Buffett Partnership Letters 1956 to 1961
巴菲特合伙公司信件（1956 - 1961）
1956 年信件
1956年有限合伙契约
有限合伙契约 签署人兹保证，即日起建立有限合伙关系， 具体如下:
I. 合伙公司名称为:BUFFETT ASSOCIATES, LTD。
II. 本合伙公司的业务是为合伙人账户买卖股票、债券、其他证券、商品以及从事其他投资活动。
III.主要营业地点是内布拉斯加州道格拉斯县奥马哈。
IV.普通合伙人是:Warren E. Buffett(内拉斯加州奥马哈)
有限合伙人是: Charles E. Peterson, Jr.(内拉斯加州奥马哈) Elisabeth B. Peterson(内拉斯加州奥马哈) Doris B. Wood(内拉斯加州奥马哈) Truman S. Wood(内拉斯加州奥马哈) Daniel J. Monen, Jr.(内拉斯加州奥马哈) William H. Thompson(内拉斯加州奥马哈) Alice R. Buffett(内拉斯加州奥马哈)
以下统称为有限合伙人。
V.本合伙公司存续时间为1956年5月1日至1976年4月30日，除非按照合伙人协议或内布拉斯加州法律规定前终止。
VI.每位有限合伙人投入的资金数额如下:
有限合伙人:投入的资金: Charles E. Peterson, Jr. $5,000.00 Elisabeth B. Peterson $25,000.00 Doris B. Wood $5,000.00 Truman S. Wood $5,000.00 Daniel J. Monen, Jr. $5,000.00 William H. Thompson $25,000.00 Alice R. Buffett $35,000.00
VII.有限合伙人并未就追加投资达成协议。
VIII.除合伙公司终止时间已到或有限合伙人退出以外，关于返还有限合伙人投入资金的时间并未达成协议。
IX.每位有限合伙人按其投入的资金数量分享利润或其他收益，具体分配方法如下: 合伙公司按照每年12月31日有限合伙人资金账户余额，支付4%的利息，有限合伙人资金账户余额以合伙公司根据当年业务交的美国联邦所得税税单上显示的金额为准，上述利息记为合伙公司的费用。
截止到1956年12月31日的利息支付方式为向每位有限合伙人按照其初始投资资金支付2%的利息，不再另行支付利息。此利息支出记为当期合伙公司费用。此外，每位有限合伙人均应分享合伙公司的综合净利润，即合伙公司从成立之日起到任意时间为止所获得的净利润。
分成比例如下: Charles E. Peterson, Jr. 1/42 Elisabeth B. Peterson 5/42 Doris B. Wood 1/42 Truman S. Wood 1/42 Daniel J. Monen, Jr. 1/42 William H. Thompson 5/42 Alice R. Buffett 7/42
X.有限合伙人无权将投资资格受让给他人。
XI.合伙人无权准许增加其他有限合伙人。
XII.有限合伙人之间不存在优先级。
XIII.若普通合伙人身故、退休或精神失常，其余合伙人无权继续经营合伙公司。
XIV.除获得投资回报外，有限合伙人无权要求并获得其他资产。
签署日期:1956年5月1日
签署人:(签名) Warren E. Bufftett Charles E. Peterson, Jr. Elisabeth B. Peterson Doris B. Wood Truman S. Wood Daniel H. Thompson Alice R. Buffett
1956年巴菲特致合伙人的信
我认为目前市场的价格水平超越了其内在价值，这种情况主要反映在蓝筹股上。
如果这种观点正确，则意味着市场将来会有所下跌——价格水平届时将被低估。虽然如此，我亦同时认为目前市场的价格水平仍然会低于从现在算起五年之后的水平。即便一个完整的熊市也不见得会对内在价值造成伤害。如果市场的价格水平被低估，我们的投资头寸将会增加，甚至不排除使用财务杠杆。反之我们的头寸将会减少，因为价格的上涨将实现利润，同时增加我们投资组合的绝对量。
所有上述的言论并不意味着对于市场的分析是我的首要工作，我的主要动机是为了让自己能够随时发现那些可能存在的、被低估的股票。
1957 年信件
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦・E・巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大街 5202 号
SECOND ANNUAL LETTER TO LIMITED PARTNERS
致有限合伙人的第二年度信件
The General Stock Market Picture in 1957
1957 年股市整体形势
In last year’s letter to partners, I said the following:
在去年致合伙人的信件中，我曾写道：
My view of the general market level is that it is priced above intrinsic value. This view relates to blue-chip securities. This view, if accurate, carries with it the possibility of a substantial decline in all stock prices, both undervalued and otherwise. In any event I think the probability is very slight that current market levels will be thought of as cheap five years from now. Even a full-scale bear market, however, should not hurt the market value of our work-outs substantially.
我认为股市整体水平高于内在价值，这一观点主要针对蓝筹股。若此观点准确，那么所有股票价格，包括被低估和其他股票，都有可能大幅下跌。无论如何，我认为当前市场水平在五年后被视为低价的可能性极小。然而，即使是全面熊市，也不会对我们的 “特殊情况投资组合” 的市值造成太大损害。
If the general market were to return to an undervalued status our capital might be employed exclusively in general issues and perhaps some borrowed money would be used in this operation at that time. Conversely, if the market should go considerably higher our policy will be to reduce our general issues as profits present themselves and increase the work-out portfolio.
如果股市整体回归到被低估状态，我们可能会将全部资金投入到普通股票中，并且在那时可能会借入一些资金用于投资。相反，如果股市大幅上涨，我们的策略将是在获利时减持普通股票，增加 “特殊情况投资组合” 的比例。
All of the above is not intended to imply that market analysis is foremost in my mind. Primary attention is given at all times to the detection of substantially undervalued securities.
需要强调的是，上述内容并不意味着市场分析是我最关注的方面。我始终将主要精力放在寻找被严重低估的证券上。
The past year witnessed a moderate decline in stock prices. I stress the word “moderate” since casual reading of the press or conversing with those who have had only recent experience with stocks would tend to create an impression of a much greater decline. Actually, it appears to me that the decline in stock prices has been considerably less than the decline in corporate earning power under present business conditions. This means that the public is still very bullish on blue chip stocks and the general economic picture. I make no attempt to forecast either business or the stock market; the above is simply intended to dispel any notions that stocks have suffered any drastic decline or that the general market, is at a low level. I still consider the general market to be priced on the high side based on long term investment value.
过去一年，股票价格适度下跌。我之所以强调 “适度”，是因为如果只是随意阅读新闻报道或与近期涉足股市的人交谈，可能会觉得下跌幅度很大。实际上，在我看来，股票价格的下跌幅度远小于当前商业环境下企业盈利能力的下降幅度。这表明公众仍然对蓝筹股和整体经济形势非常乐观。我并不试图预测商业或股市的走势；上述内容只是为了消除人们认为股票已经大幅下跌或股市处于低位的观念。我仍然认为，从长期投资价值来看，股市整体处于高估状态。
Our Activities in 1957
1957 年我们的投资活动
The market decline has created greater opportunity among undervalued situations so that, generally, our portfolio is heavier in undervalued situations relative to work-outs than it was last year. Perhaps an explanation of the term “work-out” is in order. A work-out is an investment which is dependent on a specific corporate action for its profit rather than a general advance in the price of the stock as in the case of undervalued situations. Work-outs come about through: sales, mergers, liquidations, tenders, etc. In each case, the risk is that something will upset the applecart and cause the abandonment of the planned action, not that the economic picture will deteriorate and stocks decline generally. At the end of 1956, we had a ratio of about 70-30 between general issues and work-outs. Now it is about 85-15.
股市下跌为被低估的股票创造了更多机会，因此，与去年相比，我们投资组合中被低估股票的比例相对 “特殊情况投资” 有所增加。或许有必要解释一下 “特殊情况投资” 这个术语。特殊情况投资是指其利润依赖于特定公司行动而非股票价格普遍上涨的投资，就像被低估股票的情况那样。特殊情况投资通常源于以下几种情况：出售、合并、清算、要约收购等。在每种情况下，风险在于某些因素可能会打乱计划，导致预期行动无法实现，而不是经济形势恶化或股票普遍下跌。在 1956 年底，我们的普通股票和特殊情况投资的比例约为 70:30。现在这个比例约为 85:15。
During the past year we have taken positions in two situations which have reached a size where we may expect to take some part in corporate decisions. One of these positions accounts for between 10% and 20% of the portfolio of the various partnerships and the other accounts for about 5%. Both of these will probably take in the neighborhood of three to five years of work but they presently appear to have potential for a high average annual rate of return with a minimum of risk. While not in the classification of work-outs, they have very little dependence on the general action of the stock market. Should the general market have a substantial rise, of course, I would expect this section of our portfolio to lag behind the action of the market.
在过去一年中，我们在两种情况下持有了较大头寸，预计可能会在公司决策中发挥一定作用。其中一种情况占各合伙公司投资组合的 10% 至 20%，另一种约占 5%。这两种情况可能都需要大约三到五年的时间才能完成，但目前看来它们具有较高的年化平均回报率潜力，且风险极低。虽然它们不属于特殊情况投资类别，但对股市整体走势的依赖程度非常小。当然，如果股市大幅上涨，我预计这部分投资组合的涨幅可能会落后于市场。
Results for 1957
1957 年业绩
In 1957 the three partnerships which we formed in 1956 did substantially better than the general market. At the beginning of the year, the Dow-Jones Industrials stood at 499 and at the end of the year it was at 435 for a loss of 64 points. If one had owned the Averages, he would have received 22 points in dividends reducing the overall loss to 42 points or 8.470% for the year. This loss is roughly equivalent to what would have been achieved by investing in most investment funds and, to my knowledge, no investment fund invested in stocks showed a gain for the year.
1957 年，我们在 1956 年成立的三个合伙公司的业绩明显优于大盘。年初，道琼斯工业平均指数为 499 点，年底降至 435 点，下跌了 64 点。如果持有该指数，投资者将获得 22 点股息，因此全年总体损失为 42 点，即 8.4%。据我所知，这种损失大致相当于大多数投资基金的表现，并且当年没有任何投资股票的基金实现盈利。
All three of the 1956 partnerships showed a gain during the year amounting to about 6.2%, 7.8% and 25% on yearend 1956 net worth. Naturally a question is created as to the vastly superior performance of the last partnership, particularly in the mind of the partners of the first two. This performance emphasizes theimportance of luck in the short run, particularly in regard to when funds are received. The third partnership was started the latest in 1956 when the market was at a lower level and when several securities were particularly attractive. Because of the availability of funds, large positions were taken in these issues. Whereas the two partnerships formed earlier were already substantially invested so that they could only take relatively small positions in these issues.
1956 年成立的三个合伙公司在当年都实现了盈利，收益率分别约为 6.2%、7.8% 和 25%（以 1956 年底的净资产计算）。自然会有人问到为什么最后一个合伙公司的业绩如此优异，特别是在前两个合伙公司的合伙人眼中。这种业绩差异凸显了短期内运气的重要性，尤其是在资金投入时间方面。第三个合伙公司成立时间最晚，在 1956 年股市处于较低水平时成立，当时有几只证券特别具有吸引力。由于有资金可用，我们在这些证券上持有了较大头寸。而前两个较早成立的合伙公司已经进行了大量投资，因此只能在这些证券上持有相对较小的头寸。
Basically, all partnerships are invested in the same securities and in approximately the same percentages. However, particularly during the initial stages, money becomes available at varying times and varying levels of the market so there is more variation in results than is likely to be the case in later years. Over the years, I will be quite satisfied with a performance that is 10% per year better than the Averages, so in respect to these three partnerships, 1957 was a successful and probably better than average, year.
基本上，所有合伙公司都投资于相同的证券，且比例大致相同。然而，特别是在初始阶段，资金在不同时间和不同市场水平进入，因此业绩差异比后期可能更大。多年来，如果我们的业绩每年能比指数高出 10%，我就会非常满意，所以就这三个合伙公司而言，1957 年是成功的，可能还优于平均水平。
Two partnerships were started during the middle of 1957 and their results for the balance of the year were roughly the same as the performance of the Averages which were down about 12% for the period since inception of the 1957 partnerships. Their portfolios are now starting to approximate those of the 1956 partnerships and performance of the entire group should be much more comparable in the future.
1957 年中期成立了两个合伙公司，它们在当年剩余时间的业绩与道琼斯工业平均指数的表现大致相同，自 1957 年合伙公司成立以来，该指数下跌了约 12%。它们的投资组合现在开始接近 1956 年合伙公司的情况，未来整个集团的业绩应该会更具可比性。
Interpretation of results
业绩解读
To some extent our better than average performance in 1957 was due to the fact that it was a generally poor year for most stocks. Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the Averages.
在一定程度上，我们在 1957 年优于平均水平的表现得益于这一年对大多数股票来说是糟糕的一年。相对而言，我们在熊市中的表现可能会优于牛市，因此在评估上述结果时应考虑到这是我们应该表现相对较好的一年。在股市大幅上涨的年份，我能与指数涨幅持平就会很满意。
I can definitely say that our portfolio represents better value at the end of 1957 than it did at the end of 1956. This is due to both generally lower prices and the fact that we have had more time to acquire the more substantially undervalued securities which can only be acquired with patience. Earlier I mentioned our largest position which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. In time I plan to have this represent 20% of the assets of all partnerships but this cannot be hurried. Obviously during any acquisition period, our primary interest is to have the stock do nothing or decline rather than advance. Therefore, at any given time, a fair proportion of our portfolio may be in the sterile stage. This policy, while requiring patience, should maximize long term profits.
我可以肯定地说，与 1956 年底相比，我们在 1957 年底的投资组合具有更好的价值。这是由于股价普遍较低，以及我们有更多时间去收购那些只有耐心等待才能获得的被严重低估的证券。之前我提到过我们最大的头寸，占各合伙公司资产的 10% 至 20%。我计划最终使其占所有合伙公司资产的 20%，但这不能操之过急。显然，在任何收购期间，我们最希望看到的是股票价格保持不变或下跌，而不是上涨。因此，在任何给定时间，我们投资组合中的相当一部分可能处于 “休眠” 阶段。虽然这种策略需要耐心，但它应该能最大限度地提高长期利润。
I have tried to cover points which I felt might be of interest and disclose as much of our philosophy as may be imparted without talking of individual issues. If there are any questions concerning any phase of the operation, I would welcome hearing from you.
我已尽力涵盖我认为可能有趣的要点，并在不涉及具体投资项目的情况下尽可能多地阐述我们的投资理念。如果您对运营的任何方面有任何疑问，欢迎随时与我联系。
1958 年信件
Warren E Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大街 5202 号
THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958
1958 年股市概况
A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: “The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least”.
一位经营中型投资信托的朋友最近写道：“美国人善变的性格在 1958 年引发了重大转变，至少对于股市来说，‘狂热’是恰当的形容词。”
I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “Investing” in the market. There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly. While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices, I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it. I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.
我认为这概括了 1958 年主导股市的心理变化，无论是业余投资者还是专业投资者都受到了影响。在过去一年中，几乎任何理由都被用来为在市场中的 “投资” 行为辩护。毫无疑问，现在股市中比以往多年都有更多情绪冲动的投资者，他们的停留时间将取决于他们认为能够多快、多轻松地获利。虽然无法确定他们会持续多久并继续推高股价，但可以肯定地说，他们停留的时间越长，市场的反应可能就越大。我并不试图预测股市整体走势 —— 我的努力主要集中在寻找被低估的证券上。然而，我确实认为，公众普遍认为投资股票必然获利的信念最终会引发问题。如果这种情况发生，即使是被低估证券的价格（在我看来，而非内在价值）也可能会受到重大影响。
RESULTS IN 1958
1958 年业绩
In my letter of last year, I wrote:
在我去年的信件中，我写道：
“Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively will. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages.”
“相对而言，我们在熊市中的表现可能会优于牛市，因此在评估上述结果时应考虑到这是我们应该表现相对较好的一年。在股市大幅上涨的年份，我能与指数涨幅持平就会很满意。”
The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones Industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%. Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.
后半句话描述了我们在 1958 年的情况，我的预测得到了验证。道琼斯工业平均指数从 435 点上涨到 583 点，加上约 20 点的股息，道琼斯指数的总体涨幅为 38.5%。全年运营的五个合伙公司的平均业绩略好于这一 38.5% 的涨幅。基于年末和年初的市值，它们的收益范围从 36.7% 到 46.2%。考虑到很大一部分资产仍然投资于那些在快速上涨的市场中受益甚少的证券，我认为这些结果相当不错。我将继续预测，在下跌或持平的市场中，我们的业绩将高于平均水平，但在上涨的市场中，我们能跟上步伐就已经很不错了。
TYPICAL SITUATION
典型案例
So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.
为了让您更好地理解我们的投资方法，我想回顾一下 1958 年的一项具体投资活动。去年我提到了我们最大的持仓，占各合伙公司资产的 10% 至 20%。我指出，对我们有利的情况是该股票价格下跌或保持相对稳定，这样我们就可以收购更大的头寸，这也是为什么在牛市中这种证券可能会拖累我们的相对业绩。
This stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantia1 earnings power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate loss seemed minimal.
这只股票是新泽西州尤宁城的联邦信托公司（Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey）。当我们开始购买这只股票时，根据保守计算，其内在价值为每股 125 美元。然而，由于一些合理的原因，尽管每股收益约为 10 美元，但它没有支付任何现金股息，这在很大程度上导致其股价被压低至约 50 美元。所以这里有一家管理良好、盈利能力强的银行，但其股价却远低于内在价值。管理层对我们这些新股东很友好，而且最终遭受任何损失的风险似乎极小。
Commonwealth was 25.5% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million – about half the size of the First National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for persona1 reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of:
联邦信托公司 25.5% 的股份由一家更大的银行持有（联邦信托公司的资产约为 5000 万美元 —— 大约是奥马哈第一国民银行规模的一半），这家银行多年来一直希望进行合并。由于个人原因，这种合并一直未能实现，但有证据表明这种情况不会无限期持续下去。因此，我们面临的情况是：
- Very strong defensive characteristics;
- Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and;
Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.
- 具有很强的防御性特征；
- 良好且稳定的价值正在以令人满意的速度增长；
- 有证据表明最终这种价值会得到释放，尽管可能是在一年或十年后。如果是后者，价值可能会增长到相当大的数额，比如每股 250 美元。
Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposa1.
在大约一年的时间里，我们以平均约 51 美元的价格成功收购了该银行约 12% 的股份。显然，让股票价格保持稳定对我们非常有利。随着我们持股规模的增加，其价值也在增加，特别是在我们成为第二大股东并拥有足够的投票权以确保在任何合并提案中都能进行协商之后。
Commonwealth only had about 300 stockholders and probably averaged two trades or so per month, so you can understand why I say that the activity of the stock market generally had very little effect on the price movement of some of our holdings.
联邦信托公司只有大约 300 名股东，平均每月可能只有两笔交易，所以您可以理解为什么我说股票市场的整体活动对我们部分持股的价格走势影响甚微。
Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying, which railed the price to about $65 where we were neither buyer nor seller. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having any “Leakage” regarding our portfolio holdings.
不幸的是，我们在购买过程中遇到了一些竞争，股价被推高到约 65 美元，在这个价格上我们既不买入也不卖出。在一只不活跃的股票中，很小的买入订单都可能导致股价发生如此大幅度的变化，这也说明了对我们的投资组合持仓保密的重要性。
Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holder at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.
在年底，我们成功找到了一个特殊情况，使我们能够以有吸引力的价格成为最大股东，因此我们以每股 80 美元的价格出售了我们的股份，尽管当时的市场报价要低约 20%。
It is obvious that we could still be sitting with $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such at Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.
很明显，我们本可以继续以 50 美元的价格耐心地少量买入这只股票，我也会对这样的策略感到满意，尽管我们去年相对于市场的表现可能看起来不佳。像联邦信托公司这样的情况在实现盈利的那一年，在很大程度上是偶然的。因此，我们任何一年的业绩作为估计长期结果的基础都有很大的局限性。然而，我相信投资于这种被低估且有良好保护的证券是实现证券长期利润的最可靠途径。
I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value $135 is quite different from a price $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.
我可能要提到的是，以 80 美元买入这只股票的投资者在未来几年有望获得不错的收益。然而，80 美元的相对低估程度（内在价值为 135 美元）与 50 美元（内在价值为 125 美元）有很大不同，在我看来，我们的资金在新的投资中能得到更好的利用。这个新的投资项目比联邦信托公司规模更大，约占各合伙公司资产的 25%。虽然其被低估的程度并不比我们持有的许多其他证券更大（甚至可能更小），但我们是最大的股东，这在确定纠正低估所需的时间方面具有很大的优势。在持有这只股票期间，我们几乎可以肯定其表现会优于道琼斯指数。
THE CURRENT SITUATION
当前形势
The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.
市场水平越高，被低估的证券就越少，我发现很难找到足够数量的有吸引力的投资。我更倾向于增加我们资产在特殊情况投资中的比例，但目前很难找到合适的项目。
To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast – an above average performance in a bear market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.
因此，只要有可能，我就试图通过大量买入几只被低估的证券来创造自己的特殊情况投资机会。这样的策略应该能够实现我之前的预测 —— 在熊市中表现优于平均水平。我希望以此作为评判我的标准。如果您有任何问题，请随时提问。
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦・E・巴菲特
2-11-59
1959 年 2 月 11 日
1959 年信件
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦・E・巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大街 5202 号
The General Stock Market in 1959:
1959 年股市概况
The Dow-Jones Industrial Average, undoubtedly the most widely used index of stock market behavior, presented a somewhat faulty picture in 1959. This index recorded an advance from 583 to 679, or 16.4% for the year. When the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the average are added, an overall gain of 19.9% indicated for 1959.
道琼斯工业平均指数无疑是最广泛使用的股市行为指标，但在 1959 年呈现出一些误导性的情况。该指数从 583 点上涨到 679 点，全年涨幅为 16.4%。如果加上通过持有该指数可能获得的股息，1959 年的总体涨幅为 19.9%。
Despite this indication of a robust market, more stocks declined than advanced on the New York Stock Exchange during the year by a margin of 710 to 628. Both the Dow-Jones Railroad Average and Utility Average registered declines.
尽管有此上涨迹象，但在纽约证券交易所，当年下跌的股票数量多于上涨的股票，比例为 710 比 628。道琼斯铁路平均指数和公用事业平均指数均出现下跌。
Most investment trusts had a difficult time in comparison with the Industrial Average. Tri-Continental Corp. the nation’s largest closed-end investment company (total asset $400 million) had an overall gain of about 5.7% for the year. Fred Brown, its President, had this to say about the 1959 marked in a recent speech to the Analysts Society:
大多数投资信托在与工业平均指数的比较中表现不佳。美国最大的封闭式投资公司（总资产 4 亿美元）—— 三大陆公司（Tri - Continental Corp.），全年总体涨幅约为 5.7%。其总裁弗雷德・布朗（Fred Brown）在最近对分析师协会的演讲中对 1959 年的市场表示：
“But, even though we like the portfolio, the market performance of Tri-Continental’s holdings in 1959 was disappointing to us. Markets in which investor sentiment and enthusiasm play so large a part as those of 1959, are difficult for investment managers trained in values and tuned to investing for the long-term. Perhaps we haven’t had our space boots adjusted properly. However, we believe that there is a limit to risks that an investing institution such as Tri-Continental should take with its stockholders’ money, and we believe that the portfolio is in shape for the year ahead.”
“但是，尽管我们对投资组合感到满意，但三大陆公司持有的股票在 1959 年的市场表现令我们失望。在像 1959 年这样投资者情绪和热情对市场影响巨大的市场中，对于接受价值投资训练、着眼于长期投资的投资经理来说是困难的。也许我们的‘太空靴’没有调整好。然而，我们认为像三大陆公司这样的投资机构在使用股东资金时应该有限度地承担风险，并且我们认为投资组合为来年做好了准备。”
Massachusetts Investors Trust, the country’s largest mutual fund with assets of $1.5 billion showed an overall gain of about 9% for the year.
美国最大的共同基金 —— 马萨诸塞投资者信托（Massachusetts Investors Trust），资产达 15 亿美元，全年总体涨幅约为 9%。
Most of you know I have been very apprehensive about general stock market levels for several years. To date, this caution has been unnecessary. By previous standards, the present level of “blue chip” security prices contains a substantial speculative component with a corresponding risk of loss. Perhaps other standards of valuation are evolving which will permanently replace the old standard. I don’t think so. I may very well be wrong; however, I would rather sustain the penalties resulting from over-conservatism than face the consequences of error, perhaps with permanent capital loss, resulting from the adoption of a “New Era” philosophy where trees really do grow to the sky.
你们大多数人都知道，多年来我一直对股市整体水平感到担忧。到目前为止，这种谨慎是不必要的。按照以前的标准，目前 “蓝筹股” 的价格包含了很大的投机成分，相应地也存在损失风险。也许其他估值标准正在演变，可能会永久取代旧标准。我不这么认为。我可能大错特错；然而，我宁愿因过度保守而受到惩罚，也不愿因采用 “新时代” 哲学（认为树真的可以长到天上去）而可能面临永久性资本损失的后果。
Results in 1959:
1959 年业绩
There has been emphasis in previous letters on a suggested standard of performance involving relatively good results (compared to the general market indices and leading investment trusts) in periods of declining or level prices but relatively unimpressive results in rapidly rising markets.
在之前的信件中，我一直强调一种业绩标准，即在股价下跌或持平期间（与一般市场指数和领先的投资信托相比）取得相对较好的结果，但在快速上涨的市场中结果相对不那么出色。
We were fortunate to achieve reasonably good results in 1959. The six partnerships that operated throughout the year achieved overall net gains ranging from 22.3% to 30.0%, and averaging about 25.9%. Portfolios of these partnerships are now about 80%comparable, but there is some difference due to securities and cash becoming available at varying times, payments made to partners, etc. Over the past few years, there hasn’t been any partnership which has consistently been at the top or bottom of performance from year to year, and the variance is narrowing as the portfolios tend to become comparable.
我们在 1959 年有幸取得了相当不错的业绩。全年运营的六个合伙公司的总体净收益在 22.3% 至 30.0% 之间，平均约为 25.9%。这些合伙公司的投资组合现在大约 80% 具有可比性，但由于证券和现金在不同时间可用、向合伙人支付款项等原因，仍存在一些差异。在过去几年中，没有一个合伙公司的业绩在每年都始终处于顶部或底部，并且随着投资组合趋于相似，业绩差异正在缩小。
The overall net gain is determined on the basis of market values at the beginning and end of the year adjusted for payments made to partners or contributions received from them. It is not based on actual realized profits during the year, but is intended to measure the change in liquidating value for the year. It is before interest allowed to partners (where that is specified in the partnership agreement) and before any division of profit to the general partner, but after operating expenses.
总体净收益是根据年初和年末的市值计算的，经过对向合伙人支付或从合伙人处收到的款项的调整。它不是基于当年实际实现的利润，而是旨在衡量当年清算价值的变化。它不包括合伙人协议中规定的利息（如果有的话），也不包括在向普通合伙人分配利润之前，但扣除了运营费用。
The principal operating expense is the Nebraska Intangibles Tax which amounts to .4% of market value on practically all securities. Last year represented the first time that this tax had been effectively enforced and, of course penalized our results to the extent of .4%.
主要的运营费用是内布拉斯加州无形资产税，几乎对所有证券按市值的 0.4% 征收。去年是该税首次有效执行，当然这使我们的业绩减少了 0.4%。
The present portfolio:
当前投资组合
Last year, I mentioned a new commitment which involved about 25% of assets of the various partnerships. Presently this investment is about 35% of assets. This is an unusually large percentage, but has been made for strong reasons. In effect, this company is partially an investment trust owing some thirty or forty other securities of high quality. Our investment was made and is carried at a substantial discount from asset value based on market value of their securities and a conservative appraisal of the operating business.
去年，我提到了一项新的投资，涉及各合伙公司约 25% 的资产。目前，这项投资约占资产的 35%。这是一个异常高的比例，但有充分的理由。实际上，这家公司在一定程度上是一家投资信托，持有约三四十种其他高质量证券。我们的投资是以其证券的市值和对运营业务的保守评估为基础，以大幅低于资产价值的价格进行的。
We are the company’s largest stockholder by a considerable margin, and the two other large holders agree with our ideas. The probability is extremely high that the performance of this investment will be superior to that of the general market until its disposition, and I am hopeful that this will take place this year.
我们是该公司的最大股东，其他两个大股东也同意我们的想法。极有可能的是，在处置该投资之前，其业绩将优于一般市场，我希望今年能够实现这一点。
The remaining 65% of the portfolio is in securities which I consider undervalued and work-out operations. To the extent possible, I continue to attempt to invest in situations at least partially insulated from the behavior of the general market.
投资组合的其余 65% 是我认为被低估的证券和特殊情况投资。在可能的情况下，我继续尝试投资于至少部分不受股市整体行为影响的情况。
This policy should lead to superior results in bear markets and average performance in bull markets. The first prediction may be subject to test this year since, at this writing, the Dow-Jones Industrials have retraced over half of their 1959 advance.
这种策略应该会在熊市中带来优异的业绩，在牛市中表现平均。由于截至本文撰写时，道琼斯工业指数已经回吐了 1959 年涨幅的一半以上，今年可能会对第一个预测进行检验。
Should you have any questions or if I have not been clear in any respect, I would be very happy to hear from you.
如果您有任何问题或我在任何方面表达不清楚，请随时告诉我。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1960 年 2 月 20 日
2-20-60
1960 年信件
1960 年信件（一）
WARREN E. BUFFETT
沃伦・E・巴菲特
5202 Underwood Ave. Omaha, Nebraska
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市安德伍德大街 5202 号
The General Stock Market in 1960
1960 年股市概况
A year ago, I commented on the somewhat faulty picture presented in 1959 by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average which had advanced from 583 to 679, or 16.4%. Although practically all investment companies showed gains for that year, less than 10% of them were able to match or better the record of the Industrial Average. The Dow-Jones Utility Average had a small decline and the Railroad Average recorded a substantial one.
一年前，我曾评论过道琼斯工业平均指数在 1959 年从 583 点上涨到 679 点（涨幅为 16.4%）所呈现出的有些误导性的情况。尽管实际上几乎所有投资公司在那一年都实现了盈利，但不到 10% 的公司能够跑赢工业平均指数。道琼斯公用事业平均指数略有下跌，而铁路平均指数则大幅下跌。
In 1960, the picture was reversed. The Industrial Average declined from 679 to 616, or 9.3%. Adding back the dividends which would have been received through ownership of the Average still left it with an overall loss of 6.3%. On the other hand, the Utility Average showed a good gain and, while all the results are not now available, my guess is that about 90% of all investment companies outperformed the Industrial Average. The majority of investment companies appear to have ended the year with overall results in the range of plus or minus 5%. On the New York Stock Exchange, 653 common stocks registered losses for the year while 404 showed gains.
在 1960 年，情况发生了逆转。工业平均指数从 679 点下跌至 616 点，跌幅为 9.3%。加上若持有该指数可获得的股息后，总体仍有 6.3% 的损失。另一方面，公用事业平均指数表现良好，而且据我目前的了解，大约 90% 的所有投资公司都跑赢了工业平均指数。大多数投资公司在年底的总体业绩似乎在正负 5% 的范围内。在纽约证券交易所，653 只普通股在当年出现亏损，而 404 只实现盈利。
Results in 1960:
1960 年业绩
My continual objective in managing partnership funds is to achieve a long-term performance record superior to that of the Industrial Average. I believe this Average, over a period of years, will more or less parallel the results of leading investment companies. Unless we do achieve this superior performance there is no reason for existence of the partnerships.
我管理合伙基金的持续目标是实现长期业绩优于工业平均指数。我相信，在多年的时间里，该指数的表现或多或少会与领先的投资公司相平行。除非我们确实实现了这种卓越的业绩，否则合伙公司就没有存在的理由。
However, I have pointed out that any superior record which we might accomplish should not be expected to be evidenced by a relatively constant advantage in performance compared to the Average. Rather it is likely that if such an advantage is achieved, it will be through better-than-average performance in stable or declining markets and average, or perhaps even poorer- than-average performance in rising markets.
然而，我已经指出，我们可能实现的任何卓越业绩不应期望表现为相对于平均指数的持续优势。更有可能的是，如果实现了优势，那将是在稳定或下跌的市场中表现优于平均水平，而在上涨的市场中表现平均，甚至可能低于平均水平。
I would consider a year in which we declined 15% and the Average 30% to be much superior to a year when both we and the Average advanced 20%. Over a period of time there are going to be good and bad years; there is nothing to be gained by getting enthused or depressed about the sequence in which they occur. The important thing is to be beating par; a four on a par three hole is not as good as a five on a par five hole and it is unrealistic to assume we are not going to have our share of both par three’s and par five’s.
我会认为，在我们下跌 15% 而平均指数下跌 30% 的一年里，要比我们和平均指数都上涨 20% 的一年好得多。随着时间的推移，会有好年景和坏年景；我们不应因它们出现的顺序而感到兴奋或沮丧。重要的是要跑赢标准；在标准杆为三杆的洞打出四杆不如在标准杆为五杆的洞打出五杆好，并且假设我们不会遇到标准杆为三杆和五杆的洞是不现实的。
The above dose of philosophy is being dispensed since we have a number of new partners this year and I want to make sure they understand my objectives, my measure of attainment of these objectives, and some of my known limitations.
之所以说这些，是因为今年我们有了一些新的合伙人，我想确保他们理解我的目标、衡量实现这些目标的标准以及我的一些已知局限性。
With this background it is not unexpected that 1960 was a better-than-average year for us. As contrasted with an overall loss of 6.3% for the Industrial Average, we had a 22.8% gain for the seven partnerships operating throughout the year. Our results for the four complete years of partnership operation after expenses but before interest to limited partners or allocation to the general partner are:
在这种背景下，1060 年对我们来说是一个高于平均水平的年份也就不足为奇了。与工业平均指数总体 6.3% 的损失相比，我们全年运营的七个合伙公司取得了 22.8% 的收益。在扣除费用但在向有限合伙人支付利息或向普通合伙人分配利润之前，我们四个完整年度的合伙经营的总体结果如下：
| Year | Partnerships Operating Entire Year | Partnership Gain | Dow-Jones Gain |
| 1957 | 3 | 0.4% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 5 | 0.9% | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 6 | 5.9% | 19.9% |
| 1960 | 7 | 2.8% | -6.3% |
It should be emphasized again that these are the net results to the partnership; the net results to the limited partners would depend on the partnership agreement that they had selected.
需要再次强调的是，这些是合伙公司的净结果；有限合伙人的净结果将取决于他们所选择的合伙协议。
The overall gain or loss is computed on a market to market basis. After allowing for any money added or withdrawn, such a method gives results based upon what would have been realized upon liquidation of the partnership at the beginning, of the year and what would have been realized upon liquidation at year end and is different, of course, from our tax results, which value securities at cost and realize gains or losses only when securities are actually sold.
总体收益或损失是按市值计算的。在考虑了资金的增减后，这种方法得出的结果基于年初合伙公司清算时可实现的价值以及年末可实现的价值，当然，这与我们的税务结果不同，税务结果是以成本计价证券，并仅在证券实际出售时确认收益或损失。
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
按复利计算，累计结果如下：
| Year | Partnership Gain | Dow-Jones Gain |
| 年份 | 合伙公司收益 | 道琼斯收益 |
| 1957 | 10.4% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 55.6% | 26.9% |
| 1959 | 95.9% | 52.2% |
| 1960 | 140.6% | 42.6% |
Although four years is entirely too short a period from which to make deductions, what evidence there is points toward confirming the proposition that our results should be relatively better in moderately declining or static markets. To the extent that this is true, it indicates that our portfolio may be more conservatively, although decidedly less conventionally, invested than if we owned “blue-chip” securities. During a strongly rising market for the latter, we might have real difficulty in matching their performance.
虽然四年的时间太短，不足以得出确切结论，但现有证据倾向于证实我们的结果在适度下跌或平稳的市场中应该相对较好的观点。如果这是真的，这表明我们的投资组合可能比持有 “蓝筹股” 更为保守，尽管肯定不是传统意义上的保守。在后者大幅上涨的市场中，我们可能很难与之匹敌。
Multiplicity of Partnerships:
合伙公司的多样性
A preceding table shows that the family is growing. There has been no partnership which has had a consistently superior or inferior record compared to our group average, but there has been some variance each year despite my efforts to “keep all partnerships invested in the same securities and in about the same proportions. This variation, of course, could be eliminated by combining the present partnerships into one large partnership. Such a move would also eliminate much detail and a moderate amount of expense.
前面的表格显示，我们的 “家族” 在不断壮大。没有一个合伙公司的业绩一直优于或劣于我们的集团平均水平，但尽管我努力让所有合伙公司投资于相同的证券且比例大致相同，每年仍存在一些差异。当然，这种差异可以通过将现有的合伙公司合并为一个大型合伙公司来消除。这样做也可以减少很多细节和适度的费用。
Frankly, I am hopeful of doing something along this line in the next few years. The problem is that various partners have expressed preferences for varying partnership arrangements. Nothing will be done without unanimous consent of partners.
坦率地说，我希望在未来几年内能够实现这一点。问题是，各位合伙人对不同的合伙安排表达了偏好。没有合伙人的一致同意，什么都做不了。
Advance Payments:
预付款
Several partners have inquired about adding money during the year to their partnership. Although an exception has been made, it is too difficult to amend partnership agreements during mid-year where we have more than one family represented among the limited partners. Therefore, in mixed partnerships an additional interest can only be acquired at the end of the year.
有几位合伙人询问是否可以在年内向他们的合伙公司追加资金。虽然有过例外情况，但在有限合伙人中有多个家族代表的情况下，年中修改合伙协议实在太困难了。因此，在混合合伙公司中，额外的权益只能在年底获得。
We do accept advance payments during the year toward a partnership interest and pay interest at 6% on this payment from the time received until the end of the year. At that time, subject to amendment of the agreement by the partners, the payment plus interest is added to the partnership capital and thereafter participates in profits and losses.
我们接受合伙人及潜在合伙人的预付款，并从收到款项之日起至年底按 6% 支付利息。在那时，根据合伙人的修改协议，这笔款项加上利息将被添加到合伙资本中，并在此后参与利润和损失的分配。
Sanborn Map:
桑伯恩地图公司
Last year mention was made of an investment which accounted for a very high and unusual proportion (35%) of our net assets along with the comment that I had some hope this investment would be concluded in 1960. This hope materialized. The history of an investment of this magnitude may be of interest to you.
去年提到了一项投资，它在我们的净资产中所占比例非常高且不寻常（35%），同时我也表示希望这项投资能在 1960 年完成。这个希望实现了。这项大规模投资的历史可能会让您感兴趣。
Sanborn Map Co. is engaged in the publication and continuous revision of extremely detailed maps of all cities of the United States. For example, the volumes mapping Omaha would weigh perhaps fifty pounds and provide minute details on each structure. The map would be revised by the paste-over method showing new construction, changed occupancy, new fire protection facilities, changed structural materials, etc. These revisions would be done approximately annually and a new map would be published every twenty or thirty years when further pasteovers became impractical. The cost of keeping the map revised to an Omaha customer would run around $100 per year.
桑伯恩地图公司（Sanborn Map Co.）从事美国所有城市极其详细地图的出版和持续修订工作。例如，关于奥马哈的地图卷可能重达五十磅，提供每栋建筑的详细信息。地图通过粘贴覆盖的方式进行修订，显示新建筑、用途变更、新消防设施、建筑材料变更等。这些修订大约每年进行一次，每二十或三十年当进一步粘贴覆盖变得不切实际时会出版新地图。向奥马哈客户提供地图修订服务的成本约为每年 100 美元。
This detailed information showing diameter of water mains underlying streets, location of fire hydrants, composition of roof, etc., was primarily of use to fire insurance companies. Their underwriting departments, located in a central office, could evaluate business by agents nationally. The theory was that a picture was worth a thousand words and such evaluation would decide whether the risk was properly rated, the degree of conflagration exposure in an area, advisable reinsurance procedure, etc. The bulk of Sanborn’s business was done with about thirty insurance companies although maps were also sold to customers outside the insurance industry such as public utilities, mortgage companies, and taxing authorities.
这些详细信息，如街道下的水管直径、消防栓位置、屋顶结构等，主要对火灾保险公司有用。他们的承保部门位于总部，可以评估全国各地代理商的业务。其理念是一图胜千言，这样的评估将决定风险是否被合理定价、一个地区的火灾暴露程度、明智的再保险程序等。桑伯恩的大部分业务是与大约三十家保险公司合作完成的，尽管也向保险行业外的客户如公用事业公司、抵押贷款公司和税务机关出售地图。
For seventy-five years the business operated in a more or less monopolistic manner, with profits realized in every year accompanied by almost complete immunity to recession and lack of need for any sales effort. In the earlier years of the business, the insurance industry became fearful that Sanborn’s profits would become too great and placed a number of prominent insurance men on Sanborn’s board of directors to act in a watch-dog capacity.
在七十五年的时间里，该业务或多或少处于垄断地位，每年都实现盈利，并且几乎完全不受经济衰退影响，也无需进行任何销售努力。在业务早期，保险行业担心桑伯恩的利润会过高，于是安排了一些知名保险人士进入桑伯恩的董事会担任监督角色。
In the early 1950’s a competitive method of under-writing known as “carding” made inroads on Sanborn’s business and after-tax profits of the map business fell from an average annual level of over $500,000 in the late 1930’s to under $100,000 in 1958 and 1959. Considering the upward bias in the economy during this period, this amounted to an almost complete elimination of what had been sizable, stable earning power.
在 20 世纪 50 年代初期，一种名为 “卡片法”（carding）的竞争性承保方法开始侵蚀桑伯恩的业务，地图业务的税后利润从 20 世纪 30 年代后期的平均每年超过 50 万美元降至 1958 年和 1959 年的不到 10 万美元。考虑到在此期间经济的上升趋势，这几乎相当于完全消除了曾经可观且稳定的盈利能力。
However, during the early 1930’s Sanborn had begun to accumulate an investment portfolio. There were no capital requirements to the business so that any retained earnings could be devoted to this project. Over a period of time, about $2.5 million was invested, roughly half in bonds and half in stocks. Thus, in the last decade particularly, the investment portfolio blossomed while the operating map business wilted.
然而，在 20 世纪 30 年代初期，桑伯恩开始积累投资组合。由于业务没有资本要求，任何留存收益都可以用于这个项目。在一段时间内，大约投资了 250 万美元，大致一半投资于债券，一半投资于股票。因此，在过去十年中，特别是投资组合蓬勃发展，而运营地图业务却逐渐萎缩。
Let me give you some idea of the extreme divergence of these two factors. In 1938 when the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was in the 100-120 range, Sanborn sold at $110 per share. In 1958 with the Average in the 550 area, Sanborn sold at $45 per share. Yet during that same period the value of the Sanborn investment portfolio increased from about $20 per share to $65 per share. This means, in effect, that the buyer of Sanborn stock in 1938 was placing a positive valuation of $90 per share on the map business ($110 less the $20 value of the investments unrelated to the map business) in a year of depressed business and stock market conditions. In the tremendously more vigorous climate of 1958 the same map business was evaluated at a minus $20 with the buyer of the stock unwilling to pay more than 70 cents on the dollar for the investment portfolio with the map business thrown in for nothing.
让我给您举个例子说明这两个因素的巨大差异。在 1938 年，当道琼斯工业平均指数在 100 - 120 区间时，桑伯恩的股价为每股 110 美元。在 1958 年，当道琼斯指数在 550 左右时，桑伯恩的股价为每股 45 美元。然而，在同一时期，桑伯恩的投资组合价值从每股约 20 美元增加到了 65 美元。这意味着，实际上，在 1938 年经济和股市低迷时购买桑伯恩股票的买家，对地图业务的估值为每股 90 美元（110 美元减去与地图业务无关的 20 美元投资价值）。而在 1958 年这个充满活力得多的环境中，同样的地图业务被估值为负 20 美元，买家甚至不愿意以高于投资组合价值 70% 的价格购买包含地图业务的股票。
How could this come about? Sanborn in 1958 as well as 1938 possessed a wealth of information of substantial value to the insurance industry. To reproduce the detailed information they had gathered over the years would have cost tens of millions of dollars. Despite “carding” over $500 million of fire premiums were underwritten by “mapping” companies. However, the means of selling and packaging Sanborn’s product, information had remained unchanged throughout the year and finally this inertia was reflected in the earnings.
这是怎么发生的呢？在 1958 年和 1938 年一样，桑伯恩拥有对保险行业具有重大价值的丰富信息。要重现他们多年来收集的详细信息，将花费数千万美元。尽管有 “卡片法” 的竞争，但仍有超过 5 亿美元的火灾保险费是通过 “地图法” 承保公司承保的。然而，桑伯恩销售和包装其产品（信息）的方式多年来一直没有改变，最终这种惰性反映在了收益上。
The very fact that the investment portfolio had done so well served to minimize in the eyes of most directors the need for rejuvenation of the map business. Sanborn had a sales volume of about $2 million per year and owned about $7 million worth of marketable securities. The income from the investment portfolio was substantial, the business had no possible financial worries, the insurance companies were satisfied with the price paid for maps, and the stockholders still received dividends. However, these dividends were cut five times in eight years although I could never find any record of suggestions pertaining to cutting salaries or director’s and committee fees.
投资组合表现出色这一事实在大多数董事眼中极大地减少了振兴地图业务的必要性。桑伯恩的年销售额约为 200 万美元，拥有价值约 700 万美元的有价证券。投资组合的收入相当可观，业务没有财务担忧，保险公司对地图的价格感到满意，股东仍然获得股息。然而，在八年的时间里股息被削减了五次，尽管我从未找到任何关于削减工资或董事和委员会费用的建议记录。
Prior to my entry on the Board, of the fourteen directors, nine were prominent men from the insurance industry who combined held 46 shares of stock out of 105,000 shares outstanding. Despite their top positions with very large companies which would suggest the financial wherewithal to make at least a modest commitment, the largest holding in this group was ten shares. In several cases, the insurance companies these men ran owned small blocks of stock but these were token investments in relation to the portfolios in which they were held. For the past decade the insurance companies had been only sellers in any transactions involving Sanborn stock.
在我进入董事会之前，十四名董事中，有九名是来自保险业的知名人士，他们总共持有 105,000 股流通股中的 46 股。尽管他们在大型公司担任要职，这表明他们有财务能力进行至少适度的投资，但这个群体中最大的持股量只有 10 股。在某些情况下，这些人经营的保险公司持有少量股票，但与它们持有的投资组合相比，这些只是象征性的投资。在过去十年中，保险公司在涉及桑伯恩股票的任何交易中一直只是卖家。
The tenth director was the company attorney, who held ten shares. The eleventh was a banker with ten shares who recognized the problems of the company, actively pointed them out, and later added to his holdings. The next two directors were the top officers of Sanborn who owned about 300 shares combined. The officers were capable, aware of the problems of the business, but kept in a subservient role by the Board of Directors. The final member of our cast was a son of a deceased president of Sanborn. The widow owned about 15,000 shares of stock.
第十名董事是公司的律师，持有 10 股。第十一名是一名银行家，持有 10 股，他认识到公司的问题，积极指出这些问题，并在后来增加了他的持股。接下来的两名董事是桑伯恩的高级管理人员，总共持有约 300 股。这些管理人员有能力，也意识到业务问题，但在董事会中处于从属地位。我们团队的最后一名成员是桑伯恩一位已故总裁的儿子。这位寡妇拥有约 15,000 股股票。
In late 1958, the son, unhappy with the trend of the business, demanded the top position in the company, was turned down, and submitted his resignation, which was accepted. Shortly thereafter we made a bid to his mother for her block of stock, which was accepted. At the time there were two other large holdings, one of about 10,000 shares (dispersed among customers of a brokerage firm) and one of about 8,000. These people were quite unhappy with the situation and desired a separation of the investment portfolio from the map business, as did we.
在 1958 年末，这位儿子对业务的发展趋势感到不满，要求担任公司的最高职位，但被拒绝，随后提交了辞呈，并被接受。不久之后，我们向他的母亲提出收购她的股票，她接受了。当时还有另外两个大股东，一个约持有 10,000 股（分散在一家经纪公司的客户手中），另一个约持有 8,000 股。这些人对现状非常不满，和我们一样希望将投资组合与地图业务分离。
Subsequently our holdings (including associates) were increased through open market purchases to about 24,000 shares and the total represented by the three groups increased to 46,000 shares. We hoped to separate the two businesses, realize the fair value of the investment portfolio and work to re-establish the earning power of the map business. There appeared to be a real opportunity to multiply map profits through utilization of Sanborn’s wealth of raw material in conjunction with electronic means of converting this data to the most usable form for the customer.
随后，我们（包括我们的关联方）通过公开市场购买增加了持股量，达到约 24,000 股，这三个群体的总持股量增加到 46,000 股。我们希望分离这两项业务，实现投资组合的公平价值，并努力重建地图业务的盈利能力。看起来确实有机会通过利用桑伯恩丰富的原材料并结合电子手段将这些数据转换为对客户最有用的形式，从而大幅提高地图业务的利润。
There was considerable opposition on the Board to change of any type, particularly when initiated by an outsider, although management was in complete accord with our plan and a similar plan had been recommended by Booz, Allen & Hamilton (Management Experts). To avoid a proxy fight (which very probably would not have been forthcoming and which we would have been certain of winning) and to avoid time delay with a large portion of Sanborn’s money tied up in blue-chip stocks which I didn’t care for at current prices, a plan was evolved taking out all stockholders at fair value who wanted out. The SEC ruled favorably on the fairness of the plan. About 72% of the Sanborn stock, involving 50% of the 1,600 stockholders, was exchanged for portfolio securities at fair value. The map business was left with over $l,25 million in government and municipal bonds as a reserve fund, and a potential corporate capital gains tax of over $1 million was eliminated. The remaining stockholders were left with a slightly improved asset value, substantially higher earnings per share, and an increased dividend rate.
董事会对任何形式的变革都存在相当大的反对意见，尤其是当变革由外部人士发起时，尽管管理层完全同意我们的计划，而且博思艾伦汉密尔顿公司（管理专家）也推荐了类似的计划。为了避免代理权之争（这很可能不会发生，而且我们肯定会赢得这场斗争），并避免因大量桑伯恩资金被锁定在我目前不看好的蓝筹股中而造成时间延误，我们制定了一个计划，让所有希望退出的股东以公平价值退出。美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对该计划的公平性做出了有利的裁决。大约 72% 的桑伯恩股票（涉及 1,600 名股东中的 50%）被交换为投资组合证券，按公平价值计算。地图业务留下了超过 125 万美元的政府和市政债券作为储备基金，并且消除了超过 100 万美元的潜在公司资本利得税。剩下的股东则获得了略微提高的资产价值、大幅提高的每股收益和更高的股息率。
Necessarily, the above little melodrama is a very abbreviated description of this investment operation. However, it does point up the necessity for secrecy regarding our portfolio operations as well as the futility of measuring our results over a short span of time such as a year. Such control situations may occur very infrequently. Our bread-and-butter business is buying undervalued securities and selling when the undervaluation is corrected along with investment in special situations where the profit is dependent on corporate rather than market action. To the extent that partnership funds continue to grow, it is possible that more opportunities will be available in “control situations.”
当然，上面的小故事只是对这项投资操作的一个非常简略的描述。然而，它确实凸显了对我们的投资组合操作保密的必要性，以及在短时间内（如一年）衡量我们的结果是徒劳的。这种控制情况可能很少发生。我们的主要业务是购买被低估的证券，并在低估得到纠正时出售，以及投资于利润取决于公司行动而非市场行动的特殊情况。随着合伙基金的持续增长，在 “控制情况” 下可能会有更多机会。
The auditors should be mailing your financial statement and tax information within about a week. If you have any questions at all regarding either their report or this letter, be sure to let me know.
审计师应该会在大约一周内给您寄来财务报表和税务信息。如果您对他们的报告或这封信有任何疑问，请务必告诉我。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
1-30-61
1961 年 1 月 30 日
1960 年信件（补充）
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
July, 1961
1961 年 7 月
TO MY PARTNERS:
致我的合伙人：
In the past, partners have commented that a once-a-year letter was “a long timebetween drinks,” and that a semi-annual letter would be a good idea. It really shouldn’t be too difficult to find something to say twice a year; at least it isn’t this year. Hence, this letter which will be continued in future years.
过去，合伙人曾评论说一年一封的信就像 “久旱逢甘霖”，半年一封会是个好主意。一年说两次话应该不难，至少今年不难。因此，有了这封信，并且未来几年也会继续。
During the first half of 1961, the overall gain of the Dow-Jones Industrial Average was about 13%, including dividends. Although this is the type of period when we should have the most difficulty in exceeding this standard, all partnerships that operated throughout the six months did moderately better then the Average. Partnerships formed during 1961 either equaled or exceeded results of the Average from the time of formation, depending primarily on how long they were in operation.
在 1961 年上半年，道琼斯工业平均指数（包括股息）总体上涨了约 13%。虽然这是我们最有可能难以超越标准的时期，但所有在上半年运营的合伙公司都比平均指数表现略好。1961 年成立的合伙公司从成立到现在，其业绩要么与平均指数持平，要么超过平均指数，这主要取决于它们运营的时间长短。
Let me, however, emphasize two points. First, one year is far too short a period to form any kind of an opinion as to investment performance, and measurements based upon six months become even more unreliable. One factor that has caused some reluctance on my part to write semi-annual letters is the fear that partners may begin to think in terms of short-term performance which can be most misleading. My own thinking is much more geared to five year performance, preferably with tests of relative results in both strong and weak markets.
然而，我要强调两点。首先，一年的时间太短，不足以对投资业绩形成任何看法，而基于六个月的测量则更加不可靠。我一直不愿意写半年信的一个原因是担心合伙人可能会开始关注短期业绩，而这可能会产生极大的误导。我自己的思维更侧重于五年的业绩表现，最好能在强弱市场中都对相对结果进行测试。
The second point I want everyone to understand is that if we continue in a market which advances at the pace of the first half of 1961, not only do I doubt that we will continue to exceed the results of the DJIA, but it is very likely that our performance will fall behind the Average.
第二点我希望每个人都明白，如果市场继续以 1961 年上半年的速度上涨，我不仅怀疑我们是否能够继续超越道琼斯工业平均指数，而且我们的业绩很可能会落后于平均指数。
Our holdings, which I always believe to be on the conservative side compared to general portfolios, tend to grow more conservative as the general market level rises. At all times, I attempt to have a portion of our portfolio in securities as least partially insulated from the behavior of the market, and this portion should increase as the market rises. However appetizing results for even the amateur cook (and perhaps particularly the amateur), we find that more of our portfolio is not on the stove.
与一般投资组合相比，我们的持仓一直较为保守，并且随着市场整体水平的上升，会变得更加保守。我一直试图让我们的投资组合中有一部分证券至少在一定程度上不受市场行为的影响，并且随着市场上涨，这部分的比例应该增加。然而，无论市场对业余投资者（甚至可能对专业投资者）多么有吸引力，我们发现我们的投资组合中更多的部分并没有参与其中。
We have also begun open market acquisition of a potentially major commitment which I, of course, hope does nothing marketwise for at least a year. Such a commitment may be a deterrent to short range performance, but it gives strong promise of superior results over a several year period combined with substantial defensive characteristics.
我们也已经开始公开市场收购一项可能的重大投资，当然，我希望在至少一年内它在市场上不会有什么动静。这样的投资可能会在短期内阻碍业绩表现，但结合其强大的防御特性，它有望在几年内带来优异的业绩。
Progress has been made toward combining all partners at yearend. I have talked with all partners joining during this past year or so about this goal, and have also goneover the plans with representative partners of all earlier partnerships
在年底前将所有合伙人合并的工作已经取得了进展。我已经和过去一年左右加入的所有合伙人讨论过这个目标，也和之前所有合伙公司的代表合伙人讨论过。
Some of the provisions will be:
一些规定将包括：
(A) A merger of all partnerships, based on market value at yearend, with provisions for proper allocation among partners of future tax liability due to unrealized gains at yearend. The merger itself will be taxfree, and will result in no acceleration of realization of profits;
(A) 所有合伙公司在年底按市值合并，为因年底未实现收益而导致的未来税务责任在合伙人之间进行适当分配做好准备。合并本身将免税，并且不会加速利润的实现；
(B) A division of profits between the limited partners and general partner, with the first 6% per year to partners based upon beginning capital at market, and any excess divided one-fourth to the general partner and three-fourths to all partners proportional to their capital. Any deficiencies in earnings below the 6% would be carried forward against future earnings, but would not be carried back. Presently, there are three profit arrangements which have been optional to incoming partners:
(B) 在有限合伙人与普通合伙人之间分配利润，首先每年基于年初资本按市值的 6% 分配给合伙人，任何超出部分的四分之一分配给普通合伙人，四分之三按比例分配给所有合伙人。如果收益低于 6%，不足部分将结转用于抵减未来收益，但不会追溯调整。目前，有三种利润分配方案可供新合伙人选择：
| Interest Provision | Excess to Gen. Partner | Excess to Ltd. Partners |
| 利息条款 | 超额部分给普通合伙人 | 超额部分给有限合伙人 |
| 6% | 1/3 | 2/3 |
| 4% | 1/4 | 3/4 |
| 无 | 1/6 | 5/6 |
In the event of profits, the new division will obviously have to be better for limited partners than the first two arrangements. Regarding the third, the new arrangement will be superior up to 18% per year; but above this rate the limited partners would do better under the present agreement. About 80% of total partnership assets have selected the first two arrangements, and I am hopeful, should we average better than 18% yearly, partners presently under the third arrangement will not feel short-changed under the new agreement;
在有利润的情况下，新的分配方案显然对有限合伙人比前两种方案更有利。对于第三种方案，新方案在年回报率达到 18% 之前更优；但超过这个比率，有限合伙人在现行协议下会更好。大约 80% 的合伙资产选择了前两种方案，我希望如果我们平均每年回报率超过 18%，目前选择第三种方案的合伙人不会觉得在新协议下吃亏；
(C) In the event of losses, there will be no carry back against amounts previously credited to me as general partner. Although there will be a carry-forward against future excess earnings. However, my wife and I will have the largest single investment in the new partnership, probably about one-sixth of total partnership assets, and thereby a greater dollar stake in losses than any other partner of family group, I am inserting a provision in the partnership agreement which will prohibit the purchase by me or my family of any marketable securities. In other words, the new partnership will represent my entire investment operation in marketable securities, so that my results will have to be directly proportional to yours, subject to the advantage I obtain if we do better than 6%;
(C) 在发生亏损的情况下，不会追溯调整以前分配给我的金额。虽然亏损将结转用于抵减未来的超额收益。然而，我和我的妻子将在新合伙公司中拥有最大的单一投资，可能约占总合伙资产的六分之一，因此在亏损方面比任何其他家族合伙人承担更大的美元风险。我在合伙协议中加入了一项条款，禁止我或我的家人购买任何有价证券。换句话说，新合伙公司将代表我在有价证券市场上的全部投资业务，因此我的结果将必须与您的结果直接成比例，但如果我们的回报率超过 6%，我将获得相应优势；
(D) A provision for monthly payments at the rate of 6% yearly, based on beginning of the year capital valued at market. Partners not wishing to withdraw money currently can have this credited back to them automatically as an advance payment, drawing 6%, to purchase an additional equity interest in the partnership at yearend. This will solve one stumbling block that has heretofore existed in the path of consolidation, since many partners desire regular withdrawals and others wish to plow everything back;
(D) 每月按年初资本市值的 6% 进行支付。不希望当前提款的合伙人可以自动将其作为预付款记回，年利率为 6%，以便在年底购买合伙公司的额外股权。这将解决此前在合并过程中存在的一个障碍，因为许多合伙人希望定期提款，而另一些合伙人则希望将所有资金再投资；
(E) The right to borrow during the year, up to 20% of the value of your partnership interest, at 6%, such loans to be liquidated at yearend or earlier. This will add a degree of liquidity to an investment which can now only be disposed of at yearend. It is not intended that anything but relatively permanent funds be invested in the partnership, and we have no desire to turn it into a bank. Rather, I expect this to be a relatively unused provision, which is available when something unexpected turns up and a wait until yearend to liquidate part of all of a partner’s interest would cause hardship;
(E) 合伙人有权在年内借款，借款额度最高为其合伙权益价值的 20%，年利率为 6%，借款需在年底或更早偿还。这将为一项原本只能在年底处置的投资增加一定的流动性。我们不希望将合伙公司变成银行，只是希望在出现意外情况且等到年底清算部分或全部合伙人权益会造成困难时，提供这一便利；
(F) An arrangement whereby any relatively small tax adjustment, made in later years on the partnership’s return will be assessed directly to me. This way, we will not be faced with the problem of asking eighty people, or more, to amend their earlier return over some small matter. As it stands now, a small change, such as a decision that a dividend received by the partnership has 63% a return of capital instead of 68%, could cause a multitude of paper work. To prevent this, any change amounting to less than $1,000 of tax will be charged directly to me.
(F) 对于日后合伙公司报税中出现的任何相对较小的税务调整，将直接由我承担。这样，我们就不会面临要求八十多人因一些小事而修改其早期报税表的问题。例如，如果合伙公司收到的股息被判定为 63% 的资本返还而非 68%，可能会引发大量的文书工作。为避免这种情况，任何导致税收变化小于 1000 美元的调整都将直接由我承担。
We have submitted the proposed agreement to Washington for a ruling that the merger would be taxfree, and that the partnership would be treated as a partnership under the tax laws. While all of this is a lot of work, it will make things enormously easier in the future. You might save this letter as a reference to read in conjunction with the agreement which you will receive later in the year.
我们已将拟议的协议提交华盛顿，以获得合并将免税且合伙公司将根据税法被视为合伙公司的裁决。虽然这需要做很多工作，但这将使未来的事情变得更加容易。您可以保存这封信，以便在今年晚些时候收到协议时作为参考。
The minimum investment for new partners is currently $25,000, but, of course, this does not apply to present partners. Our method of operation will enable the partners to add or withdraw amounts of any size (in round $100) at yearend. Estimated total assets of the partnership will be in the neighborhood of $4 million, which enables us to consider investments such as the one mentioned earlier in this letter, which we would have had to pass several years ago.
新合伙人的最低投资额目前为 25000 美元，但这不适用于现有合伙人。我们的运营方式将使合伙人能够在年底增加或提取任意金额（以 100 美元为单位）。合伙公司的预计总资产约为 400 万美元，这使我们能够考虑进行一些几年前不得不放弃的投资。
This has turned out to be more of a production than my annual letter. If you have any questions, particularly regarding anything that isn’t clear in my discussion of the new partnership agreement, be sure to let me know. If there are a large number of questions, I will write a supplemental letter to all partners giving the questions that arise and the answers to them.
这封信比我的年度信件内容更丰富。如果您有任何问题，特别是关于我对新合伙协议的讨论中不明确的任何内容，请务必告诉我。如果有大量问题，我将给所有合伙人写一封补充信件，列出问题及答案。
沃伦・E・巴菲特
Warren E. Buffett
1961 年 7 月 22 日
July 22, 1961
1961 年信件
BUFFETT PARTNERSHIP, LTD.
巴菲特合伙有限公司
810 KIEWIT PLAZA OMAHA 31, NEBRASKA
内布拉斯加州奥马哈市基威特广场 810 号
January 24, 1962
1962 年 1 月 24 日
Our Performance in 1961
我们在 1961 年的业绩表现
I have consistently told partners that it is my expectation and hope (it’s alwayshard to tell which is which) that we will do relatively well compared to the general market in down or static markets, but that we may not look so good in advancing markets. In strongly advancing markets I expect to have real difficulty keeping up with the general market.
我一直向合伙人表示，我期望（也希望，很难说清到底是哪种）在市场下跌或持平的情况下，我们的业绩相对大盘会表现良好，但在市场上涨时可能看起来不那么出色。在市场大幅上涨时，我预计很难跟上大盘的步伐。
Although 1961 was certainly a good year for the general market, and in addition, a very good year for us on both an absolute and relative basis, the expectations in the previous paragraph remain unchanged.
尽管 1961 年对大盘来说无疑是个好年头，对我们来说，无论是绝对收益还是相对收益，也都是非常好的一年，但上述预期并未改变。
During 1961, the general market as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Average (hereinafter called the “Dow”) showed an over-all gain of 22.2% including dividends received through ownership of the Dow. The gain for all partnerships operating throughout the entire year, after all expenses of operation, but before payments to limited partners or accrual to the general partner, averaged 45.9%. The details of this gain by partnership are shown in the appendix along with results for the partnerships started during the year.
在 1961 年，以道琼斯工业平均指数（以下简称 “道指”）衡量的市场总体上涨了 22.2%（包括通过持有道指获得的股息）。在扣除所有运营费用后，但在向有限合伙人支付款项或向普通合伙人计提收益之前，所有全年运营的合伙公司的平均收益为 45.9%。这些收益的详细情况以及当年成立的合伙公司的结果见附录。
We have now completed five full years of partnership operation, and the results of these five years are shown below on a year-by-year basis and also on a cumulative or compounded basis. These results are stated on the basis described in the preceding paragraph: after expenses, but before division of gains among partners or payments to partners.
我们现已完成五个完整年度的合伙经营，以下是这些年度的业绩情况，包括按年统计和累计（复利）统计。这些结果是基于上述段落中描述的基础计算得出的：扣除费用后，但在合伙人之间分配收益或向合伙人支付款项之前。
| Year | Partnerships Operating Entire Year | Partnership Gain | Dow-Jones Industrials Gain* |
| 年份 | 全年运营的合伙公司数量 | 合伙公司收益 | 道琼斯工业平均指数收益 |
| 1957 | 3 | 10.4% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 5 | 40.9% | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 6 | 25.9% | 19.9% |
| 1960 | 7 | 22.8% | -6.3% |
| 1961 | 7 | 45.9% | 22.2% |
Including dividends received through ownership of the Dow.
包括通过拥有道琼斯指数获得的股息
On a compounded basis, the cumulative results have been:
按复利计算，累计结果如下：
| Year | Partnership Gain | Dow-Jones Industrials Gain |
| 年份 | 合伙公司收益 | 道琼斯工业平均指数收益 |
| 1957 | 10.4% | -8.4% |
| 1957 - 1958 | 55.6% | 26.9% |
| 1957 - 1959 | 95.9% | 52.2% |
| 1957 - 1960 | 140.6% | 42.6% |
| 1957 - 1961 | 251.0% | 74.3% |
These results do not measure the gain to the limited partner, which of course, is the figure in which you are most interested. Because of the varying partnership arrangements that have existed in the past, I have used the overall net gain (based on market values at the beginning and end of the year) to the partnership as being the fairest measure of over-all performance.
这些结果并未衡量有限合伙人的收益，当然，这才是您最关心的数字。由于过去存在不同的合伙安排，我使用合伙公司的总体净收益（基于年初和年末的市值）作为衡量整体业绩的最公平方式。
On a pro-forma basis adjusted to the division of gains entailed in our present Buffett Partnership, Ltd. agreement, the results would have been:
根据我们目前巴菲特合伙有限公司协议中规定的收益分配方式进行调整后，结果如下：
| Year | Limited Partners’ Gain | Dow Gain |
| 年份 | 有限合伙人收益 | 道指收益 |
| 1957 | 9.3% | -8.4% |
| 1958 | 32.2% | 38.5% |
| 1959 | 20.9% | 19.9% |
| 1960 | 18.6% | -6.3% |
| 1961 | 35.9% | 22.2% |
COMPOUNDED
按复利计算：
| Year | Limited Partners’ Gain | Dow Gain |
| 年份 | 有限合伙人收益 | 道指收益 |
| 1957 | 9.3% | -8.4% |
| 1957 - 1958 | 44.5% | 26.9% |
| 1957 - 1959 | 74.7% | 52.2% |
| 1957 - 1960 | 107.2% | 42.6% |
| 1957 - 1961 | 181.6% | 74.3% |
A Word About Par
关于业绩标准
The outstanding item of importance in my selection of partners, as well as in my subsequent relations with them, has been the determination that we use the same yardstick. If my performance is poor, I expect partners to withdraw, and indeed, I should look for a new source of investment for my own funds. If performance is good, I am assured of doing splendidly, a state of affairs to which I am sure I can adjust.
在选择合伙人以及与他们后续的关系中，最重要的一点是确定我们使用相同的衡量标准。如果我的业绩不佳，我预计合伙人会撤资，实际上，我也应该为自己的资金寻找新的投资渠道。如果业绩良好，我相信自己会做得很好，我相信自己能够适应这种情况。
The rub, then, is in being sure that we all have the same ideas of what is good and what is poor. I believe in establishing yardsticks prior to the act; retrospectively, almost anything can be made to look good in relation to something or other.
那么，关键在于确保我们对什么是好业绩和什么是差业绩有相同的看法。我认为在行动之前确立标准很重要；事后看来，几乎任何事情都可以与其他事情相比看起来不错。
I have continuously used the Dow-Jones Industrial Average as our measure of par. It is my feeling that three years is a very minimal test of performance, and the best test consists of a period at least that long where the terminal level of the Dow is reasonably close to the initial level.
我一直将道琼斯工业平均指数作为我们的业绩衡量标准。我认为三年是对业绩的一个非常基本的测试，最好的测试是在至少三年的时间里，道指的期末水平与期初水平相当接近。
While the Dow is not perfect (nor is anything else) as a measure of performance, it has the advantage of being widely known, has a long period of continuity, and reflects with reasonable accuracy the experience of investors generally with the market. I have no objection to any other method of measurement of general market performance being used, such as other stock market averages, leading diversified mutual stock funds, bank common trust funds, etc.
虽然道指作为业绩衡量标准并不完美（其他标准也一样），但它具有广为人知、具有长期连续性的优势，并且能够合理准确地反映投资者在市场中的总体经验。我不反对使用任何其他衡量一般市场表现的方法，如其他股票市场指数、领先的多元化共同基金、银行普通信托基金等。
You may feel I have established an unduly short yardstick in that it perhaps appears quite simple to do better than an unmanaged index of 30 leading common stocks. Actually, this index has generally proven to be a reasonably tough competitor. Arthur Wiesenberger’s classic book on investment companies lists performance for the 15 years 1946-60, for all leading mutual funds. There is presently over $20 billion invested in mutual funds, so the experience of these funds represents, collectively, the experience of many million investors. My own belief, though the figures are not obtainable, is that portfolios of most leading investment counsel organizations and bank trust departments have achieved results similar to these mutual funds.
您可能会觉得我设定的标准过低，因为似乎很容易跑赢由 30 只主要普通股组成的未管理指数。实际上，这个指数通常被证明是一个相当强劲的竞争对手。亚瑟・威森伯格（Arthur Wiesenberger）关于投资公司的经典著作列出了 1946 - 1960 年 15 年间所有领先共同基金的业绩。目前共同基金的投资总额超过 200 亿美元，因此这些基金的经验代表了数百万投资者的总体经验。我个人认为，大多数领先的投资顾问机构和银行信托部门的投资组合业绩与这些共同基金类似，尽管我没有具体数据。
Wiesenberger lists 70 funds in his “Charts & Statistics” with continuous records since 1946. I have excluded 32 of these funds for various reasons since they were balanced funds (therefore not participating fully in the general market rise), specialized industry funds, etc. Of the 32 excluded because I felt a comparison would not be fair, 31 did poorer than the Dow, so they were certainly not excluded to slant the conclusions below.
威森伯格在他的 “图表与统计” 中列出了 70 只自 1946 年以来有连续记录的基金。由于各种原因，我排除了其中 32 只基金，因为它们是平衡基金（因此没有完全参与市场上涨）、特定行业基金等。在排除的 32 只基金中，有 31 只的业绩比道指差，所以排除它们并不是为了歪曲下面的结论。
Of the remaining 38 mutual funds whose method of operation I felt was such as to make a comparison with the Dow reasonable, 32 did poorer than the Dow, and 6 did better. The 6 doing better at the end of 1960 had assets of about $1 billion, and the 32 doing poorer had assets of about $6-1/2 billion. None of the six that were superior beat the Dow by more than a few percentage points a year.
在剩下的 38 只共同基金中，我认为其投资方式与道指进行比较是合理的，其中 32 只的业绩比道指差，6 只表现更好。在 1960 年底，表现较好的 6 只基金资产约为 10 亿美元，而表现较差的 32 只基金资产约为 65 亿美元。表现较好的 6 只基金中，没有一只每年比道指高出几个百分点。
Below I present the year-by-year results for our period of operation (excluding 1961 for which I don’t have exact data, although rough figures indicate no variance from the 1957-60 figures) for the two largest common stock open-end investment companies (mutual funds) and the two largest closed-end investment companies:
以下是我们运营期间（不包括 1961 年，因为我没有确切数据，尽管大致数字表明与 1957 - 1960 年的数据没有差异）两家最大的普通股开放式投资公司（共同基金）和两家最大的封闭式投资公司的逐年业绩结果：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托 | 投资者股票基金 | 雷曼公司 | 三大陆公司 | 道琼斯工业平均指数 | 有限合伙人 |
| 1957 | -12.0% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1958 | 44.1% | 47.6% | 40.8% | 33.2% | 38.5% | 32.2% |
| 1959 | 8.2% | 10.3% | 8.1% | 8.4% | 19.9% | 20.9% |
| 1960 | -0.9% | -0.1% | 2.5% | 2.8% | -6.3% | 18.6% |
(From Moody’s Banks & Finance Manual, 1961)
（数据来源于穆迪银行与金融手册，1961 年）
COMPOUNDED:
按复利计算：
| Year | Mass. Inv. Trust | Investors Stock | Lehman | Tri-Cont. | Dow | Limited Partners |
| 年份 | 马萨诸塞投资者信托 | 投资者股票基金 | 雷曼公司 | 三大陆公司 | 道琼斯工业平均指数 | 有限合伙人 |
| 1957 | -12.0% | -12.4% | -11.4% | -2.4% | -8.4% | 9.3% |
| 1957 - 1958 | 26.8% | 29.3% | 24.7% | 30.0% | 26.9% | 44.5% |
| 1957 - 1959 | 37.2% | 42.6% | 34.8% | 40.9% | 52.2% | 74.7% |
| 1957 - 1960 | 36.0% | 41.6% | 38.2% | 44.8% | 42.6% | 107.2% |
Massachusetts Investors Trust has net assets of about $1.8 billion; Investors Stock Fund about $1 billion; Tri -Continental Corporation about $ .5 billion; and Lehman Corporation about $350 million; or a total of over $3.5 billion.
马萨诸塞投资者信托的净资产约为 18 亿美元；投资者股票基金约为 10 亿美元；三大陆公司约为 5 亿美元；雷曼公司约为 3.5 亿美元；总计超过 35 亿美元。
I do not present the above tabulations and information with the idea of indicting investment companies. My own record of investing such huge sums of money, with restrictions on the degree of activity I might take in companies where we had investments, would be no better, if as good. I present this data to indicate the Dow as an investment competitor is no pushover, and the great bulk of investment funds in the country are going to have difficulty in bettering, or perhaps even matching, its performance.
我提供上述表格和信息并不是为了指责投资公司。如果我管理如此巨额资金，并受到对投资公司的限制，我的业绩也不会更好。我提供这些数据是为了表明道指作为投资竞争对手并非易与之辈，并且国内大多数投资基金都难以超越其业绩表现。
Our portfolio is very different from that of the Dow. Our method of operation is substantially different from that of mutual funds.
我们的投资组合与道指有很大不同，我们的投资方法也与共同基金有很大差异。
However, most partners, as all alternative to their investment in the partnership, would probably have their funds invested in a media producing results comparable to the Dow, therefore, I feel it is a fair test of performance.
然而，大多数合伙人如果不投资于我们的合伙公司，可能会将资金投资于与道指业绩相当的投资渠道，因此我认为将道指作为业绩衡量标准是合理的。
Our Method of Operation
我们的投资方法
Our avenues of investment break down into three categories. These categories have different behavior characteristics, and the way our money is divided among them will have an important effect on our results, relative to the Dow in any given year. The actual percentage division among categories is to some degree planned, but to a great extent, accidental, based upon availability factors.
我们的投资途径分为三类。这些类别具有不同的行为特征，我们在这些类别之间分配资金的方式将在任何给定年份对我们相对于道琼斯指数的业绩产生重要影响。各类别之间的实际比例分配在一定程度上是有计划的，但在很大程度上是偶然的，取决于资金的可获得性等因素。
The first section consists of generally undervalued securities (hereinafter called “generals”) where we have nothing to say about corporate policies and no timetable as to when the undervaluation may correct itself. Over the years, this has been our largest category of investment, and more money has been made here than in either of the other categories. We usually have fairly large positions (5% to 10% of our total assets) in each of five or six generals, with smaller positions in another ten or fifteen.
第一类是通常被低估的证券（以下简称 “低估股”），对于这类证券，我们对公司政策没有影响力，也无法确定其低估情况何时会得到纠正。多年来，这一直是我们最大的投资类别，在这里赚取的资金也比其他类别更多。我们通常会在五六只低估股中各持有相当大的头寸（占总资产的 5% 至 10%），在另外十到十五只中持有较小头寸。
Sometimes these work out very fast; many times they take years. It is difficult at the time of purchase to know any specific reason why they should appreciate in price. However, because of this lack of glamour or anything pending which might create immediate favorable market action, they are available at very cheap prices. A lot of value can be obtained for the price paid. This substantial excess of value creates a comfortable margin of safety in each transaction. This individual margin of safety, coupled with a diversity of commitments creates a most attractive package of safety and appreciation potential. Over the years our timing of purchases has been considerably better than our timing of sales. We do not go into these generals with the idea of getting the last nickel, but are usually quite content selling out at some intermediate level between our purchase price and what we regard as fair value to a private owner.
有时这些投资会很快见效；但很多时候需要数年时间。在购买时，很难知道它们价格上涨的具体原因。然而，正是因为缺乏吸引力或没有即将发生的可能引发市场立即积极反应的因素，它们才以非常便宜的价格出售。以支付的价格能够获得很大的价值。这种价值上的巨大优势为每笔交易创造了舒适的安全边际。这种个体的安全边际与投资的多样性相结合，形成了极具吸引力的安全与增值潜力组合。多年来，我们的买入时机比卖出时机要好得多。我们买入这些低估股时，并不期望获得最后一分钱的利润，通常在达到我们认为的对私人所有者而言的合理价值与购买价格之间的某个中间水平时就会满意地卖出。
The generals tend to behave market-wise very much in sympathy with the Dow. Just because something is cheap does not mean it is not going to go down. During abrupt downward movements in the market, this segment may very well go down percentage-wise just as much as the Dow. Over a period of years, I believe the generals will outperform the Dow, and during sharply advancing years like 1961, this is the section of our portfolio that turns in the best results. It is, of course, also the most vulnerable in a declining market.
低估股的市场表现与道琼斯指数非常相似。仅仅因为某只股票便宜并不意味着它不会下跌。在市场突然下跌时，这部分投资可能会按百分比计算与道琼斯指数下跌幅度相当。但从长期来看，我相信低估股的表现会优于道琼斯指数，在像 1961 年这样的大幅上涨年份，这部分投资组合会取得最佳业绩。当然，在下跌市场中，它也是最脆弱的。
Our second category consists of “work-outs.” These are securities whose financial results depend on corporate action rather than supply and demand factors created by buyers and sellers of securities. In other words, they are securities with a timetable where we can predict, within reasonable error limits, when we will get how much and what might upset the applecart. Corporate events such as mergers, liquidations, reorganizations, spin-offs, etc., lead to work-outs. An important source in recent years has been sell-outs by oil producers to major integrated oil companies.
我们的第二类投资是 “套利交易”。这些证券的财务结果取决于公司行动，而不是证券买卖双方创造的供求因素。换句话说，这些证券有一个时间表，我们可以在合理的误差范围内预测何时能获得多少收益，以及什么可能会打乱计划。公司事件如合并、清算、重组、分拆等会引发套利交易。近年来，一个重要的来源是石油生产商向大型综合石油公司的出售。
This category will produce reasonably stable earnings from year to year, to a large extent irrespective of the course of the Dow. Obviously, if we operate throughout a year with a large portion of our portfolio in work-outs, we will look extremely good if it turns out to be a declining year for the Dow or quite bad if it is a strongly advancing year. Over the years, work-outs have provided our second largest category. At any given time, we may be in ten to fifteen of these; some just beginning and others in the late stage of their development. I believe in using borrowed money to offset a portion of our work-out portfolio since there is a high degree of safety in this category in terms of both eventual results and intermediate market behavior. Results, excluding the benefits derived from the use of borrowed money, usually fall in the 10% to 20% range. My self-imposed limit regarding borrowing is 25% of partnership net worth. Oftentimes we owe no money and when we do borrow, it is only as an offset against work-outs.
这一类别每年将产生相当稳定的收益，在很大程度上与道琼斯指数的走势无关。显然，如果我们在一整年中大部分投资组合都处于套利交易中，那么在道琼斯指数下跌的年份，我们的表现会非常好；而在大幅上涨的年份，则可能表现不佳。多年来，套利交易一直是我们的第二大投资类别。在任何给定时间，我们可能会参与十到十五个这样的交易；有些刚刚开始，有些则处于后期阶段。我认为应该利用借款来抵消部分套利交易组合，因为从最终结果和中间市场行为来看，这一类别具有高度的安全性。不包括借款带来的收益，结果通常在 10% 至 20% 的范围内。我给自己设定的借款上限是合伙公司净资产的 25%。很多时候我们不借款，而当我们借款时，也只是为了抵消套利交易。
The final category is “control” situations where we either control the company or take a very large position and attempt to influence policies of the company. Such operations should definitely be measured on the basis of several years. In a given year, they may produce nothing as it is usually to our advantage to have the stock be stagnant market-wise for a long period while we are acquiring it. These situations, too, have relatively little in common with the behavior of the Dow. Sometimes, of course, we buy into a general with the thought in mind that it might develop into a control situation. If the price remains low enough for a long period, this might very well happen. If it moves up before we have a substantial percentage of the company’s stock, we sell at higher levels and complete a successful general operation. We are presently acquiring stock in what may turn out to be control situations several years hence.
最后一类是 “控股情况”，在这种情况下，我们要么控制公司，要么持有很大的头寸并试图影响公司政策。这类投资肯定需要数年时间来衡量。在给定的一年里，它们可能不会产生任何收益，因为通常在我们收购股票期间，让股票在市场上保持停滞对我们有利。这些情况与道琼斯指数的行为也没有太多共同之处。有时，当然，我们会买入一只被认为可能发展成为控股情况的普通股票。如果价格在很长一段时间内保持足够低，这种情况很可能会发生。如果在我们持有公司大量股票之前股价上涨，我们会在更高的价位卖出，完成一次成功的普通股票投资操作。我们目前正在收购可能在几年后成为控股情况的股票。
Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company
邓普斯特制造公司
We are presently involved in the control of Dempster Mill Manufacturing Company of Beatrice, Nebraska. Our first stock was purchased as a generally undervalued security five years ago. A block later became available, and I went on the Board about four years ago. In August 1961, we obtained majority control, which is indicative of the fact that many of our operations are not exactly of the “overnight” variety.
我们目前参与了内布拉斯加州比阿特丽斯市的邓普斯特制造公司的控股。我们的第一批股票是在五年前作为通常被低估的证券购买的。后来又有一批股票可供购买，大约四年前我进入了董事会。1961 年 8 月，我们获得了多数控制权，这表明我们的许多操作并非一蹴而就。
Presently we own 70% of the stock of Dempster with another 10% held by a few associates. With only 150 or so other stockholders, a market on the stock is virtually non-existent, and in any case, would have no meaning for a controlling block. Our own actions in such a market could drastically affect the quoted price.
目前我们拥有邓普斯特 70% 的股票，另外 10% 由少数几个关联方持有。由于只有大约 150 名其他股东，该股票的市场实际上不存在，而且在任何情况下，对于控股股份来说，市场报价都没有意义。我们自己在这个市场上的行动可能会极大地影响报价。
Therefore, it is necessary for me to estimate the value at yearend of our controlling interest. This is of particular importance since, in effect, new partners are buying in based upon this price, and old partners are selling a portion of their interest based upon the same price. The estimated value should not be what we hope it would be worth, or what it might be worth to an eager buyer, etc., but what I would estimate our interest would bring if sold under current conditions in a reasonably short period of time. Our efforts will be devoted toward increasing this value, and we feel there are decent prospects of doing this.
因此，我需要估计我们控股权益在年底的价值。这一点尤为重要，因为实际上，新合伙人是基于这个价格入伙，老合伙人也是基于此价格出售部分权益。估计价值不应是我们希望它能值多少，或者一个急切的买家可能认为它值多少等等，而应是我估计在当前条件下，如果在相当短的时间内出售，我们的权益能卖多少钱。我们将致力于提高这个价值，并且我们觉得有不错的前景做到这一点。
Dempster is a manufacturer of farm implements and water systems with sales in 1961 of about $9 million. Operations have produced only nominal profits in relation to invested capital during recent years. This reflected a poor management situation, along with a fairly tough industry situation. Presently, consolidated net worth (book value) is about $4.5 million, or $75 per share, consolidated working capital about $50 per share, and at yearend we valued our interest at $35 per share. While I claim no oracular vision in a matter such as this, I feel this is a fair valuation to both new and old partners. Certainly, if even moderate earning power can be restored, a higher valuation will be justified, and even if it cannot, Dempster should work out at a higher figure. Our controlling interest was acquired at an average price of about $28, and this holding currently represents 21% of partnership net assets based on the $35 value.
邓普斯特是一家农业设备和供水系统制造商，1961 年销售额约为 900 万美元。近年来，相对于投入资本，其运营仅产生了微薄的利润。这反映了管理不善以及所处行业形势较为严峻的情况。目前，合并净资产（账面价值）约为 450 万美元，即每股 75 美元，合并营运资金约为每股 50 美元，我们在年底将我们的权益估值为每股 35 美元。虽然我不敢自称有先见之明，但我觉得这个估值对新老合伙人都是公平的。当然，如果能恢复哪怕适度的盈利能力，更高的估值将是合理的，即使不能恢复，邓普斯特的估值也应该会更高。我们的控股权益是以平均约 28 美元的价格收购的，目前这部分持股占合伙公司净资产的 21%（基于 35 美元的估值）。
Of course, this section of our portfolio is not going to be worth more money merely because General Motors, U.S. Steel, etc., sell higher. In a raging bull market, operations in control situations will seem like a very difficult way to make money, compared to just buying the general market. However, I am more conscious of the dangers presented at current market levels than the opportunities. Control situations, along with work-outs, provide a means of insulating a portion of our portfolio from these dangers.
当然，我们投资组合的这部分价值不会仅仅因为通用汽车、美国钢铁等公司股价上涨而增加。在疯狂的牛市中，与仅仅购买市场指数相比，控股投资的盈利似乎是一种非常困难的方式。然而，我比以往更加意识到当前市场水平所带来的危险，而不是机会。控股情况以及套利交易，为我们的投资组合提供了一种免受这些危险影响的手段。
The Question of Conservatism
关于保守性的问题
The above description of our various areas of operation may provide some clues as to how conservatively our portfolio is invested. Many people some years back thought they were behaving in the most conservative manner by purchasing medium or long-term municipal or government bonds. This policy has produced substantial market depreciation in many cases, and most certainly has failed to maintain or increase real buying power.
上述对我们各个投资领域的描述可能会为我们的投资组合的保守程度提供一些线索。许多年前，一些人认为购买中长期市政债券或政府债券是最保守的行为方式。但在很多情况下，这种政策导致了市场大幅贬值，而且肯定无法维持或增加实际购买力。
Conscious, perhaps overly conscious, of inflation, many people now feel that they are behaving in a conservative manner by buying blue chip securities almost regardless of price-earnings ratios, dividend yields, etc. Without the benefit of hindsight as ill the bond example, I feel this course of action is fraught with danger. There is nothing at all conservative, in my opinion, about speculating as to just how high a multiplier a greedy and capricious public will put on earnings.
意识到（也许是过度意识到）通货膨胀，现在很多人认为购买蓝筹股几乎不考虑市盈率、股息收益率等因素就是保守的行为方式。没有事后诸葛亮的优势（就像债券的例子一样），我觉得这种做法充满了危险。在我看来，仅仅猜测贪婪和反复无常的公众会给盈利乘以多高的倍数，根本没有任何保守可言。
You will not be right simply because a large number of people momentarily agree with you. You will not be right simply because important people agree with you. In many quarters the simultaneous occurrence of the two above factors is enough to make a course of action meet the test of conservatism.
仅仅因为很多人暂时同意你，你不一定就是正确的。仅仅因为重要人物同意你，你也不一定就是正确的。在很多情况下，上述两个因素同时出现就足以使一种行为方式符合保守主义的标准，但这是错误的。
You will be right, over the course of many transactions, if your hypotheses are correct, your facts are correct, and your reasoning is correct. True conservatism is only possible through knowledge and reason.
如果你的假设是正确的，你的事实是正确的，你的推理是正确的，那么从长期来看，你才是正确的。真正的保守主义只有通过知识和理性才能实现。
I might add that in no way does the fact that our portfolio is not conventional prove that we are more conservative or less conservative than standard methods of investing. This can only be determined by examining the methods or examining the results.
我要补充的是，我们的投资组合不传统这一事实并不能证明我们比标准的投资方法更保守或更不保守。这只能通过审视投资方法或投资结果来确定。
I feel the most objective test as to just how conservative our manner of investing is arises through evaluation of performance in down markets. Preferably these should involve a substantial decline in the Dow. Our performance in the rather mild declines of 1957 and 1960 would confirm my hypothesis that we invest in an extremely conservative manner. I would welcome any partner’s suggesting objective tests as to conservatism to see how we stack up. We have never suffered a realized loss of more than 0.5% of 1% of total net assets, and our ratio of total dollars of realized gains to total realized losses is something like 100 to 1. Of course; this reflects the fact that on balance we have been operating in an up market. However, there have been many opportunities for loss transactions even in markets such as these (you may have found out about a few of these yourselves) so I think the above facts have some significance.
我认为评估我们投资方式保守程度的最客观标准是观察在下跌市场中的表现，最好是道琼斯指数大幅下跌的市场。我们在 1957 年和 1960 年较为温和的下跌中的表现，证实了我的假设，即我们的投资方式极其保守。我欢迎任何合伙人提出关于保守主义的客观测试，看看我们的表现如何。我们从未遭受过超过总资产 0.5% 的实际损失，我们的总实现收益与总实现损失之比约为 100:1。当然，这反映了一个事实，即总体而言，我们一直在上涨的市场中运营。然而，即使在这样的市场中，也有很多可能出现亏损交易的机会（你们自己可能也发现了一些），所以我认为上述事实是有意义的。
The Question of Size
关于规模的问题
Aside from the question as to what happens upon my death (which with a metaphysical twist, is a subject of keen interest to me), I am probably asked most often: “What affect is the rapid growth of partnership funds going to have upon performance?”
除了我去世后会发生什么的问题（从形而上学的角度来看，这是我非常感兴趣的一个问题），我最常被问到的问题可能是：“合伙基金的快速增长会对业绩产生什么影响？”
Larger funds tug in two directions. From the standpoint of “passive” investments, where we do not attempt by the size of our investment to influence corporate policies, larger sums hurt results. For the mutual fund or trust department investing in securities with very broad markets, the effect of large sums should be to penalize results only very slightly. Buying 10,000 shares of General Motors is only slightly more costly (on the basis of mathematical expectancy) than buying 1,000 or 100 shares.
规模较大的基金有两个方面的影响。从 “被动” 投资的角度来看，即我们不试图通过投资规模影响公司政策，较大的资金量会对业绩产生不利影响。对于投资于广泛市场证券的共同基金或信托部门来说，资金量大应该只会对业绩产生非常轻微的惩罚。购买 10,000 股通用汽车股票与购买 1,000 股或 100 股相比，在数学预期上成本只会略高一点。
In some of the securities in which we deal (but not all by any means) buying 10,000 shares is much more difficult than buying 100 and is sometimes impossible. Therefore, for a portion of our portfolio, larger sums are definitely disadvantageous. For a larger portion of the portfolio, I would say increased sums are only slightly disadvantageous. This category includes most of our work-outs and some generals.
但在我们交易的一些证券中（绝不是所有证券），购买 10,000 股比购买 100 股要困难得多，有时甚至是不可能的。因此，对于我们投资组合的一部分来说，资金量大肯定是不利的。对于投资组合中更大的一部分，我想说增加的资金量只是稍微不利。这一类别包括我们的大多数套利交易和一些被低估的股票。
However, in the case of control situations increased funds are a definite advantage. A “Sanborn Map” cannot be accomplished without the wherewithal. My definite belief is that the opportunities increase in this field as the funds increase. This is due to the sharp fall-off in competition as the ante mounts plus the important positive correlation that exists between increased size of company and lack of concentrated ownership of that company’s stock.
然而，在控股情况中，资金增加是一个明显的优势。像 “桑伯恩地图” 这样的投资项目没有足够的资金是无法完成的。我坚信，随着资金的增加，这个领域的机会也会增加。这是因为随着资金规模的增大，竞争会急剧减少，而且公司规模的增大与该公司股票所有权的集中程度之间存在着重要的正相关关系。
Which is more important – the decreasing prospects of profitability in passive investments or the increasing prospects in control investments? I can’t give a definite answer to this since to a great extent it depends on the type of market in which we are operating. My present opinion is that there is no reason to think these should not be offsetting factors; if my opinion should change, you will be told. I can say, most assuredly, that our results in 1960 and 1961 would not have been better if we had been operating with the much smaller sums of 1956 and 1957.
那么，被动投资中盈利前景的下降和控股投资中机会的增加，哪个更重要呢？我无法给出明确的答案，因为在很大程度上这取决于我们所处的市场类型。我目前的看法是，没有理由认为它们不会相互抵消；如果我的看法改变，我会告知大家。我可以肯定地说，如果我们在 1960 年和 1961 年运营的资金量像 1956 年和 1957 年那样少得多，我们的业绩不会更好。
And a Prediction
一个预测
Regular readers (I may be flattering myself) will feel I have left the tracks when I start talking about predictions. This is one thing from which I have always shied away and I still do in the normal sense.
经常阅读（我可能是在自夸）的读者可能会觉得我在开始谈论预测时已经偏离了轨道。这是我一直回避的事情，现在从通常意义上来说我仍然会回避。
I am certainly not going to predict what general business or the stock market are going to do in the next year or two since I don’t have the faintest idea.
我当然不会预测未来一两年的总体商业或股市走势，因为我对此毫无头绪。
I think you can be quite sure that over the next ten years there are going to be a few years when the general market is plus 20% or 25%, a few when it is minus on the same order, and a majority when it is in between. I haven’t any notion as to the sequence in which these will occur, nor do I think it is of any great importance for the long-term investor.
我认为可以相当肯定的是，在接下来的十年里，会有几年股市总体上涨 20% 或 25%，也会有几年下跌幅度相当，而大多数年份会在两者之间。我不知道这些情况会以什么顺序发生，我也认为对于长期投资者来说，这并不重要。
Over any long period of years, I think it likely that the Dow will probably produce something like 5% to 7% per year compounded from a combination of dividends and market value gain. Despite the experience of recent years, anyone expecting substantially better than that from the general market probably faces disappointment.
从长期来看，我认为道琼斯指数可能会产生大约 5% 到 7% 的年复合增长率，包括股息和市值增长。尽管近年来有过这样的经历，但任何期望大幅超过这个水平的人可能都会失望。
Our job is to pile up yearly advantages over the performance of the Dow without worrying too much about whether the absolute results in a given year are a plus or a minus. I would consider a year in which we were down 15% and the Dow declined 25% to be much superior to a year when both the partnership and the Dow advanced 20%. I have stressed this point in talking with partners and have watched them nod their heads with varying degrees of enthusiasm. It is most important to me that you fully understand my reasoning in this regard and agree with me not only in your cerebral regions, but also down in the pit of your stomach.
我们的工作是逐年积累相对于道琼斯指数表现的优势，而不必过于担心给定年份的绝对结果是正还是负。我会认为在我们下跌 15% 而道琼斯指数下跌 25% 的一年里，要比我们和道琼斯指数都上涨 20% 的一年好得多。我在与合伙人交谈时强调了这一点，并看到他们带着不同程度的热情点头表示同意。对我来说，最重要的是你们完全理解我在这方面的推理，并且不仅在理智上，而且在内心深处也认同我。
For the reasons outlined in my method of operation, our best years relative to the Dow are likely to be in declining or static markets. Therefore, the advantage we seek will probably come in sharply varying amounts. There are bound to be years when we are surpassed by the Dow, but if over a long period we can average ten percentage points per year better than it, I will feel the results have been satisfactory.
由于我们的投资方法，我们相对于道琼斯指数表现最好的年份可能会出现在下跌或平稳的市场中。因此，我们所寻求的优势可能会有很大的波动。肯定会有我们被道琼斯指数超越的年份，但如果在很长一段时间内我们平均每年能比它高出十个百分点，我会觉得结果是令人满意的。
Specifically, if the market should be down 35% or 40% in a year (and I feel this has a high probability of occurring one year in the next ten–no one knows which one), we should be down only 15% or 20%. If it is more or less unchanged during the year, we would hope to be up about ten percentage points. If it is up 20% or more, we would struggle to be up as much. The consequence of performance such as this over a period of years would mean that if the Dow produces a 5% to 7% per year overall gain compounded, I would hope our results might be 15% to 17% per year.
具体来说，如果市场在一年内下跌 35% 或 40%（我觉得在接下来的十年里有很大的可能性会发生一次 —— 只是不知道是哪一年），我们应该只会下跌 15% 或 20%。如果市场在这一年基本持平，我们希望能上涨约十个百分点。如果市场上涨 20% 或更多，我们会努力跟上。如果道琼斯指数每年产生 5% 到 7% 的总体复合增长率，这样的表现意味着在多年后，我们的结果可能会是每年 15% 到 17%。
The above expectations may sound somewhat rash, and there is no question but that they may appear very much so when viewed from the vantage point of 1965 or 1970. It may turn out that I am completely wrong. However, I feel the partners are certainly entitled to know what I am thinking in this regard even though the nature of the business is such as to introduce a high probability of error in such expectations. In anyone year, the variations may be quite substantial. This happened in 1961, but fortunately the variation was on the pleasant side. They won’t all be!
上述预期可能听起来有些轻率，而且毫无疑问，从 1965 年或 1970 年的角度来看，可能会显得更加轻率。可能结果会证明我完全错了。然而，我觉得合伙人有权知道我在这方面的想法，即使这种业务的性质使得这样的预期有很大的出错可能性。在任何一年里，实际的变化可能会相当大。1961 年就是这样，但幸运的是，这种变化是令人愉快的。但不会每年都是这样！
Miscellaneous
杂项
We are now installed in an office at 810 Kiewit Plaza with a first-class secretary, Beth Henley, and an associate with considerable experience in my type of securities, Bill Scott. My father is sharing office space with us (he also shares the expenses) and doing a brokerage business in securities. None of our brokerage is done through him so we have no “vicuna coat” situation.
我们现在在基威特广场 810 号的办公室办公，有一位一流的秘书贝丝・亨利（Beth Henley），还有一位在我所从事的证券领域有丰富经验的同事比尔l・斯科特（Bil Scott）。我的父亲和我们共用办公空间（他也分担费用），并从事证券经纪业务。我们没有通过他进行任何经纪业务，所以不存在利益冲突的情况。
Overall, I expect our overhead, excluding interest on borrowings and Nebraska Intangibles Tax, to run less than 0.5 of 1% of net assets. We should get our money’s worth from this expenditure, and you are most cordially invited to drop in and see how the money is being spent.
总体而言，我预计除了借款利息和内布拉斯加州无形资产税之外，我们的管理费用将低于净资产的 0.5%。我们应该能从这笔支出中获得相应的价值，非常欢迎您随时来访，看看这笔钱是如何花出去的。
With over 90 partners and probably 40 or so securities, you can understand that it is quite a welcome relief to me to shake loose from some of the details.
我们现在有超过 90 位合伙人，可能涉及约 40 种证券，您可以理解，能从一些繁琐的事务中解脱出来让我感到如释重负。
We presently have partners residing in locations from California to Vermont, and net assets at the beginning of 1962 amounted to $ 7,178,500.00. Susie and I have an interest in the partnership amounting to $1,025,000.00, and other relatives of mine have a combined interest totaling $782,600.00. The minimum for new partners last year was $25,000, but I am giving some thought to increasing it this year.
我们目前的合伙人分布在从加利福尼亚到佛蒙特的各个地方，1962 年初的净资产达到了 7,178,500 美元。我和苏西（Susie）在合伙公司中的权益为 1,025,000 美元，我的其他亲属的权益总计为 782,600 美元。去年新合伙人的最低投资额为 25,000 美元，我正在考虑今年是否要提高这个金额。
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company did an excellent job of expediting the audit, providing tax figures much earlier than in the past. They assure me this performance can be continued.
佩特・马威克・米切尔公司（Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company）出色地完成了审计工作，比以往更早地提供了税务数据。他们向我保证这种表现能够持续。
Let me hear from you regarding questions you may have on any aspects of this letter, your audit, status of your partnership interest, etc. that may puzzle you.
如果您对这封信的任何方面、您的审计情况、您的合伙权益状况等有任何疑问，请务必告诉我。
Cordially Warren E. Buffett.
诚挚的 沃伦・E・巴菲特
APPENDIX
附录
Partnerships Operating Throughout 1961
1961年全年运营的合伙公司
| Partnership | 1/1/61 Capital at Market | Overall Gain in 1961* | Percentage Gain |
| 合伙公司 | 1961年1月1日市值 | 1961年全年收益 | 收益百分比 |
| Buffett Associates | 486,874.27 | 225,387.80 | 46.3% |
| Buffett Fund | 351,839.29 | 159,696.93 | 45.4% |
| Dacee | 235,480.31 | 116,504.47 | 49.5% |
| Emdee | 140,005.24 | 67,387.28 | 48.1% |
| Glenoff | 78,482.70 | 39,693.80 | 50.5% |
| Mo-Buff | 325,844.71 | 149,163.71 | 45.8% |
| Underwood | 582,256.82 | 251,951.26 | 43.3% |
| 总计 | 2,200,783.34 | 1,009,785.25 | 45.9% |
Partnerships Started in 1961
1961年成立的合伙公司
| Partnership | Paid-in | Overall Gain in 1961 | Percentage Gain |
| 合伙公司 | 注入资金 | 1961年全年收益 | 收益百分比 |
| Ann Investments | 100,100 (1-30-61) | 35,367.93 | 35.3% |
| Buffett-TD | 250,100 ($200,100 on 3-8-61, $50,000 on 5-31-61) | 70,294.08 | 28.1% |
| Buffett-Holland | 125,100 (5-17-61) | 16,703.76 | 13.3% |
Gain in net assets at market values plus payments to limited partners during year.
按市值计算的净资产收益加上当年向有限合伙人支付的款项。