Buffett Partnership Letters 1967 to 1970
1967 年信件
1967 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
January 25, 1967
1967 年 1 月 25 日
The First Decade
第一个十年
The Partnership had its tenth anniversary during 1966. The celebration was appropriate - an all - time record (both past and future) was established for our performance margin relative to the Dow. Our advantage was 36 points, which resulted from a plus 20.4% for the Partnership and a minus 15.6% for the Dow.
1966 年，合伙公司迎来了它的十周年纪念。这场庆祝活动恰逢其时 —— 我们相对于道琼斯指数的业绩优势创下了历史纪录（无论是在过去还是在未来）。我们的优势达到了 36 个百分点，这得益于合伙公司的回报率为正 20.4%，而道琼斯指数的回报率为负 15.6%。
This pleasant but non - repeatable experience was partially due to a lackluster performance by the Dow. Virtually all investment managers outperformed it during the year. The Dow is weighted by the dollar price of the thirty stocks involved. Several of the highest priced components, which thereby carry disproportionate weight (Dupont, General Motors), were particularly poor performers in 1966. This, coupled with the general aversion to conventional blue chips, caused the Dow to suffer relative to general investment experience, particularly during the last quarter.
这段令人愉快但难以复制的经历，部分原因在于道琼斯指数表现平平。在这一年里，几乎所有的投资经理的业绩都超过了道琼斯指数。道琼斯指数是根据所涉及的 30 只股票的美元价格进行加权计算的。其中几只价格最高、因而权重过大的成分股（如杜邦公司、通用汽车公司）在 1966 年的表现尤其糟糕。再加上市场普遍对传统蓝筹股不感兴趣，这使得道琼斯指数相对于整体投资表现而言表现欠佳，尤其是在最后一个季度。
The following summarizes the year - by - year performance of the Dow, the performance of the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
以下内容总结了道琼斯指数逐年的表现、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配（超过 6% 的超额收益的四分之一）之前的业绩表现，以及有限合伙人的收益情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体业绩（1） | 合伙公司业绩（2） | 有限合伙人业绩（3） |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 累计业绩（Cumulative Results） | 141.1% | 1028.7% | 641.5% |
| 年复合收益率（Annual Compounded Rate） | 9.7% | 29.0% | 23.5% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
（1）基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，再加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年份。
(2) For 1957 - 61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
（2）1957 年至 1961 年的数据包括所有此前存续一整年的有限合伙公司在扣除所有费用之后、向合伙人分配收益或向普通合伙人划拨收益之前的综合业绩。
(3) For 1957 - 61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
（3）1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一栏合伙公司的业绩计算得出的，考虑到根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人进行的划拨，但不包括有限合伙人每月的提款情况。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
从累计或复利的角度来看，业绩情况如下：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
|---|---|---|---|
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体业绩 | 合伙公司业绩 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 年复合收益率 Annual Compounded Rate | 11.4% | 29.8% | 23.9% |
Investment Companies
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of the two largest open - end investment companies (mutual funds) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 - 100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed - end investment companies.
下一页是常见的列表，展示了两家最大的遵循通常将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股这一策略的开放式投资公司（共同基金），以及两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩情况。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri - Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司（1） | 投资者股票基金（1） | 雷曼公司（2） | 三大陆公司（2） | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 累计业绩 Cumulative Results | 118.1% | 106.3% | 142.8% | 126.9% | 141.1% | 641.5% |
| 年复合收益率 Annual Compounded Rate | 8.6% | 7.9% | 9.8% | 9.0% | 9.7% | 23.5% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化以及当年向登记在册的持有人所进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1966 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 - 1965. Estimated for 1966.
(2) 数据来源于 1966 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中关于 1957 年至 1965 年的内容。1966 年的数据为估算值。
These investment company performance figures have been regularly reported here to show that the Dow is no patsy as an investment standard. It should again be emphasized that the companies were not selected on the basis of comparability to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. There are important differences including: (1) investment companies operate under both internally and externally imposed restrictions on their investment actions that are not applicable to us; (2) investment companies diversify far more than we do and, in all probability, thereby have less chance for a really bad performance relative to the Dow in a single year; and (3) their managers have considerably less incentive for abnormal performance and greater incentive for conventionality.
这些投资公司的业绩数据一直定期在此公布，以表明道琼斯指数作为一种投资标准并非不堪一击。应当再次强调的是，这些公司并非基于与巴菲特合伙公司的可比性而挑选出来的。存在一些重要差异，其中包括：(1) 投资公司在开展投资活动时，既受到内部限制，也受到外部限制，而这些限制并不适用于我们；(2) 投资公司的多元化程度远高于我们，而且很有可能，相对于道琼斯指数而言，它们在单个年份出现真正糟糕业绩的可能性更小；(3) 投资公司的经理们追求超常业绩的动力远不如我们，而因循守旧的倾向则更大。
However, the records above do reveal what well - regarded, highly paid, full - time professional investment managers have been able to accomplish while working with common stocks. These managers have been favorites of American investors (more than 600,000) making free choices among many alternatives in the investment management field. It is probable that their results are typical of the overwhelming majority of professional investment managers.
然而，以上记录确实揭示了那些备受推崇、薪酬丰厚的全职专业投资经理在从事普通股投资时所能取得的业绩。这些经理一直是美国投资者（超过 60 万人）的青睐对象，这些投资者可以在投资管理领域的众多选择中自由挑选。很可能他们的业绩代表了绝大多数专业投资经理的典型水平。
It is not true, however, that these are the best records achieved in the investment field. A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities. However, they are generally managed by very bright, motivated people and it is only fair that I mention the existence of such superior results in this general discussion of the record of professional investment management.
然而，认为这些就是投资领域所取得的最佳业绩，这种说法是不正确的。有几家共同基金和一些私人投资机构所取得的业绩远远超过道琼斯指数，在某些情况下，也大幅超过了巴菲特合伙公司。它们的投资技巧通常与我们的大不相同，而且超出了我的能力范围。不过，这些机构通常由非常聪明且有进取心的人管理，在对专业投资管理业绩进行一般性讨论时，我公平地提及这些更为出色的业绩的存在是很有必要的。
Trends in Our Business
我们业务的发展趋势
A keen mind working diligently at interpreting the figures on page one could come to a lot of wrong conclusions.
一个敏锐的头脑若努力去解读第一页上的数据，也可能得出许多错误的结论。
The results of the first ten years have absolutely no chance of being duplicated or even remotely approximated during the next decade. They may well be achieved by some hungry twenty - five year old working with $105,100 initial partnership capital and operating during a ten year business and market environment which is frequently conducive to successful implementation of his investment philosophy.
过去十年所取得的业绩，在未来十年绝无可能复制，甚至连近似的成绩都难以达到。也许某个满怀雄心壮志的 25 岁年轻人，初始合伙资本为 105,100 美元，在一个对其投资理念的成功实施十分有利的十年商业和市场环境中开展业务，能够取得这样的业绩。
They will not be achieved by a better fed thirty - six year old working with our $54,065,345 current partnership capital who presently finds perhaps one - fifth to one - tenth as many really good ideas as previously to implement his investment philosophy.
而一个生活优渥的 36 岁人士，管理着我们目前价值 54,065,345 美元的合伙资本，且如今他能想到的真正好的投资点子大概只有以前的五分之一到十分之一，他是无法取得这样的业绩的。
Buffett Associates. Ltd. (predecessor to Buffett Partnership. Ltd.) was founded on the west banks of the Missouri. May 5, 1956 by a hardy little band consisting of four family members, three close friends and $105,100. (I tried to find some brilliant flash of insight regarding our future or present conditions from my first page and a half annual letter of January, 1957 to insert as a quote here. However, someone evidently doctored my file copy so as to remove the perceptive remarks I must have made.)
巴菲特联合公司（巴菲特合伙公司的前身）于 1956 年 5 月 5 日在密苏里河西岸成立，起初是由四名家庭成员、三位密友和 105,100 美元资金组成的一个小团体。（我试图从 1957 年 1 月我写的长达一页半的年度信件中，找到一些有关我们未来或当前状况的深刻见解，并引用在此处。然而，显然有人篡改了我的存档副本，把我当时肯定写下的那些深刻言论给删掉了。）
At that time, and for some years subsequently, there were substantial numbers of securities selling at well below the “value to a private owner” criterion we utilized for selection of general market investments. We also experienced a flow of “workout” opportunities where the percentages were very much to our liking. The problem was always which, not what. Accordingly, we were able to own fifteen to twenty - five issues and be enthusiastic about the probabilities inherent in all holdings.
在那个时候以及随后的几年里，有大量证券的售价远低于我们在选择普通市场投资时所采用的 “对私人所有者的价值” 这一标准。我们还遇到了一系列 “套利” 机会，这些机会的回报率非常符合我们的期望。问题总是在于该选择哪些机会，而不是有没有机会。因此，我们能够持有 15 到 25 只证券，并且对所有持仓证券的预期收益充满信心。
In the last few years this situation has changed dramatically. We now find very few securities that are understandable to me, available in decent size, and which offer the expectation of investment performance meeting our yardstick of ten percentage points per annum superior to the Dow. In the last three years we have come up with only two or three new ideas a year that have had such an expectancy of superior performance. Fortunately, in some cases, we have made the most of them. However, in earlier years, a lesser effort produced literally dozens of comparable opportunities. It is difficult to be objective about the causes for such diminution of one’s own productivity. Three factors that seem apparent are: (1) a somewhat changed market environment; (2) our increased size; and (3) substantially more competition.
在过去几年里，这种情况发生了巨大变化。我们现在发现，几乎没有多少证券是我能够理解的，能够大量购入的，并且有望实现比道琼斯指数每年高出 10 个百分点的投资业绩的。在过去三年里，我们每年只能想出两三个有这种超额业绩预期的新点子。幸运的是，在某些情况下，我们充分利用了这些点子。然而，在早些年，付出较少的努力就能轻易获得数十个类似的机会。要客观分析自己创造力下降的原因并非易事。有三个因素似乎较为明显：(1) 市场环境发生了一定变化；(2) 我们的规模有所扩大；(3) 竞争大幅加剧。
It is obvious that a business based upon only a trickle of fine ideas has poorer prospects than one based upon a steady flow of such ideas. To date the trickle has provided as much financial nourishment as the flow. This is true because there is only so much one can digest (million dollar ideas are of no great benefit to thousand dollar bank accounts - this was impressed on me in my early days) and because a limited number of ideas causes one to utilize those available more intensively. The latter factor has definitely been operative with us in recent years. However, a trickle has considerably more chance of drying up completely than a flow.
显然，一家仅依赖零星优质投资点子的企业，其前景要比一家能持续产生这类点子的企业更差。到目前为止，零星的点子所带来的财务收益与大量点子所带来的收益相当。这是因为一个人能够消化的投资机会是有限的（百万美元的投资点子对于只有数千美元资金的账户来说并无太大益处 —— 这一点在我早年就给我留下了深刻印象），而且投资点子数量有限会促使一个人更深入地利用现有的点子。近年来，后一个因素对我们来说确实起到了作用。然而，零星的点子完全枯竭的可能性要比源源不断的点子大得多。
These conditions will not cause me to attempt investment decisions outside my sphere of understanding (I don’t go for the “If you can’t lick ‘em, join ‘em” philosophy - my own leaning is toward “If you can’t join ‘em, lick ‘em”). We will not go into businesses where technology which is away over my head is crucial to the investment decision. I know about as much about semi - conductors or integrated circuits as I do of the mating habits of the chrzaszcz. (That’s a Polish May bug, students - if you have trouble pronouncing it, rhyme it with thrzaszcz.)
这些情况不会促使我在自己的理解范围之外做出投资决策（我不认同 “打不过，就加入” 的理念 —— 我更倾向于 “加入不了，就打败它” 的理念）。我们不会涉足那些对投资决策起关键作用的技术超出我理解范围的业务领域。我对半导体或集成电路的了解，和我对波兰金龟子（学生们，那是一种波兰的五月甲虫 —— 如果你们发音有困难，可以和 “thrzaszcz” 押韵）的交配习性的了解差不多。
Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so - called “fashion” investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.
此外，我们不会采用那种常见的投资方法，即在投资证券时，试图预测市场走势的重要性超过对企业估值的考量。近年来（在我撰写本文的 1 月份也是如此），这种所谓的 “跟风” 投资常常能带来非常可观且迅速的利润。这是一种我既不能肯定其合理性，也不能否定其合理性的投资技巧。它无法完全满足我的理性思考（或者也许是我的偏见），而且肯定不符合我的投资风格。我不会基于这种方法来投资自己的钱，因此，我当然也不会用你们的钱来进行这样的投资。
Finally, we will not seek out activity in investment operations, even if offering splendid profit expectations, where major human problems appear to have a substantial chance of developing.
最后，即使某些投资业务有极好的盈利预期，但如果很有可能出现重大的人为问题，我们也不会去参与。
What I do promise you, as partners, is that I will work hard to maintain the trickle of ideas and try to get the most out of it that is possible – but if it should dry up completely, you will be informed honestly and promptly so that we may all take alternative action.
作为合伙人，我向你们承诺，我会努力保持那些零星的投资点子，并尽可能充分利用它们 —— 但如果这些点子完全枯竭，我会如实且及时地告知你们，以便我们都能采取其他行动。
Analysis of 1966 Results
1966 年业绩分析
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1966. Specifically, we had a total overall gain of $8,906,701 derived as follows:
1966 年，我们投资业务的四大主要类别都取得了不错的成绩。具体而言，我们总共获得了 8,906,701 美元的总体收益，来源如下：
| Category | Average Investment | Overall Gain |
| 类别 | 平均投资额 | 总收益 |
| Controls（控股投资） | $17,259,342 | $1,566,302 |
| Generals – Private Owner（一般投资（私人所有者视角）） | $1,359,340 | $1,004,362 |
| Generals – Relatively Undervalued（一般投资（相对低估）） | $21,847,045 | $5,124,254 |
| Workouts（套利投资） | $7,666,314 | $1,714,181 |
| Miscellaneous, including US Treasury Bills（杂项投资（包括美国国库券）） | $1,332,609 | $(18,422) |
| Total Income（总收入） | $9,390,677 | |
| Less: General Expense（减去：一般费用） | $483,976 | |
| Overall Gain（总收益） | $8,906,701 |
A few caveats are necessary before we get on with the main discussion:
在我们展开主要讨论之前，有几点需要说明：
- An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. we’ll be glad to give you a copy.
- 上述各类别的解释已在 1965 年 1 月 18 日的信中给出。如果您需要重温相关内容，而您常去的报摊又没有袖珍版的信件，我们很乐意给您提供一份副本。
- The classifications are not iron - clad. Nothing is changed retroactively but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary.
- 这些分类并非绝对严格。不会对已有的分类进行追溯更改，但最初对于类别的划分有时具有一定的主观性。
- Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be understated relative to partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the above figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 150 on December 31 would have an average investment of 125 producing a 40% result contrasted to a 50% result by the customary approach. In other words, the above figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.
- 按类别以平均投资为基础计算的回报率，相对于以初始投资为基础计算的合伙公司回报率而言会被低估。在上述数据中，假设我们在 1 月 1 日以 100 美元购入一只证券，该证券在 12 月 31 日以均匀的速度升值到 150 美元，那么平均投资额为 125 美元，按此计算的回报率为 40%，而按照常规方法计算的回报率则为 50%。换句话说，上述数据是使用市场价值的月平均值来计算平均投资额的。
- All results are based on a 100% ownership, non - leverage, basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable average investment category.
- 所有业绩结果均基于 100% 所有权、无杠杆的基础。利息和其他一般费用从总业绩中扣除，不按类别进行细分。与特定投资操作直接相关的费用，例如卖空股票所支付的股息，会按类别扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资（多头减去空头）会列入相应的平均投资类别中。
- The above table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non - homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
- 上述表格的用途有限。每个类别的业绩结果主要由一两项投资决定。它们并不代表大量稳定的数据集合（比如所有美国男性的死亡率之类的数据），从中可以得出结论并进行预测。相反，它们代表的是不常出现、性质各异的现象，只能为我们采取的各种行动提供非常初步的参考，我们也正是这样使用这些数据的。
- Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely self - checking.
- 最后，这些计算不像我们数钱时那样精心细致，由于并非完全能够自我检验，所以可能存在文书或计算错误。
Controls
控股投资
There were three main sources of gain during 1966 in respect to controlled companies. These arose through: (1) retained business earnings applicable to our holdings in 1966; (2) open market purchases of additional stock below our controlling interest valuation and; (3) unrealized appreciation in marketable securities held by the controlled companies. The total of all positive items came to $2,600,838 in 1966.
1966 年，就控股公司而言，主要有三个收益来源。分别是：(1) 2016 年归属于我们所持股份的公司留存业务收益；(2) 在低于我们控股权益估值的情况下，通过公开市场额外购入的股票；(3) 控股公司所持有的可交易证券的未实现增值。1966 年，所有这些正向收益项目总计达 2,600,838 美元。
However, due to factors mentioned in my November 1, 1966 letter, specific industry conditions, and other relevant valuation items, this gain was reduced by $1,034,780 in arriving at our fair valuation applicable to controlling interests as of December 31, 1966. Thus the overall gain in the control category was reduced to $1,566,058 for the year.
然而，由于我在 1966 年 11 月 1 日的信中提到的一些因素、特定行业的状况以及其他相关估值项目，在计算截至 1966 年 12 月 31 日我们对控股权益的合理估值时，这一收益减少了 1,034,780 美元。因此，控股投资类别的全年总收益降至 1,566,058 美元。
We were undoubtedly fortunate that we had a relatively high percentage of net assets invested in businesses and not stocks during 1966. The same money in general market holdings would probably have produced a loss, perhaps substantial, during the year. This was not planned and if the stock market had advanced substantially during the year, this category would have been an important drag on overall performance. The same situation will prevail during 1967.
毫无疑问，我们很幸运，在 1966 年相对较高比例的净资产投资于企业而非股票。如果同样的资金投资于普通市场的股票，当年很可能会产生亏损，甚至可能是大幅亏损。这并非我们预先计划好的，如果当年股市大幅上涨，这一类别将会对整体业绩产生重大拖累。1967 年也会存在同样的情况。
Generals - Private Owner
一般投资（私人所有者视角）
Our performance here falls in the “twenty - one dollars a day, once a month” category. In the middle of 1965 we started purchasing a very attractive widely held security which was selling far below its value to a private owner. Our hope was that over a two or three year period we could get $10 million or more invested at the favorable prices prevailing. The various businesses that the company operated were understandable and we could check out competitive strengths and weaknesses thoroughly with competitors, distributors, customers, suppliers, ex - employees, etc. Market conditions peculiar to the stock gave us hope that, with patience, we could buy substantial quantities of the stock without disturbing the price.
我们在这方面的业绩属于 “每月一次，每天赚 21 美元” 的类型。1965 年年中，我们开始购入一种极具吸引力且被广泛持有的证券，其售价远低于它对于私人所有者的价值。我们原本希望在两到三年的时间里，能够以当时的优惠价格投资 1000 万美元或更多资金。该公司所经营的各类业务都易于理解，我们能够通过与竞争对手、经销商、客户、供应商、前雇员等进行沟通，彻底了解其竞争优势和劣势。该股票所处的特殊市场环境让我们相信，只要有耐心，我们就可以在不影响股价的情况下大量购入该股票。
At yearend 1965 we had invested $1,956,980 and the market value of our holding was $2,358,412 so that $401,432 was contributed to performance during 1965. We would have preferred, of course, to have seen the market below cost since our interest was in additional buying, not in selling. This would have dampened Buffett Partnerships Ltd.’s 1965 performance and perhaps reduced the euphoria experienced by limited partners (psychically, the net result to all partners would have been a standoff since the general partner would have been floating) but would have enhanced long term performance. The fact that the stock had risen somewhat above our cost had already slowed down our buying program and thereby reduced ultimate profit.
1965 年底，我们已投资 1,956,980 美元，所持股票的市值为 2,358,412 美元，因此在 1965 年为业绩贡献了 401,432 美元。当然，我们更希望看到股价低于成本价，因为我们的兴趣在于继续买入，而不是卖出。这可能会拉低巴菲特合伙公司 1965 年的业绩，或许还会减少有限合伙人的欣喜之情（从实际情况来看，对所有合伙人的最终结果可能是持平的，因为普通合伙人会从中受益），但却会提升长期业绩。实际上，该股票的价格已经略高于我们的成本价，这已经减缓了我们的买入计划，从而减少了最终的利润。
An even more dramatic example of the conflict between short term performance and the maximization of long term results occurred in 1966. Another party, previously completely unknown to me, issued a tender offer which foreclosed opportunities for future advantageous buying. I made the decision that the wisest course (it may not have been) for us to follow was to dispose of our holdings and we thus realized a total profit of $1,269,181 in February, of which $867,749 was applicable to 1966.
1966 年出现了一个更为典型的例子，凸显了短期业绩与长期业绩最大化之间的冲突。另一个此前我完全不了解的一方发出了收购要约，这使得我们未来无法再进行有利的买入操作。我认为对我们来说最明智的做法（也许并非如此）是处置我们持有的股票，因此我们在 2 月实现了总计 1,269,181 美元的利润，其中 867,749 美元归属于 1966 年。
While any gains looked particularly good in the market environment that intimately developed in 1966, you can be sure I don’t delight in going round making molehills out of mountains. The molehill, of course, was reflected in 1966 results. However, we would have been much better off from a long range standpoint if 1966 results had been five percentage points worse and we were continuing to buy substantial quantities of the stock at the depressed prices that might have been expected to prevail in this year’s market environment.
尽管在 1966 年逐渐形成的市场环境下，任何收益看起来都相当不错，但可以肯定的是，我并不喜欢把大事化小。当然，这种 “小事化了” 体现在了 1966 年的业绩中。然而，从长远来看，如果 1966 年的业绩差 5 个百分点，并且我们能够继续以今年市场环境下可能出现的低价大量购入该股票，那对我们来说会好得多。
Good ideas were a dime a dozen, such a premature ending would not be unpleasant. There is something to be said, of course, for a business operation where some of the failures produce moderate profits. However, you can see how hard it is to develop replacement ideas by examining our average investment in the Private Owner category - we came up with nothing during the remainder of the year despite lower stock prices, which should have been conducive to finding such opportunities.
好点子俯拾皆是，这样过早结束投资倒也没什么可遗憾的。当然，对于一项业务运营来说，如果一些看似失败的操作也能带来适度的利润，那也有可取之处。然而，通过查看我们在 “私人所有者视角” 类别中的平均投资情况，您就能明白想出替代投资点子有多难了 —— 尽管当年剩余时间里股价更低，本应更有利于发现这样的机会，但我们却毫无收获。
Generals - Relatively Undervalued
一般投资（相对低估）
Our relative performance in this category was the best we have ever had - due to one holding which was our largest investment at yearend 1965 and also yearend 1966. This investment has substantially out - performed the general market for us during each year (1964, 1965, 1966) that we have held it. While any single year’s performance can be quite erratic, we think the probabilities are highly favorable for superior future performance over a three or four year period. The attractiveness and relative certainty of this particular security are what caused me to introduce Ground Rule 7 in November, 1965 to allow individual holdings of up to 40% of our net assets. We spend considerable effort continuously evaluating every facet of the company and constantly testing our hypothesis that this security is superior to alternative investment choices. Such constant evaluation and comparison at shifting prices is absolutely essential to our investment operation.
在这一类别中，我们的相对业绩是有史以来最好的 —— 这得益于我们持有的一只股票，它在 1965 年底和 1966 年底都是我们最大的投资项目。在我们持有这只股票的每一年（1964 年、1965 年、1966 年），它的表现都大幅超过了大盘。虽然任何单一年份的业绩可能会相当不稳定，但我们认为，在三到四年的时间里，它未来表现出色的可能性非常大。正是这只特定股票的吸引力和相对确定性，促使我在 1965 年 11 月引入了第七条基本原则，允许单个持仓最高可达我们净资产的 40%。我们投入了大量精力，持续评估这家公司的方方面面，并不断检验我们的假设，即这只股票优于其他投资选择。在不断变化的股价下进行这种持续的评估和比较，对我们的投资运作来说绝对至关重要。
It would be much more pleasant (and indicate a more favorable future) to report that our results in the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category represented fifteen securities in ten industries, practically all of which outperformed the market. We simply don’t have that many good ideas. As mentioned above, new ideas are continually measured against present ideas and we will not make shifts if the effect is to downgrade expectable performance. This policy has resulted in limited activity in recent years when we have felt so strongly about the relative merits of our largest holding. Such a condition has meant that realized gains have been a much smaller portion of total performance than in earlier years when the flow of good ideas was more substantial.
如果能够报告说，我们在 “一般投资（相对低估）” 类别中的业绩来自十个行业的十五只股票，而且几乎所有这些股票的表现都超过了大盘，那会令人愉快得多（也预示着更美好的未来）。但我们确实没有那么多好的投资点子。如前所述，新的投资点子会不断与现有的点子进行比较，如果更换投资会降低预期业绩，我们就不会进行调整。近年来，由于我们对最大持仓股票的相对优势非常看好，这一政策导致我们的投资活动有限。这种情况意味着，与早些年好点子更多的时候相比，已实现收益在总业绩中所占的比例要小得多。
The sort of concentration we have in this category is bound to produce wide swings in short term performance – some, most certainly, unpleasant. There have already been some of these applicable to shorter time spans than I use in reporting to partners. This is one reason I think frequent reporting to be foolish and potentially misleading in a long term oriented business such as ours.
我们在这一类别中的这种集中投资必然会导致短期业绩大幅波动 —— 其中一些波动肯定会令人不快。在比我向合伙人汇报业绩所采用的更短时间跨度内，已经出现过一些这样的波动。这就是为什么我认为，对于像我们这样以长期为导向的业务来说，频繁汇报业绩是愚蠢的，而且可能会产生误导。
Personally, within the limits expressed in last year’s letter on diversification, I am willing to trade the pains (forget about the pleasures) of substantial short term variance in exchange for maximization of long term performance. However, I am not willing to incur risk of substantial permanent capital loss in seeking to better long term performance. To be perfectly clear - under our policy of concentration of holdings, partners should be completely prepared for periods of substantial underperformance (far more likely in sharply rising markets) to offset the occasional over performance such as we have experienced in 1965 and 1966, and as a price we pay for hoped - for good long term performance.
就我个人而言，在去年信中所述的分散投资的限度内，我愿意承受短期业绩大幅波动带来的痛苦（先不说其中的乐趣），以换取长期业绩的最大化。然而，我不愿意为了追求更好的长期业绩而承担大量永久性资本损失的风险。需要明确的是 —— 根据我们集中持仓的策略，合伙人应该完全做好准备，应对业绩大幅不佳的时期（在股市大幅上涨的情况下，这种可能性要大得多），以抵消偶尔出现的如我们在 1965 年和 1966 年所经历的超额业绩，这也是我们为期望中的良好长期业绩所付出的代价。
All this talk about the long pull has caused one partner to observe that “even five minutes is a long time if one’s head is being held under water.” This is the reason, of course, that we use borrowed money very sparingly in our operation. Average bank borrowings during 1966 were well under 10% of average net worth.
所有这些关于长期投资的讨论，让一位合伙人评论说：“如果一个人的头被按在水下，即使五分钟也感觉很长。” 当然，这就是为什么我们在运营中非常谨慎地使用借款。1966 年的平均银行借款远低于平均净资产的 10%。
One final word about the Generals - Relatively Undervalued category. In this section we also had an experience which helped results in 1966 but hurt our long term prospects. We had just one really important new idea in this category in 1966. Our purchasing started in late spring but had only come to about $1.6 million (it could be bought steadily but at only a moderate pace) when outside conditions drove the stock price up to a point where it was not relatively attractive. Though our overall gain was $728,141 on an average holding period of six and a half months in 1966, it would have been much more desirable had the stock done nothing for a long period of time while we accumulated a really substantial position.
关于 “一般投资（相对低估）” 类别，还有最后一点要说明。在这一类别中，我们也有过一次经历，它在 1966 年有助于提升业绩，但却损害了我们的长期前景。1966 年，在这一类别中我们只有一个真正重要的新投资点子。我们在春末开始买入，但当外界因素导致股价上涨到不再具有相对吸引力的水平时，我们的买入量仅达到约 160 万美元（可以持续买入，但速度只能适中）。尽管在 1966 年，我们平均持有期为六个半月，整体收益达到了 728,141 美元，但如果这只股票在很长一段时间内没有上涨，而我们能够积累起相当大的持仓量，那情况会好得多。
Workouts
套利投资
In last year’s letter I forecast reduced importance for workouts. While they were not of the importance of some past years. I was pleasantly surprised by our experience in 1966 during which we kept an average of $7,666,314 employed in this category. Furthermore, we tend to ascribe borrowings to the workout section so that our net equity capital employed was really something under this figure and our return was somewhat better than the 22.4% indicated on page six. Here, too, we ran into substantial variation. At June 30, our overall profit on this category was $16,112 on an average investment of $7,870,151 so that we really had a case of an extraordinarily good second half offsetting a poor first half.
在去年的信中，我预测套利投资的重要性会降低。虽然它们不像过去某些年份那么重要，但 1966 年的经历还是让我惊喜，这一年我们在这一类别中的平均投资额达到了 7,666,314 美元。此外，我们倾向于将借款归入套利投资类别，所以我们实际投入的净股本资金低于这个数字，我们的回报率也略高于第六页所示的 22.4%。在这里，我们也遇到了业绩的大幅波动。6 月 30 日，我们在这一类别上的平均投资额为 7,870,151 美元，总利润为 16,112 美元，所以实际上是下半年的超常表现弥补了上半年的不佳表现。
In past years, sometimes as much as 30 - 40% of our net worth has been invested in workouts, but it is highly unlikely that this condition will prevail in the future. Nevertheless, they may continue to produce some decent returns on the moderate amount of capital employed.
在过去的年份里，有时我们净资产的 30% 到 40% 都投资于套利项目，但未来这种情况极不可能再次出现。尽管如此，对于投入的适度资金，它们可能仍会继续产生一些不错的回报。
Miscellaneous
杂项
Operationally, we continue to function well above rated capacity with Bill, John, Elizabeth and Donna all contributing excellent performances. At Buffett Partnership. Ltd. we have never had to divert investment effort to offset organizational shortcomings and this has been an important ingredient in the performance over the years.
在运营方面，比尔、约翰、伊丽莎白和唐娜都表现出色，我们的运作效率远远超过了额定水平。在巴菲特合伙公司，我们从未因组织缺陷而分散投资精力，这也是多年来业绩良好的一个重要因素。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., aided for the second year by their computer, turned in the usual speedy, efficient and comprehensive job.
毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）在他们的计算机辅助下（这是第二年使用计算机辅助），又一次出色地完成了快速、高效且全面的工作。
We all continue to maintain more than an academic interest in the Partnership. The employees and I, our spouses and children, have a total of over $10 million invested at January 1, 1967. In the case of my family, our Buffett Partnership, Ltd. investment represents well over 90% of our net worth.
我们所有人对合伙公司的关注都不仅仅停留在理论层面。截至 1967 年 1 月 1 日，公司员工和我，以及我们的配偶和子女，总共在合伙公司投资了超过 1000 万美元。就我家而言，我们在巴菲特合伙公司的投资占我们净资产的比例远远超过 90%。
Within the coming two weeks you will receive:
在接下来的两周内，您将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1966 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- 一封税务信函，其中包含您填写 1966 年联邦所得税申报表所需的所有巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的信息。就税务目的而言，这封信函是唯一重要的文件。
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. for 1966, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
- 毕马威会计师事务所出具的 1966 年审计报告，其中阐述了巴菲特合伙公司的运营情况和财务状况，以及您个人的资本账户情况。
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1967. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封由我签署的信函，说明了截至 1967 年 1 月 1 日您在巴菲特合伙公司的权益状况。这与审计报告中的数据一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 15 summarizing the first half of this year.
如果这封信中的任何内容或今年内出现的任何情况需要进一步说明，请告知我。我的下一封信大约会在 7 月 15 日发出，对今年上半年的情况进行总结。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB eh
1967 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
July 12, 1967
1967 年 7 月 12 日
First Half Performance
上半年业绩
Again, this is being written in late June prior to the family’s trip to California. To maintain the usual chronological symmetry (I try to sublimate my aesthetic urges when it comes to creating symmetry in the profit and loss statement), I will leave a few blanks and trust that the conclusions look appropriate when the figures are entered.
这封信同样是在 6 月下旬写的，此时我们一家人还没去加利福尼亚旅行。为了保持一贯的时间顺序上的对称性（在编制损益表时，我尽量克制自己对对称性的审美追求），我会留下几个空白处，并且相信等填入数据后，得出的结论会显得比较合适。
We began 1967 on a traumatic note with January turning out to be one of the worst months we have experienced with a plus 3.3% for BPL versus a plus 8.5% for the Dow. Despite this sour start, we finished the half about plus 21% for an edge of 9.6 percentage points over the Dow. Again, as throughout 1966, the Dow was a relatively easy competitor (it won’t be every year, prevailing thinking to the contrary notwithstanding) and a large majority of investment managers outdid this yardstick. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual basis:
1967 年一开始就不太顺利，1 月成了我们经历过的最糟糕的月份之一，巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的涨幅为 3.3%，而道琼斯指数的涨幅为 8.5%。尽管开局不利，但我们上半年最终的涨幅约为 21%，比道琼斯指数高出 9.6 个百分点。和 1966 年全年的情况一样，道琼斯指数在今年相对来说是个比较容易超越的参照标准（尽管普遍观点并非如此，但道琼斯指数不会每年都这么容易超越），而且绝大多数投资经理的业绩都超过了这一标准。下表按照惯例总结了截至目前的业绩情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 (1) | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 (2) | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 (3) |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| First half 1967（1967 年上半年） | 11.4% | 21.0% | 17.3% |
| Cumulative Results（累计业绩） | 148.3% | 1419.8% | 843.3% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 9.1% | 29.6% | 23.8% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(1) 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957 - 61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙公司全年运营的合并业绩，扣除了所有费用，但在向合伙人分配利润或向普通合伙人进行利润划拨之前。
(3) For 1957 - 61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩数据计算得出的，考虑了根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人的利润划拨，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
BPL’s performance during the first half reflects no change in valuation of our controlled companies and was thus achieved solely by the 63.3% of our net assets invested in marketable securities at the beginning of the year. Any revaluation of Diversified Retailing Company (DRC) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (B - H) will be made in December prior to the time the commitment letters become final and will be based upon all relevant criteria (including current operating, market and credit conditions) at that time.
巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）上半年的业绩反映出我们控股公司的估值没有变化，因此这一业绩完全是由年初占我们净资产 63.3% 的可交易证券投资所取得的。多元化零售公司（DRC）和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（B - H）的任何估值重估都将在 12 月承诺函最终确定之前进行，并且将基于届时所有相关标准（包括当前的运营、市场和信贷状况）。
Both DRC and B - H made important acquisitions during the first half. The overall progress of DRC (80% owned) and both of its subsidiaries (Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) is highly satisfactory. However, B - H is experiencing and faces real difficulties in the textile business, while I don’t presently foresee any loss in underlying values. I similarly see no prospect of a good return on the assets employed in the textile business. Therefore, this segment of our portfolio will be a substantial drag on our relative performance (as it has been during the first half) if the Dow continues to advance. Such relative performance with controlled companies is expected in a strongly advancing market, but is accentuated when the business is making no progress. As a friend of mine says. “Experience is what you find when you’re looking for something else.”
多元化零售公司（DRC）和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（B - H）上半年都进行了重要的收购。多元化零售公司（我们持有 80% 股权）及其两家子公司（霍赫希尔德・科恩公司和联合棉花商店）的整体进展非常令人满意。然而，伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（B - H）在纺织业务方面正面临着切实的困难，虽然我目前预计其内在价值不会有任何损失，但我同样看不到纺织业务所投入资产能带来良好回报的前景。因此，如果道琼斯指数继续上涨，我们投资组合中的这一部分将对我们的相对业绩造成重大拖累（就像上半年那样）。在市场强劲上涨时，控股公司出现这样的相对业绩表现是可以预料的，但当业务毫无进展时，这种情况会更加突出。就像我的一个朋友说的：“经验就是你在寻找别的东西时所发现的东西。”
Investment Companies
投资公司
The usual comparison follows showing the results of the two largest open - end and two largest closed - end investment companies which pursue a policy of 95 - 100% investment in common stocks.
下面是常见的业绩对比，展示了两家最大的开放式投资公司和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的业绩，这些公司奉行将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri - Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资信托公司 (1) | 投资者股票基金 (1) | 雷曼公司 (2) | 三大陆公司 (2) | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| First half 1967（1967 年上半年） | 11.3% | 12.3% | 19.3% | 14.4% | 11.4% | 17.3% |
| Cumulative Results（累计业绩） | 143.3% | 126.4% | 185.4% | 156.8% | 148.3% | 843.3% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 8.9% | 8.1% | 10.5% | 9.4% | 9.1% | 23.8% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化以及当年向登记在册的持有人所进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1967 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 - 1966. Estimated for first half of 1967.
(2) 数据来源于 1967 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中关于 1957 年至 1966 年的内容。1967 年上半年的数据为估算值。
The tide continues to be far more important than the swimmers.
大势远比投资者的能力重要得多。
Taxes
税务
We entered 1967 with unrealized gains of $16,361,974. Through June 30 we have realized net capital gains of $7,084,104 so it appears likely that we will realize in 1967 a fairly substantial portion of the unrealized gain attributable to your interest at the beginning of the year. This amount was reported to you as Item 3 of our February 2, 1967 letter. A copy of that letter, along with a tax letter, will be mailed to you in November giving a rough idea of the tax situation at that time.
进入 1967 年时，我们有 16,361,974 美元的未实现收益。截至 6 月 30 日，我们已实现的净资本利得为 7,084,104 美元，因此看来我们很可能在 1967 年实现年初归属于您权益的未实现收益中的相当大一部分。这一金额已在 1967 年 2 月 2 日我们信件的第 3 项中向您报告过。那封信的副本，连同一封税务信函，将在 11 月寄给您，让您大致了解当时的税务情况。
As I regularly suggest, the safe course to follow on interim estimates is to pay the same estimated tax for 1967 as your actual tax was for 1966. There can be no penalties if you follow this procedure.
正如我经常建议的那样，在进行中期税务估算时，稳妥的做法是，20167 年的预估税额与您 1966 年的实际纳税额相同。如果您遵循这一做法，就不会有任何罚款。
Whatever our final figure, it looks now as if it will be very largely long term capital gain with only minor amounts, if any, of short term gain and ordinary income. (I consider the whole Income - Principal Myth fair game for one of my soft - spoken gently worded critiques. As I told Susie in the early days of our marriage, “Don’t worry about the income; just the outcome.”)
无论最终数字是多少，现在看来，大部分很可能是长期资本利得，如果有短期利得和普通收入的话，数额也会很少。（我认为 “收入 - 本金的谬误” 完全值得我以温和委婉的措辞进行一番批评。就像我在结婚初期对苏茜说的那样：“别担心收入，只关注结果就好。”）
Miscellaneous
杂项
During the first half, Stan Perimeter resigned from the Dissolution Committee because of his present full - time involvement in investment management. Fred Stanback, Jr., a long time partner and experienced investor, was elected by the remaining members to fill the vacancy.
上半年，斯坦・佩里梅特（Stan Perimeter）因目前全身心投入到投资管理工作中，辞去了清算委员会的职务。小弗雷德・斯坦巴克（Fred Stanback, Jr.），一位长期的合伙人且经验丰富的投资者，被其余成员推选出来填补了这一空缺。
As in past years, we will have a report out about November 11 along with the Commitment Letter, and the rough estimate of the 1967 tax situation, etc.
和往年一样，我们将在 11 月 11 日左右发布一份报告，同时附上承诺函以及对 1967 年税务情况的大致估算等内容。
However, there will be a special letter (to focus your attention upon it) in October. The subject matter will not relate to change in the Partnership Agreement, but will involve some evolutionary changes in several “Ground Rules” which I want you to have ample time to contemplate before making your plans for 1968. Whereas the Partnership Agreement represents the legal understanding among us, the “Ground Rules” represent the personal understanding and in some ways is the more important document. I consider it essential that any changes be clearly set forth and explained prior to their effect on partnership activity or performance – hence, the October letter.
然而，10 月会有一封特别信件（为了引起您的注意）。信件主题不会涉及合伙协议的变更，而是会涉及几项 “基本原则” 的一些渐进式变化。我希望在您为 1968 年做规划之前，能有充足的时间来考虑这些变化。合伙协议体现的是我们之间的法律约定，而 “基本原则” 体现的是个人之间的约定，在某些方面，它是更为重要的文件。我认为，在任何变更对合伙公司的运营或业绩产生影响之前，必须清晰地阐述并解释这些变更，因此才有了这封 10 月的信件。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEBeh
1967 年信件（三）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
October 9, 1967
1967 年 10 月 9 日
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
Over the past eleven years, I have consistently set forth as the BPL investment goal an average advantage in our performance of ten percentage points per annum in comparison with the Dow Jones Industrial Average. Under the environment that existed during that period. I have considered such an objective difficult but obtainable.
在过去的十一年里，我一直将巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的投资目标设定为：与道琼斯工业平均指数相比，我们的业绩平均每年高出 10 个百分点。在那段时间的市场环境下，我认为这个目标虽然具有挑战性，但并非无法实现。
The following conditions now make a change in yardsticks appropriate:
如今，以下情况使得我们有必要对衡量标准做出调整：
- The market environment has changed progressively over the past decade, resulting in a sharp diminution in the number of obvious quantitatively based investment bargains available;
- 在过去十年中，市场环境逐渐发生了变化，基于数量分析的明显投资良机数量急剧减少；
- Mushrooming interest in investment performance (which has its ironical aspects since I was among a lonely few preaching the importance of this some years ago) has created a hyper - reactive pattern of market behavior against which my analytical techniques have limited value;
- 人们对投资业绩的关注度如雨后春笋般高涨（这颇具讽刺意味，因为几年前我还是寥寥无几的强调投资业绩重要性的人之一），市场行为因此变得过度反应，而我的分析技巧在这种情况下所能发挥的作用有限；
- The enlargement of our capital base to about $65 million when applied against a diminishing trickle of good investment ideas has continued to present the problems mentioned in the January, 1967 letter; and
- 我们的资本基础已扩大到约 6500 万美元，而优质投资点子却越来越少，这继续带来了我在 1967 年 1 月的信件中提到的那些问题；
- My own personal interests dictate a less compulsive approach to superior investment results than when I was younger and leaner.
- 就我个人兴趣而言，现在我不像年轻时那样迫切地追求卓越的投资业绩了。
Let’s look at each of these factors in more detail.
让我们更详细地分析一下这些因素。
The evaluation of securities and businesses for investment purposes has always involved a mixture of qualitative and quantitative factors. At the one extreme, the analyst exclusively oriented to qualitative factors would say. “Buy the right company (with the right prospects, inherent industry conditions, management, etc.) and the price will take care of itself.” On the other hand, the quantitative spokesman would say, “Buy at the right price and the company (and stock) will take care of itself.” As is so often the pleasant result in the securities world, money can be made with either approach. And, of course, any analyst combines the two to some extent - his classification in either school would depend on the relative weight he assigns to the various factors and not to his consideration of one group of factors to the exclusion of the other group.
出于投资目的对证券和企业进行评估，一直都涉及到定性和定量因素的综合考量。在一个极端情况下，完全侧重于定性因素的分析师会说：“买入合适的公司（拥有良好的前景、有利的行业条件、优秀的管理等等），价格自然会水到渠成。” 另一方面，侧重于定量分析的分析师会说：“以合适的价格买入，公司（和股票）自然会发展良好。” 就像证券市场中经常出现的令人欣喜的情况一样，这两种方法都能赚钱。当然，任何分析师在一定程度上都会将两者结合 —— 他属于哪一类，取决于他对各种因素赋予的相对权重，而不是他只考虑其中一类因素而排除另一类因素。
Interestingly enough, although I consider myself to be primarily in the quantitative school (and as I write this no one has come back from recess - I may be the only one left in the class), the really sensational ideas I have had over the years have been heavily weighted toward the qualitative side where I have had a “high - probability insight”. This is what causes the cash register to really sing. However, it is an infrequent occurrence, as insights usually are, and, of course, no insight is required on the quantitative side - the figures should hit you over the head with a baseball bat. So the really big money tends to be made by investors who are right on qualitative decisions but, at least in my opinion, the more sure money tends to be made on the obvious quantitative decisions.
有趣的是，尽管我认为自己主要属于定量分析学派（写这封信时，课间休息的人还没回来 —— 我可能是班里唯一留下的人了），但多年来我真正出色的投资点子在很大程度上都偏向于定性分析方面，在这些方面我有 “高概率的洞察力”。正是这种洞察力让钱源源不断地流入。然而，这种情况很少发生，毕竟洞察力通常都是难得的，而且，当然，在定量分析方面不需要洞察力 —— 那些数据应该像用棒球棒打你头一样让你一目了然。所以，真正赚大钱的往往是那些在定性决策上正确的投资者，但至少在我看来，更稳妥的赚钱方式往往来自于那些明显的定量决策。
Such statistical bargains have tended to disappear over the years. This may be due to the constant combing and recombing of investments that has occurred during the past twenty years, without an economic convulsion such as that of the ‘30s to create a negative bias toward equities and spawn hundreds of new bargain securities. It may be due to the new growing social acceptance, and therefore usage (or maybe it’s vice versa - I’ll let the behaviorists figure it out) of takeover bids which have a natural tendency to focus on bargain issues. It may be due to the exploding ranks of security analysts bringing forth an intensified scrutiny of issues far beyond what existed some years ago. Whatever the cause, the result has been the virtual disappearance of the bargain issue as determined quantitatively - and thereby of our bread and butter. There still may be a few from time to time. There will also be the occasional security where I am really competent to make an important qualitative judgment. This will offer our best chance for large profits. Such instances will. however, be rare. Much of our good performance during the past three years has been due to a single idea of this sort.
这些年来，这类基于统计分析的投资良机往往已经消失了。这可能是因为在过去的二十年里，人们不断地梳理和重新评估各种投资，却没有像 20 世纪 30 年代那样的经济大动荡来引发对股票的负面偏见，从而催生数百种新的廉价证券。也可能是因为社会对收购要约的接受度越来越高，因此其使用频率也越来越高（或者情况正好相反 —— 我会让行为学家去弄清楚），而收购要约自然倾向于关注那些被低估的证券。还可能是因为证券分析师的队伍不断壮大，对证券的审查比几年前更加严格。无论原因是什么，结果是基于定量分析确定的廉价证券几乎消失了 —— 而这曾是我们的主要利润来源。偶尔可能还会出现一些这样的机会，也会偶尔出现一些我确实有能力做出重要定性判断的证券。这将为我们带来获得巨额利润的最佳机会。然而，这种情况会很少见。在过去三年里，我们的良好业绩在很大程度上得益于一个这样的点子。
The next point of difficulty is the intensified interest in investment performance. For years I have preached the importance of measurement. Consistently I have told partners that unless our performance was better than average, the money should go elsewhere. In recent years this idea has gained momentum throughout the investment (or more importantly, the investing) community. In the last year or two it has started to look a bit like a tidal wave. I think we are witnessing the distortion of a sound idea.
下一个难点是人们对投资业绩的关注度不断提高。多年来，我一直在强调衡量投资业绩的重要性。我一直告诉合伙人，除非我们的业绩优于平均水平，否则他们的钱应该投向别处。近年来，这个理念在整个投资（或者更重要的是，在投资者群体中）领域越来越受到重视。在过去的一两年里，这种趋势开始像潮水一样涌来。我认为我们正在见证一个正确理念的扭曲。
I have always cautioned partners that I considered three years a minimum in determining whether we were “performing”. Naturally, as the investment public has taken the bit in its teeth, the time span of expectations has been consistently reduced to the point where investment performance by large aggregates of money is being measured yearly, quarterly, monthly, and perhaps sometimes even more frequently (leading to what is known as “instant research”). The payoff for superior short term performance has become enormous, not only in compensation for results actually achieved, but in the attraction of new money for the next round. Thus a self - generating type of activity has set in which leads to larger and larger amounts of money participating on a shorter and shorter time span. A disturbing corollary is that the vehicle for participation (the particular companies or stocks) becomes progressively less important - at times virtually incidental - as the activity accelerates.
我一直告诫合伙人，我认为至少要以三年为期限来判断我们是否 “表现良好”。自然而然地，随着投资大众对投资业绩的关注度不断提高，他们对投资业绩的预期时间跨度不断缩短，以至于大量资金的投资业绩现在是按年、按季度、按月来衡量，有时甚至更频繁（这就导致了所谓的 “即时研究”）。卓越短期业绩的回报变得极为丰厚，不仅体现在对实际取得业绩的回报上，还体现在吸引新资金进行下一轮投资上。因此，一种自我强化的活动模式已经形成，越来越多的资金在越来越短的时间跨度内参与其中。一个令人不安的必然结果是，参与投资的载体（特定的公司或股票）变得越来越不重要 —— 有时甚至几乎无关紧要 —— 随着这种活动的加速进行。
In my opinion what is resulting is speculation on an increasing scale. This is hardly a new phenomenon; however, a dimension has been added by the growing ranks of professional (in many cases formerly quite docile) investors who feel they must “get aboard”. The game is dignified, of course, by appropriate ceremonies, personages and lexicon. To date it has been highly profitable. It may also be that this is going to be the standard nature of the market in the future. Nevertheless, it is an activity at which I am sure I would not do particularly well. As I said on page five of my last annual letter,
在我看来，现在的结果是投机活动的规模越来越大。这并不是什么新现象；然而，越来越多的专业投资者（在很多情况下，他们以前相当温顺）加入其中，觉得自己必须 “上车”，这给投机活动增添了一个新的维度。当然，通过适当的仪式、人物和术语，这种游戏被赋予了一定的尊严。到目前为止，它带来了丰厚的利润。也许这将成为未来市场的常态。尽管如此，我确信自己在这种活动中不会表现得特别出色。正如我在上一份年度信件的第五页所说：
“Furthermore, we will not follow the frequently prevalent approach of investing in securities where an attempt to anticipate market action overrides business valuations. Such so - called ‘fashion’ investing has frequently produced very substantial and quick profits in recent years (and currently as I write this in January). It represents an investment technique whose soundness I can neither affirm nor deny. It does not completely satisfy my intellect (or perhaps my prejudices), and most definitely does not fit my temperament. I will not invest my own money based upon such an approach – hence, I will most certainly not do so with your money.”
“此外，我们不会采用那种常见的投资证券的方法，即试图预测市场走势的重要性超过对企业估值的考量。近年来（在我 1 月份写这封信的时候也是如此），这种所谓的‘跟风’投资常常能带来非常可观且迅速的利润。这是一种我既不能肯定其合理性，也不能否定其合理性的投资技巧。它无法完全满足我的理性思考（或者也许是我的偏见），而且肯定不符合我的投资风格。我不会基于这种方法来投资自己的钱 —— 因此，我当然也不会用你们的钱来进行这样的投资。”
Any form of hyper - activity with large amounts of money in securities markets can create problems for all participants. I make no attempt to guess the action of the stock market and haven’t the foggiest notion as to whether the Dow will be at 600, 900 or 1200 a year from now. Even if there are serious consequences resulting from present and future speculative activity, experience suggests estimates of timing are meaningless. However, I do believe certain conditions that now exist are likely to make activity in markets more difficult for us for the intermediate future.
证券市场中任何形式的过度活跃以及大量资金的涌入都会给所有参与者带来问题。我不会试图猜测股市的走势，对于一年后道琼斯指数会是 600 点、900 点还是 1200 点，我也毫无头绪。即使现在和未来的投机活动会带来严重的后果，经验表明，对时机的预测是毫无意义的。然而，我确实认为，目前存在的某些情况可能会使我们在未来一段时间内更难在市场上开展投资活动。
The above may simply be “old - fogeyism” (after all, I am 37). When the game is no longer being played your way, it is only human to say the new approach is all wrong, bound to lead to trouble, etc. I have been scornful of such behavior by others in the past. I have also seen the penalties incurred by those who evaluate conditions as they were - not as they are. Essentially I am out of step with present conditions. On one point, however, I am clear. I will not abandon a previous approach whose logic I understand (although I find it difficult to apply) even though it may mean foregoing large and apparently easy, profits to embrace an approach which I don’t fully understand, have not practiced successfully and which, possibly, could lead to substantial permanent loss of capital.
以上这些可能只是 “守旧观念”（毕竟，我已经 37 岁了）。当游戏不再按照你习惯的方式进行时，人们很自然会说新的方式都是错误的，必然会导致麻烦等等。过去我曾对别人的这种行为嗤之以鼻。我也看到过那些按照过去的情况而非当前的情况来评估形势的人所遭受的惩罚。从本质上讲，我与当前的形势脱节了。然而，有一点我很清楚。我不会放弃一种我理解其逻辑的投资方法（尽管我发现这种方法现在很难应用），即使这可能意味着放弃大量看似唾手可得的利润，而去采用一种我不完全理解、没有成功实践过、并且可能会导致大量永久性资本损失的方法。
The third point of difficulty involves our much greater base of capital. For years my investment ideas were anywhere from 110% to 1000% of our capital. It was difficult for me to conceive that a different condition could ever exist. I promised to tell partners when it did and in my January, 1967 letter had to make good on that promise. Largely because of the two conditions previously mentioned, our greater capital is now something of a drag on performance. I believe it is the least significant factor of the four mentioned, and that if we were operating with one - tenth of our present capital our performance would be little better. However, increased funds are presently a moderately negative factor.
第三个难点涉及到我们庞大的资本基础。多年来，我想到的投资点子的价值是我们资本的 110% 到 1000% 不等。我很难想象会出现不同的情况。我曾承诺，当情况发生变化时会告诉合伙人，而在 1967 年 1 月的信件中，我不得不兑现这个承诺。主要是由于前面提到的两个原因，我们庞大的资本现在在一定程度上对业绩产生了拖累。我认为这是上述四个因素中最不重要的一个，而且我相信，如果我们现在的资本只有目前的十分之一，我们的业绩也不会好多少。然而，目前资金的增加是一个适度的负面因素。
The final, and most important, consideration concerns personal motivation. When I started the partnership I set the motor that regulated the treadmill at “ten points better than the DOW”. I was younger, poorer and probably more competitive. Even without the three previously discussed external factors making for poorer performance. I would still feel that changed personal conditions make it advisable to reduce the speed of the treadmill. I have observed many cases of habit patterns in all activities of life, particularly business, continuing (and becoming accentuated as years pass) long after they ceased making sense. Bertrand Russell has related the story of two Lithuanian girls who lived at his manor subsequent to World War I. Regularly each evening after the house was dark, they would sneak out and steal vegetables from the neighbors for hoarding in their rooms; this despite the fact that food was bountiful at the Russell table. Lord Russell explained to the girls that while such behavior may have made a great deal of sense in Lithuania during the war, it was somewhat out of place in the English countryside. He received assenting nods and continued stealing.
最后，也是最重要的一点，是个人动机方面的考虑。当我创办合伙公司时，我把衡量业绩的标准设定为 “比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点”。那时我更年轻、更贫穷，可能也更具竞争意识。即使没有前面讨论的三个导致业绩不佳的外部因素，我仍然觉得，个人情况的变化使得降低衡量标准是明智之举。我观察到，在生活的各个方面，尤其是商业领域，许多习惯模式在它们不再合理之后仍然持续存在（而且随着时间的推移变得更加明显）。伯特兰・罗素（Bertrand Russell）曾讲述过一战后住在他庄园里的两个立陶宛女孩的故事。每天晚上，等房子里的灯都熄灭后，她们就会偷偷溜出去，从邻居那里偷蔬菜，然后藏在自己的房间里；尽管罗素家的餐桌上食物非常丰盛。罗素勋爵向女孩们解释说，虽然这种行为在战争期间的立陶宛可能很有意义，但在英国乡村却不太合适。女孩们点头表示同意，但还是继续偷菜。
He finally contented himself with the observation that their behavior, strange as it might seem to the neighbors, was really not so different from that of the elder Rockefeller.
最后，他只能自我安慰地说，她们的行为虽然在邻居们看来很奇怪，但其实和老洛克菲勒的行为并没有太大的不同。
Elementary self - analysis tells me that I will not be capable of less than all - out effort to achieve a publicly proclaimed goal to people who have entrusted their capital to me. All - out effort makes progressively less sense. I would like to have an economic goal which allows for considerable non - economic activity. This may mean activity outside the field of investments or it simply may mean pursuing lines within the investment field that do not promise the greatest economic reward. An example of the latter might be the continued investment in a satisfactory (but far from spectacular) controlled business where I liked the people and the nature of the business even though alternative investments offered an expectable higher rate of return. More money would be made buying businesses at attractive prices, then reselling them. However, it may be more enjoyable (particularly when the personal value of incremental capital is less) to continue to own them and hopefully improve their performance, usually in a minor way, through some decisions involving financial strategy.
简单的自我分析告诉我，对于那些把资金托付给我的人，我无法不尽全力去实现公开宣布的目标。然而，全力以赴所带来的意义越来越小。我希望有一个经济目标，能让我有足够的时间去从事大量的非经济活动。这可能意味着从事投资领域之外的活动，或者仅仅意味着在投资领域内选择那些不一定能带来最大经济回报的项目。后者的一个例子可能是继续投资于一家令人满意（但远非出色）的控股企业，我喜欢这家企业的员工和业务性质，即使其他投资项目预期回报率更高。以有吸引力的价格收购企业，然后再将其出售，可能会赚更多的钱。然而，继续持有这些企业，并且希望通过一些涉及财务战略的决策（通常是一些小的决策）来改善它们的业绩，可能会更令人愉快（尤其是当增加的资本对个人的价值较小时）。
Thus, I am likely to limit myself to things which are reasonably easy, safe, profitable and pleasant. This will not make our operation more conservative than in the past since I believe, undoubtedly with some bias, that we have always operated with considerable conservatism. The long - term downside risk will not be less; the upside potential will merely be less.
因此，我可能会把自己局限在那些相对容易、安全、有利可图且令人愉快的事情上。这并不会使我们的运营比过去更加保守，因为我相信（无疑带有一些偏见），我们一直以来的运营都相当保守。长期来看，下行风险不会降低；只是上行潜力会变小。
Specifically, our longer term goal will be to achieve the lesser of 9% per annum or a five percentage point advantage over the Dow. Thus, if the Dow averages - 2% over the next five years, I would hope to average + 3% but if the Dow averages + 12%, I will hope to achieve an average of only + 9%. These may be limited objectives, but I consider it no more likely that we will achieve even these more modest results under present conditions than I formerly did that we would achieve our previous goal of a ten percentage point average annual edge over the Dow. Furthermore, I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort (I’m quite sure the converse is true).
具体来说，我们的长期目标将是实现以下两者中较低的那个：每年 9% 的回报率，或者比道琼斯指数高出 5 个百分点的优势。因此，如果未来五年道琼斯指数平均回报率为 - 2%，我希望我们的平均回报率能达到 + 3%；但如果道琼斯指数平均回报率为 + 12%，我希望我们的平均回报率只能达到 + 9%。这些可能是比较有限的目标，但我认为，在目前的情况下，我们实现这些相对适度的目标的可能性，并不比以前实现我们设定的平均每年比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点的目标的可能性更大。此外，我希望有限的目标能让我们付出相对较少的努力（我非常确定相反的情况是成立的）。
I will incorporate this new goal into the Ground Rules to be mailed you about November 1, along with the 1968 Commitment Letter. I wanted to get this letter off to you prior to that mailing so you would have ample time to consider your personal situation, and if necessary get in touch with me to clear up some of the enclosed, before making a decision on 1968. As always, I intend to continue to leave virtually all of my capital (excluding Data Documents stock), along with that of my family, in BPL. What I consider satisfactory and achievable may well be different from what you consider so. Partners with attractive alternative investment opportunities may logically decide that their funds can be better employed elsewhere, and you can be sure I will be wholly in sympathy with such a decision.
我会将这个新目标纳入到大约 11 月 1 日寄给你们的基本原则中，同时还会附上 1968 年的承诺函。我想在寄这些文件之前先把这封信发给你们，这样你们就有足够的时间来考虑自己的个人情况。如果有必要，在对 1968 年做出决定之前，你们可以联系我，以弄清楚信中所包含的一些内容。和往常一样，我打算继续把我几乎所有的资本（不包括数据文件公司的股票），以及我家人的资本，都留在巴菲特合伙公司。我认为令人满意且可实现的目标，很可能与你们认为的不同。如果合伙人有更有吸引力的其他投资机会，从逻辑上讲，他们可能会决定把资金投向别处，而且你们可以放心，我会完全理解这样的决定。
I have always found behavior most distasteful which publicly announces one set of goals and motivations when actually an entirely different set of factors prevails. Therefore, I have always tried to be 100% candid with you about my goals and personal feelings so you aren’t making important decisions pursuant to phony proclamations (I’ve run into a few of these in our investment experience). Obviously all the conditions enumerated in this letter haven’t appeared overnight. I have been thinking about some of the points involved for a long period of time. You can understand, I am sure, that I wanted to pick a time when past goals had been achieved to set forth a reduction in future goals. I would not want to reduce the speed of the treadmill unless I had fulfilled my objectives to this point.
我一直非常厌恶那种公开宣称一套目标和动机，而实际上却受完全不同的因素支配的行为。因此，我一直努力对你们 100% 坦诚地说明我的目标和个人感受，这样你们就不会根据虚假的宣言做出重要决定（在我们的投资经历中，我遇到过一些这样的情况）。显然，这封信中列举的所有情况并不是一夜之间出现的。我对其中涉及的一些问题已经思考了很长时间。我相信你们能够理解，我想选择一个过去的目标已经实现的时候，来阐述未来目标的调整。除非我已经实现了到目前为止的目标，否则我不想降低衡量标准。
Please let me know if I can be of any help in deciphering any portion of this letter.
如果在理解这封信的任何部分时需要我的帮助，请告诉我。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB eh
1968 年信件
1968 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
January 24, 1968
1968 年 1 月 24 日
Our Performance in 1967
1967 年我们的业绩
By most standards, we had a good year in 1967. Our overall performance was plus 35.9% compared to plus 19.0% for the Dow, thus surpassing our previous objective of performance ten points superior to the Dow. Our overall gain was $19,384,250 which, even under accelerating inflation, will buy a lot of Pepsi. And, due to the sale of some longstanding large positions in marketable securities, we had realized taxable income of $27,376,667 which has nothing to do with 1967 performance but should give all of you a feeling of vigorous participation in The Great Society on April 15th.
从大多数标准来看，1967 年我们表现出色。我们的总体业绩涨幅为 35.9%，而道琼斯指数的涨幅为 19.0%，因此我们超越了之前设定的业绩比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点的目标。我们的总收益为 19,384,250 美元，即便在通货膨胀加剧的情况下，这笔钱也能买到大量的百事可乐。而且，由于出售了一些长期持有的大量可交易证券头寸，我们实现了 27,376,667 美元的应税收入，这与 1967 年的业绩并无关联，但应该会让你们所有人在 4 月 15 日（纳税日）时强烈感受到自己参与到了 “伟大社会”（注：指美国约翰逊总统提出的社会改革计划）之中。
The minor thrills described above are tempered by any close observation of what really took place in the stock market during 1967. Probably a greater percentage of participants in the securities markets did substantially better than the Dow last year than in virtually any year in history. In 1967, for many, it rained gold and it paid to be out playing the bass tuba. I don’t have a final tabulation at this time but my guess is that at least 95% of investment companies following a common stock program achieved better results than the Dow - in many cases by very substantial amounts. It was a year when profits achieved were in inverse proportion to age - and I am in the geriatric ward, philosophically.
然而，只要仔细观察 1967 年股票市场的实际情况，上述那些小小的喜悦之情就会有所消减。与历史上几乎任何一年相比，去年证券市场中业绩大幅好于道琼斯指数的参与者比例可能更高。在 1967 年，对很多人来说可谓是 “天上掉馅饼”，就算只是在市场中随性参与也能获利。目前我还没有最终的统计数据，但我猜测，至少 95% 遵循普通股投资策略的投资公司取得的业绩都好于道琼斯指数，在很多情况下，超出的幅度还相当大。这是一年中，获得的利润与年龄成反比的年份 —— 从理念上来说，我已经属于 “老年组” 了。
The following summarizes the year - by - year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the general partner, and the results for limited partners:
以下总结了道琼斯指数、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配（超出 6% 部分的四分之一）之前、以及有限合伙人的逐年业绩情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 (1) | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 (2) | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 (3) |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(1) 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957 - 61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙公司全年运营的合并业绩，扣除了所有费用，但在向合伙人分配利润或向普通合伙人进行利润划拨之前。
(3) For 1957 - 61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩数据计算得出的，考虑了根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人的利润划拨，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
从累计或复利的角度来看，结果如下：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| Annual Compounded Rate | 9.3% | 29.4% | 23.6% |
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they have stood at the top in size since BPL was formed - this year, however, Dreyfus Fund overtook them) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 - 100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed - end investment companies.
下一页是常见的列表，展示了两家最大的共同基金（自巴菲特合伙公司成立以来，它们在规模上一直名列前茅 —— 不过今年，德雷福斯基金超过了它们）的业绩，这些共同基金通常遵循将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略，此外还展示了两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩。
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri - Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资信托基金 (1) | 投资者股票基金 (1) | 雷曼公司 (2) | 三大陆公司 (2) | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| Cumulative Results（累计业绩） | 162.3% | 147.6% | 206.2% | 181.5% | 165.3% | 932.6% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 9.2% | 8.6% | 10.7% | 9.9% | 9.3% | 23.6% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变化以及当年向登记在册的持有人所进行的任何分配计算得出。
(2) From 1967 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 - 1966. Estimated for 1967.
(2) 数据来源于 1967 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中关于 1957 年至 1966 年的内容。1967 年的数据为估算值。
Last year I said:
去年我说过：
“A few mutual funds and some private investment operations have compiled records vastly superior to the Dow and, in some cases, substantially superior to Buffett Partnership, Ltd. Their investment techniques are usually very dissimilar to ours and not within my capabilities.”
“有几家共同基金和一些私人投资机构所取得的业绩远远超过道琼斯指数，在某些情况下，也大幅超过了巴菲特合伙公司。它们的投资技巧通常与我们的大不相同，而且超出了我的能力范围。”
In 1967 this condition intensified. Many investment organizations performed substantially better than BPL, with gains ranging to over 100%. Because of these spectacular results, money, talent and energy are converging in a maximum effort for the achievement of large and quick stock market profits. It looks to me like greatly intensified speculation with concomitant risks - but many of the advocates insist otherwise.
在 1967 年，这种情况变得更加明显。许多投资机构的表现大幅好于巴菲特合伙公司，收益涨幅甚至超过了 100%。由于这些惊人的业绩，资金、人才和精力都汇聚在一起，全力以赴地在股票市场中追求巨额且快速的利润。在我看来，这就像是投机活动大幅加剧，同时也伴随着相应的风险 —— 但许多倡导者却坚持认为并非如此。
My mentor, Ben Graham, used to say. “Speculation is neither illegal, immoral nor fattening (financially).”
我的导师本・格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）过去常说：“投机既不违法，也不违背道德，也不会让人发财（从经济角度来说）。”
During the past year, it was possible to become fiscally flabby through a steady diet of speculative bonbons. We continue to eat oatmeal but if indigestion should set in generally, it is unrealistic to expect that we won’t have some discomfort.
在过去的一年里，通过持续参与投机活动，有可能在财务上变得臃肿（指获得大量财富）。我们继续坚持保守的投资策略（吃燕麦片比喻保守投资），但如果市场普遍出现 “消化不良”（指市场出现问题），指望我们完全不受影响是不现实的。
Analysis of 1967 Results
1967 年业绩分析
The overall figures given earlier conceal vast differences in profitability by portfolio category during 1967.
前面给出的总体数据掩盖了 1967 年投资组合中不同类别在盈利能力上的巨大差异。
We had our worst performance in history in the “Workout” section. In the 1965 letter, this category was defined as,
我们在 “套利投资” 类别中取得了有史以来最差的业绩。在 1965 年的信中，这一类别被定义为：
“…securities with a timetable. They arise from corporate activity – sell - outs, mergers, reorganizations, spin - offs, etc. In this category, we are not talking about rumors or inside information pertaining to such developments, but to publicly announced activities of this sort. We wait until we can read it in the paper. The risk does not pertain primarily to general market behavior (although that is sometimes tied in. to a degree). but instead to something upsetting the applecart so that the expected corporate development does not materialize.”
“…… 有时间规划的证券。它们源于公司的一些活动，如出售、合并、重组、分拆等。在这一类别中，我们讨论的不是与这些发展相关的谣言或内幕消息，而是此类公开宣布的活动。我们一直等到能在报纸上看到相关消息才行动。风险主要不涉及整体市场走势（尽管有时在一定程度上也与之相关），而是在于某些因素破坏了计划，导致预期的公司发展未能实现。”
The streets were filled with upset applecarts - our applecarts - during 1967. Thus, on an average investment of $17,246,879, our overall gain was $153,273. For those of you whose slide rule does not go to such insulting depths, this represents a return of .89 of 1%. While I don’t have complete figures. I doubt that we have been below 10% in any past year. As in other categories, we tend to concentrate our investments in the workout category in just a few situations per year. This technique gives more variation in yearly results than would be the case if we used an across - the - board approach. I believe our approach will result in as great (or greater) profitability on a long - term basis, but you can’t prove it by 1967.
在 1967 年，市场上到处都是出问题的 “计划”—— 我们的投资计划也未能幸免。因此，在平均投资额为 17,246,879 美元的情况下，我们的总收益仅为 153,273 美元。对于那些使用计算尺的人来说，如果计算结果低到如此程度，简直是一种侮辱，这意味着回报率仅为 0.89%。虽然我没有完整的数据，但我怀疑在过去的任何一年里，我们在这一类别上的回报率都没有低于过 10%。和其他类别一样，我们在套利投资类别中每年也倾向于只集中投资少数几个项目。与全面撒网的投资方式相比，这种方法会使年度业绩的波动更大。我相信从长期来看，我们的投资方法会带来同样高（甚至更高）的盈利能力，但仅从 1967 年的情况无法证明这一点。
Our investment in controlled companies was a similar drag on relative performance in 1967, but this is to be expected in strong markets. On an average investment of $20,192,776 we had an overall gain of $2,894,571. I am pleased with this sort of performance, even though this category will continue to underperform if the market continues strong during 1968. Through our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing and Berkshire Hathaway), we acquired two new enterprises in 1967. Associated Cotton Shops and National Indemnity (along with National Fire & Marine, an affiliated company). These acquisitions couldn’t be more gratifying. Everything was as advertised or better. The principal selling executives, Ben Rosner and Jack Ringwalt, have continued to do a superb job (the only kind they know), and in every respect have far more than lived up to their end of the bargain.
1967 年，我们对控股公司的投资同样对相对业绩产生了拖累，但在强劲的市场环境下，这是可以预料到的。在平均投资额为 20,192,776 美元的情况下，我们的总收益为 2,894,571 美元。我对这样的业绩感到满意，尽管如果 1968 年市场继续走强，这一类别仍将表现不佳。通过我们的两家控股公司（多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司），我们在 1967 年收购了两家新企业，即联合棉花商店和国民赔偿公司（以及其附属公司国民火灾及海上保险公司）。这些收购令人非常满意，一切都如预期的那样，甚至更好。主要的卖方高管本・罗斯纳（Ben Rosner）和杰克・林沃尔特（Jack Ringwalt）继续出色地完成工作（他们只会以这种高水平的方式工作），在各个方面都远远超出了他们当初的承诺。
The satisfying nature of our activity in controlled companies is a minor reason for the moderated investment objectives discussed in the October 9th letter. When I am dealing with people I like, in businesses I find stimulating (what business isn’t ?), and achieving worthwhile overall returns on capital employed (say, 10 - 12%), it seems foolish to rush from situation to situation to earn a few more percentage points. It also does not seem sensible to me to trade known pleasant personal relationships with high grade people, at a decent rate of return, for possible irritation, aggravation or worse at potentially higher returns. Hence, we will continue to keep a portion of our capital (but not over 40% because of the possible liquidity requirements arising from the nature of our partnership agreement) invested in controlled operating businesses at an expected rate of return below that inherent in an aggressive stock market operation.
我们在控股公司投资活动中获得的满足感，是我在 10 月 9 日的信中提到降低投资目标的一个次要原因。当我与我喜欢的人合作，从事我觉得有吸引力的业务（毕竟有哪种业务没有吸引力呢？），并且在所投入的资本上获得可观的总体回报（比如 10% - 12%）时，为了多赚几个百分点而频繁更换投资项目似乎是不明智的。对我来说，用与优秀人才之间已知的愉快合作关系以及合理的回报率，去换取可能更高的回报但同时伴随着潜在的烦恼、困扰甚至更糟的情况，也不是明智之举。因此，我们将继续把一部分资金（但不会超过 40%，因为根据我们合伙协议的性质可能会有流动性需求）投资于控股运营企业，预期回报率低于积极的股票市场操作所能带来的回报率。
With a combined total of $37,439,655 in workouts and controls producing an overall gain of only $3,047,844, the more alert members of the class will have already concluded we had a whale of a year in the “Generals - Relatively Undervalued” category. On a net average investment of $19,487,996, we had an overall gain of $14,096,593, or 72%. Last year I referred to one investment which substantially outperformed the general market in 1964, 1965 and 1966 and because of its size (the largest proportion we have ever had in anything - we hit our 40% limit) had a very material impact on our overall results and, even more so, this category. This excellent performance continued throughout 1967 and a large portion of total gain was again accounted for by this single security. Our holdings of this security have been very substantially reduced and we have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.
套利投资和控股投资的总投资额为 37,439,655 美元，但总收益仅为 3,047,844 美元，聪明的人此时应该已经得出结论，我们在 “一般投资（相对低估）” 类别中度过了非常成功的一年。在平均净投资额为 19,487,996 美元的情况下，我们的总收益为 14,096,593 美元，回报率达 72%。去年我提到过一项投资，它在 1964 年、1965 年和 1966 年的表现都大幅超过大盘，并且由于其规模（这是我们在任何一项投资中所占比例最大的一次 —— 达到了我们 40% 的上限），对我们的总体业绩产生了重大影响，对这一类别更是如此。这种出色的表现一直持续到 1967 年，总收益的很大一部分再次来自这一只证券。我们对这只证券的持有量已经大幅减少，而且在这一类别中，目前没有任何一项投资的规模或潜力能与之前的这项投资相媲美。
The “Generals - Private Owner” section produced good results last year ($1,297,215 on $5,141,710 average investment), and we have some mildly interesting possibilities in this area at present.
“一般投资（私人所有者视角）” 类别去年取得了不错的成绩（平均投资额为 5,141,710 美元，收益为 1,297,215 美元），目前我们在这一领域也有一些比较有吸引力的潜在投资机会。
Miscellaneous
杂项
We begin the new year with net assets of $68,108,088. We had partners with capital of about $1,600,000 withdraw at yearend, primarily because of the reduced objectives announced in the October 9th letter. This makes good sense for them, since most of them have the ability and motivation to surpass our objectives and I am relieved from pushing for results that I probably can’t attain under present conditions.
新的一年开始时，我们的净资产为 68,108,088 美元。年底时，大约有资本为 160 万美元的合伙人撤资，主要原因是我在 10 月 9 日的信中宣布降低了投资目标。这对他们来说是合理的，因为他们中的大多数人有能力和动力超越我们的目标，而且我也不用再为在当前情况下可能无法实现的业绩目标而努力了。
Some of those who withdrew (and many who didn’t) asked me, “What do you really mean?” after receiving the October 9th letter. This sort of a question is a little bruising to any author, but I assured them I meant exactly what I had said. I was also asked whether this was an initial stage in the phasing out of the partnership. The answer to this is, “Definitely, no”. As long as partners want to put up their capital alongside of mine and the business is operationally pleasant (and it couldn’t be better), I intend to continue to do business with those who have backed me since tennis shoes.
一些撤资的合伙人（以及许多没有撤资的合伙人）在收到 10 月 9 日的信后问我：“你到底是什么意思？” 这样的问题对任何作者来说都有点伤自尊，但我向他们保证，我所说的就是我的真实想法。我还被问到这是否是合伙公司逐步解散的初始阶段。答案是：“绝对不是。” 只要合伙人愿意和我一起投入资金，而且业务运营愉快（目前已经非常愉快了），我就打算继续与那些从一开始就支持我的人合作。
Gladys Kaiser has joined us and is doing the same sort of top - notch job that we have long received from Donna, Bill and John. The office group, spouses and children have over $15 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1968, so we have not had a need for NoDoz during business hours.
格拉迪斯・凯泽（Gladys Kaiser）加入了我们，她和唐娜（Donna）、比尔（Bill）以及约翰（John）一样，工作非常出色。截至 1968 年 1 月 1 日，办公室团队成员、他们的配偶和子女在巴菲特合伙公司的投资额超过了 1500 万美元，所以我们在工作时间内不需要靠提神药（NoDoz）来保持清醒。
Within a few days, you will receive:
在几天之内，您将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1967 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- 一封税务信函，其中包含您填写 1967 年联邦所得税申报表所需的所有巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的信息。就税务目的而言，这封信函是唯一重要的文件。
- An audit from Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1967, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
- 毕马威会计师事务所（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.）出具的 1967 年审计报告（他们再次出色地完成了工作），其中阐述了巴菲特合伙公司的运营情况和财务状况，以及您个人的资本账户情况。
- A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1968. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封由我签署的信函，说明了截至 1968 年 1 月 1 日您在巴菲特合伙公司的权益状况。这与审计报告中的数据一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July15th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果这封信中的任何内容或今年内出现的任何情况需要进一步说明，请告知我。我的下一封信大约会在 7 月 15 日发出，对今年上半年的情况进行总结。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1968 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
July 11th, 1968
1968 年 7 月 11 日
First Half Performance
上半年业绩
During the first half of 1968, the Dow - Jones Industrial Average declined fractionally from 905 to 898. Ownership of the Dow would also have produced dividends of about $15 during the half, resulting in an overall gain of 0.9% for that Average. The Dow, once again, was an anemic competitor for most investment managers, although it was not surpassed by anything like the margins of 1967.
1968 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数从 905 点微跌至 898 点。持有道琼斯指数成分股在这半年里也能获得约 15 美元的股息，因此道琼斯指数的总体涨幅为 0.9%。对于大多数投资经理来说，道琼斯指数再次成为一个表现平平的参照标准，尽管它没有像 1967 年那样被大幅超越。
Our own performance was unusually good during the first half, with an overall gain of 16% excluding any change in valuation for controlled companies (which represented slightly over one - third of net assets at the beginning of the year). However, any release of adrenalin is unwarranted. Our marketable security investments are heavily concentrated in a few situations, making relative performance potentially more volatile than in widely diversified investment vehicles. Our long term performance goals are as stated in the revised “Ground Rules” and I will be quite happy if we achieve those limited objectives over a period of years. The following table summarizes performance to date on the usual basis:
我们上半年的业绩异常出色，在不考虑控股公司估值变化的情况下（控股公司在年初时约占净资产的三分之一多一点），总体涨幅达到了 16%。然而，现在还没到值得激动的时候。我们的可交易证券投资高度集中在少数几个项目上，这使得相对业绩的波动可能比那些多元化程度高的投资工具更大。我们的长期业绩目标如修订后的 “基本原则” 中所述，如果我们能在几年内实现这些有限的目标，我将会非常满意。下表按照惯例总结了截至目前的业绩情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 (1) | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 (2) | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 (3) |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| First Half 1968（1968年上半年） | 0.9% | 16.0% | 13.5% |
| Cumulative Results（累计业绩） | 167.7% | 1880.0% | 1072.0% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 8.9% | 29.6% | 23.8% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of partnership activity.
(1) 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957 - 61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses but before distributions to partners or allocations to the general partner.
(2) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙公司全年运营的合并业绩，扣除了所有费用，但在向合伙人分配利润或向普通合伙人进行利润划拨之前。
(3) For 1957 - 61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of partnership results allowing for allocation to the general partner based upon the present partnership agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩数据计算得出的，考虑了根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人的利润划拨，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
Although we revise valuations of our controlled companies only at yearend, it presently appears that our share of their 1968 earnings will be something over $3 million. Those with primary responsibility for their operations, Ken Chace at Berkshire Hathaway, Louis Kohn at Hochschild Kohn, Jack Ringwalt at National Indemnity and Ben Rosner at Associated Cotton Shops, continue to meld effort and ability into results.
尽管我们仅在年末对控股公司进行估值调整，但目前看来，我们在这些公司 1968 年收益中的份额将超过 300 万美元。负责这些公司运营的主要人员，包括伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的肯・蔡斯（Ken Chace）、霍赫希尔德・科恩公司（Hochschild Kohn）的路易斯・科恩（Louis Kohn）、国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity）的杰克・林沃尔特（Jack Ringwalt）以及联合棉花商店（Associated Cotton Shops）的本・罗斯纳（Ben Rosner），他们继续将精力和能力转化为实际成果。
This year, Diversified Retailing Company (owner of Hochschild Kohn and Associated Cotton Shops) issued its first published annual report. This was occasioned by the public sale of debentures to approximately 1,000 investors last December. Thus, DRC is in the rather unusual position of being a public company from a creditors’ viewpoint, but a private one (there are three stockholders - BPL owns 80%) for ownership purposes. I am enclosing the DRC report with this letter (except where duplicates go to one household) and plan to continue to send them along with future mid - year letters.
今年，多元化零售公司（霍赫希尔德・科恩公司和联合棉花商店的所有者）发布了其首份公开年度报告。这是由于去年 12 月该公司向约 1000 名投资者公开发售了债券。因此，从债权人的角度来看，多元化零售公司是一家上市公司，但从股权所有的角度来看，它又是一家私人公司（公司有三名股东，巴菲特合伙公司持有 80% 的股份）。我随信附上多元化零售公司的这份报告（若同一家庭有重复收件情况则除外），并计划在未来发送年中信件时继续附上该公司的报告。
As I have mentioned before, we cannot make the same sort of money out of permanent ownership of controlled businesses that can be made from buying and reselling such businesses, or from skilled investment in marketable securities. Nevertheless, they offer a pleasant long term form of activity (when conducted in conjunction with high grade, able people) at satisfactory rates of return.
正如我之前提到的，通过永久持有控股企业，我们无法获得像买卖这些企业，或通过对可交易证券进行专业投资那样多的收益。不过，（当与优秀且有能力的人合作经营时）这些控股企业提供了一种令人愉快的长期投资活动形式，并且能带来令人满意的回报率。
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the form sheet on the usual investment companies:
下一页是常见投资公司的情况表格：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust (1) | Investors Stock (1) | Lehman (2) | Tri - Cont (2) | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资信托基金 (1) | 投资者股票基金 (1) | 雷曼公司 (2) | 三重控制公司 (2) | 道琼斯指数 | 有限合伙人业绩 |
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| First Half 1968 | 5.1% | 2.8% | 4.4% | 2.0% | 0.9% | 13.5% |
| Cumulative Results（累计业绩） | 175.7% | 154.5% | 218.6% | 186.7% | 167.7% | 1072.0% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 9.2% | 8.5% | 10.6% | 9.6% | 8.9% | 23.8% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变动情况，加上当年向登记在册的持有人进行的任何分配来计算。
(2) From 1968 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957 -1967. Estimated for first half of 1968.
(2) 数据来源于 1968 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中关于 1957 年至 1967 年的内容。1968 年上半年的数据为估算值。
Due to a sluggish performance by the Dow in the last few years, the four big funds now have, on average, about a one-half point per annum advantage over
由于道琼斯指数在过去几年表现疲软，如今这四大基金在整个时间段内平均每年比道琼斯指数高出约 0.5 个百分点。
The Dow for the full period.
整个时间段的道琼斯指数
I make no effort to predict the course of general business or the stock market. Period. However, currently there are practices snowballing in the security markets and business world which, while devoid of short term predictive value, bother me as to possible long term consequences.
我从不试图预测总体经济或股市的走势，就是这样。然而，目前在证券市场和商业领域中，一些做法正像滚雪球一样愈演愈烈，尽管这些做法在短期内没有预测价值，但它们可能带来的长期后果让我担忧。
I know that some of you are not particularly interested (and shouldn’t be) in what is taking place on the financial stage. For those who are, I am enclosing a reprint of an unusually clear and simple article which lays bare just what is occurring on a mushrooming scale. Spectacular amounts of money are being made by those participating (whether as originators, top employees. professional advisors, investment bankers, stock speculators, etc… ) in the chain-letter type stock-promotion vogue. The game is being played by the gullible, the self-hypnotized, and the cynical. To create the proper illusions, it frequently requires accounting distortions (one particularly progressive entrepreneur told me he believed in “bold, imaginative accounting”), tricks of capitalization and camouflage of the true nature of the operating businesses involved. The end product is popular, respectable and immensely profitable (I’ll let the philosophers figure in which order those adjectives should be placed).
我知道你们当中有些人对金融领域发生的事情并不特别感兴趣（也不应该感兴趣）。但对于那些感兴趣的人，我随信附上一篇异常清晰简洁的文章的重印本，它揭示了正在大规模迅速发展的实际情况。参与这种类似连锁信式的股票炒作潮流的人（无论是发起人、高级雇员、专业顾问、投资银行家、股票投机者等等）都赚得盆满钵满。这场游戏的参与者有容易上当受骗的人、自我催眠的人，还有愤世嫉俗的人。为了制造恰当的假象，这常常需要在会计处理上做手脚（一位特别激进的企业家曾告诉我，他相信 “大胆、富有想象力的会计处理方式”），使用资本运作的手段，并掩盖所涉及的经营业务的真实性质。最终的结果是这种做法广受欢迎、看似合理且利润丰厚（我就让哲学家们去判断这些形容词的先后顺序吧）。
Quite candidly, our own performance has been substantially improved on an indirect basis because of the fall-out from such activities. To create an ever widening circle of chain letters requires increasing amounts of corporate raw material and this has caused many intrinsically cheap (and not so cheap) stocks to come to life.When we have been the owners of such stocks, we have reaped market rewards much more promptly than might otherwise have been the case. The appetite for such companies, however, tends to substantially diminish the number of fundamentally attractive investments which remain.
坦率地说，由于这类活动的影响，我们自己的业绩在间接层面上得到了显著提升。为了让连锁信式的炒作圈子不断扩大，就需要越来越多的公司作为 “原材料”，这使得许多原本价格低廉（以及不那么低廉）的股票活跃了起来。当我们持有这类股票时，我们从市场中获得回报的速度比其他情况下要快得多。然而，对这类公司的追捧往往会大幅减少那些从根本上具有吸引力的投资的数量。
I believe the odds are good that, when the stock market and business history of this period is being written, the phenomenon described in Mr. May’s article will be regarded as of major importance, and perhaps characterized as a mania. You should realize, however, that his “The Emperor Has No Clothes” approach is at odds (or dismissed with a “SO What?” or an “Enjoy, Enjoy”) with the views of most investment banking houses and currently successful investment managers. We live in an investment world, populated not by those who must be logically persuaded to believe, but by the hopeful, credulous and greedy, grasping for an excuse to believe.
我认为很有可能，当人们书写这个时期的股市和商业历史时，梅先生文章中所描述的现象将被视为具有重要意义，甚至可能被形容为一种狂热。不过，你们应该意识到，他那种 “皇帝的新衣” 式的揭露方式与大多数投资银行以及目前成功的投资经理的观点相悖（或者他们会以 “那又怎样？” 或者 “尽情享受吧” 这样的态度不予理会）。我们所处的投资世界里，占据主导的不是那些需要通过逻辑说服才能相信的人，而是充满希望、容易轻信且贪婪的人，他们急切地寻找理由去相信。
Finally, for a magnificent account of the current financial scene, you should hurry out and get a copy of “The Money Game” by Adam Smith. It is loaded with insights and supreme wit. (Note: Despite my current “Support Your Local Postmaster” drive, I am not enclosing the book with this letter - it retails for $6.95.)
最后，要想全面了解当前的金融形势，你们应该赶紧去买一本亚当・斯密（Adam Smith）写的《金钱游戏》（The Money Game）。这本书充满了深刻的见解和非凡的智慧。（注意：尽管我现在正在 “支持当地邮局”（鼓励邮寄信件），但我不会随信附上这本书 —— 它的零售价是 6.95 美元。）
Taxes
税务
Several unusual factors make the tax figure even more difficult than usual to estimate this year. We will undoubtedly have an above average amount of ordinary income. The picture on short term and long term capital gain is subject to unusually substantial variance. At the beginning of the year, I suggested that you use an 8% ordinary income factor (it won’t come in this manner but this figure embodies an adjustment for long term capital gain) applied to your BPL capital account on an interim basis to compute quarterly tax estimates. If a figure different from 8% seems more appropriate for your September 15th quarterly estimate. I will let you know by September 5th. If no change is necessary, you will next hear from me on November 1st with the Commitment Letter for 1969.
今年有几个不寻常的因素使得税务金额比往常更难以估算。我们无疑会有高于平均水平的普通收入。短期和长期资本利得的情况存在异常大的变数。年初时，我建议你们在计算季度税务预估时，暂时使用 8% 的普通收入系数（实际情况并非完全如此，但这个数字包含了对长期资本利得的调整），应用于你们在巴菲特合伙公司的资本账户。如果对于 9 月 15 日的季度预估，8% 这个数字对你们来说不太合适，我会在 9 月 5 日前告知你们更合适的数字。如果不需要更改，你们接下来会在 11 月 1 日收到我寄来的 1969 年的承诺书。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
1969 年信件
1969 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
January 22nd, 1969
1969 年 1 月 22 日
Our Performance in 1968
1968 年我们的业绩
Everyone makes mistakes.
人非圣贤，孰能无过。
At the beginning of 1968, I felt prospects for BPL performance looked poorer than at any time in our history. However, due in considerable measure to one simple but sound idea whose time had come (investment ideas, like women are often more exciting than punctual), we recorded an overall gain of $40,032,691.
1968 年初，我觉得巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的业绩前景比以往任何时候都要差。然而，在很大程度上得益于一个简单却靠谱且时机正好的投资点子（投资点子就像女人一样，往往更令人兴奋，却不太准时出现），我们实现了总计 40,032,691 美元的总收益。
Naturally, you all possess sufficient intellectual purity to dismiss the dollar result and demand an accounting of performance relative to the Dow-Jones Industrial Average. We established a new mark at plus 58.8% versus an overall plus 7.7 % for the Dow, including dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average throughout the year. This result should be treated as a freak like picking up thirteen spades in a bridge game. You bid the slam, make it look modest, pocket the money and then get back to work on the part scores. We will also have our share of hands when we go set.
自然，你们都有着足够纯粹的理性思维，不会只看重收益金额，而是会要求了解我们相对于道琼斯工业平均指数的业绩表现。我们创下了新的纪录，业绩涨幅达到 58.8%，而道琼斯指数（包括全年持有该指数成分股应获得的股息）的总体涨幅为 7.7%。这样的结果就如同在桥牌游戏中拿到了 13 张黑桃牌一样，属于罕见的异常情况。你叫了满贯，表现得很谦逊，把钱收入囊中，然后再继续专注于那些小的得分情况。当然，我们也会有输牌的时候。
The following summarizes the year-by-year performance of the Dow, the Partnership before allocation (one quarter of the excess over 6%) to the General Partner and the results for limited partners:
以下总结了道琼斯指数、合伙公司在向普通合伙人分配（超出 6% 部分的四分之一）之前的业绩，以及有限合伙人的逐年业绩情况：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow (1) | Partnership Results (2) | Limited Partners’ Results (3) |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 (1) | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 (2) | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 (3) |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 38.5% | 40.9% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 20.0% | 25.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -6.2% | 22.8% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 22.4% | 45.9% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -7.6% | 13.9% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.6% | 38.7% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 18.7% | 27.8% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 14.2% | 47.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -15.6% | 20.4% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 19.0% | 35.9% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 7.7% | 58.8% | 45.6% |
(1) Based on yearly changes in the value of the Dow plus dividends that would have been received through ownership of the Dow during that year. The table includes all complete years of Partnership activity.
(1) 基于道琼斯指数的年度价值变化，加上当年持有道琼斯指数成分股本应获得的股息来计算。该表格涵盖了合伙公司运营的所有完整年度。
(2) For 1957-61 consists of combined results of all predecessor limited partnerships operating throughout the entire year after all expenses, but before distributions to partners or allocations to the General Partner.
(2) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是所有前身有限合伙公司全年运营的合并业绩，已扣除所有费用，但在向合伙人分配利润或向普通合伙人进行利润划拨之前。
(3) For 1957-61 computed on the basis of the preceding column of Partnership results allowing for allocation to the General Partner based upon the present Partnership Agreement, but before monthly withdrawals by limited partners.
(3) 1957 年至 1961 年的数据是根据前一列合伙公司业绩数据计算得出的，已考虑根据现行合伙协议向普通合伙人的利润划拨，但在有限合伙人每月提款之前。
On a cumulative or compounded basis, the results are:
从累计或复利的角度来看，结果如下：
| Year | Overall Results From Dow | Partnership Results | Limited Partners’ Results |
| 年份 | 道琼斯指数总体涨幅 | 合伙公司业绩涨幅 | 有限合伙人业绩涨幅 |
| 1957 | -8.4% | 10.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 – 58 | 26.9% | 55.6% | 44.5% |
| 1957 – 59 | 52.3% | 95.9% | 74.7% |
| 1957 – 60 | 42.9% | 140.6% | 107.2% |
| 1957 – 61 | 74.9% | 251.0% | 181.6% |
| 1957 – 62 | 61.6% | 299.8% | 215.1% |
| 1957 – 63 | 95.1% | 454.5% | 311.2% |
| 1957 – 64 | 131.3% | 608.7% | 402.9% |
| 1957 – 65 | 164.1% | 943.2% | 588.5% |
| 1957 – 66 | 122.9% | 1156.0% | 704.2% |
| 1957 – 67 | 165.3% | 1606.9% | 932.6% |
| 1957 – 68 | 185.7% | 2610.6% | 1403.5% |
| Annual Compounded Rate（年复合收益率） | 9.1% | 31.6% | 25.3% |
Investment Companies
投资公司
On the following page is the usual tabulation showing the results of what were the two largest mutual funds (they stood at the top in size from 1957 through 1966 - they are still number two and three) that follow a policy of being, typically, 95 -100% invested in common stocks, and the two largest diversified closed-end investment companies.
下一页是常见的列表，展示了两家最大的共同基金（从 1957 年到 1966 年，它们在规模上一直名列前茅，目前仍位居第二和第三）的业绩情况，这些共同基金通常遵循将 95% 至 100% 的资金投资于普通股的策略，此外还展示了两家最大的多元化封闭式投资公司的业绩。
| 年份 (Year) | 大众投资信托 (Mass. Inv. Trust) | 投资者股票 (Investors Stock) | 莱曼 (Lehman) | 三连续 (Tri-Cont) | 道琼斯 (Dow) | 有限合伙人 (Limited Partners) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1957 | -11.4% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 42.7% | 47.5% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 9.0% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 20.0% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -1.0% | -0.6% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.2% | 18.6% |
| 1961 | 25.6% | 24.9% | 23.6% | 22.5% | 22.4% | 35.9% |
| 1962 | -9.8% | -13.4% | -14.4% | -10.0% | -7.6% | 11.9% |
| 1963 | 20.0% | 16.5% | 23.7% | 18.3% | 20.6% | 30.5% |
| 1964 | 15.9% | 14.3% | 13.6% | 12.6% | 18.7% | 22.3% |
| 1965 | 10.2% | 9.8% | 19.0% | 10.7% | 14.2% | 36.9% |
| 1966 | -7.7% | -10.0% | -2.6% | -6.9% | -15.6% | 16.8% |
| 1967 | 20.0% | 22.8% | 28.0% | 25.4% | 19.0% | 28.4% |
| 1968 | 10.3% | 8.1% | 6.7% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 45.6% |
| 累计结果 (Cumulative Results) | 189.3% | 167.7% | 225.6% | 200.2% | 185.7% | 1403.5% |
| 年复合增长率 (Annual Compounded Rate) | 9.3% | 8.6% | 10.3% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 25.3% |
(1) Computed from changes in asset value plus any distributions to holders of record during year.
(1) 根据资产价值的变动情况，加上当年向登记在册的持有人所进行的任何分配来计算。
(2) From 1968 Moody’s Bank & Finance Manual for 1957-1967. Estimated for 1968.
(2) 数据来源于 1968 年《穆迪银行与金融手册》中关于 1957 年至 1967 年的内容。1968 年的数据为估算值。
It is interesting that after twelve years these four funds (which presently aggregate well over $5 billion and account for over 10% of the investment company industry) have averaged only a fraction of one percentage point annually better than the Dow.
有趣的是，十二年后，这四只基金（目前它们的资产总额远超过 50 亿美元，占投资公司行业资产的 10% 以上）的年均表现仅比道琼斯指数高出零点几个百分点。
Some of the so-called “go-go” funds have recently been re-christened “no-go” funds. For example, Gerald Tsai’s Manhattan Fund, perhaps the world’s best-known aggressive investment vehicle, came in at minus 6.9% for 1968. Many smaller investment entities continued to substantially outperform the general market in 1968, but in nothing like the quantities of 1966 and 1967.
一些所谓的 “激进型” 基金最近已被重新 “冠名” 为 “保守型” 基金。例如，蔡至勇（Gerald Tsai）的曼哈顿基金，这可能是世界上最知名的激进型投资工具，在 1968 年的收益率为负 6.9%。1968 年，许多规模较小的投资机构的表现仍大幅优于大盘，但数量远不及 1966 年和 1967 年。
The investment management business, which I used to severely chastise in this section for excessive lethargy, has now swung in many quarters to acute hypertension. One investment manager, representing an organization (with an old established name you would recognize) handling mutual funds aggregating well over $1 billion, said upon launching a new advisory service in 1968:
过去我常在此处严厉批评投资管理行业过于懈怠，而如今，在许多方面，这个行业已走向了过度激进的极端。一位代表着一家机构（拥有一个你肯定熟悉的老牌名称）的投资经理，该机构管理的共同基金总额远超过 10 亿美元，他在 1968 年推出一项新的咨询服务时说道：
1
2
3
“The complexities of national and international economics make money management a full-time job. A good money manager cannot maintain a study of securities on a week-by-week or even a day-by-day basis. Securities must be studied in a minute-by-minute program.”
“国内和国际经济形势错综复杂，这使得资金管理成为一项全职工作。一位优秀的资金管理者无法仅以周为单位，甚至无法以天为单位来研究证券。必须分秒必争地对证券进行研究。”
Wow!
哇哦！
This sort of stuff makes me feel guilty when I go out for a Pepsi. When practiced by large and increasing numbers of highly motivated people with huge amounts of money on a limited quantity of suitable securities, the result becomes highly unpredictable. In some ways it is fascinating to watch and in other ways it is appalling.
当我出去买瓶百事可乐时，听到这种言论都会感到内疚。当大量积极性高涨的人，带着巨额资金，集中投资于数量有限的合适证券时，结果就变得极难预测。从某些方面看，这很有趣；但从另一些方面看，又令人震惊。
Analysis of 1968 Results
1968 年业绩分析
All four main categories of our investment operation worked out well in 1968. Our total overall gain of $40,032,691 was divided as follows:
1968 年，我们投资业务的四大主要类别都取得了不错的成绩。我们总计 40,032,691 美元的总收益来源如下：
| 类别 (Category) | 平均投资 (Average Investment) | 总收益 (Overall Gain) |
|---|---|---|
| 控制公司 (Controls) | $24,996,998 | $5,886,109 |
| 一般 - 私人所有者 (Generals – Private Owner) | $16,363,100 | $21,994,736 |
| 一般 - 相对低估 (Generals – Relatively Undervalued) | $8,766,878 | $4,271,825 |
| 工作重组 (Workouts) | $18,980,602 | $7,317,128 |
| 其他，主要为美国国库券 (Miscellaneous, primarily US Treasury Bills) | $12,744,973 | $839,496 |
| 总收入 (Total Income) | $40,309,294 | |
| 减：总费用，包括利息 (Less – General Expense, including Interest) | $276,603 | |
| 总收益 (Overall Gain) | $40,032,691 |
A few caveats, as mentioned in my letter two years ago, are again in order (non-doctoral candidates may proceed to next section):
正如我两年前在信中提到的，有几点需要说明（非专业人士可以直接看下一部分内容）：
- An explanation of the various categories listed above was made in the January 18, 1965 letter. If your memory needs refreshing and your favorite newsstand does not have the pocketbook edition. We’ll be glad to give you a copy.
- The classifications are not iron clad. Nothing is changed retroactively, but the initial decision as to category is sometimes arbitrary. Sometimes later classification proves difficult; e.g. a workout that falls through but that I continue to hold for reasons unrelated or only partially related to the original decision (like stubbornness).
- Percentage returns calculated on the average investment base by category would be significantly understated relative to Partnership percentage returns which are calculated on a beginning investment base. In the foregoing figures, a security purchased by us at 100 on January 1 which appreciated at an even rate to 200 on December 31 would have an average investment of 150 producing a 66-2/3% result contrasted to a 100% result by the customary approach. In other words, the foregoing figures use a monthly average of market values in calculating the average investment.
- All results are based on a 100% ownership, non-leverage basis. Interest and other general expenses are deducted from total performance and not segregated by category. Expenses directly related to specific investment operations, such as dividends paid on short stock, are deducted by category. When securities are borrowed directly and sold short, the net investment (longs minus shorts) is shown for the applicable category’s average investment.
- The foregoing table has only limited use. The results applicable to each category are dominated by one or two investments. They do not represent a collection of great quantities of stable data (mortality rates of all American males or something of the sort) from which conclusions can be drawn and projections made. Instead, they represent infrequent, non-homogeneous phenomena leading to very tentative suggestions regarding various courses of action and are so used by us.
Finally, these calculations are not made with the same loving care we apply to counting the money and are subject to possible clerical or mathematical error since they are not entirely se1f-checking.
- 上述各类别的解释已在 1965 年 1 月 18 日的信中给出。如果您需要重温相关内容，而您常去的报摊又没有袖珍版的信件，我们很乐意给您提供一份副本。
- 这些分类并非绝对严格。不会对已有的分类进行追溯更改，但最初对于类别的划分有时具有一定的主观性。有时后期的分类会变得困难，例如，一项套利投资失败了，但2由于与最初决策无关或仅部分相关的原因（比如固执），我仍继续持有。
- 按类别以平均投资为基础计算的回报率，与以初始投资为基础计算的合伙公司回报率相比，会被显著低估。在上述例子中，我们在 1 月 1 日以 100 美元购入一只证券，该证券在 12 月 31 日以均匀的速度升值到 200 美元，那么平均投资额为 150 美元，按此计算的回报率为 66 又 2/3%，而按照常规方法计算的回报率则为 100%。换句话说，上述数据是使用市场价值的月平均值来计算平均投资额的。
- 所有业绩结果均基于 100% 所有权、无杠杆的基础。利息和其他一般费用从总业绩中扣除，不按类别进行细分。与特定投资操作直接相关的费用，例如卖空股票所支付的股息，会按类别扣除。当直接借入证券并卖空时，净投资（多头减去空头）会列入相应类别的平均投资中。
- 上述表格的用途有限。每个类别的业绩结果主要由一两项投资决定。它们并不代表大量稳定的数据集合（比如所有美国男性的死亡率之类的数据），从中可以得出结论并进行预测。相反，它们代表的是不常出现、性质各异的现象，只能为我们采取的各种行动提供非常初步的参考，我们也正是这样使用这些数据的。
- 最后，这些计算不像我们数钱时那样精心细致，由于并非完全能够自我检验，所以可能存在文书或计算错误。
Controls
控股投资
Overall, the controlled companies turned in a decent performance during 1968. Diversified Retailing Company Inc. (80% owned) and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (70% owned) had combined after-tax earnings of over $5 million.
总体而言，控股公司在 1968 年表现不错。多元化零售公司（我们持有 80% 的股份）和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（我们持有 70% 的股份）的合并税后收益超过 500 万美元。
Particularly outstanding performances were turned in by Associated Cotton Shops, a subsidiary of DRC run by Ben Rosner, and National Indemnity Company, a subsidiary of B-H run by Jack Ringwalt. Both of these companies earned about 20% on capital employed in their businesses. Among Fortune’s “500” (the largest manufacturing entities in the country, starting with General Motors), only 37 companies achieved this figure in 1967, and our boys outshone such mildly better-known (but not better appreciated) companies as IBM, General Electric, General Motors, Procter & Gamble, DuPont, Control Data, Hewlett-Packard, etc…
特别突出的是联合棉花商店（由本・罗斯纳经营，是多元化零售公司的子公司）和国民赔偿公司（由杰克・林沃尔特经营，是伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的子公司）的业绩。这两家公司在其业务中所投入资本的回报率约为 20%。在《财富》杂志评选的 “500 强” 企业（美国最大的制造企业，通用汽车排名首位）中，1967 年只有 37 家公司达到了这一回报率，而我们的公司比一些稍微更知名（但并非更受赞赏）的公司，如国际商业机器公司（IBM）、通用电气公司（General Electric）、通用汽车公司（General Motors）、宝洁公司（Procter & Gamble）、杜邦公司（DuPont）、控制数据公司（Control Data）、惠普公司（Hewlett-Packard）等表现得更为出色。
I still sometimes get comments from partners like: “Say, Berkshire is up four points - that’s great!” or “What’s happening to us, Berkshire was down three last week?” Market price is irrelevant to us in the valuation of our controlling interests. We valued B-H at 25 at yearend 1967 when the market was about 20 and 31 at yearend 1968 when the market was about 37. We would have done the same thing if the markets had been 15 and 50 respectively. (“Price is what you pay. value is what you get”). We will prosper or suffer in controlled investments in relation to the operating performances of our businesses - we will not attempt to profit by playing various games in the securities markets.
我有时仍会收到合伙人的评论，比如：“嘿，伯克希尔的股价涨了 4 个点 —— 太棒了！” 或者 “我们怎么了，伯克希尔上周股价跌了 3 个点？” 在评估我们的控股权益时，市场价格对我们来说无关紧要。1967 年底，当市场价格约为 20 美元时，我们对伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的估值为 25 美元；1968 年底，当市场价格约为 37 美元时，我们的估值为 31 美元。即使当时的市场价格分别为 15 美元和 50 美元，我们也会做出同样的估值。（“价格是你付出的，价值是你得到的”）。我们在控股投资中的成败将取决于我们所投资企业的经营业绩 —— 我们不会试图通过在证券市场上玩各种把戏来获利。
Generals -Private Owner
一般投资（私人所有者视角）
Over the years this has been our best category, measured by average return, and has also maintained by far the best percentage of profitable transactions. This approach was the way I was taught the business, and it formerly accounted for a large proportion of all our investment ideas. Our total individual profits in this category during the twelve year BPL history are probably fifty times or more our total losses. The cash register really rang on one simple industry idea (implemented in several ways) in this area in 1968. We even received a substantial fee (included in Other Income in the audit) for some work in this field.
多年来，从平均回报率来看，这一直是我们表现最好的投资类别，并且到目前为止，盈利交易的比例也最高。这种投资方式是我进入这个行业所学习的方式，以前在我们所有的投资想法中占很大比例。在巴菲特合伙公司成立的 12 年里，我们在这一类别中的个人总利润可能是总亏损的 50 倍甚至更多。1968 年，在这个领域，一个简单的行业投资想法（以多种方式实施）带来了丰厚的收益。我们甚至因为在这个领域的一些工作而获得了一笔可观的费用（包含在审计报告的其他收入中）。
Our total investment in this category (which is where I feel by far the greatest certainty regarding consistently decent results) is presently under $2 million and I have nothing at all in the hopper to bolster this. What came through like the Johnstown flood in 1968 looks more like a leaky faucet in Altoona for 1969.
我们在这一类别中的总投资额（这是我目前最有把握能持续获得不错收益的领域）目前不到 200 万美元，而且我没有任何新的投资项目来增加这一投资额。1968 年如约翰斯敦洪水般大量涌入的投资机会，在 1969 年看来更像是阿尔图纳的一个漏水水龙头，断断续续。
Generals - Relatively Undervalued
一般投资（相对低估）
This category produced about two-thirds of the overall gain in 1966 and 1967 combined. I mentioned last year that the great two-year performance here had largely come from one idea. I also said, “We have nothing in this group remotely approaching the size or potential which formerly existed in this investment.” It gives me great pleasure to announce that this statement was absolutely correct. It gives me somewhat less pleasure to announce that it must be repeated this year.
这一类别在 1966 年和 1967 年的总收益中占了约三分之二。去年我提到，这两年的出色表现主要来自于一个投资想法。我还说过：“在这一类别中，目前没有任何一项投资的规模或潜力能与之前的这项投资相媲美。” 我很高兴地宣布，这个说法完全正确。但有点不太开心的是，今年我还得重复这句话。
Workouts
套利投资
This category, which was a disaster in 1967, did well during 1968. Our relatively heavy concentration in just a few situations per year (some of the large arbitrage houses may become involved in fifty or more workouts per annum) gives more variation in yearly results than an across-the-board approach. I feel the average profitability will be as good with our policy and 1968 makes me feel better about that conclusion than 1967 did.
这一类别在 1967 年表现糟糕，但在 1968 年表现良好。我们每年相对集中地投资于少数几个项目（一些大型套利公司每年可能会参与 50 个或更多的套利项目），与全面撒网的投资方式相比，这种方式会使年度业绩的波动更大。我认为我们的投资策略能带来不错的平均盈利能力，而且与 1967 年相比，1968 年的情况让我对这一结论更有信心。
It should again be stated that our results in the Workout area (as well as in other categories) are somewhat understated compared to the more common method of determining results computed on an initial base figure and utilizing borrowed money (which is often a sensible part of the Workout business).
应该再次说明的是，与更常见的以初始基数计算并使用借款（这在套利业务中通常是合理的做法）来确定业绩的方法相比，我们在套利投资领域（以及其他类别）的业绩在一定程度上被低估了。
I can’t emphasize too strongly that the quality and quantity of ideas is presently at an all time low - the product of the factors mentioned in my October 9th, 1967 letter, which have largely been intensified since then.
我再怎么强调都不为过，目前投资想法的质量和数量都处于历史最低水平 —— 这是我在 1967 年 10 月 9 日的信中提到的那些因素导致的结果，而且从那以后这些因素在很大程度上进一步加剧了。
Sometimes I feel we should have a plaque in our office like the one at the headquarters of Texas Instruments in Dallas which reads: “We don’t believe in miracles, we rely on them.” It is possible for an old, overweight ball player, whose legs and batting eye are gone, to tag a fast ball on the nose for a pinch-hit home run, but you don’t change your line-up because of it.
有时我觉得我们办公室应该挂一块牌匾，就像达拉斯德州仪器公司总部的那块牌匾一样，上面写着：“我们不相信奇迹，但我们依赖奇迹。” 对于一个年老、超重且腿脚不利索、击球眼光也大不如前的棒球运动员来说，有可能在关键时刻击中快速球并打出一个致胜本垒打，但你不会因为这个就改变你的阵容。
We have a number of important negatives operating on our future and, while they shouldn’t add up to futility, they certainly don’t add up to more than an average of quite moderate profitability.
我们未来面临着许多重大的不利因素，虽然这些因素不至于让我们一事无成，但它们肯定也不会带来超过平均水平的适度盈利能力。
Memorabilia
大事记
As one of my older friends says, “Nostalgia just isn’t what it used to be.” Let’s take a stab at it, anyway.
就像我的一位老朋友说的：“怀旧已不复当年模样。” 不管怎样，我们还是来回顾一下吧。
Buffett Associates, Ltd., the initial predecessor partnership, was formed May 5, 1956 with seven limited partners (four family, three close friends), contributing $105,000, and the General Partner putting his money where his mouth was by investing $100. Two additional single-family limited partnerships were formed during 1956, so that on January 1, 1957 combined net assets were $303,726. During 1957, we had a gain of $31,615.97, leading to the 10.4% figure shown on page one. During 1968 I would guess that the New York Stock Exchange was open around 1,200 hours, giving us a gain of about $33,000 per hour (sort of makes you wish they had stayed with the 5-1/2 hour, 5 day week, doesn’t it), or roughly the same as the full year gain in 1957.
巴菲特联合有限公司，作为最初的前身合伙企业，成立于 1956 年 5 月 5 日，有七位有限合伙人（四位是家人，三位是亲密朋友），出资 105,000 美元，普通合伙人则以实际行动证明了自己的决心，投资了 100 美元。1956 年又成立了另外两家单户有限合伙企业，所以到 1957 年 1 月 1 日，合并净资产为 303,726 美元。1957 年，我们获得了 31,615.97 美元的收益，也就是第一页所显示的 10.4% 的回报率。我猜测 1968 年纽约证券交易所大约开市 1200 个小时，这意味着我们每小时的收益约为 33,000 美元（这多少会让你希望他们还保持着每周五天、每天 5 个半小时的开市时间，不是吗），大致相当于 1957 年全年的收益。
On January 1, 1962 we consolidated the predecessor limited partnerships moved out of the bedroom and hired our first full-time employees. Net assets at that time were $7,178,500. From that point to our present net assets of $104,429,431 we have added one person to the payroll. Since 1963 (Assets $9,405,400) rent has gone from $3,947 to $5,823 (Ben Rosner would never have forgiven me if I had signed a percentage lease) travel from $3,206 to $3,603, and dues and subscriptions from $900 to $994. If one of Parkinson’s Laws is operating, at least the situation hasn’t gotten completely out of control.
1962 年 1 月 1 日，我们合并了之前的有限合伙企业，从卧室搬了出来，并雇佣了我们的第一位全职员工。当时的净资产为 7,178,500 美元。从那时到现在，我们的净资产达到了 104,429,431 美元，员工人数只增加了一人。自 1963 年（净资产 9,405,400 美元）以来，租金从 3,947 美元涨到了 5,823 美元（如果我签了按比例收费的租约，本・罗斯纳绝对不会原谅我），差旅费从 3,206 美元涨到了 3,603 美元，会费和订阅费从 900 美元涨到了 994 美元。如果帕金森定律（注：机构人员会不断膨胀等现象）在起作用，至少情况还没有完全失控。
In making our retrospective survey of our financial assets, our conclusion need not parallel that of Gypsy Rose Lee who opined, when reviewing her physical assets on her fifty-fifth birthday: “I have everything I had twenty years ago - it’s just that it’s all lower.”
在回顾我们的金融资产时，我们得出的结论不必和吉卜赛・罗斯・李（Gypsy Rose Lee）的一样。她在 55 岁生日回顾自己的身体状况时曾说：“我拥有 20 年前拥有的一切 —— 只是所有东西都下垂了。”
Miscellaneous
杂项
Although the investment environment is difficult, the office environment is superb. With Donna, Gladys, Bill and John, we have an organization that functions speedily, efficiently and pleasantly. They are the best.
尽管投资环境艰难，但我们的办公环境却非常棒。有唐娜（Donna）、格拉迪斯（Gladys）、比尔（Bill）和约翰（John），我们这个团队工作迅速、高效且氛围愉快。他们是最棒的。
The office group, along with spouses (one apiece - I still haven’t figured out how I should handle that plural) and children have over $27 million invested in BPL on January 1, 1969. Assorted sizes and shapes of aunts, uncles, parents, in-laws, brothers, sisters and cousins make the BPL membership list read like “Our Crowd” - which, so far as I am concerned, is exactly what it is.
截至 1969 年 1 月 1 日，办公室团队成员及其配偶（每人一位 —— 我还没想明白复数形式该怎么处理）和子女在巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的投资额超过了 2700 万美元。各种身份的阿姨、叔叔、父母、姻亲、兄弟姐妹和表亲等，让巴菲特合伙公司的成员名单读起来就像《我们这一伙》（注：一部描绘一群孩子生活的作品）—— 在我看来，事实也确实如此。
Within a few days, you will receive:
在几天之内，您将收到：
- A tax letter giving you all BPL information needed for your 1968 federal income tax return. This letter is the only item that counts for tax purposes.
- An audit from Peat Marwick. Mitchell & Co. (they have again done an excellent job) for 1968, setting forth the operations and financial position of BPL, as well as your own capital account.
A letter signed by me setting forth the status of your BPL interest on January 1, 1969. This is identical with the figures developed in the audit.
- 一封税务信函，其中包含您填写 1968 年联邦所得税申报表所需的所有巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的信息。就税务目的而言，这封信函是唯一重要的文件。
- 毕马威会计师事务所（Peat Marwick. Mitchell & Co.）出具的 1968 年审计报告（他们再次出色地完成了工作），其中阐述了巴菲特合伙公司的运营情况和财务状况，以及您个人的资本账户情况。
- 一封由我签署的信函，说明了截至 1969 年 1 月 1 日您在巴菲特合伙公司的权益状况。这与审计报告中的数据一致。
Let me know if anything in this letter or that occurs during the year needs clarifying. My next letter will be about July 10th, summarizing the first half of this year.
如果这封信中的任何内容或今年内出现的任何情况需要进一步说明，请告知我。我的下一封信大约会在 7 月 10 日发出，对今年上半年的情况进行总结。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
1969 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
May 29th, 1969
1969 年 5 月 29 日
To My Partners:
致我们的合伙人：
About eighteen months ago I wrote to you regarding changed environmental and personal factors causing me to modify our future performance objectives.
大约十八个月前，我曾致信于您，谈及因环境和个人因素的变化，我将调整我们未来的业绩目标。
The investing environment I discussed at that time (and on which I have commented in various other letters has generally become more negative and frustrating as time has passed. Maybe I am merely suffering from a lack of mental flexibility. (One observer commenting on security analysts over forty stated: “They know too many things that are no longer true.”)
我当时所讨论的投资环境（并且在其他信件中也有过相关评论），随着时间的推移，总体上变得更加不利和令人沮丧。也许我只是缺乏思维的灵活性。（有一位观察家在评价四十岁以上的证券分析师时说：“他们知道太多已经不再正确的东西。”）
However, it seems to me that: (1) opportunities for investment that are open to the analyst who stresses quantitative factors have virtually disappeared, after rather steadily drying up over the past twenty years; (2) our $100 million of assets further eliminates a large portion of this seemingly barren investment world, since commitments of less than about $3 million cannot have a real impact on our overall performance, and this virtually rules out companies with less than about $100 million of common stock at market value; and (3) a swelling interest in investment performance has created an increasingly short-term oriented and (in my opinion) more speculative market.
然而，在我看来：（1）对于注重定量分析的分析师而言，投资机会几乎已经消失，在过去二十年里，这些机会逐渐减少；（2）我们拥有的一亿美元资产，进一步限制了我们在这个看似贫瘠的投资领域的选择，因为低于约三百万美元的投资对我们的整体业绩不会产生实质性影响，这实际上排除了市值低于约一亿美元普通股的公司；（3）人们对投资业绩的关注度不断增加，导致市场越来越短视，而且（在我看来）投机性更强。
The October 9th, 1967 letter stated that personal considerations were the most important factor among those causing me to modify our objectives. I expressed a desire to be relieved of the (self-imposed) necessity of focusing 100% on BPL. I have flunked this test completely during the last eighteen months. The letter said: I hope limited objectives will make for more limited effort. It hasn’t worked out that way. As long as I am “on stage”, publishing a regular record and assuming responsibility for management of what amounts to virtually 100% of the net worth of many partners, I will never be able to put sustained effort into any non-BPL activity. If I am going to participate publicly. I can’t help being competitive. I know I don’t want to be totally occupied with out-pacing an investment rabbit all my life. The only way to slow down is to stop.
1967 年 10 月 9 日的信中提到，个人因素是促使我调整目标的最重要因素。我表达了希望摆脱（自我强加的）将全部精力 100% 投入到巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）的必要性。在过去的十八个月里，我完全没有通过这个考验。那封信中说：“我希望有限的目标能让我付出相对较少的努力。” 但事实并非如此。只要我还 “在舞台上”，定期公布业绩记录，并对许多合伙人几乎 100% 的净资产负责管理，我就永远无法持续地将精力投入到任何非巴菲特合伙公司的活动中。如果我要公开参与其中，我就无法抑制自己的竞争意识。我知道我不想一辈子都在努力超越投资领域的各种挑战。唯一能让我慢下来的方法就是停下来。
Therefore, before yearend. I intend to give all limited partners the required formal notice of my intention to retire. There are, of course, a number of tax and legal problems in connection with liquidating the Partnership, but overall, I am concerned with working out a plan that attains the following objectives:
因此，在年底之前，我打算向所有有限合伙人正式发出我打算退休的通知。当然，清算合伙公司会涉及到一些税务和法律问题，但总体而言，我关注的是制定一个能实现以下目标的计划：
- The most important item is that I have an alternative regarding money management to suggest to the many partners who do not want to handle this themselves. Some partners of course, have alternatives of their own in which they have confidence and find quite acceptable. To the others, however, I will not hand over their money with a “good luck”. I intend to suggest an alternative money manager to whom I will entrust funds of my relatives and others for whom I have lifetime financial responsibility. This manager has integrity and ability and will probably perform as well or better than I would in the future (although nowhere close to what he or I have achieved in the past). He will be available to any partner, so that no minimum size for accounts will cause any of you a problem. I intend, in the future, to keep in general touch with what he is doing, but only on an infrequent basis with any advice on my part largely limited to a negative type.
- 最重要的一点是，对于许多不想自己管理资金的合伙人，我能提供一个资金管理的替代方案。当然，有些合伙人自己有他们信任且认为可以接受的选择。但对于其他合伙人，我不会只说一句 “祝你好运” 就把他们的钱交出去。我打算推荐一位资金管理人，我会把我亲戚的资金以及那些我负有终身财务责任的人的资金交给他管理。这位管理人正直且有能力，未来他的表现可能和我一样好，甚至更好（尽管远不及他或我过去取得的成绩）。他会为任何一位合伙人服务，所以账户金额没有最低限制，不会给你们任何人带来问题。未来，我打算大致了解他的工作情况，但不会频繁过问，而且我的建议也大多是负面的。
- I want all partners to have the option of receiving cash and possibly readily marketable securities (there will probably be only one where this will apply) where I like both the prospects and price but which partners will be able to freely convert to cash if they wish.
- 我希望所有合伙人都可以选择接收现金，或者可能是易于变现的证券（可能只有一种证券符合这种情况），我看好这种证券的前景和价格，而且如果合伙人愿意，他们可以自由地将其转换为现金。
- However, I also want all partners to have the option of maintaining their proportional interests in our two controlled companies (Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc.) and one other small “restricted” holding. Because these securities will be valued unilaterally by me at fair value, I feel it is essential that, if you wish, you can maintain your proportionate interest at such valuation.
- 不过，我也希望所有合伙人可以选择保留他们在我们两家控股公司（多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司）以及另一项小型 “受限” 投资中的权益比例。由于这些证券将由我按照公允价值单方面估值，我认为如果您愿意，能够按照该估值保留您的权益比例是非常重要的。
However, these securities are not freely marketable (various SEC restrictions apply to “control” stock and non-registered stock) and they will probably be both non-transferable and non-income -producing for a considerable period of time. Therefore, I want you to be able to go either way in our liquidation - either stick with the restricted securities or take cash equivalent. I strongly like all of the people running our controlled businesses (joined now by the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, a $100 million plus, extremely well-run bank, purchased by Berkshire Hathaway earlier this year), and want the relationship to be life long. I certainly have no desire to sell a good controlled business run by people I like and admire, merely to obtain a fancy price. However, specific conditions may cause the sale of one operating unit at some point.
然而，这些证券不能自由交易（美国证券交易委员会对 “控制股” 和未注册股票有各种限制），而且在相当长的一段时间内，它们可能既无法转让，也不会产生收益。因此，在清算过程中，我希望您可以有两种选择 —— 要么持有这些受限证券，要么选择现金等价物。我非常欣赏经营我们控股企业的所有人（现在还包括伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司，这是一家资产超过一亿美元、经营非常出色的银行，今年早些时候被伯克希尔・哈撒韦收购），并且希望这种合作关系能够持续一生。我当然不想仅仅为了获得一个诱人的价格，就卖掉一家由我喜欢和钦佩的人经营的优秀控股企业。但是，特定的情况可能会在某个时候导致出售其中一个经营部门。
I believe we will have a liquidation program which will accomplish the above objectives. Our activities in this regard should cause no change in your tax planning for 1969.
我相信我们会制定一个清算计划来实现上述目标。我们在这方面的行动不会改变您 1969 年的税务规划。
One final objective, I would like very much to achieve (but which just isn’t going to happen) is to go out with a bang. I hate to end with a poor year, but we are going to have one in 1969. My best guess is that at yearend, allowing for a substantial increase in value of controlled companies (against which all partners except me will have the option of taking cash), we will show a breakeven result for 1969 before any monthly payments to partners. This will be true even if the market should advance substantially between now and yearend, since we will not be in any important position which will expose us to much upside potential.
我非常希望实现的最后一个目标（但这不会发生）是以辉煌的业绩结束。我不想以糟糕的一年收尾，但 1969 年我们将会面临这样的一年。我最好的猜测是，到年底时，考虑到控股公司的价值大幅增长（除了我之外，所有合伙人都可以选择接收现金），在向合伙人进行每月支付之前，我们在 1969 年的业绩将勉强持平。即使从现在到年底市场大幅上涨，情况也会如此，因为我们不会处于任何重要的投资位置，无法从市场上涨中获得太多收益。
Our experience in workouts this year has been atrocious - during this period I have felt like the bird that inadvertently flew into the middle of a badminton game. We are not alone in such experience, but it came at a time when we were toward the upper limit of what has been our historical range of percentage commitment in this category.
今年我们在套利投资方面的经历非常糟糕 —— 在此期间，我感觉自己就像一只不小心飞进羽毛球比赛场地的鸟。并非只有我们有这样的经历，但糟糕的是，此时我们在这一投资类别中的投资比例已接近历史最高水平。
Documenting one’s boners is unpleasant business. I find “selective reporting” even more distasteful. Our poor experience this year is 100% my fault. It did not reflect bad luck, but rather an improper assessment of a very fast-developing governmental trend. Paradoxically, I have long believed the government should have been doing (in terms of the problem attacked – not necessarily the means utilized) what it finally did - in other words, on an overall basis, I believe the general goal of the activity which has cost us substantial money is socially desirable and have so preached for some time. Nevertheless, I didn’t think it would happen. I never believe in mixing what I think should happen (socially) with what I think will happen in making decisions - in this case, we would be some millions better off if I had.
记录自己的错误是一件不愉快的事情。我觉得 “选择性报告” 更令人厌恶。今年的糟糕经历完全是我的错。这并非因为运气不好，而是因为我对快速发展的政府政策趋势做出了错误的评估。矛盾的是，长期以来我一直认为政府应该采取（就所针对的问题而言 —— 不一定是所采用的手段）它最终采取的行动 —— 换句话说，总体而言，我认为导致我们损失大量资金的这项政策的总体目标从社会角度来看是可取的，并且我也宣扬这一观点有一段时间了。然而，我没想到它会发生。在做决策时，我从不认为应该把我认为（从社会角度）应该发生的事情和我认为将会发生的事情混为一谈 —— 在这件事情上，如果我考虑了后者，我们可能会多赚几百万美元。
Quite frankly, in spite of any factors set forth on the earlier pages. I would continue to operate the Partnership in 1970, or even 1971, if I had some really first class ideas. Not because I want to, but simply because I would so much rather end with a good year than a poor one. However. I just don’t see anything available that gives any reasonable hope of delivering such a good year and I have no desire to grope around, hoping to “get lucky” with other people’s money. I am not attuned to this market environment and I don’t want to spoil a decent record by trying to play a game I don’t understand just so I can go out a hero.
坦率地说，尽管前面提到了各种因素，如果我有一些真正一流的投资想法，我会在 1970 年，甚至 1971 年继续经营合伙公司。不是因为我想这么做，只是因为我非常希望以良好的业绩结束，而不是以糟糕的业绩收场。然而，我确实看不到任何能够带来良好业绩的希望，我也不想四处摸索，寄希望于用别人的钱 “碰运气”。我不适应现在的市场环境，我也不想为了成为英雄而尝试参与一个我不理解的游戏，从而破坏我还算不错的业绩记录。
Therefore, we will be liquidating holdings throughout the year, working toward a residual of the controlled companies, the one “investment letter” security, the one marketable security with favorable long-term prospects, and the miscellaneous “stubs”, etc. of small total value which will take several years to clean up in the Workout category.
因此，我们将在全年逐步清算资产，最终保留控股公司、一项 “投资信函” 证券、一项具有良好长期前景的可交易证券，以及一些总价值较小的 “残余” 资产等，套利投资类别的这些残余资产可能需要几年时间才能清理完毕。
I have written this letter a little early in lieu of the mid-year letter. Once I made a decision, I wanted you to know. I also wanted to be available in Omaha for a period after you received this letter to clear up anything that may be confusing in it. In July, I expect to be in California.
我提前写了这封信，以代替年中的信件。一旦我做出了决定，我就希望您能知道。我也希望在您收到这封信后的一段时间内，我能在奥马哈为您解答信中可能存在的任何疑问。七月份，我预计会在加利福尼亚。
Some of you are going to ask, “What do you plan to do?” I don’t have an answer to that question. I do know that when I am 60, I should be attempting to achieve different personal goals than those which had priority at age 20. Therefore, unless I now divorce myself from the activity that has consumed virtually all of my time and energies during the first eighteen years of my adult life, I am unlikely to develop activities that will be appropriate to new circumstances in subsequent years.
你们中的一些人会问：“你打算做什么？” 我无法回答这个问题。我知道，当我六十岁的时候，我应该追求与二十岁时不同的个人目标。因此，除非我现在摆脱几乎占据了我成年后前十八年所有时间和精力的工作，否则我不太可能在未来几年发展出适合新情况的活动。
We will have a letter out in the Fall, probably October, elaborating on the liquidation procedure, the investment advisor suggestion, etc…
我们将在秋季，可能是十月份，发出一封信，详细说明清算程序、投资顾问的建议等内容。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
1969 年信件（三）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
October 9th, 1969
1969 年 10 月 9 日
To My Partners:
致我们的合伙人：
Here is my present estimate of the BPL calendar for the months to come:
以下是我目前对巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）未来几个月日程安排的预估：
(1) This letter - to tell you something of Bill Ruane, the money manager within my knowledge who ranks the highest when combining the factors of integrity, ability and continued availability to all partners. I also want to comment upon the present range of expectations involved in deciding on a bond-stock mix.
（1）这封信 —— 向你介绍比尔・鲁安（Bill Ruane）的一些情况。在我认识的资金管理人中，综合考虑诚信、能力以及对所有合伙人的持续服务意愿等因素，他是最优秀的。我还想谈谈目前在决定债券与股票的投资组合比例时所涉及的预期范围。
(2) Late November - the required thirty days formal notice of my intent to retire from the Partnership at the end of the year.
（2）11 月下旬 —— 我将按规定发出为期 30 天的正式通知，表明我打算在年底从合伙公司退休。
(3) Early December - a package of publicly available material, as well as some general comments by me relating to our controlled companies. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (owning the textile business, Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois, National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company and Sun Newspapers) and Diversified Retailing Company (owning Hochschild, Kohn & Co. and Associated Cotton Shops). I want you to have ample time to study the material relating to such companies before you make any decision to hold, sell or buy such securities after distribution to you in early January. I will solicit written questions from partners (I don’t want to talk to you individually about such companies, as I want all partners to obtain exactly the same information) and then have a further mailing late in December, giving all questions received relating to these companies along with my answers, if possible. I still anticipate having a plan enabling partners to promptly convert such controlled company holdings to cash, if they wish.
（3）12 月初 —— 会提供一套公开可得的资料，以及我对我们控股公司的一些一般性评论。这些公司包括伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司（拥有纺织业务、伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司、国民赔偿公司、国民火灾及海上保险公司以及太阳报系）和多元化零售公司（拥有霍赫希尔德・科恩公司和联合棉花商店）。我希望在你于 1 月初收到这些证券并决定持有、出售或购买之前，你有充足的时间研究与这些公司相关的资料。我会向合伙人征集书面问题（我不想单独与你谈论这些公司，因为我希望所有合伙人都能获得完全相同的信息），然后在 12 月下旬再次邮寄信件，尽可能给出收到的所有与这些公司相关问题的答案。我仍预计会制定一个计划，使合伙人如果愿意，能够迅速将持有的控股公司证券转换为现金。
(4) About January 5th - (a) a cash distribution amounting to at least 56% (probably more - depending upon what percentage of our remaining holdings are sold before yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital, less any distributions (the regular monthly payments many of you receive) or borrowings by you during 1969, (b) your proportional share of our holdings in Diversified Retailing Company Inc. and Berkshire Hathaway Inc. I which, if you dispose of them, will bring 30% - 35% (my estimate of value will be made at yearend) of your January 1, 1969 capital.
（4）大约 1 月 5 日 ——（a）现金分配至少达到你 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 56%（可能会更多 —— 取决于年底前我们出售剩余资产的比例），扣除你在 1969 年期间的任何分配（你们中许多人每月收到的定期付款）或借款；（b）你在多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司中按比例持有的股份。如果你处置这些股份，将获得相当于你 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 30% - 35%（我对其价值的评估将在年底进行）。
We may make substantial additional sales before yearend - if so, the early January cash distribution will be somewhat larger than the 56% mentioned above. If we don’t, such sales will be made during the first half of 1970 and an interim distribution made. Residual assets will be sold at appropriate times and I believe not more than 10% of our present asset value will remain after June 30th, 1970 pending a final distribution when all assets and liabilities have been cleaned up.
我们可能会在年底前进行大量额外的资产出售 —— 如果是这样，1 月初的现金分配将比上述的 56% 略多。如果没有，这些资产将在 1970 年上半年出售，并进行中期分配。剩余资产将在适当的时候出售，我认为在 1970 年 6 月 30 日之后，在清理完所有资产和负债并进行最终分配之前，剩余资产的价值将不超过我们目前资产价值的 10%。
Unless there is a further substantial decline in the market. I still expect about a breakeven performance before any monthly payments for 1969. We were lucky - if we had not been in liquidation this year, our results would have been significantly worse. Ideas that looked potentially interesting on a “continuing” basis have on balance performed poorly to date. We have only two items of real size left - one we are selling as I write this and the other is a holding of limited marketability representing about 7-1/2% of the outstanding stock of Blue Chip Stamps which we may sell via a registered public offering around yearend, depending upon market conditions and other factors.
除非市场进一步大幅下跌，否则我仍预计在进行任何月度支付之前，1969 年的业绩大致持平。我们很幸运 —— 如果今年我们没有进行清算，我们的业绩会明显更差。从 “持续经营” 的角度看，那些原本看起来有潜在吸引力的投资想法，到目前为止总体表现不佳。我们只剩下两项规模较大的资产 —— 一项我在写这封信时正在出售，另一项是持有蓝 Chip Stamps 公司约 7.5% 已发行股份的限售股，根据市场情况和其他因素，我们可能会在年底左右通过注册公开发行的方式出售。
(5) March 1st. 1970 - John Harding expects to leave Buffett Partnership. Ltd. and open a branch office in Omaha for Ruane, Cunniff & Stires. Bill Scott and I will be available at BPL offices to help any partners who are desirous of purchasing bonds, tax-free or taxable. We will set aside the month of March to make our services available without cost to those who want to acquire bonds. Because of some experience we have in analysis and purchasing, as well as the access we have to wholesale markets. I think it is likely we can save material elements of cost as well as help select better relative values for those of you who wish to invest in bonds. After April 1st, however, we want to be out of any form of personal advisory activity.
（5）1970 年 3 月 1 日 —— 约翰・哈丁（John Harding）预计将离开巴菲特合伙公司，并在奥马哈为鲁安、坎尼夫及斯蒂尔斯公司（Ruane, Cunniff & Stires）开设一家分公司。比尔・斯科特（Bill Scott）和我将在巴菲特合伙公司的办公室，为任何希望购买免税或应税债券的合伙人提供帮助。我们将留出 3 月份的时间，为那些希望购买债券的人免费提供服务。由于我们在债券分析和购买方面有一些经验，并且能够进入批发市场，我认为我们有可能为你们节省大量成本，同时帮助你们选择相对更有价值的债券。不过，4 月 1 日之后，我们希望不再参与任何形式的个人咨询活动。
(6) After March, 1970 - Bill and I will continue to office in Kiewit Plaza, spending a very minor portion of our time completing the wind-up of BPL. This will mean filing tax returns for 1970 and probably 1971 resolving minor assets and liabilities etc.
（6）1970 年 3 月之后 —— 比尔和我将继续在基威特广场（Kiewit Plaza）的办公室办公，花费很少的时间来完成巴菲特合伙公司的收尾工作。这将包括提交 1970 年甚至可能是 1971 年的纳税申报表，以及处理一些小额资产和负债等事宜。
Now, to Bill Ruane - we met in Ben Graham’s class at Columbia University in 1951 and I have had considerable opportunity to observe his qualities of character, temperament and intellect since that time. If Susie and I were to die while our children are minors, he is one of three trustees who have carte blanche on investment matters - the other two are not available for continuous investment management for all partners, large or small.
现在，谈谈比尔・鲁安 ——1951 年我们在哥伦比亚大学本・格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）的课堂上相识，从那时起，我有很多机会观察他的品格、性情和才智。如果苏西（Susie）和我在孩子还未成年时离世，他是三位在投资事务上拥有全权委托的受托人之一 —— 另外两位无法为所有大小合伙人持续进行投资管理。
There is no way to eliminate the possibility of error when judging humans particularly in regard to future behavior in an unknown environment. However, decisions have to be made - whether actively or passively - and I consider Bill to be an exceptionally high probability decision on character and a high probability one on investment performance. I also consider it likely that Bill will continue as a money manager for many years to come.
在评判一个人时，尤其是预测他在未知环境中的未来行为时，无法完全排除犯错的可能性。然而，无论主动还是被动，都必须做出决定 —— 我认为，从品格方面来看，选择比尔是一个非常可靠的决定，从投资业绩方面来看，也是一个很有可能成功的决定。我还认为，比尔很可能在未来许多年继续担任资金管理人。
Bill has recently formed a New York Stock Exchange firm, Ruane, Cunniff & Stires, Inc., 85 Broad Street, New York, N.Y. 10004, telephone number (212) 344-6700. John Harding presently plans to establish an office for the firm in Omaha about March 1st, 1970. Bill manages accounts individually on a fee basis and also executes brokerage for the accounts - presently with some portion of the brokerage commissions used to offset a portion of the investment advisory fee. His method of operation allows monthly withdrawals on a basis similar to BPL -as a percentage of capital and unrelated to realized or unrealized gain or loss. It is possible he may form some sort of pooled account but such determinations will be made between him and those of you who elect to go with him. I, of course, will not be involved with his operation. I am making my list of partners available to him and he will be writing you fairly soon regarding a trip he plans to make before yearend to Omaha, Los Angeles and Chicago, so that those of you who wish to meet him may do so. Any of you who are going to be in New York during the next few months can contact him directly.
比尔最近成立了一家纽约证券交易所会员公司，即鲁安、坎尼夫及斯蒂尔斯公司，地址是纽约市百老汇大街 85 号，邮编 10004，电话号码是（212）344-6700。约翰・哈丁目前计划在 1970 年 3 月 1 日左右为该公司在奥马哈设立一个办公室。比尔按费用标准单独管理账户，同时也为这些账户执行经纪业务 —— 目前部分经纪佣金用于抵消部分投资咨询费用。他的运营方式允许每月按类似于巴菲特合伙公司的方式提款 —— 按资本的一定比例，且与已实现或未实现的盈亏无关。他可能会成立某种集合账户，但这些决定将由他和选择跟随他的你们共同做出。当然，我不会参与他的运营。我会把合伙人名单提供给他，他很快会给你们写信，告知他计划在年底前前往奥马哈、洛杉矶和芝加哥的行程安排，以便你们中希望与他见面的人能够如愿。在接下来的几个月里，你们中如果有人在纽约，可以直接联系他。
Bill’s overall record has been very good-averaging fairly close to BPL’s, but with considerably greater variation. From 1956-1961 and from 1964-1968, a composite of his individual accounts averaged over 40% per annum. However, in 1962, undoubtedly somewhat as a product of the euphoric experience of the earlier years, he was down about 50%. As he re-oriented his thinking, 1963 was about breakeven.
比尔的整体业绩非常出色 —— 平均水平与巴菲特合伙公司相当接近，但波动幅度要大得多。从 1956 年到 1961 年以及从 1964 年到 1968 年，他管理的个人账户组合平均每年回报率超过 40%。然而，1962 年，无疑部分是因为前几年的成功带来的过度乐观，他的账户亏损了约 50%。随着他调整思路，1963 年的业绩大致持平。
While two years may sound like a short time when included in a table of performance, it may feel like a long time when your net worth is down 50%. I think you run this sort of short-term risk with virtually any money manager operating in stocks and it is a factor to consider in deciding the portion of your capital to commit to equities. To date in 1969, Bill is down about 15%, which I believe to be fairly typical of most money managers. Bill, of course, has not been in control situations or workouts, which have usually tended to moderate the swings in BPL year-to-year performance. Even excluding these factors, I believe his performance would have been somewhat more volatile (but not necessarily poorer by any means) than mine - his style is different, and while his typical portfolio (under most conditions) would tend to have a mild overlap with mine, there would always be very significant differences.
虽然从业绩表上看，两年时间可能很短，但当你的净资产下跌 50% 时，这两年可能会感觉很漫长。我认为，几乎任何一位投资股票的资金管理人都存在这种短期风险，这也是你在决定投入股票的资金比例时需要考虑的一个因素。截至 1969 年，比尔的业绩下跌了约 15%，我认为这与大多数资金管理人的情况相当典型。当然，比尔没有参与控股投资或套利投资，而这些投资通常有助于缓冲巴菲特合伙公司年度业绩的波动。即使排除这些因素，我认为他的业绩波动幅度可能会比我的更大（但不一定更差）—— 他的投资风格不同，虽然在大多数情况下，他的典型投资组合与我的会有一定程度的重叠，但也会存在非常显著的差异。
Bill has achieved his results working with an average of $5 to $10 million. I consider the three most likely negative factors in his future to be: (1) the probability of managing significantly larger sums - this is a problem you are going to have rather quickly with any successful money manager, and it will tend to moderate performance; I believe Bill’s firm is now managing $20 -$30 million and, of course, they will continue to add accounts; (2) the possibility of Bill’s becoming too involved in the detail of his operation rather than spending all of his time simply thinking about money management. The problems of being the principal factor in a NYSE firm as well as handling many individual accounts can mean that he, like most investment advisors, will be subject to pressures to spend much of his time in activities that do nothing to lead to superior investment performance. In this connection, I have asked Bill to make his services available to all BPL partners - large or small and he will, but I have also told him he is completely a free agent if he finds particular clients diverting him from his main job; (3) the high probability that even excellent investment management during the next decade will only produce limited advantages over passive management. I will comment on this below.
比尔在平均管理 500 万到 1000 万美元资金的情况下取得了这样的业绩。我认为他未来可能面临的三个最主要的不利因素是：（1）管理规模大幅增加的可能性 —— 对于任何一位成功的资金管理人来说，你很快就会遇到这个问题，而且这可能会导致业绩下滑；我认为比尔的公司目前管理着 2000 万到 3000 万美元的资金，而且他们当然会继续增加账户数量；（2）比尔可能过于陷入运营细节，而没有把所有时间都用于思考资金管理。作为纽约证券交易所会员公司的主要负责人，同时还要管理众多个人账户，这可能意味着他和大多数投资顾问一样，会面临压力，不得不把大量时间花在那些对提升投资业绩没有帮助的活动上。在这方面，我请比尔为所有巴菲特合伙公司的合伙人（无论资金规模大小）提供服务，他也会这么做，但我也告诉他，如果他发现某些客户分散了他的主要精力，他完全可以自由决定不再为这些客户服务；（3）即使是优秀的投资管理，在未来十年也很可能只能比被动投资管理带来有限的优势。我将在下面对此进行评论。
The final point regarding the negatives listed above is that they are not the sort of drawbacks leading to horrible performance, but more likely the sort of things that lead to average performance. I think this is the main risk you run with Bill - and average performance is just not that terrible a risk.
关于上述不利因素的最后一点是，它们并非会导致糟糕业绩的缺陷，而更可能是导致平均业绩的因素。我认为这是选择比尔时你面临的主要风险 —— 而平均业绩并不是一个非常可怕的风险。
In recommending Bill, I am engaging in the sort of activity I have tried to avoid in BPL portfolio activities - a decision where there is nothing to gain (personally) and considerable to lose. Some of my friends who are not in the Partnership have suggested that I make no recommendation since, if results were excellent it would do me no good and, if something went wrong, I might well get a portion of the blame. If you and I had just had a normal commercial relationship, such reasoning might be sound. However, the degree of trust partners have extended to me and the cooperation manifested in various ways precludes such a “hands off” policy. Many of you are professional investors or close thereto and need no advice from me on managers - you may well do better yourself. For those partners who are financially inexperienced. I feel it would be totally unfair for me to assume a passive position and deliver you to the most persuasive salesman who happened to contact you early in 1970.
推荐比尔，我正在进行一种我在巴菲特合伙公司的投资组合活动中一直试图避免的行为 —— 这是一个没有（个人）收益，却可能损失惨重的决定。我的一些非合伙公司成员的朋友建议我不要做任何推荐，因为如果业绩出色，对我没有好处；如果出了问题，我很可能会受到部分指责。如果你和我只是普通的商业关系，这种说法可能有道理。然而，合伙人给予我的信任程度以及以各种方式表现出来的合作精神，使我不能采取这种 “袖手旁观” 的政策。你们中的许多人是专业投资者或接近专业水平，不需要我在资金管理人方面给你们建议 —— 你们自己可能做得更好。对于那些缺乏财务经验的合伙人，我觉得如果我采取被动的态度，把你们交给在 1970 年初碰巧联系到你们的最有说服力的推销员，那是完全不公平的。
Finally, a word about expectations. A decade or so ago was quite willing to set a target of ten percentage points per annum better than the Dow, with the expectation that the Dow would average about 7%. This meant an expectancy for us of around 17%, with wide variations and no guarantees, of course - but, nevertheless, an expectancy. Tax-free bonds at the time yielded about 3%. While stocks had the disadvantage of irregular performance, overall they seemed much the more desirable option. I also stressed this preference for stocks in teaching classes, participating in panel discussions, etc…
最后，谈谈预期。大约十年前，我很愿意设定一个每年比道琼斯指数高出 10 个百分点的目标，当时预计道琼斯指数的平均涨幅约为 7%。这意味着我们的预期回报率约为 17%，当然会有很大的波动且没有任何保证 —— 但这就是我们的预期。当时免税债券的收益率约为 3%。虽然股票的业绩不稳定，但总体而言，它们似乎是更可取的投资选择。我在授课、参与小组讨论等活动中也强调了对股票的这种偏好。
For the first time in my investment lifetime. I now believe there is little choice for the average investor between professionally managed money in stocks and passive investment in bonds. If correct. this view has important implications. Let me briefly (and in somewhat oversimplified form) set out the situation as I see it:
在我的投资生涯中，我第一次认为，对于普通投资者来说，在专业管理的股票投资和被动的债券投资之间几乎没有什么区别。如果这个观点是正确的，那么它具有重要的意义。让我简要地（并在一定程度上简化）阐述一下我所看到的情况：
(1) I am talking about the situation for, say, a taxpayer in a 40% Federal Income Tax bracket who also has some State Income Tax to pay. Various changes are being proposed in the tax laws, which may adversely affect net results from presently tax-exempt income, capital gains, and perhaps other types of investment income. More proposals will probably come in the future. Overall, I feel such changes over the years will not negate my relative expectations about after-tax income from presently tax-free bonds versus common stocks, and may well even mildly reinforce them.
（1）我所说的情况是针对，比如说，一个处于 40% 联邦所得税税率区间，同时还需缴纳一些州所得税的纳税人。税法正在提出各种修改建议，这可能会对目前免税收入、资本利得以及其他可能的投资收入的净收益产生不利影响。未来可能还会有更多的建议出台。总体而言，我认为多年来的这些变化不会否定我对目前免税债券与普通股的税后收益的相对预期，甚至可能会在一定程度上加强这种预期。
(2) I am talking about expectations over the next ten years - not the next weeks or months. I find it much easier to think about what should develop over a relatively long period of time than what is likely in any short period. As Ben Graham said: “In the long run, the market is a weighing machine - in the short run, a voting machine.” I have always found it easier to evaluate weights dictated by fundamentals than votes dictated by psychology.
（2）我所说的预期是针对未来十年 —— 而不是未来几周或几个月。我发现思考相对较长时期内可能发生的事情，比思考短期内可能发生的事情要容易得多。正如本・格雷厄姆所说：“从长期来看，市场是一台称重机 —— 从短期来看，是一台投票机。” 我一直觉得评估由基本面决定的价值，比评估由心理因素决定的市场投票更容易。
(3) Purely passive investment in tax-free bonds will now bring about 6-1/2%. This yield can be achieved with excellent quality and locked up for just about any period for which the investor wishes to contract. Such conditions may not exist in March when Bill and I will be available to assist you in bond purchases, but they exist today.
（3）纯粹被动投资于免税债券现在的收益率约为 6.5%。这种收益率可以通过优质债券实现，并且投资者可以根据自己的意愿锁定任何期限。当比尔和我在 3 月份为你提供债券购买帮助时，这种情况可能不存在，但目前是存在的。
(4) The ten year expectation for corporate stocks as a group is probably not better than 9% overall. say 3% dividends and 6% gain in value. I would doubt that Gross National Product grows more than 6% per annum - I don’t believe corporate profits are likely to grow significantly as a percentage of GNP - and if earnings multipliers don’t change (and with these assumptions and present interest rates they shouldn’t) the aggregate valuation of American corporate enterprise should not grow at a long-term compounded rate above 6% per annum. This typical experience in stocks might produce (for the taxpayer described earlier) 1-3/4% after tax from dividends and 4-3/4% after tax from capital gain, for a total after-tax return of about 6-1/2%. The pre-tax mix between dividends and capital gains might be more like 4% and 5%, giving a slightly lower aftertax result. This is not far from historical experience and overall, I believe future tax rules on capital gains are likely to be stiffer than in the past.
（4）从总体上看，未来十年公司股票的预期回报率可能不会超过 9%，比如说，3% 的股息和 6% 的价值增长。我怀疑国民生产总值（GNP）的年增长率不会超过 6%—— 我认为公司利润占 GNP 的比例不太可能显著增长 —— 如果市盈率不变（根据这些假设和目前的利率，市盈率不应改变），美国企业的总体估值的长期复合增长率不应超过每年 6%。股票的这种典型表现可能会为（前面描述的纳税人）带来 1.75% 的股息税后收益和 4.75% 的资本利得税后收益，总计约 6.5% 的税后回报率。股息和资本利得的税前比例可能更接近 4% 和 5%，这会使税后回报率略低。这与历史经验相差不大，而且总体而言，我认为未来关于资本利得的税收规定可能会比过去更严格。
(5) Finally, probably half the money invested in stocks over the next decade will be professionally managed. Thus, by definition virtually, the total investor experience with professionally managed money will be average results (or 6-1/2% after tax if my assumptions above are correct).
（5）最后，在未来十年投资股票的资金中，可能大约有一半会由专业人士管理。因此，从定义上说，专业管理资金的总体投资回报率将是平均水平（如果我上述假设正确，税后回报率为 6.5%）。
My judgment would be that less than 10% of professionally managed money (which might imply an average of $40 billion just for this superior segment) handled consistently for the decade would average 2 points per annum over group expectancy. So-called “aggressively run” money is unlikely to do significantly better than the general run of professionally managed money. There is probably $50 billion in various gradations of this “aggressive” category now - maybe 100 times that of a decade ago - and $50 billion just can’t “perform”.
我的判断是，在未来十年持续管理的专业管理资金中，只有不到 10%（这可能意味着仅这一优秀部分的平均资金规模就达到 400 亿美元）的资金能够平均每年比总体预期高出 2 个百分点。所谓的 “积极管理” 资金不太可能比一般的专业管理资金表现得好很多。目前，各种不同程度的 “积极管理” 资金可能达到 500 亿美元 —— 可能是十年前的 100 倍 —— 而 500 亿美元的资金规模不可能都 “表现出色”。
If you are extremely fortunate and select advisors who achieve results in the top 1% to 2% of the country (but who will be working with material sums of money because they are that good), I think it is unlikely you will do much more than 4 points per annum better than the group expectancy. I think the odds are good that Bill Ruane is in this select category. My estimate . therefore, is that over the next decade the results of really excellent management for our “typical taxpayer” after tax might be 1-3/4% from dividends and 7-3/4% from capital gain. or 9 –1.2% overall.
如果你非常幸运，选择了在全国排名前 1% 到 2% 的投资顾问（但他们管理的资金规模会很大，因为他们非常优秀），我认为你不太可能比总体预期每年多获得超过 4 个百分点的收益。我认为比尔・鲁安很有可能属于这一优秀类别。因此，我的估计是，在未来十年，对于我们的 “典型纳税人” 来说，真正优秀的管理所带来的税后收益可能是 1.75% 的股息收益和 7.75% 的资本利得收益，总计约 9% 到 12%。
(6) The rather startling conclusion is that under today’s historically unusual conditions, passive investment in tax-free bonds is likely to be fully the equivalent of expectations from professionally managed money in stocks, and only modestly inferior to extremely well-managed equity money.
（6）相当令人惊讶的结论是，在当今这种历史上不寻常的情况下，被动投资于免税债券的预期收益很可能与专业管理的股票投资的预期收益相当，并且仅略逊于管理极为出色的股票投资。
(7) A word about inflation - it has very little to do with the above calculation except that it enters into the 6% assumed growth rate in GNP and contributes to the causes producing 6-1/2% on tax-free bonds. Ifstocks should produce 8% after tax and bonds 4%, stocks are better to own than bonds, regardless of whether prices go up, down or sidewise. The converse is true if bonds produce 6-1/2% after tax. and stocks 6%. The simple truth, of course, is that the best expectable after-tax rate of return makes the most sense - given a rising, declining or stable dollar.
（7）再谈谈通货膨胀 —— 它与上述计算关系不大，只是它影响了假设的 6% 的 GNP 增长率，并导致免税债券的收益率达到 6.5%。如果股票的税后收益率为 8%，债券为 4%，无论价格上涨、下跌还是持平，持有股票都比持有债券更有利。反之，如果债券的税后收益率为 6.5%，股票为 6%，则持有债券更有利。当然，简单的事实是，无论美元升值、贬值还是稳定，预期的最佳税后回报率才是最关键的。
All of the above should be viewed with all the suspicion properly accorded to assessments of the future. It does seem to me to be the most realistic evaluation of what is always an uncertain future - I present it with no great feeling regarding its approximate accuracy, but only so you will know what I think at this time.
上述所有内容都应该带着对未来评估应有的怀疑态度来看待。在我看来，这确实是对总是充满不确定性的未来最现实的评估 —— 我提出这些观点，并不是非常确定其准确性，只是想让你知道我目前的想法。
You will have to make your own decision as between bonds and stocks and, if the latter, who advises you on such stocks. In many cases, I think the decision should largely reflect your tangible and intangible (temperamental) needs for regularity of income and absence of large principal fluctuation, perhaps balanced against psychic needs for some excitement and the fun associated with contemplating and perhaps enjoying really juicy results. If you would like to talk over the problem with me, I will be very happy to help.
你将不得不自己决定是投资债券还是股票，如果选择股票，还要决定由谁为你提供股票投资建议。在很多情况下，我认为这个决定应该在很大程度上反映你对稳定收入的实际和无形（性格方面）需求，以及对避免本金大幅波动的需求，同时可能还需要与你对投资带来的一些刺激和乐趣的心理需求相平衡，比如思考并可能享受丰厚的投资回报。如果你想和我讨论这个问题，我很乐意提供帮助。
Sincerely,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
1969 年信件（四）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
December 5th , 1969
1969 年 12 月 5 日
To My Partners:
亲爱的合伙人：
This letter is to supply you with some published information relating to our two controlled companies (and their four principal operating components), as well as to give you my general views regarding their operations. My comments are not designed to give you loads of detailed information prospectus-style, but only my general “slant” as I see the businesses at this time.
这封信旨在向您提供一些与我们两家控股公司（及其四个主要运营部门）相关的已发布信息，同时也向您阐述我对这些公司运营情况的总体看法。我的评论并非要像招股说明书那样为您提供大量详细信息，而只是我目前对这些业务的总体 “观点”。
At yearend, BPL will own 800,000 of 1,000,000 shares outstanding of Diversified Retailing Company. First Manhattan Company and Wheeler, Munger & Company will each own 100,000 shares. DRC previously owned 100% of Hochschild, Kohn & Company of Baltimore, and currently owns 100% of Associated Retail Stores (formerly named Associated Cotton Shops). On December 1st, DRC sold its entire interest in H-K to Supermarkets General Corp. for $5,045,205 of cash plus non-interest bearing SGC notes for $2 million due 2-1-70, and $4,540,000 due 2-1-71. The present value of these notes approximates $6.0 million so, effectively, DRC received about $11 million on the sale. Various warranties were made by DRC in connection with the sale, and, while we expect no claims pursuant to the contract, a remote contingent liability always exists while warranties are in force.
截至年底，巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）将持有多元化零售公司（Diversified Retailing Company）已发行的 1,000,000 股股份中的 800,000 股。第一曼哈顿公司（First Manhattan Company）和惠勒、芒格公司（Wheeler, Munger & Company）将各持有 100,000 股。此前，多元化零售公司全资拥有巴尔的摩的霍希尔德・科恩公司（Hochschild, Kohn & Company），目前则全资拥有联合零售商店（Associated Retail Stores，前身为联合棉花商店）。12 月 1 日，多元化零售公司将其在霍希尔德・科恩公司的全部股权以 5,045,205 美元现金加上 200 万美元的无息通用超市公司（Supermarkets General Corp.）票据（于 1970 年 2 月 1 日到期）以及 4,540,000 美元（于 1971 年 2 月 1 日到期）的价格出售给了通用超市公司。这些票据的现值约为 600 万美元，因此，实际上多元化零售公司在此次出售中获得了约 1100 万美元。多元化零售公司在此次出售中作出了各种保证，虽然我们预计不会有根据合同提出的索赔，但在保证期内，始终存在着极小的或有负债的可能性。
Associated Retail Stores has a net worth of about $7.5 million. It is an excellent business with a strong financial position, good operating margins and a record of increasing sales and earnings in recent years. Last year, sales were about $37.5 million and net income about $1 million. This year should see new records in sales and earnings, with my guess on the latter to be in the area of $1.1 million after full taxes.
联合零售商店的净资产约为 750 万美元。这是一家非常出色的企业，财务状况良好，经营利润率较高，并且近年来销售和盈利均呈现增长态势。去年，其销售额约为 3750 万美元，净利润约为 100 万美元。今年的销售额和盈利有望创下新纪录，我预计扣除全部税款后的净利润将达到约 110 万美元。
DRC has $6.6 million in debentures outstanding (prospectus with full description of the business as of December 18th, 1967 and the debenture terms will be sent you upon request) which have one unusual feature in that if I, or an entity controlled by me, is not the largest shareholder of DRC, the debentureholders have the right to present their debentures for payment by the company at par.
多元化零售公司有 660 万美元的未偿债券（如您有要求，我们将向您发送包含截至 1967 年 12 月 18 日该公司业务完整描述以及债券条款的招股说明书），这些债券有一个不寻常的特点，即如果我或我控制的实体不再是多元化零售公司的最大股东，债券持有人有权要求公司按面值赎回其债券。
Thus, DRC has tangible net assets of about $11.50 - $12.00 per share, an excellent operating business and substantial funds available for reinvestment in other operating businesses. On an interim basis, such funds will be employed in marketable securities.
因此，多元化零售公司的每股有形净资产约为 11.50 美元至 12.00 美元，拥有出色的运营业务，并且有大量资金可用于对其他运营业务进行再投资。在过渡期间，这些资金将投资于有价证券。
Berkshire Hathaway Inc. has 983,582 shares outstanding, of which BPL owns 691,441. B-H has three main operating businesses, the textile operation, the insurance operation (conducted by National Indemnity Company and National Fire & Marine Insurance Company, which will be collectively called the insurance company) and the Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois. It also owns Sun Newspapers Inc, Blacker Printing Company and 70% of Gateway Underwriters, but these operations are not financially significant relative to the total.
伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司有 983,582 股已发行股份，其中巴菲特合伙公司持有 691,441 股。伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司有三项主要运营业务，即纺织业务、保险业务（由国民赔偿公司和国民火灾及海运保险公司经营，以下统称为保险公司）以及伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行和信托公司。它还拥有太阳报纸公司、布莱克印刷公司以及网关保险承销公司70% 的股权，但相对于公司总体而言，这些业务在财务上并不重要。
The textile operation presently employs about $16 per share in capital and, while I think it has made some progress relative to the textile industry generally, cannot be judged a satisfactory business. Its return on capital has not been sufficient to support the assets employed in the business and, realistically, an adequate return has less than an even chance of being averaged in the future. It represents the best segments of the business that existed when we purchased control four and one-half years ago. Capital from the other segments has been successfully redeployed - first, on an interim basis into marketable securities and, now on a permanent basis into insurance and banking. I like the textile operating people - they have worked hard to improve the business under difficult conditions - and, despite the poor return, we expect to continue the textile operation as long as it produces near current levels.
目前，纺织业务每股投入的资本约为 16 美元，虽然我认为它相对于整个纺织行业已经取得了一些进展，但仍不能被视为一项令人满意的业务。其资本回报率不足以支撑业务中所使用的资产，而且实事求是地说，未来实现足够回报率的可能性并不大。这代表了我们在四年半前收购控制权时该业务中最好的部分。其他部分的资本已成功进行了重新配置 —— 首先，在过渡期间投资于有价证券，现在则永久性地投入到了保险和银行业务中。我喜欢纺织业务的运营团队 —— 他们在困难的条件下努力改善业务 —— 尽管回报率不佳，但只要该业务的产出接近当前水平，我们预计仍会继续经营纺织业务。
The insurance operation (of which B-H owns virtually 100%) and the bank (where B-H owns 97.7%) present a much happier picture. Both are first-class businesses, earning good returns on capital and stacking up well on any absolute or comparative analysis of operating statistics. The bank has about $17 per share of net tangible assets applicable to B-H, and the insurance company approximately $15. I would estimate their normal current earning power to be about $4 per share (compared to about $3.40 from operations pro-forma in 1968), with good prospects for future growth on the combined $32 of tangible net assets in the bank and insurance company. Adding in the textile business and miscellaneous assets, and subtracting parent company bank debt of about $7 million, gives a tangible net asset value of about $43 per share for B-H, or about $45 stated book value, allowing for the premium over tangible assets paid for the bank.
保险业务（伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司几乎持有其 100% 的股权）和银行业务（伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司持有其 97.7% 的股权）的情况要好得多。这两项业务都是一流的，资本回报率良好，并且在对运营统计数据进行任何绝对或比较分析时都表现出色。银行每股约有 17 美元的适用于伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的净有形资产，保险公司每股约有 15 美元。我估计它们目前的正常盈利能力约为每股 4 美元（相比之下，1968 年预计运营收益约为每股 3.40 美元），银行和保险公司合计 32 美元的有形净资产具有良好的未来增长前景。加上纺织业务和其他杂项资产，并减去母公司约 700 万美元的银行债务，伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的每股有形净资产价值约为 43 美元，或者考虑到为收购银行所支付的高于有形资产的溢价，账面价值约为 45 美元。
One caveat - when I talk above of tangible net assets. I am valuing the $75 million of bonds held by the insurance company and bank at amortized cost. This is in accord with standard accounting procedures used in those industries and also in accord with the realities of their business operations where it is quite unlikely that bonds will have to be sold before maturity. At today’s historically low bond prices, however, our bonds have a market value substantially below carrying value, probably on the order of $10 per share of B-H stock.
需要提醒的一点是，当我在上面提到有形净资产时，我是按照摊销成本对保险公司和银行持有的 7500 万美元债券进行估值的。这符合这些行业使用的标准会计程序，也符合它们的业务运营实际情况，因为在到期前债券很不太可能被出售。然而，在当前处于历史低位的债券价格下，我们的债券市值大幅低于账面价值，可能约为伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司每股股票 10 美元。
Between DRC and B-H, we have four main operating businesses with three of them in my opinion, definitely first class by any of the usual standards of evaluation. The three excellent businesses are all run by men over sixty who are largely responsible for building each operation from scratch. These men are hard working, wealthy, and good – extraordinarily good. Their age is a negative, but it is the only negative applicable to them. One of the reasons I am happy to have a large segment of my capital in B-H and DRC is because we have such excellent men in charge of the operating businesses.
在多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司中，我们有四项主要运营业务，在我看来，其中三项无论按照任何常见的评估标准肯定都是一流的。这三项出色的业务都由六十多岁的人经营，他们在很大程度上负责从零开始打造每一项业务。这些人工作努力，富有且优秀 —— 非常优秀。他们的年龄是一个不利因素，但这是唯一适用于他们的不利因素。我很高兴将自己的大部分资金投入到伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司和多元化零售公司的原因之一，就是我们有如此优秀的人来负责运营这些业务。
We have various annual reports, audits, interim reports, proxy materials prospectuses, etc… applicable to our control holdings and we will be glad to supply you with any item you request. I also solicit your written questions and will send to all partners the questions and answers shortly before yearend. Don’t hesitate to ask any question at all that comes to mind - if it isn’t clear to you, it probably isn’t clear to others - and there is no reason for any of you to be wondering about something that I might clear up.DRC and B-H presently pay no dividends and will probably pay either no dividends or very modest dividends for some years to come. There are a number of reasons for this. Both parent companies have borrowed money -we want to maintain a good level of protection for depositors at the bank and policyholders at the insurance company - some of the operating companies have very satisfactory ways to utilize additional capital - and we are hopeful of finding new businesses to both diversify and augment our earning power.
我们有各种与我们控股公司相关的年度报告、审计报告、中期报告、委托投票材料、招股说明书等，我们很乐意根据您的要求提供任何您需要的资料。我也欢迎您提出书面问题，并且会在年底前将问题和答案发送给所有合伙人。如果您想到任何问题，都不要犹豫，尽管问 —— 如果您不清楚某个问题，其他人可能也不清楚 —— 而且您没有理由对我可能能够解答的问题感到疑惑。多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司目前不支付股息，并且在未来几年可能要么不支付股息，要么支付很少的股息。这有几个原因。两家母公司都借了钱 —— 我们希望为银行的储户和保险公司的保单持有人保持良好的保障水平 —— 一些运营公司有非常令人满意的方式来利用额外资本 —— 并且我们希望找到新的业务，既能实现业务多元化，又能增强我们的盈利能力。
My personal opinion is that the intrinsic value of DRC and B-H will grow substantially over the years. While no one knows the future, I would be disappointed if such growth wasn’t at a rate of approximately 10% per annum. Market prices for stocks fluctuate at great amplitudes around intrinsic value but, over the long term, intrinsic value is virtually always reflected at some point in market price. Thus, I think both securities should be very decent long-term holdings and I am happy to have a substantial portion of my net worth invested in them. You should be unconcerned about short-term price action when you own the securities directly, just as you were unconcerned when you owned them indirectly through BPL. I think about them as businesses, not “stocks”, and if the business does all right over the long term, so will the stock.
我个人认为，多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的内在价值在未来几年将大幅增长。虽然没有人能预知未来，但如果这种增长速度达不到每年约 10%，我会感到失望。股票的市场价格会在内在价值周围大幅波动，但从长期来看，内在价值几乎总会在某个时候反映在市场价格中。因此，我认为这两只证券都应该是非常不错的长期投资，我很高兴将自己的大部分净资产投资于它们。当您直接持有这些证券时，您应该不必担心短期价格波动，就像您之前通过巴菲特合伙公司间接持有它们时一样。我将它们视为业务，而不是 “股票”，如果业务在长期内表现良好，股票也会如此。
I want to stress that I will not be in a managerial or partnership status with you regarding your future holdings of such securities. You will be free to do what you wish with your stock in the future and so, of course, will I. I think that there is a very high probability that I will maintain my investment in DRC and B-H for a very long period, but I want no implied moral commitment to do so nor do so nor do I wish to advise others over an indefinite future period regarding their holdings. The companies, of course, will keep all shareholders advised of their activities and you will receive reports as issued by them, probably on a semi-annual basis. Should I continue to hold the securities, as I fully expect to do, my degree of involvement in their activities may vary depending upon my other interests. The odds are that I will take an important position on matters of policy, but I want no moral obligation to be other than a passive shareholder, should my interests develop elsewhere.
我想强调的是，对于您未来持有的这些证券，我不会处于管理或合伙的地位。您未来可以自由处置您持有的股票，当然，我也可以自由处置我持有的股票。我认为我极有可能会在很长一段时间内继续持有我在多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的投资，但我不希望有任何隐含的道德义务要求我这样做，也不希望在不确定的未来期间就其他人的持股情况提供建议。当然，这些公司会让所有股东了解它们的活动，您可能会每半年收到一次它们发布的报告。如果我像我完全预期的那样继续持有这些证券，我参与这些公司活动的程度可能会因我的其他兴趣而有所不同。很有可能我会在公司政策事务上发挥重要作用，但如果我的兴趣转移到其他地方，我不希望承担除了作为一名被动股东之外的任何道德义务。
We presently plan to make the initial BPL cash distribution on January 5th, which will now come to at least 64% of January 1, 1969 capital less any distributions (including monthly payments) you have received from us since January 1, 1969. There is now pending a public offering, headed by Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, of our Blue Chip Stamps holdings which, if completed this month as expected, should bring the figure to at least 70%.
我们目前计划于 1 月 5 日进行巴菲特合伙公司的首次现金分配，此次分配金额现在至少将达到 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 64%，扣除自 1969 年 1 月 1 日以来您从我们这里收到的任何分配（包括每月支付的款项）。目前，由美林公司（Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith）牵头的我们持有的蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）股份的公开募股正在进行中，如果能像预期的那样在本月完成，分配比例应该至少会达到 70%。
If you wish Bill and me to give you our ideas regarding bonds in March, you should purchase U.S. Treasury Bills maturing in late March with the applicable portion of the January 5th distribution. Then advise us in the last week of February of the amount you wish to invest in bonds and we will let you know our thoughts.
如果您希望比尔（Bill）和我在 3 月份就债券问题提供我们的建议，您应该用 1 月 5 日分配的相应部分资金购买 3 月底到期的美国国库券。然后在 2 月的最后一周告知我们您希望投资债券的金额，我们会告诉您我们的想法。
About the middle of January (as soon as the exact amounts are figured and shares are received from the Transfer Agent after having been registered in your name) we will distribute the DRC and B-H stock applicable to your partnership interest and subsequently advise you of your tax basis and acquisition date attributable to the stock. Such shares will be “legended” as described in the enclosed letter from Monen, Seidler & Ryan. These stock certificates are valuable and should be kept in a safe place.
大约在 1 月中旬（一旦确切金额计算出来，并且在股份以您的名义登记后从过户代理人处收到股份），我们将分配与您的合伙权益相应的多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股票，随后会告知您这些股票的税务基础和收购日期。这些股票将如随附的莫宁、塞德勒和瑞安律师事务所（Monen, Seidler & Ryan）的信件中所述带有 “说明”。这些股票证书很有价值，应妥善保管在安全的地方。
In past letters I had expressed the hope that BPL could supply a mechanism whereby you could, if you wished, automatically convert your DRC and B-H to cash. I have had two law firms consider extensively the status of these shares in your hands following the liquidation and the accompanying letters (which should be saved and kept with the shares) give their conclusions. As you can see, it is not an area that produces simple, clear-cut guidelines. I see no prudent way to implement the alternatives I had previously been considering. Therefore, you must follow the guidelines they set forth if you wish to dispose of your shares. As you probably realize, the restrictions on subsequent sale apply more severely to Susie and me (because of my continued “insider” position) than they probably do to you. Substantial quantities of securities often are sold via the “private sale” option described in paragraph (3) of the opinion. If the rules become clearer or more simplified in the future, I will be sure to let you know.
在过去的信件中，我曾表示希望巴菲特合伙公司能够提供一种机制，使您如果愿意的话，可以自动将您持有的多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股票转换为现金。我请了两家律师事务所对清算后您手中这些股票的状况进行了深入研究，随附的信件（您应该保存好并与股票放在一起）给出了他们的结论。如您所见，这并不是一个能得出简单、明确指导方针的领域。我认为没有谨慎的方法来实施我之前考虑的那些替代方案。因此，如果您希望处置您的股票，就必须遵循他们制定的指导方针。您可能已经意识到，对后续出售的限制对苏西（Susie）和我（因为我继续处于 “内部人士” 的地位）的影响可能比对您的影响更严格。大量证券通常通过意见书中第（3）段所述的 “私下出售” 方式进行出售。如果未来相关规则变得更加清晰或简化，我一定会通知您。
At the time of distribution of DRC and B-H, I will advise you of the values applied to such shares at 1969 yearend. You will receive our audit and tax letter about the end of January. It presently appears that sale of our Blue Chip shares and a substantial increase in value of DRC and B- H will bring our overall gain for the year to slightly over 6%.
在分配多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股票时，我会告知您 1969 年底对这些股票的估值。您大约会在 1 月底收到我们的审计和税务信件。目前看来，出售我们持有的蓝筹邮票公司股份以及多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司价值的大幅增长，将使我们今年的总体收益略高于 6%。
My next letter will be in late December, summarizing the questions and answers regarding DRC and B-H. and also supplying a final estimate on the January 5th cash distribution.
我的下一封信将在 12 月下旬发出，总结关于多元化零售公司和伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的问题与答案，同时也会提供 1 月 5 日现金分配的最终预估。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEBI glk
Enclosures:
附件：
Legal opinion. Monen, Seidler & Ryan
法律意见书，莫宁、塞德勒和瑞安律师事务所
Concurring opinion, Munger, Tolles. Hills & Rickershauser 1968 Annual Report. Berkshire Hathaway. Inc. 1969 Semi-Annual Report. Berkshire Hathaway. Inc.
赞同意见书，芒格、托尔斯、希尔斯和里克斯豪瑟律师事务所（Munger, Tolles. Hills & Rickershauser） 1968 年度报告，伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司
April 3. 1969 letter to Shareholders. Berkshire Hathaway. Inc. 1968 Annual Report. Diversified Retailing Company. Inc.
1969 年 4 月 3 日伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司致股东函；多元化零售公司 1968 年度报告
Financial information regarding Associated Retail Stores. Inc. Financial information regarding Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. 1969 Best’s Report. National Indemnity Company
联合零售商店公司财务信息；伊利诺伊国民银行与信托公司财务信息
1969 Best’s Report. National Fire & Marine Insurance Company
国民火灾及海运保险公司 1969 年贝氏评级报告
1969 年信件（五）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
December 26, 1969
1969 年 12 月 26 日
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
Our plans regarding the initial cash distribution have been finalized and we expect to mail to you on January 3rd a check dated January 5th, 1970 for approximately 64% of your January 1st. 1969 capital, less any distributions made to you (including monthly payments) since January 1st. 1969. If you have taken no monthly payments during 1969, there will be a small interest adjustment in your favor; if you have had loans from BPL, there will be an interest charge. I couldn’t be more delighted about the action of the bond and stock markets from the standpoint of the timing of our liquidation. I believe practically all partners - whether they would have invested in bonds or stocks - will be far better off receiving the cash now than if we had liquidated at the end of last year. Those seeking income will receive about 40% more after tax on the same principal investment than they would have achieved only a year ago at what then seemed like generous yields.
我们关于首次现金分配的计划已确定，预计将于 1 月 3 日给您寄出一张日期为 1970 年 1 月 5 日的支票，金额约为您 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 64%，并扣除自 1969 年 1 月 1 日起已向您进行的任何分配（包括每月支付款项）。如果您在 1969 年未领取每月支付款项，会有一笔对您有利的小额利息调整；如果您从巴菲特合伙公司（BPL）借过款，则会有一笔利息费用。从清算时机的角度来看，债券和股票市场的表现让我无比欣喜。我相信，几乎所有合伙人 —— 无论他们原本打算投资债券还是股票 —— 现在收到现金都远比我们在去年年底清算要好得多。寻求收益的人在相同本金投资上，税后收益将比仅一年前看似丰厚的收益率时高出约 40% 。
Our tax picture is virtually complete and it appears that you will have ordinary income (dividends plus interest income less ordinary loss) for Federal tax purposes of about 3 –3/4% of your January 1st. 1969 capital (item 1 in enclosed letter), no significant long-term capital gain or loss, and a short-term capital loss of about 8-1/2% of your January 1st, 1969 unrealized appreciation (item 3). These estimates are just rough approximations -definitive figures will reach you in early February.
我们的税务情况基本明晰，就联邦税收而言，您的普通收入（股息加利息收入减去普通损失）约为您 1969 年 1 月 1 日资本的 3 - 3/4%（附函中的第 1 项），不存在重大的长期资本利得或损失，短期资本损失约为您 1969 年 1 月 1 日未实现增值的 8 - 1/2%（第 3 项）。这些只是大致估算，确切数据将在 2 月初告知您。
The sale of our 371,400 shares of Blue Chip Stamps was not completed in 1969. When the stock went into registration, it was selling at about $24 per share. The underwriters indicated a range where they expected to offer our shares (along with others) with heavy weight placed on a comparison with Sperry & Hutchinson. Shortly before the stock was to be offered, with the Dow-Jones Industrials much lower but S & H virtually unchanged, they indicated a price below their former range. We reluctantly agreed and felt we had a deal but, on the next business day, they stated that our agreed price was not feasible. We then withdrew and a much smaller offering was done.
我们持有的 371,400 股蓝筹邮票公司（Blue Chip Stamps）股票在 1969 年未能完成出售。股票进入登记程序时，售价约为每股 24 美元。承销商给出了他们预计发售我们股票（以及其他股票）的价格区间，且十分看重与斯佩里 - 哈钦森公司（Sperry & Hutchinson）的对比。就在股票即将发售前不久，道琼斯工业平均指数大幅下跌，但斯佩里 - 哈钦森公司股价几乎未变，承销商表示价格将低于之前的区间。我们不情愿地同意了，以为达成了交易，但在下一个工作日，他们称商定的价格不可行。于是我们撤回了股票，之后进行了一次规模小得多的发售。
I intend to hold our block of Blue Chip Stamps in BPL for a more advantageous disposal or eventual distribution to our partners. The odds are decent that we will do better in this manner -even if it takes a year or two - than if we had participated in a very large sale into a somewhat distressed market. Unless there is a material change in the market in the next few days, I plan to value our Blue Chip holdings at yearend at the price received by selling shareholders on the public offering after underwriting discount and expenses.
我打算在巴菲特合伙公司继续持有我们的蓝筹邮票公司股票，以便更有利地处置或最终分配给合伙人。很有可能，即使这需要一两年时间，这样做也比我们在市场有些低迷时大量抛售要好。除非未来几天市场出现重大变化，我计划在年底时按照公开发售中扣除承销折扣和费用后股东的出售价格来对我们持有的蓝筹邮票公司股票进行估值。
Various questions have been asked pursuant to the last letter:
根据上一封信，大家提出了各种问题：
If we are not getting a good return on the textile business of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., why do we continue to operate it?
如果伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的纺织业务回报率不高，我们为什么还要继续经营它？
Pretty much for the reasons outlined in my letter. I don’t want to liquidate a business employing 1100 people when the Management has worked hard to improve their relative industry position, with reasonable results, and as long as the business does not require substantial additional capital investment. I have no desire to trade severe human dislocations for a few percentage points additional return per annum. Obviously, if we faced material compulsory additional investment or sustained operating losses, the decision might have to be different, but I don’t anticipate such alternatives.
主要原因我在信中已说明。当管理层努力提升其在行业中的相对地位并取得一定成效，且该业务无需大量额外资本投资时，我不想清算一家雇佣着 1100 人的企业。我不想为了每年几个百分点的额外回报而造成严重的人员安置问题。显然，如果我们面临大量强制性额外投资或持续经营亏损，决策可能会不同，但我预计不会出现这种情况。
How large is our investment in Sun Newspapers, etc., and do we intend to expand in the newspaper, radio and TV business?
我们在太阳报纸公司等企业的投资规模有多大，我们是否打算在报纸、广播和电视业务领域进行扩张？
The combined investment in Sun, Blacker Printing and Gateway Underwriters is a little over $1 per share of Berkshire Hathaway, and earns something less than 10 cent per share. We have no particular plans to expand in the communication field.
在太阳报纸公司、布莱克印刷公司和网关保险承销公司的总投资，折合成伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股份，每股略超 1 美元，每股收益不到 10 美分。我们没有在传播领域扩张的特别计划。
What does Gateway Underwriters do?
网关保险承销公司是做什么的？
Gateway Underwriters serves primarily as a General Agent for National Indemnity Company in the State of Missouri.
网关保险承销公司主要是国民赔偿公司在密苏里州的总代理商。
Are there good “second men” to take over from the men running the three excellent operating businesses?
经营这三项出色业务的人之后，有没有优秀的 “接班人”？
In any company where the founder and chief driving force behind the enterprise is still active, it is very difficult to evaluate “second men”. The only real way to see how someone is going to do when running a company is to let him run it. Some of our businesses have certainly been more “one-man shows” than the typical corporation. Subject to the foregoing caveat, I think that we do have some good “second men” coming along.
在任何企业创始人及主要推动力仍活跃的公司里，评估 “接班人” 都非常困难。检验一个人经营公司能力的唯一真正方法就是让他去做。我们的一些业务相比典型企业，更像是 “个人秀”。尽管有上述提醒，但我认为我们确实有一些不错的 “接班人” 正在成长起来。
In what area do you plan to invest the cash in Diversified Retailing Company and do you intend to stick primarily to the retailing field?
您计划将多元化零售公司的现金投资于哪些领域，您是否打算主要专注于零售领域？
While we prefer the retailing field, we do not preclude anything that will make sense. We have been looking without success for two years for an intelligent acquisition for DRC, so we are not about to rule out any industry, if the business looks good. Pending such time as we find one or more operating businesses to buy, the money will be invested in marketable securities.
虽然我们倾向于零售领域，但并不排除任何合理的投资。两年来，我们一直在为多元化零售公司寻找明智的收购对象，但没有成功，所以如果业务看起来不错，我们不排除任何行业。在找到一个或多个可供收购的运营业务之前，资金将投资于有价证券。
Why didn’t DRC payout the money it received on the sale of Hochschild, Kohn & Company?
为什么多元化零售公司在出售霍希尔德・科恩公司后没有将所得资金分配出去？
In addition to the fact that such a payment would constitute a dividend, taxable in significant part as ordinary income, there are restrictions in the bond indenture which prevent such a pay-out without turning over control of the company to the bondholders.
除了这种支付会构成股息，且很大一部分会作为普通收入纳税之外，债券契约中也有限制，在未将公司控制权交给债券持有人的情况下，禁止进行此类分配。
Will distribution of the DRC stock cause the DRC debentures to be called?
分配多元化零售公司的股票会导致其债券被赎回吗？
After distribution of the stock, I will be the largest stockholder in DRC and, hence, the call provision will not apply.
股票分配后，我将成为多元化零售公司的最大股东，因此赎回条款将不适用。
How would we know if the DRC debentures were called?
我们如何得知多元化零售公司的债券是否被赎回？
All stockholders and debenture holders would find out directly from the company through regular or special reports that the company issues to its security holders. There is no intention at all of calling the debentures.
所有股东和债券持有人都会通过公司向证券持有人发布的定期或特别报告直接知晓。目前完全没有赎回债券的打算。
Why did you not register our Berkshire Hathaway and Diversified Retailing shares so that the stock, when received by the partners, would be freely marketable?
为什么您没有对我们持有的伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司和多元化零售公司的股票进行登记，以便合伙人收到股票后可自由交易？
We considered this possibility but rejected it for both practical and legal considerations. I will just discuss the practicalities, since they would independently dictate the decision we made.
我们考虑过这种可能性，但出于实际和法律方面的考量放弃了。我只谈谈实际因素，因为这些因素本身就决定了我们的决策。
There is presently no existing market for Diversified Retailing, and our holdings of Berkshire Hathaway are probably four or five times the present floating supply of this stock. An attempt to quickly buy or sell a few thousand shares can easily move BH stock several points or more. We own 691,441 shares. Were we to distribute these stocks to you via a registration without an underwriting, and with the possibility that a substantial portion would be offered for sale by many sellers operating individually but virtually simultaneously, there is a real likelihood, particularly in a stock market environment such as we have seen recently, that the market for these two stocks would be little short of chaotic. It has not seemed to me that this was the kind of situation with which I should leave you, both from the standpoint of the price level which might prevail, as well as for the reason that different partners might well have to liquidate at widely varying price levels. The more sophisticated partners might have an important edge on the less sophisticated ones, and I believe many partner’s might have no chance to realize the prices I anticipate using for yearend valuation. This would rightly seem most unfair to you, since I would have received some allocation of 1969 BPL profits based upon these yearend valuations. If the markets were to become distressed, I would probably come in for criticism, whether I personally bought at lower prices or, perhaps more so, if I refrained from buying.
目前多元化零售公司的股票没有现成市场，而我们持有的伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司股票数量可能是当前流通股数量的四到五倍。试图快速买卖几千股就很容易使伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股价波动几个百分点甚至更多。我们持有 691,441 股。如果我们不通过承销商，仅通过登记就将这些股票分配给您，而且很多股东可能会几乎同时单独出售大量股票，那么在当前这样的股市环境下，这两只股票的市场很可能会陷入混乱。从可能出现的股价水平，以及不同合伙人可能不得不在差异很大的股价水平上清算股票的角度来看，我觉得我不应该让您面临这种局面。经验丰富的合伙人可能会比经验不足的合伙人有很大优势，而且我认为很多合伙人可能没有机会实现我预计用于年底估值的股价。这对您来说显然不公平，因为我会根据这些年底估值获得 1969 年巴菲特合伙公司利润的分配。如果市场低迷，无论我个人是否以低价买入，或者更可能的是，如果我不买入，我都可能受到批评。
Were we to attempt to sponsor an underwriting in connection with a registration for those partners who might wish to sell, there would be, in my opinion, the likelihood that the result would still be far less than satisfactory. We have just been around this track with our holdings of Blue Chip Stamps, where we watched the price of our stock go from 24 to 16-1/2 after announcement of the underwriting, of which we originally were to be a part. I did not want this sort of result for the partners with respect to their holdings of Berkshire and Diversified.
如果我们试图为那些可能想出售股票的合伙人安排承销并进行登记，在我看来，结果可能仍远不尽如人意。我们在蓝筹邮票公司股票的操作中就有过类似经历，宣布承销后（我们原本也参与其中），股价从 24 美元跌到了 16 - 1/2 美元 。我不希望合伙人持有的伯克希尔和多元化零售公司股票出现这种情况。
It is my belief that, by confining sales to private placements, those partners who wish to sell will realize more for their stock (with the sophisticated partners having no marketing edge on the less knowledgeable) than would be achieved, through an underwriting at this time. Also, the stock should be more likely to find its way into the hands of long-term investment-minded holders, which should mean less volatile markets in the future. We have had several phone calls from persons indicating that they wish to make private sales -we anticipate there will be no difficulty in effectuating such sales at prices related to our yearend valuations.
我认为，通过将股票出售限制为私募，那些想出售股票的合伙人能获得比此时通过承销更高的收益（经验丰富的合伙人不会比经验不足的合伙人在销售上有优势）。而且，股票更有可能落入有长期投资意向的人手中，这意味着未来市场波动会更小。已经有几个人打电话表示希望进行私募，我们预计以与年底估值相关的价格完成这些交易不会有困难。
Those partners who would prefer an underwritten distribution always have the option of having a registration of their own. I will be glad to facilitate this by placing all partners in touch with each other who indicate to me their desire to sell via a registered underwriting, at their expense and through an underwriter of their choice. In this way the expense of an underwriting, which can be considerable, would be borne by the selling partners and not by the partners as a whole.
那些希望通过承销商分配股票的合伙人，始终可以自行选择进行股票登记。如果有合伙人向我表明希望通过登记承销的方式出售股票，我很乐意帮忙牵线搭桥，让他们相互联系，费用由出售股票的合伙人承担，承销商也由他们自行选择。这样，承销费用（可能很高）就由出售股票的合伙人承担，而不是由全体合伙人承担。
I have also had partners ask if they could participate in a registered offering in the future if I should sell shares in this manner. I think it is almost certain I will never sell stock via public offering but, should it ever happen, I will be glad to let any of you participate in any underwritten offering in which I might be involved. In all probability, if it ever did happen, your stock would already be “free”, although mine would still be restricted. I cannot make the same commitment to you regarding any private sale I might make in the future, just as I can’t expect you to restrict any sale options you might have in order to include me.
也有合伙人问，如果我以后以这种方式出售股票，他们能否参与登记发售。我几乎可以肯定自己永远不会通过公开发售股票，但如果真有那么一天，我很乐意让您参与我可能涉及的任何承销发售。如果真的发生这种情况，很可能您的股票那时已经可以自由交易了，尽管我的股票可能仍受限制。对于我未来可能进行的私募，我无法向您作出同样的承诺，就像我不能期望您为了让我参与而限制您可能拥有的出售选择一样。
Will you let us know if you sell your holdings of BH or DRC?
如果您出售持有的伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司或多元化零售公司的股票，会告知我们吗？
You would undoubtedly know from corporate communications, reports in the press and reports to Government agencies if I disposed of my holdings. I have no intention at all of doing so in the foreseeable future - I merely make no commitment not to. However, former BPL partners will have no priority over other BH or DRC security holders in obtaining information relating to their corporate activities.
如果我处置持有的股票，您无疑会通过公司公告、新闻报道以及向政府机构提交的报告知晓。在可预见的未来，我完全没有出售的打算，只是不承诺一定不会出售。不过，前巴菲特合伙公司的合伙人在获取与公司活动相关信息方面，并不比其他伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司或多元化零售公司的证券持有人有优先权。
Should I hold my BH or DRC stock?
我应该持有伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司或多元化零售公司的股票吗？
I can’t give you the answer on this one. All I can say is that I’m going to do so and I plan to buy more. I am very happy to have a material portion of my net worth invested in these companies on a long term basis. Obviously, I think they will be worth significantly more money five or ten years hence. Compared to most stocks, I think there is a low risk of loss. I hope their price patterns follow a rather moderate range related to business results rather than behaving in a volatile manner related to speculative enthusiasm or depression. Obviously, I cannot control the latter phenomena, but there is no intent to “promote” the stocks a la much of the distasteful general financial market activity of recent years.
这个问题我无法替您回答。我只能说我会继续持有，还打算增持。我很高兴长期将自己相当一部分净资产投资于这些公司。显然，我认为五到十年后它们的价值会大幅提升。与大多数股票相比，我认为其损失风险较低。我希望其股价走势与业务业绩适度相关，而不是因投机热情或低迷而大幅波动。显然，我无法控制后一种情况，但我也无意像近年来许多令人反感的金融市场活动那样去 “炒作” 这些股票。
Can I give either BH or DRC shares to my wife or children?
我可以把伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司或多元化零售公司的股票赠送给我的妻子或孩子吗？
We are advised by counsel that this is permissible but, of course the same restrictions on transfer that applied to you would apply to the donee of the gift.
律师告知我们这是可以的，但当然，适用于您的转让限制同样适用于受赠人。
Why are you waiting until March to give us your suggestions regarding bonds?
为什么您要等到 3 月才给我们关于债券的建议？
January and February promise to be very busy months. Many partners may want to talk to me about their questions and objectives regarding bonds. I want to have all important BPL matters out of the way before I talk with any of them on an individual basis. I make no forecasts regarding the bond market (or stock market) - it may be higher or lower in March than now. After my October letter, several partners became very eager to buy bonds immediately - to date they are much better off by waiting. The excellent quality tax-free bonds I talked about at that time with yields of 6 -1/2% can now be bought to yield about 7%.
1 月和 2 月预计会非常忙碌。很多合伙人可能想和我聊聊他们关于债券的疑问和目标。在我与任何一位合伙人单独交流之前，我希望先处理完所有重要的巴菲特合伙公司事务。我不会对债券市场（或股票市场）进行预测，3 月的市场可能比现在高，也可能比现在低。在我 10 月的信发出后，有几位合伙人急切地想立即购买债券，到目前为止，他们等待的决策让他们收益更多。我当时提到的收益率为 6 - 1/2% 的优质免税债券，现在购买收益率约为 7% 。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEB/glk
1970 年信件
1970 年信件（一）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
February 25th, 1970
1970 年 2 月 25 日
To My Partners:
致我的合伙人：
This letter will attempt to provide a very elementary education regarding tax-exempt bonds with emphasis on the types and maturities of bonds which we expect to help partners in purchasing next month. If you expect to use our help in the purchase of bonds, it is important that you carefully read (and, if necessary , reread) this letter as it will serve as background for the specific purchases I suggest. If you disagree with me as to conclusions regarding types of bonds or maturities (and you would have been right and I would have been wrong if you had disagreed with me on the latter point either one or two years ago), you may well be correct, but we cannot be of assistance to you in the purchase of bonds outside our area. We will simply have our hands full concentrating in our recommended area, so will be unavailable to assist or advise in the purchase of convertible bonds, corporate bonds or short term issues.
这封信将尝试对免税债券进行非常基础的介绍，重点讲解我们预计下个月帮助合伙人购买的债券类型和期限。如果您希望我们协助购买债券，务必仔细阅读（如有必要，反复阅读）这封信，它将为我建议的具体购买操作提供背景知识。如果您在债券类型或期限的结论上与我意见相左（要是在一两年前，您在期限问题上反对我，您可能是对的，我可能是错的 ），您很可能是正确的，但对于我们推荐范围之外的债券购买，我们无法提供帮助。我们将全力专注于推荐范围内的债券，因此无法为可转换债券、公司债券或短期债券的购买提供协助或建议。
I have tried to boil this letter down as much as possible. Some of it will be a little weighty - some a little oversimplified. I apologize for the shortcomings in advance. I have a feeling I am trying to put all the meat of a 100 page book in 10 pages - and have it read like the funny papers.
我已尽力精简这封信的内容。部分内容可能有些晦涩，有些又过于简化。在此，我先为这些不足之处致歉。我感觉自己像是要把一本 100 页书的精华浓缩在 10 页里，还得让它读起来像通俗读物一样轻松。
I am sure you understand that our aid in the purchase of bonds will involve no future assistance regarding either these specific bonds or general investment decisions. I want to be available at this time to be of help because of the unusual amount of cash you have received in one distribution from us. I have no desire to be in the investment counseling business, directly or indirectly, and will not be available for discussion of financial matters after March 31st.
我相信您能理解，我们对此次债券购买的协助，不涉及未来对这些特定债券或一般投资决策的后续支持。我希望此时能提供帮助，是因为您从我们的一次分配中收到了大量现金。我无意直接或间接地从事投资咨询业务，3 月 31 日后也不会再讨论财务问题。
The mechanics of Tax-Free Bonds.
免税债券的交易机制
For those who wish our help, we will arrange the purchase of bonds directly from municipal bond dealers throughout the country and have them confirm sale of the bonds directly to you. The confirmation should be saved as a basic document for tax purposes. You should not send a check to the bond dealer since he will deliver the bonds to your bank, along with a draft which the bank will pay by charging your account with them. In the case of bonds purchased in the secondary market (issues already outstanding), this settlement date will usually be about a week after confirmation date whereas, on new issues, the settlement date may be as much as a month later. The settlement date is shown plainly on the confirmation ticket (in the case of new issues this will be the second and final ticket rather than the preliminary “when issued” ticket), and you should have the funds at your bank ready to pay for the bonds on the settlement date. If you presently own Treasury Bills, they can be sold on a couple of days notice by your bank upon your instructions, so you should experience no problems in having the money available on time. Interest begins to accrue to you on the settlement date, even if the bond dealer is late in getting them delivered to your bank.
对于希望我们提供帮助的人，我们将安排从全国各地的市政债券交易商处直接购买债券，并让他们直接向您确认债券销售。该确认书应作为税务方面的基本文件妥善保存。您不应向债券交易商寄支票，因为他会将债券连同汇票交付给您的银行，银行会从您的账户扣款来支付汇票。对于在二级市场购买的债券（已发行的债券 ），结算日通常在确认日之后约一周；而新发行债券的结算日可能在一个月之后。结算日会在确认单上清晰标明（对于新发行债券，会在第二份也是最终的确认单上，而不是初步的 “发行时” 确认单 ），您应在结算日之前将资金存入银行，准备好支付债券款项。如果您目前持有美国国库券，可根据您的指示，让银行在接到通知后的几天内出售，这样您就能按时准备好资金。即使债券交易商延迟将债券交付给您的银行，利息也从结算日起开始计算。
Bonds will be delivered in negotiable form (so-called “bearer” form which makes them like currency) with coupons attached. Usually the bonds are in $5,000 denominations and frequently they can be exchanged for registered bonds (sometimes at considerable expense and sometimes free-it depends upon the terms). Bonds in registered form are nonnegotiable without assignment by you, since you are the registered owner on the Transfer Agent’s books. Bonds trade almost exclusively on a bearer basis and it is virtually impossible to sell registered bonds without converting them back into bearer form. Thus, unless you are going to own great physical quantities of bonds. I recommend keeping bonds in bearer form. This means keeping them in a very safe place and clipping the coupons every six months. Such coupons, when clipped, can be deposited in your bank account just like checks. If you have $250,000 in bonds, this probably means about fifty separate pieces of paper ($5,000 denominations) and perhaps six or eight trips a year to the safe deposit section to cut and deposit coupons.
债券将以可转让形式（即所谓的 “不记名” 形式，就像货币一样 ）交付，并附有息票。通常债券面值为 5000 美元，且往往可以换成记名债券（有时费用很高，有时免费，这取决于具体条款 ）。记名债券如果没有您的转让，就不可转让，因为您是过户代理人登记册上的记名所有者。债券几乎都是以不记名形式交易的，如果不转换回不记名形式，记名债券实际上很难出售。因此，除非您打算持有大量债券，否则我建议您将债券保持为不记名形式。这意味着要将它们妥善保管在安全的地方，每六个月剪下息票。剪下的息票可以像支票一样存入您的银行账户。如果您持有价值 25 万美元的债券，可能意味着约 50 张单独的票据（面值 5000 美元 ），每年可能需要去保险箱存放处六到八次，剪下并存入息票。
It is also possible to open a custody account with a bank where, for a fairly nominal cost, they will keep the bonds, collect the interest and preserve your records for you. For example, a bank will probably perform the custodial service for you for about $200 a year on a $250,000 portfolio. If you are interested in a custodial account, you should talk to a Trust Officer at your commercial bank as to the nature of their services and cost. Otherwise, you should have a safe deposit box.
您也可以在银行开设保管账户，银行会收取一笔相对较低的费用，为您保管债券、收取利息并保存记录。例如，对于价值 25 万美元的债券投资组合，银行可能每年收取约 200 美元的保管服务费。如果您对保管账户感兴趣，应该与您的商业银行信托专员沟通，了解其服务内容和费用。否则，您应该有一个保险箱。
Taxation
税务问题
The interest received upon the deposit of coupons from tax-free bonds is, of course, free from Federal Income Taxes. This means if you are at a 30% top Federal Income Tax bracket, a 6% return from tax-free bonds is equivalent to about 8-1/2% from taxable bonds. Thus, for most of our partners, excluding minors or some retired people, tax-free bonds will be more attractive than taxable bonds. For people with little or no income from wages or dividends, but with substantial capital, it is possible that a combination of taxable bonds (to bring taxable income up to about the 25% or 30% bracket) plus tax-free bonds will bring the highest total after-tax income. Where appropriate, we will work with you to achieve such a balance.
免税债券的息票存入银行后所获得的利息，当然免征联邦所得税。这意味着如果您处于联邦所得税最高 30% 的税率区间，免税债券 6% 的回报率相当于应税债券约 8.5% 的回报率。因此，对于我们的大多数合伙人（未成年人或一些退休人员除外 ），免税债券比应税债券更具吸引力。对于工资或股息收入很少或没有，但拥有大量资本的人来说，将应税债券（使应税收入达到约 25% 或 30% 的税率区间 ）和免税债券结合起来，可能会带来最高的税后总收入。在适当情况下，我们会与您合作以实现这种平衡。
The situation in respect to State Income Taxes is more complicated. In Nebraska. where the State Income Tax is computed as a percentage of the Federal Income Tax, the effect is that there is no state tax on interest from taxfree bonds. My understanding of both the New York and California law is that tax-free bonds of entities within the home state are not subject to State Income Tax, but tax-free bonds from other states are subject to the local State Income Tax. I also believe that the New York City Income Tax exempts tax-free bonds of entities based within the State of New York, but taxes those from other states. I am no expert on state income taxes and make no attempt to post myself on changes taking place within the various states or cities. Therefore, I defer to your local tax advisor, but simply mention these few general impressions so that you will be alert to the existence of a potential problem. In Nebraska there is no need to have any local considerations enter into the after-tax calculation. Where out-of-state issues are subject to local taxation, the effective cost of your State or Municipal Income Tax is reduced by the benefit received from deducting it on your Federal Income Tax return. This, of course, varies with the individual. Additionally, in some states there are various taxes on intangible property which may apply to all tax-free bonds or just those of out-of-state entities. There are none of these in Nebraska, but I cannot advise on the other states.
州所得税的情况更为复杂。在内布拉斯加州，州所得税是按联邦所得税的一定比例计算的，因此免税债券的利息无需缴纳州税。据我对纽约和加利福尼亚州法律的了解，本州实体发行的免税债券无需缴纳州所得税，但其他州发行的免税债券需缴纳当地州所得税。我还认为，纽约市所得税对纽约州内实体发行的免税债券免税，但对其他州的免税债券征税。我并非州所得税方面的专家，也无意关注各州或城市的相关法律变化。因此，我建议您咨询当地税务顾问，我只是提及这些大致印象，让您注意到可能存在的问题。在内布拉斯加州，税后计算无需考虑当地特殊情况。对于需缴纳当地税的州外债券，您在联邦所得税申报表中扣除州或市政所得税所带来的抵税优惠，会降低其实际税负。当然，这因个人情况而异。此外，在一些州，对无形资产有各种税收，可能适用于所有免税债券，或仅适用于州外实体发行的债券。内布拉斯加州没有这些税，但我无法为其他州提供建议。
When bonds are bought at a discount from par and later are sold or mature (come due and get paid), the difference between the proceeds and cost is subject to capital gain or loss treatment. (There are minor exceptions to this statement as, unfortunately, there are to most general statements on investments and taxes but they will be pointed out to you should they affect any securities we recommend). This reduces the net after-tax yield by a factor involving the general rate of future capital gains taxes and the specific future tax position of the individual. Later on, we will discuss the impact of such capital gains taxes in calculating the relativeattractiveness of discount bonds versus “full coupon” bonds.
当债券以低于面值的折扣价买入，之后出售或到期（到期并获得偿付 ）时，收益与成本之间的差额需按资本利得或损失处理。（此说法有一些小例外，遗憾的是，大多数关于投资和税收的一般性陈述都有例外情况，如果这些例外影响到我们推荐的任何证券，我们会向您指出 ）。这会根据未来资本利得税的一般税率以及个人未来的具体税务状况，降低税后净收益率。稍后，我们将讨论在计算折扣债券与 “全息票” 债券的相对吸引力时，此类资本利得税的影响。
Finally, one most important point. Although the law is not completely clear, you should probably not contemplate owning tax-free bonds if you have, or expect to have, general purpose bank or other indebtedness.
最后，一个非常重要的点。尽管法律规定并非完全明确，但如果您有或预计会有一般用途的银行贷款或其他债务，可能不应考虑持有免税债券。
The law excludes the deductibility of interest on loans incurred or continued to purchase or carry tax-free bonds, and the interpretation of this statute will probably tend to be broadened as the years pass. For example, my impression is that you have no problem if you have a mortgage against real property (unless the debt was incurred in order to acquire municipal bonds) in deducting the mortgage interest on your Federal Tax return, even though you own tax-free bonds at the same time. However, I believe that if you have a general bank loan, even though the proceeds were directly used to purchase stocks, a handball court, etc. and the tax-free bonds are not used for security for the loan, you are asking for trouble if you deduct the interest and, at the same time, are the owner of tax-free bonds. Therefore, I would pay off bank loans before owning tax-free bonds, but I leave detailed examination of this question to you and your tax advisor. I merely mention it to make you aware of the potential problem.
法律规定，为购买或持有免税债券而产生或持续的贷款利息不得扣除，并且随着时间推移，对该法规的解释可能会趋于宽泛。例如，我的理解是，如果您有一笔针对房地产的抵押贷款（除非该债务是为了购买市政债券而产生 ），即使您同时持有免税债券，在联邦纳税申报中仍可扣除抵押贷款利息。然而，我认为如果您有一笔一般银行贷款，即使贷款资金直接用于购买股票、手球场等，且免税债券并非该贷款的抵押物，但如果您在扣除贷款利息的同时持有免税债券，就可能会有麻烦。因此，我建议在持有免税债券之前还清银行贷款，但这个问题的详细审查工作留给您和您的税务顾问。我只是提及此事，让您意识到潜在的问题。
Marketability
可销售性
Tax-free bonds are materially different from common stocks or corporate bonds in that there are literally hundreds of thousands of issues, with the great majority having very few holders. This substantially inhibits the development of close, active markets. Whenever the City of New York or Philadelphia wants to raise money it sells perhaps twenty, thirty or forty non-identical securities, since it will offer an issue with that many different maturities. A 6% bond of New York coming due in 1980 is a different animal from a 6% bond of New York coming due in 1981. One cannot be exchanged for the other, and a seller has to find a buyer for the specific item he holds. When you consider that New York may offer bonds several times a year, it is easy to see why just this one city may have somewhere in the neighborhood of 1,000 issues outstanding. Grand Island, Nebraska may have 75 issues outstanding. The average amount of each issue might be $100,000 and the average number of holders may be six or eight per issue. Thus, it is absolutely impossible to have quoted markets at all times for all issues and spreads between bids and offers may be very wide. You can’t set forth in the morning to buy a specific Grand Island issue of your choosing. It may not be offered at any price, anywhere, and if you do find one seller, there is no reason why he has to be realistic compared to other offerings of similar quality. On the other hand, there are single issues such as those of the Ohio Turnpike, Illinois Turnpike, etc. that amount to $200 million or more and have thousands of bondholders owning a single entirely homogeneous and interchangeable issue. Obviously, here you get a high degree of marketability.
免税债券与普通股或公司债券有很大不同，免税债券发行数量多达几十万种，且绝大多数债券的持有人很少。这极大地阻碍了紧密、活跃市场的形成。每当纽约市或费城想要筹集资金时，可能会出售二十、三十或四十种不同的证券，因为它们会发行具有多种不同期限的债券。1980 年到期的纽约市 6% 债券与 1981 年到期的纽约市 6% 债券是不同的品种，两者不能互换，卖方必须为自己持有的特定债券找到买家。想想纽约市可能一年发行几次债券，就很容易明白为什么仅这一个城市就可能有大约 1000 种已发行债券。内布拉斯加州的格兰德艾兰可能有 75 种已发行债券。每种债券的平均发行额可能是 10 万美元，平均持有人数可能是每种六到八人。因此，根本不可能随时为所有债券提供报价，买卖价差可能很大。您不能早上决定去购买自己选定的格兰德艾兰的某种债券，它可能在任何地方都没有报价，即便您找到一个卖家，也不能保证他的报价与其他类似质量债券的报价相符。另一方面，也有一些单一债券，如俄亥俄收费公路、伊利诺伊收费公路等发行的债券，规模达 2 亿美元或更多，且有成千上万的债券持有人持有完全相同且可互换的债券。显然，这类债券的可销售性很高。
My impression is that marketability is generally a function of the following three items, in descending order of importance: (1) the size of the particular issue; (2) the size of the issuer (a $100,000 issue of the State of Ohio will be more marketable than a $100,000 issue of Podunk, Ohio); and (3) the quality of the issuer. By far the most sales effort goes into the selling of new issues of bonds. An average of over $200 million per week of new issues comes up for sale, and the machinery of bond distribution is geared to get them sold, large or small. In my opinion, there is frequently insufficient differential in yield at time of issue for the marketability differences that will exist once the initial sales push is terminated. We have frequently run into markets in bonds where the spread between bid and asked prices may get to 15%. There is no need to buy bonds with the potential for such grotesque markets (although the profit spread to the dealer who originally offers them is frequently wider than on more marketable bonds) and we will not be buying them for you. The bonds we expect to buy will usually tend to have spreads (reflecting the difference between what you would pay net for such bonds on purchase and receive net on sale at the same point in time) of from 2% to 5%. Such a spread would be devastating if you attempted to trade in such bonds, but I don’t believe it should be a deterrent for a long-term investor. The real necessity is to stay away from bonds of very limited marketability - which frequently are the type local bond dealers have the greatest monetary incentive to push.
在我看来，可销售性通常取决于以下三个因素，按重要性从高到低排列：（1）特定债券的发行规模；（2）发行主体的规模（俄亥俄州发行的 10 万美元债券比俄亥俄州某个小镇发行的 10 万美元债券更具可销售性 ）；（3）发行主体的信用质量。到目前为止，新发行债券的销售投入最大。每周平均有超过 2 亿美元的新债券待售，债券分销机制也围绕着将它们销售出去而运转，无论规模大小。在我看来，新债券发行时，其收益率差异往往不足以体现初始销售热潮结束后可能出现的可销售性差异。我们经常遇到债券市场中买卖价差达到 15% 的情况。没必要购买可能面临这种异常市场的债券（尽管最初出售这些债券的交易商的利润空间往往比可销售性更好的债券更大 ），我们也不会为您购买此类债券。我们预计购买的债券价差（反映您购买此类债券的净支付价格与同一时间出售的净收入价格之间的差异 ）通常在 2% 到 5% 之间。如果您试图交易此类债券，这样的价差可能会造成损失，但我认为对于长期投资者来说，这不应该成为阻碍。真正要避免的是购买可销售性非常有限的债券，而这类债券往往是当地债券交易商最有经济动力推销的。
Specific Areas of Purchase
具体购买领域
We will probably concentrate our purchases in the following general areas:
我们可能会将购买重点集中在以下大致领域：
(1) Large revenue-producing public entities such as toll roads, electric power districts, water districts, etc.
(1) 大型创收公共实体：如收费公路、电力区、水区等发行的债券。
Many of these issues possess high marketability, are subject to quantitative analysis, and sometimes have favorable sinking fund or other factors which tend not to receive full valuation in the market place.
许多此类债券可销售性高，可进行定量分析，有时还具有有利的偿债基金或其他因素，而这些因素在市场上可能未得到充分估值。
(2) Industrial Development Authority bonds which arise when a public entity holds title to property leased to a private corporation. For example, Lorain, Ohio holds title to an $80 million project for U.S. Steel Corp. The Development Authority Board issued bonds to pay for the project and has executed a net and absolute lease with U.S. Steel to cover the bond payments. The credit of the city or state is not behind the bonds and they are only as good as the company that is on the lease. Many top-grade corporations stand behind an aggregate of several billion dollars of these obligations, although new ones are being issued only in small amounts ($5 million per project or less) because of changes in the tax laws. For a period of time there was a very substantial prejudice against such issues, causing them to sell at yields considerably higher than those commensurate with their inherent credit standing. This prejudice has tended to diminish, reducing the premium yields available, but I still consider it a most attractive field. Our insurance company owns a majority of its bonds in this category.
(2) 工业发展管理局债券：当公共实体持有租赁给私营公司的财产所有权时会发行此类债券。例如，俄亥俄州洛兰市为美国钢铁公司持有一个价值 8000 万美元项目的所有权。发展管理局委员会发行债券为该项目融资，并与美国钢铁公司签订了净租赁和绝对租赁协议，以支付债券款项。此类债券没有城市或州的信用担保，其质量仅取决于租赁协议中的公司。许多顶级公司为总计几十亿美元的此类债务提供支持，不过由于税法变更，新发行的此类债券规模较小（每个项目 500 万美元或更少 ）。曾有一段时间，市场对此类债券存在很大偏见，导致其收益率远高于与其内在信用状况相符的水平。这种偏见已有所减轻，溢价收益率也随之降低，但我仍认为这是一个极具吸引力的领域。我们的保险公司持有的债券大多属于这一类。
(3) Public Housing Authority Issues for those of you who wish the very highest grade of tax-free bonds. In effect, these bonds bear the guarantee of the U.S. Government, so they are all rated AAA. In states where local taxes put a premium on buying in-state issues, and I can’t fill your needs from (1) and (2) , my tendency would be to put you into Housing Authority issues rather than try to select from among credits that I don’t understand. If you direct me to buy obligations of your home state, you should expect substantial quantities of Housing Authority issues. There is no need to diversify among such issues, as they all represent the top credit available.
(3) 公共住房管理局债券：适合那些希望购买最高等级免税债券的合伙人。实际上，此类债券由美国政府担保，因此评级均为 AAA。在一些州，当地税收政策使购买本州债券更具优势，且如果我无法从第（1）和（2）类债券中满足您的需求，我倾向于为您购买住房管理局债券，而不是从那些我不了解其信用状况的债券中挑选。如果您要求我购买您所在州的债券，您应该预期会有大量住房管理局债券。此类债券无需分散投资，因为它们都代表着顶级信用。
(4) State obligations of a direct or indirect nature.
(4) 直接或间接性质的州政府债券。
You will notice I am not buying issues of large cities. I don’t have the faintest idea how to analyze a New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, etc. (a friend mentioned the other day when Newark was trying to sell bonds at a very fancy rate that the Mafia was getting very upset because Newark was giving them a bad name). Your analysis of a New York City - and I admit it is hard to imagine them not paying their bills for any extended period of time - would be as good as mine. My approach to bonds is pretty much like my approach to stocks. If I can’t understand something, I tend to forget it. Passing an opportunity which I don’t understand - even if someone else is perceptive enough to analyze it and get paid well for doing it - doesn’t bother me. All I want to be sure of is that I get paid well for the things I do feel capable of handling - and that I am right when I make affirmative decisions.
您会注意到我不购买大城市发行的债券。我完全不知道如何分析纽约市、芝加哥、费城等城市（前几天有个朋友提到，纽瓦克试图以很高的利率出售债券时，黑手党非常不满，因为纽瓦克给他们带来了坏名声 ）。您对纽约市的分析 —— 我承认很难想象它们会长时间拖欠债务 —— 可能和我的一样好。我对待债券的方式与对待股票差不多。如果我不理解某个东西，往往就会忽略它。错过一个我不理解的机会 —— 即使别人有足够的洞察力去分析它并从中获利 —— 也不会困扰我。我只想确保自己能从有能力处理的事情中获得丰厚回报，并且在做出肯定决策时是正确的。
We will probably tend to purchase somewhere between five and ten issues for most of you. However, if you wish to limit me to your home state, it may be fewer issues - and perhaps those will only be Housing Authorities. We will try not to buy in smaller than $25,000 pieces and will prefer larger amounts where appropriate. Smaller lots of bonds are usually penalized upon resale, sometimes substantially. The bond salesman doesn’t usually explain this to you when you buy the $10,000 of bonds from him, but it gets explained when you later try to sell the $10,000 to him. We may make exceptions where we are buying secondary market issues in smaller pieces - but only if we are getting an especially good price on the buy side because of the small size of the offering.
我们可能会为大多数合伙人购买五到十种债券。不过，如果您因当地税务原因希望我仅限于购买您所在州的债券，债券种类可能会更少，也许只有住房管理局债券。我们尽量不会购买低于 2.5 万美元的债券，合适的话会倾向于更大的金额。小额债券在转售时通常会受到不利影响，有时影响还很大。债券销售人员在您从他那里购买 1 万美元债券时，通常不会向您解释这一点，但当您稍后试图将这 1 万美元债券卖给他时，他就会说明了。如果我们因债券出售规模小而在二级市场以较低价格购买小额债券，可能会有例外情况，但前提是我们能因购买规模小而获得特别优惠的价格。
Callable Bonds
可赎回债券
We will not buy bonds where the issuer of the bonds has a right to call (retire) the bonds on a basis which substantially loads the contract in his favor. It is amazing to me to see people buy bonds which are due in forty years, but where the issuer has the right to call the bonds at a tiny premium in five or ten years. Such a contract essentially means that you have made a forty year deal if it is advantageous to the issuer (and disadvantageous to you) and a five year deal if the initial contract turns out to be advantageous to you (and disadvantageous to the issuer). Such contracts are really outrageous and exist because bond investors can’t think through the implications of such a contract form and bond dealers don’t insist on better terms for their customers. One extremely interesting fact is that bonds with very unattractive call features sell at virtually the same yield as otherwise identical bonds which are noncallable.
我们不会购买发行人有权以对其极为有利的条件赎回（收回 ）的债券。我很惊讶地看到，人们购买期限为四十年的债券，但发行人却有权在五到十年后仅支付少量溢价就赎回债券。这样的合同本质上意味着，如果对发行人有利（对您不利 ），您就做了一个四十年的交易；如果最初的合同对您有利（对发行人不利 ），您就做了一个五年的交易。这样的合同实在不合理，之所以存在，是因为债券投资者无法透彻理解这种合同形式的影响，而债券交易商也没有为客户争取更好的条款。一个非常有趣的事实是，具有极不合理赎回条款的债券，其收益率几乎与其他方面相同但不可赎回的债券相同。
It should be pointed out that most Nebraska bonds carry highly unfair call provisions. Despite this severe contractual disadvantage, they do not offer higher yields than bonds with more equitable terms.
需要指出的是，大多数内布拉斯加州的债券都带有极不公平的赎回条款。尽管存在这种严重的合同劣势，但它们的收益率并不比条款更公平的债券高。
One way to avoid this problem is to buy bonds which are totally noncallable. Another way is to buy discount bonds where the right of the issuer to call the bond is at a price so far above your cost as to render the possible call inconsequential. If you buy a bond at 60 which is callable at 103, the effective cost to you of granting the issuer the right to prematurely terminate the contract (which is a right you never have) is insignificant. But to buy a bond of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power at 100 to come due at 100 in 1999 or to come due at 104 in 1974, depending on which is to the advantage of the issuer and to your disadvantage, is the height of foolishness when comparable yields are available on similar credits without such an unfair contract. Nevertheless, just such a bond was issued in October, 1969 and similar bonds continue to be issued every day. I only write at such length about an obvious point, since it is apparent from the continual sale of such bonds that many investors haven’t the faintest notion how this loads the dice against them and many bond salesmen aren’t about to tell them.
避免这个问题的一种方法是购买完全不可赎回的债券。另一种方法是购买折扣债券，发行人赎回债券的价格远高于您的购买成本，使得可能的赎回变得无关紧要。如果您以 60 的价格购买一种可按 103 赎回的债券，授予发行人提前终止合同的权利（您永远没有这种权利 ）对您来说实际成本微不足道。但是，以 100 的价格购买洛杉矶水电局发行的债券，它可能在 1999 年按 100 到期，也可能在 1974 年按 104 到期，具体取决于哪种情况对发行人有利、对您不利，而在有类似信用且没有这种不公平合同的债券能提供相同收益率的情况下，这样做就太愚蠢了。尽管如此，1969 年 10 月仍发行了这样的债券，而且类似的债券每天都在发行。我之所以对这个明显的问题长篇大论，是因为从这类债券不断被出售的情况来看，显然许多投资者根本不知道这种条款对他们多么不利，而许多债券销售人员也无意告知他们。
Maturity and the Mathematics of Bonds
期限与债券数学
Many people, in buying bonds, select maturities based on how long they think they are going to want to hold bonds, how long they are going to live, etc. While this is not a silly approach, it is not necessarily the most logical. The primary determinants in selection of maturity should probably be (1) the shape of the yield curve; (2) your expectations regarding future levels of interest rates and (3) the degree of quotational fluctuation you are willing to endure or hope to possibly profit from. Of course, (2) is the most important but by far the most difficult upon which to comment intelligently.
许多人在购买债券时，会根据自己认为想要持有债券的时长、自己的寿命等因素来选择期限。虽然这种方法并非不合理，但不一定是最合乎逻辑的。选择期限的主要决定因素可能是：（1）收益率曲线的形状；（2）您对未来利率水平的预期；（3）您愿意承受或希望从中获利的报价波动程度。当然，（2）是最重要的，但也是最难给出明智评论的。
Let’s tackle the yield curve first. When other aspects of quality are identical, there will be a difference in interest rates paid based upon the length of the bond being offered. For example, a top grade bond being offered now might have a yield of 4.75% if it came due in six or nine months, 5.00% in two years, 5.25% in five years, 5.50% in ten years and 6.25% in twenty years. When long rates are substantially higher than short rates, the curve is said to be strongly positive. In the U. S. Government bond market, rates recently have tended to produce a negative yield curve; that is, a long term Government bond over the last year or so has consistently yielded less than a short term one. Sometimes the yield curve has been very flat, and sometimes it is positive out to a given point, such as ten years, and then flattens out. What you should understand is that it varies, often very substantially, and that on an historical basis the present slope tends to be in the high positive range. This doesn’t mean that long bonds are going to be worth more but it does mean that you are being paid more to extend maturity than in many periods. If yields remained constant for several years, you would do better with longer bonds than shorter bonds, regardless of how long you intended to hold them.
我们先来看看收益率曲线。当债券的其他质量方面相同时，根据发行债券的期限长短，支付的利率会有所不同。例如，目前发行的顶级债券，如果期限为六到九个月，收益率可能为 4.75%；两年期的为 5.00%；五年期的为 5.25%；十年期的为 5.50%；二十年期的为 6.25%。当长期利率大幅高于短期利率时，收益率曲线被称为强正向。在美国政府债券市场，近期利率往往形成负收益率曲线，也就是说，在过去一年左右的时间里，长期政府债券的收益率一直低于短期政府债券。有时收益率曲线非常平缓，有时在某个期限（如十年 ）之前呈正向，然后趋于平缓。您应该明白，收益率曲线会变化，而且往往变化很大，从历史数据来看，目前的斜率往往处于较高的正向区间。这并不意味着长期债券的价值会更高，但意味着与许多时期相比，延长债券期限能获得更高的收益。如果收益率在几年内保持不变，无论您打算持有多久，长期债券的收益都会比短期债券更好。
The second factor in determining maturity selection is expectations regarding future rate levels. Anyone who has done much predicting in this field has tended to look very foolish very fast. I did not regard rates as unattractive one year ago, and I was proved very wrong almost immediately. I believe present rates are not unattractive and I may look foolish again. Nevertheless, a decision has to be made and you can make just as great a mistake if you buy short term securities now and rates available on reinvestment in a few years are much lower.
决定期限选择的第二个因素是对未来利率水平的预期。在这个领域做过大量预测的人，往往很快就会显得很愚蠢。一年前，我认为利率水平并非没有吸引力，但很快就被证明大错特错。我认为目前的利率水平并非没有吸引力，也许我又会显得很愚蠢。尽管如此，还是得做出决定，而且如果您现在购买短期证券，几年后再投资时利率大幅降低，您也可能犯大错。
The final factor involves your tolerance for quotational fluctuation. This involves the mathematics of bond investment and may be a little difficult for you to understand. Nevertheless, it is important that you get a general grasp of the principles. Let’s assume for the moment a perfectly flat yield curve and a non-callable bond. Further assume present rates are 5% and that you buy two bonds, one due in two years and one due in twenty years. Now assume one year later that yields on new issues have gone to 3% and that you wish to sell your bonds. Forgetting about market spreads, commissions, etc. , you will receive $1,019.60 for the original two year $1,000 bond (now with one year to run) and $1,288.10 for the nineteen year bond (originally twenty years). At these prices, a purchaser will get exactly 3% on his money after amortizing the premium he has paid and cashing the stream of 5% coupons attached to each bond. It is a matter of indifference to him whether to buy your nineteen year 5% bond at $1,288.10 or a new 3% bond (which we have assumed is the rate current - one year later) at $1,000.00. On the other hand, let’s assume rates went to 7%. Again we will ignore commissions, capital gains taxes on the discount, etc. Now the buyer will only pay $981.00 for the bond with one year remaining until maturity and $791.60 for the bond with nineteen years left. Since he can get 7% on new issues, he is only willing to buy your bond at a discount sufficient so that accrual of this discount will give him the same economic benefits from your 5% coupon that a 7% coupon at $1,000.00 would give him.
最后一个因素涉及您对报价波动的容忍度。这涉及债券投资的数学原理，您可能有点难以理解。不过，您大致掌握这些原理很重要。我们暂时假设收益率曲线完全平坦，且债券不可赎回。进一步假设当前利率为 5%，您购买两种债券，一种两年到期，一种二十年到期。现在假设一年后，新发行债券的收益率变为 3%，您想出售手中的债券。忽略市场价差、佣金等因素，您最初面值 1000 美元的两年期债券（现在还剩一年到期 ）将卖得 1019.60 美元，十九年期债券（最初为二十年期 ）将卖得 1288.10 美元。在这些价格下，购买者在摊销溢价并兑现每张债券附带的 5% 息票后，将获得 3% 的收益率。对他来说，以 1288.10 美元购买您的十九年期 5% 债券，与以 1000.00 美元购买新发行的 3% 债券（我们假设这是一年后的当前利率 ）没有区别。另一方面，假设利率变为 7%。同样，我们忽略佣金、折扣债券的资本利得税等因素。现在，购买者只会为距离到期还有一年的债券支付 981.00 美元，为还剩 19 年到期的债券支付 791.60 美元。因为他能从新发行债券中获得 7% 的收益，所以他只愿意以足够的折扣购买您的债券，这样债券折扣的增值能让他从您 5% 息票中获得的经济收益，与以 1000.00 美元购买 7% 息票债券所获收益相同。
The principle is simple. The wider the swings in interest rates and the longer the bond, the more the value of a bond can go up or down on an interim basis before maturity. It should be pointed out in the first example where rates went to 3%, our long term bond would only have appreciated to about $1,070.00 if it had been callable in five years at par, although it would have gone down just as much if 7% rates had occurred. This just illustrates the inherent unfairness of call provisions.
原理很简单。利率波动幅度越大，债券期限越长，在到期前债券价值的涨跌幅度就可能越大。需要指出的是，在利率降至 3% 的第一个例子中，如果长期债券在五年内可按面值赎回，其增值幅度只会达到约 1070.00 美元，不过在利率升至 7% 的情况下，其跌幅也会相同。这只是说明了赎回条款固有的不公平性。
For over two decades, interest rates on tax-free bonds have almost continuously gone higher and buyers of long term bonds have continuously suffered. This does not mean it is bad now to buy long term bonds - it simply means that the illustration in the above paragraph has worked in only one direction for a long period of time and people are much more conscious of the downside risks from higher rates than the upside potential from lower ones.
在过去二十多年里，免税债券的利率几乎持续上升，长期债券的购买者不断遭受损失。这并不意味着现在购买长期债券是错误的，只是说明上述例子中的情况在很长一段时间里只朝着一个方向发展，人们更关注利率上升带来的下行风险，而非利率下降带来的上行潜力。
If it is a 50-50 chance as to the future general level of interest rates and the yield curve is substantially positive, then the odds are better in buying long term non-callable bonds than shorter term ones. This reflects my current conclusion and, therefore, I intend to buy bonds within the ten to twenty-five year range. If you have any preferences within that range, we will try to select bonds reflecting such preferences, but if you are interested in shorter term bonds, we will not be able to help you as we are not searching out bonds in this area.
如果未来利率总体水平上升或下降的可能性各占一半，且收益率曲线呈明显正向，那么购买长期不可赎回债券比短期债券更有利。这反映了我目前的结论，因此，我打算购买期限在 10 到 25 年的债券。如果您在这个期限范围内有偏好，我们会尽量选择符合您偏好的债券，但如果您对短期债券感兴趣，我们无法提供帮助，因为我们不关注这个领域的债券。
Before you decide to buy a twenty year bond, go back and read the paragraph showing how prices change based upon changes in interest rates. Of course, if you hold the bond straight through, you are going to get the contracted rate of interest, but if you sell earlier, you are going to be subject to the mathematical forces described in that paragraph, for better or for worse. Bond prices also change because of changes in quality over the years but, in the tax-free area, this has tended to be - and probably will continue to be - a relatively minor factor compared to the impact of changes in the general structure of interest rates.
在您决定购买二十年期债券之前，请回头再读一下关于利率变化如何影响债券价格的段落。当然，如果您一直持有债券直至到期，就能获得合同约定的利率，但如果您提前出售，就会受到该段落中所述数学因素的影响，可能有利，也可能不利。债券价格也会因多年来信用质量的变化而改变，但在免税债券领域，与利率总体结构变化的影响相比，这往往是 —— 而且可能会继续是 —— 一个相对次要的因素。
Discount Versus Full Coupon Bonds
折扣债券与全息票债券
You will have noticed in the above discussion that if you now wanted to buy a 7% return on a nineteen year bond, you had a choice between buying a new nineteen year bond with a 7% coupon rate or buying a bond with a 5% coupon at $791.60, which would pay you $1,000.00 in nineteen years. Either purchase would have yielded exactly 7% compounded semi-annually to you. Mathematically, they are the same. In the case of tax-free bonds the equation is complicated, however, by the fact that the $70.00 coupon is entirely tax-free to you, whereas the bond purchased at a discount gives you tax-free income of $50.00 per year but a capital gain at the end of the nineteenth year of $208.40. Under the present tax law, you would owe anything from a nominal tax, if the gain from realization of the discount was your only taxable income in the nineteenth year, up to a tax of over $70.00 if it came on top of very large amounts of capital gain at that time (the new tax law provides for capital gain rates of 35%, and even slightly higher on an indirect basis in 1972 and thereafter for those realizing very large gains.) In addition to this, you might have some state taxes to pay on the capital gain.
您可能已经注意到，在上述讨论中，如果您现在想购买一种期限为十九年、收益率为 7% 的债券，您有两种选择：一是购买息票率为 7% 的新发行十九年期债券；二是购买息票率为 5%、价格为 791.60 美元的债券，该债券在十九年后将支付给您 1000.00 美元。无论哪种购买方式，对您来说都能获得半年复利一次、精确为 7% 的收益率。从数学角度看，两者是一样的。然而，对于免税债券，这个等式会变得复杂，因为 70.00 美元的息票对您来说完全免税，而以折扣价购买的债券每年为您提供 50.00 美元的免税收入，但在十九年末会产生 208.40 美元的资本利得。根据现行税法，如果在十九年中实现折扣的收益是您唯一的应税收入，您只需缴纳很少的税；但如果那时您还有大量资本利得，纳税额可能会超过 70.00 美元（新税法规定资本利得税率为 35%，对于实现大量收益的人，在 1972 年及以后，间接税率甚至会略高 ）。除此之外，您可能还需为资本利得缴纳一些州税。
Obviously, under these circumstances you are not going to pay the $791.60 for the 5% coupon and feel you are equally as well off as with the 7% coupon at $1,000.00. Neither is anyone else. Therefore, identical quality securities with identical maturities sell at considerably higher gross yields when they have low coupons and are priced at discounts than if they bear current high coupons.
显然，在这种情况下，您不会认为花 791.60 美元购买息票率为 5% 的债券，与花 1000.00 美元购买息票率为 7% 的债券能带来同样的收益。其他人也不会这么认为。因此，期限相同、质量相同的证券，当息票率较低且以折扣价出售时，其总收益率会明显高于息票率高的债券。
Interestingly enough, for most taxpayers, such higher gross yields over-compensate for the probable tax to be paid. This is due to several factors. First, no one knows what the tax law will be when the bonds mature and it is both natural and probably correct to assume the tax rate will be stiffer at that time than now. Second, even though a 5% coupon on a $1,000.00 bond purchased at $791.60 due in nineteen years is the equivalent of a 7% coupon on a $1,000.00 bond purchased at par with the same maturity, people prefer to get the higher current return in their pocket. The owner of the 5% coupon bond is only getting around 6.3% current yield on his $791.60 with the balance necessary to get him up to 7% coming from the extra $208.40 he picks up at the end. Finally, the most important factor affecting prices currently on discount bonds (and which will keep affecting them) is that banks have been taken out of the market as buyers of discount tax-free bonds by changes brought about in bank tax treatment through the 1969 Tax Reform Act. Banks have historically been the largest purchasers and owners of tax-free bonds and anything that precludes them from one segment of the market has dramatic effects on the supply-demand situation in that segment. This may tend to give some edge to individuals in the discount tax-free market, particularly those who are not likely to be in a high tax bracket when the bonds mature or are sold.
有趣的是，对于大多数纳税人来说，这种较高的总收益率足以弥补可能缴纳的税款。这有几个原因。首先，没人知道债券到期时税法会怎样，而且很自然也很可能正确的是，那时的税率会比现在更高。其次，尽管以 791.60 美元购买的面值 1000.00 美元、期限为十九年、息票率为 5% 的债券，与以面值 1000.00 美元购买的相同期限、息票率为 7% 的债券在收益率上是等效的，但人们更喜欢将较高的当前收益拿到手。息票率为 5% 的债券所有者，其 791.60 美元投资的当前收益率约为 6.3%，剩下达到 7% 收益率所需的收益来自十九年末获得的额外 208.40 美元。最后，目前影响折扣债券价格（且会持续产生影响 ）的最重要因素是，1969 年《税收改革法案》对银行税收处理的变更，使银行不再是折扣免税债券的购买者。从历史上看，银行一直是免税债券的最大购买者和持有者，任何将银行排除在某个市场细分领域之外的举措，都会对该领域的供需状况产生显著影响。这可能会让个人在折扣免税债券市场上获得一些优势，尤其是那些在债券到期或出售时不太可能处于高税率区间的个人。
If I can get a significantly higher effective after-tax yield (allowing for sensible estimates of your particular future tax rate possibilities), I intend to purchase discount bonds for you. I know some partners prefer full coupon bonds, even though their effective yield is less, since they prefer to maximize the current cash yield and if they will so advise me, we will stick to full coupon issues (or very close thereto) in their cases.
如果我能为您买到有效税后收益率显著更高的债券（考虑到对您未来特定税率可能性的合理估算 ），我打算为您购买折扣债券。我知道有些合伙人更喜欢全息票债券，尽管其有效收益率较低，因为他们希望最大化当前现金收益率。如果他们告知我这种偏好，我们会为他们购买全息票债券（或非常接近的债券 ）。
Procedure
操作流程
I intend to be in the office solidly through March (including every Saturday except March 7th) and will be glad to see any partner or talk with him by phone. To aid in scheduling, please make an appointment with Gladys (or me). The only request I make is that you absorb as much as possible of this letter before we talk. As you can see, it would be an enormous problem if I had to explain each item to all of you.
我打算整个 3 月都在办公室（包括除 3 月 7 日之外的每个周六 ），很乐意与任何合伙人见面或电话沟通。为便于安排时间，请与格拉迪斯（或我）预约。我唯一的请求是，在我们交谈之前，您尽可能充分理解这封信的内容。如您所见，如果我必须向所有人逐一解释每个要点，那将是个大问题。
If you decide you want us to help you in buying bonds, you should let us know:
如果您决定希望我们协助购买债券，应告知我们：
(1) Whether you want to restrict purchases to your home state for local tax reasons;
出于当地税务原因，您是否希望将购买范围限制在您所在的州；
(2) Whether you want to restrict us to full coupon issues or let us use our judgment as to where you get the best value;
您是希望我们只购买全息票债券，还是让我们根据判断为您选择最具价值的债券；
(3) Your preference as to maturity in the ten to twenty-five year range or if you prefer to let us use our judgment in that area;
您对 10 到 25 年期限范围的偏好，或者您是否希望我们在该领域自行判断；
(4) How much you want to invest - we may end up several per cent short of the figure you name, but we will never go over;
您想要投资的金额 —— 最终投资金额可能会比您告知的金额少几个百分点，但绝不会超出；
(5) On what bank the bonds should be drafted.
债券应通过哪家银行付款。
We will advise you by phone or letter as we buy bonds. Bill and John will be doing much of the mechanical work. Needless to say, none of us will have any financial interest in any transaction. Should you have any questions regarding the mechanics, please direct them to John or Bill as I will probably be swamped and they will be more familiar with specific transactions. After March 31st, I don’t expect to be around the office for several months. Therefore, if you want to talk things over, come in by then. The completion of all purchases may go into April, but Bill will be taking care of this and the mechanics will all be set up.
我们在购买债券时会通过电话或信件通知您。比尔和约翰将负责大部分具体工作。不用说，我们任何人都不会从任何交易中获取经济利益。如果您对操作流程有任何疑问，请向约翰或比尔咨询，因为我可能会非常忙，而他们对具体交易更熟悉。3 月 31 日后，我预计有几个月不在办公室。因此，如果您想商量事情，请在那之前来。所有购买工作可能会持续到 4 月，但比尔会负责处理，相关操作流程也都会安排好。
You should realize that because of the enormous diversity of issues mentioned earlier, it is impossible to say just what will be bought. Sometimes the tax-free bond market has more similarities to real estate than to stocks. There are hundreds of thousands of items of varying comparability, some with no sellers, some with reluctant sellers and some with eager sellers. Which may be the best buy depends on the quality of what is being offered, how well it fits your needs and the eagerness of the seller. The standard of comparison is always new issues where an average of several hundred million dollars worth have to be sold each week - however, specific secondary market opportunities (issues already outstanding) may be more attractive than new issues and we can only find out how attractive they are when we are ready to make bids.
您应该明白，由于前文提到的债券种类极为多样，无法确切说会购买哪些债券。有时，免税债券市场与房地产市场的相似之处比与股票市场的更多。这里有成千上万种可比性各异的债券，有些没有卖家，有些卖家不情愿，有些卖家很积极。哪种债券最值得购买，取决于所售债券的质量、是否符合您的需求以及卖家的积极性。比较的标准通常是新发行债券，每周平均有几亿美元的新债券需要出售。不过，特定的二级市场机会（已发行债券 ）可能比新发行债券更具吸引力，而我们只有在准备出价时才能知道它们的吸引力有多大。
Although markets can change, it looks as if we will have no difficulty in getting in the area of 6-1/2% after tax (except from Housing Authority issues) on bonds in the twenty-year maturity range.
尽管市场可能变化，但看起来我们应该能顺利买到期限为二十年左右、税后收益率达到 6.5% 左右的债券（住房管理局债券除外 ）。
Cordially,
诚挚的，
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
WEBI glk
1970 年信件（二）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP. LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
610 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA, NEBRASKA 68131
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号 68131
TELEPHONE 042 - 4110
电话 042-4110
April 3th, 1970
1970 年 4 月 3 日
To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股东：
Four years ago your management committed itself to the development of more substantial and more consistent earning power than appeared possible if capital continued to be invested exclusively in the textile industry. The funds for this program were temporarily utilized in marketable securities, pending the acquisition of operating businesses meeting our investment and management criteria.
四年前，公司管理层致力于开发比单纯将资金持续投入纺织行业更可观、更稳定的盈利能力。在收购符合我们投资和管理标准的运营企业之前，用于该计划的资金暂时投资于有价证券。
This policy has proved reasonably successful—particularly when contrasted with results achieved by firms which have continued to commit large sums to textile expansion in the face of totally inadequate returns. We have been able to conclude two major purchases of operating businesses, and their successful operations enabled Berkshire Hathaway to achieve an over-all return of more than 10% on average stockholders’ equity last year in the face of less than a 5% return from the portion of our capital employed in the textile business. We have liquidated our entire holdings of marketable securities over the last two years at a profit of more than $5 million after taxes. These gains provided important funds to facilitate our major purchase of 1969, when borrowed money to finance acquisitions was generally most difficult to obtain.
事实证明，这一策略相当成功 —— 尤其是与那些在回报率极低的情况下仍继续投入大量资金用于纺织业务扩张的公司所取得的业绩相比。我们已成功完成了两项对运营企业的重大收购，这些企业的成功运营使得伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司去年的平均股东权益总体回报率超过 10%，而我们投入纺织业务的那部分资金回报率却不到 5%。在过去两年里，我们已全部清仓有价证券，税后获利超过 500 万美元。这些收益为我们在 1969 年的重大收购提供了重要资金支持，因为当时通过借款为收购项目融资普遍极为困难。
We anticipate no further purchases of marketable securities, but our search for desirable acquisitions continues. Any acquisition will, of course, be dependent upon obtaining appropriate financing.
我们预计不会再购买有价证券，但会继续寻找理想的收购目标。当然，任何收购都将取决于能否获得合适的融资。
Textile Operations
纺织业务
Dollar sales volume in 1969 was approximately 12% below 1968. Net earnings were slightly higher despite substantial operating losses incurred in the termination of our Box Loom Division. Earnings on capital employed improved modestly but still remain unsatisfactory despite strenuous efforts toward improvement.
1969 年的美元销售额比 1968 年大约低 12%。尽管在关闭箱式织机部门时产生了大量运营亏损，但净利润仍略有增长。尽管我们为改善经营付出了巨大努力，所投入资本的收益虽有小幅提升，但仍然不尽如人意。
We are presently in the midst of a textile recession of greater intensity than we have seen for some years. There is an over-all lack of demand for textile products in a great many end uses. This lack of demand has required curtailment of production to avoid inventory build-up. Both our Menswear Lining Division and Home Fabrics Division have been forced to schedule two-week shutdowns during the first quarter of 1970, but inventories remain on the high side. The slowdown in demand appears even greater than that normally occurring in the cyclical textile market. Recovery from this cycle will probably be dependent upon Federal Government action on economic factors they can control.
目前，我们正处于一场比过去几年更为严重的纺织业衰退之中。在许多最终用途方面，对纺织产品的整体需求不足。由于需求不足，我们不得不削减产量以避免库存积压。我们的男装衬里部门和家用纺织品部门都被迫在 1970 年第一季度安排了为期两周的停产，但库存水平依然偏高。需求放缓的程度似乎比纺织市场周期性波动中通常出现的情况更为严重。从这一周期中复苏，可能依赖于联邦政府对其所能控制的经济因素采取的行动。
We have concentrated our textile operations in those areas that appear, from historical performance and from our market projections, to be potentially satisfactory businesses. Improvements have been made in our mill operations which, under better industry conditions, should produce substantial cost reductions. However, the present picture is for lower profits in this business during 1970.
我们已将纺织业务集中在那些从历史业绩和市场预测来看有潜力取得良好效益的领域。我们对工厂运营进行了改进，在行业状况改善的情况下，这些改进应能大幅降低成本。然而，目前看来，20 世纪 70 年代该业务的利润将会下降。
Insurance Operations
保险业务
Jack Ringwalt and his outstanding management group turned in new records in just about every department during 1969. During another year in which the fire and casualty insurance industry experienced substantial underwriting losses, our insurance subsidiaries achieved significant adjusted underwriting profits. Since establishment of the business in 1941, Mr. Ringwalt has held to the principle of underwriting for a profit—a policy which is frequently talked about within the industry but much less frequently achieved.
1969 年，杰克・林沃尔特（Jack Ringwalt）及其出色的管理团队在几乎每个部门都创下了新纪录。在火灾及意外保险行业又一年出现大量承保亏损的情况下，我们的保险子公司实现了可观的调整后承保利润。自 1941 年公司成立以来，林沃尔特先生一直坚持以盈利为目的进行承保的原则 —— 这是行业内经常被提及但却很少有人能真正做到的策略。
Our new surety department, although small, made good progress during the year. We are entering the workmen’s compensation market in California through the establishment of a branch office in Los Angeles. Our new reinsurance division seems to be off to a strong start, although the nature of this business is such that it takes at least several years to render an intelligent verdict as to operating results. We also have interesting plans for a new “home state” insurance operation.
我们新成立的担保部门虽然规模较小，但在这一年里取得了良好进展。我们通过在洛杉矶设立分公司，进入了加利福尼亚州的工人补偿保险市场。我们新成立的再保险部门似乎开局良好，不过由于这项业务的性质，至少需要几年时间才能对运营成果做出合理的评估。我们还为一项新的 “本州” 保险业务制定了颇具吸引力的计划。
Phil Liesche—over 20 years a major contributor to outstanding results in the production and underwriting departments—was elected Executive Vice President early this year.
菲尔・利舍（Phil Liesche）在生产和承保部门工作了 20 多年，为取得出色业绩做出了重大贡献，今年年初他被选为执行副总裁。
Expectations are for continued growth in our insurance operations.
我们预计保险业务将继续增长。
Banking Operations
银行业务
The most significant event of 1969 for Berkshire Hathaway was the acquisition of 97.7% of the stock of The Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Rockford, Illinois. This bank had been built by Eugene Abegg, without addition of outside capital, from $250,000 of net worth and $400,000 of deposits in 1931 to $17 million of net worth and $100 million of deposits in 1969. Mr. Abegg has continued as Chairman and produced record operating earnings (before security losses) of approximately $2 million in 1969. Such earnings, as a percentage of either deposits or total assets, are close to the top among larger commercial banks in the country which are not primarily trust department operations. It will not be easy to achieve greater earnings in 1970 because (1) our bank is already a highly efficient business, and (2) the unit banking law of Illinois makes more than modest deposit growth difficult for a major downtown bank.
1969 年，对伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司来说最重要的事件是收购了伊利诺伊州罗克福德市的伊利诺伊国民银行及信托公司（The Illinois National Bank and Trust Co. of Rockford, Illinois）97.7% 的股份。尤金・阿贝格（Eugene Abegg）在未引入外部资本的情况下，将这家银行从 1931 年的 25 万美元净资产和 40 万美元存款，发展到 1969 年的 1700 万美元净资产和 1 亿美元存款。阿贝格先生继续担任董事长，并在 1969 年创造了约 200 万美元的创纪录运营收益（扣除证券投资损失前）。无论是以存款还是总资产的百分比计算，这样的收益在国内大型商业银行（非主要以信托业务为主的银行）中都名列前茅。要在 1970 年实现更高的收益并非易事，原因如下：（1）我们的银行已经是一家高效运营的企业；（2）伊利诺伊州的单一银行法使得位于市中心的大型银行难以实现较大幅度的存款增长。
After almost a year of ownership, we are delighted with our investment in Illinois National Bank, and our association with Mr. Abegg.
在拥有这家银行近一年后，我们对在伊利诺伊国民银行的投资以及与阿贝格先生的合作感到非常满意。
Kenneth V. Chace
肯尼斯・V・蔡斯（Kenneth V. Chace）
President
总裁