它们。
Market Forecasting
市场预测
Ground Rule No.6 (from our November packet) says: “I am not in the business of predicting general stock market or business fluctuations. If you think I can do this, or think it is essential to an investment program, you should not be in the partnership.”
基本规则第 6 条（来自我们 11 月发布的材料）规定：“我不从事预测股市大盘或商业波动的业务。如果你认为我能做到这一点，或者认为这对投资计划至关重要，那么你就不应该加入合伙公司。”
Of course, this rule can be attacked as fuzzy, complex, ambiguous, vague, etc. Nevertheless, I think the point is well understood by the great majority of our partners. We don’t buy and sell stocks based upon what other people think the stock market is going to do (I never have an opinion) but rather upon what we think the company is going to do. The course of the stock market will determine, to a great degree, when we will be right, but the accuracy of our analysis of the company will largely determine whether we will be right. In other words, we tend to concentrate on what should happen, not when it should happen.
当然，这条规则可能会被指责为模糊、复杂、模棱两可、含糊不清等等。不过，我认为我们绝大多数合伙人都很清楚这一点。我们买卖股票并不是基于其他人对股市走势的看法（我从来都没有这方面的观点），而是基于我们对公司未来发展的判断。股市的走势在很大程度上会决定我们何时是正确的，但我们对公司分析的准确性在很大程度上决定了我们是否正确。换句话说，我们倾向于关注应该发生什么，而不是什么时候发生。
In our department store business I can say with considerable assurance that December will be better than July. (Notice how sophisticated I have already become about retailing.) What really counts is whether December is better than last December by a margin greater than our competitors’ and what we are doing to set the stage for future Decembers. However, in our partnership business I not only can’t say whether December will be better than July, but I can’t even say that December won’t produce a very large loss. It sometimes does. Our investments are simply not aware that it takes 365-1/4 days for the earth to make it around the sun. Even worse, they are not aware that your celestial orientation (and that of the IRS) requires that I report to you upon the conclusion of each orbit (the earth’s - not ours). Therefore, we have to use a standard other than the calendar to measure our progress. This yardstick is obviously the general experience in securities as measured by the Dow. We have a strong feeling that this competitor will do quite decently over a period of years (Christmas will come even if it’s in July) and if we keep beating our competitor we will have to do something better than “quite decently”. It’s something like a retailer measuring his sales gains and profit margins against Sears’ - beat them every year and somehow you’ll see daylight.
对于我们的百货公司业务，我可以相当肯定地说，12 月的业绩会比 7 月好。（注意我对零售业已经变得多么在行。）真正重要的是，今年 12 月的业绩相比去年 12 月的提升幅度是否大于我们的竞争对手，以及我们正在采取什么措施为未来的 12 月做好准备。然而，对于我们的合伙公司业务，我不仅不能说 12 月的业绩是否会比 7 月好，甚至不能确定 12 月不会产生巨大的亏损。有时确实会出现亏损。我们的投资根本不会在意地球绕太阳一圈需要 365.25 天。更糟糕的是，它们也不会在意你的时间观念（以及美国国税局的时间观念）要求我在地球每绕完一圈（是地球绕圈，不是我们绕圈）时向你汇报情况。因此，我们必须使用一种不同于日历的标准来衡量我们的进展。这个标准显然就是以道琼斯指数来衡量的证券市场的总体表现。我们坚信，在几年的时间里，这个竞争对手（指道琼斯指数）会表现得相当不错（即使圣诞节在 7 月到来，它也会来的），如果我们想要一直超越这个竞争对手，我们就必须做得比 “相当不错” 更好。这有点像零售商拿自己的销售额增长和利润率与西尔斯百货（Sears）作比较 —— 每年都超越它，不知怎的你就能看到曙光了。
I resurrect this “market-guessing” section only because after the Dow declined from 995 at the peak in February to about 865 in May, I received a few calls from partners suggesting that they thought stocks were going a lot lower. This always raises two questions in my mind: (1) if they knew in February that the Dow was going to 865 in May, why didn’t they let me in on it then; and, (2) if they didn’t know what was going to happen during the ensuing three months back in February, how do they know in May? There is also a voice or two after any hundred point or so decline suggesting we sell and wait until the future is clearer. Let me again suggest two points: (1) the future has never been clear to me (give us a call when the next few months are obvious to you –or, for that matter the next few hours); and, (2) no one ever seems to call after the market has gone up one hundred points to focus my attention on how unclear everything is, even though the view back in February doesn’t look so clear in retrospect.
我之所以再次提起 “猜测市场走势” 这部分内容，只是因为当道琼斯指数从 2 月的峰值 995 点下跌到 5 月的约 865 点之后，我接到了几位合伙人的电话，他们认为股票还会大幅下跌。这总是让我心中产生两个疑问：（1）如果他们在 2 月就知道道琼斯指数会在 5 月跌到 865 点，那为什么当时不告诉我呢；（2）如果他们在 2 月时不知道接下来三个月会发生什么，那他们在 5 月又怎么会知道呢？而且，每当指数下跌大约 100 点左右时，总会有一两个人建议我们卖出股票，等到未来形势更明朗时再行动。让我再次强调两点：（1）未来对我来说从来都不明朗（当你能清楚地看到未来几个月的走势时，给我们打个电话 —— 或者说，当你能清楚地看到未来几个小时的走势时也可以）；（2）似乎从来没有人在市场上涨 100 点之后打电话提醒我注意一切是多么不明朗，尽管现在回头看，2 月时的形势也并非那么清晰。
If we start deciding, based on guesses or emotions, whether we will or won’t participate in a business where we should have some long run edge, we’re in trouble. We will not sell our interests in businesses (stocks) when they are attractively priced just because some astrologer thinks the quotations may go lower even though such forecasts are obviously going to be right some of the time. Similarly, we will not buy fully priced securities because “experts” think prices are going higher. Who would think of buying or selling a private business because of someone’s guess on the stock market? The availability of a question for your business interest (stock) should always be an asset to be utilized if desired. If it gets silly enough in either direction, you take advantage of it. Its availability should never be turned into a liability whereby its periodic aberrations in turn formulate your judgments. A marvelous articulation of this idea is contained in chapter two (The Investor and Stock Market Fluctuations) of Benjamin Graham’s “The Intelligent Investor”. In my opinion, this chapter has more investment importance than anything else that has been written.
如果我们开始基于猜测或情绪来决定是否参与一项我们从长远来看应该具有一定优势的业务，那我们就麻烦了。即使某些 “预言家” 认为股价可能会进一步下跌（尽管这种预测显然有时是正确的），但只要这些业务（股票）的价格具有吸引力，我们就不会出售我们的股权。同样，我们也不会因为 “专家” 认为价格会上涨就去购买价格高估的证券。有谁会因为别人对股市的猜测就去买卖一家私人企业呢？对于你所拥有的企业权益（股票），其价格波动的情况应该是一种可以利用的优势，如果有需要的话。如果价格走势在任何一个方向上变得足够离谱，你就可以利用这一点。价格波动的存在绝不应该变成一种负担，导致你根据其周期性的异常波动来做出判断。本杰明・格雷厄姆（Benjamin Graham）所著的《聪明的投资者》（The Intelligent Investor）第二章（投资者与股市波动）中对这一观点有精彩的阐述。在我看来，这一章在投资方面的重要性超过了其他任何相关的论述。
We will have a letter out about November 1 with the Commitment Letter for 1967 and an estimate of the 1966 tax situation.
我们大约会在 11 月 1 日发出一封信，其中包括 1967 年的承诺书以及对 1966 年税务情况的预估。
Cordially,
诚挚问候，
Warren Buffett
沃伦・巴菲特
WEB eh