Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway
Charlie Munger – The Architect of Berkshire Hathaway
查理・芒格 —— 伯克希尔・哈撒韦的缔造者
Charlie Munger died on November 28, just 33 days before his 100th birthday.
查理・芒格于 11 月 28 日逝世，距他的百岁生日仅差 33 天。
Though born and raised in Omaha, he spent 80% of his life domiciled elsewhere. Consequently, it was not until 1959 when he was 35 that I first met him. In 1962, he decided that he should take up money management.
尽管查理在奥马哈出生长大，但他一生 80% 的时间都生活在别处。因此，直到 1959 年他 35 岁时我才第一次见到他。1962 年，他决定投身于资金管理行业。
Three years later he told me – correctly! – that I had made a dumb decision in buying control of Berkshire. But, he assured me, since I had already made the move, he would tell me how to correct my mistake.
三年后，他告诉我（事实证明他是正确的！），我收购伯克希尔的控制权是一个愚蠢的决定。但是，他向我保证，既然我已经迈出了这一步，他会告诉我如何纠正我的错误。
In what I next relate, bear in mind that Charlie and his family did not have a dime invested in the small investing partnership that I was then managing and whose money I had used for the Berkshire purchase. Moreover, neither of us expected that Charlie would ever own a share of Berkshire stock.
在接下来我要讲述的事情中，请记住，查理和他的家人在我当时管理的小型投资合伙公司中没有投入一分钱，而我正是用这个合伙公司的资金购买了伯克希尔。此外，我们两人都没想到查理会拥有伯克希尔的股票。
Nevertheless, Charlie, in 1965, promptly advised me: “Warren, forget about ever buying another company like Berkshire. But now that you control Berkshire, add to it wonderful businesses purchased at fair prices and give up buying fair businesses at wonderful prices. In other words, abandon everything you learned from your hero, Ben Graham. It works but only when practiced at small scale.” With much back-sliding I subsequently followed his instructions.
然而，在 1965 年，查理立即建议我：“沃伦，不要再购买像伯克希尔这样的公司了。但是既然你已经控制了伯克希尔，那就用合理的价格收购优秀的企业，并放弃以高价购买平庸的企业。换句话说，抛弃你从你的偶像本・格雷厄姆那里学到的一切。那种方法在小规模投资时有效，但仅此而已。” 后来，尽管我时常会走回头路，但还是基本上遵循了他的指示。
Many years later, Charlie became my partner in running Berkshire and, repeatedly, jerked me back to sanity when my old habits surfaced. Until his death, he continued in this role and together we, along with those who early on invested with us, ended up far better off than Charlie and I had ever dreamed possible.
许多年后，查理成为了我在管理伯克希尔方面的合伙人，并且在我的旧习惯冒头时，他多次把我拉回正轨。直到他去世，他一直扮演着这个角色，我们以及那些早期投资于我们的人，最终取得了比查理和我曾经梦想的更好的结果。
In reality, Charlie was the “architect” of the present Berkshire, and I acted as the “general contractor” to carry out the day-by-day construction of his vision.
实际上，查理是现在伯克希尔的 “建筑师”，而我则是执行他愿景的 “总承包商”，负责日常的建设工作。
Charlie never sought to take credit for his role as creator but instead let me take the bows and receive the accolades. In a way his relationship with me was part older brother, part loving father. Even when he knew he was right, he gave me the reins, and when I blundered he never – never –reminded me of my mistake.
查理从不寻求因自己的创造者角色而获得赞誉，而是让我接受掌声和荣誉。在某种程度上，他与我的关系一部分像兄长，一部分像慈父。即使他知道自己是正确的，他也会让我掌控局面，而当我犯错时，他从不 —— 从不 —— 提醒我所犯的错误。
In the physical world, great buildings are linked to their architect while those who had poured the concrete or installed the windows are soon forgotten. Berkshire has become a great company. Though I have long been in charge of the construction crew; Charlie should forever be credited with being the architect.
在现实世界中，伟大的建筑与它们的建筑师紧密相连，而那些浇筑混凝土或安装窗户的人很快就会被遗忘。伯克希尔已经成为一家伟大的公司。虽然长期以来我一直负责施工团队，但查理永远应该被视为公司的缔造者。
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.
伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司
To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:
致伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股东们
Berkshire has more than three million shareholder accounts. I am charged with writing a letter every year that will be useful to this diverse and ever-changing group of owners, many of whom wish to learn more about their investment.
伯克希尔拥有超过三百万个股东账户。我每年都有责任撰写一封信，希望这封信对这个多元化且不断变化的股东群体有所帮助，他们中的许多人希望更多地了解自己的投资。
Charlie Munger, for decades my partner in managing Berkshire, viewed this obligation identically and would expect me to communicate with you this year in the regular manner. He and I were of one mind regarding our responsibilities to Berkshire shareholders.
查理・芒格，数十年来我在管理伯克希尔方面的合伙人，对这项义务有着相同的看法，并期望我今年以常规方式与你们沟通。他和我在对伯克希尔股东的责任方面想法一致。
Writers find it useful to picture the reader they seek, and often they are hoping to attract a mass audience. At Berkshire, we have a more limited target: investors who trust Berkshire with their savings without any expectation of resale (resembling in attitude people who save in order to buy a farm or rental property rather than people who prefer using their excess funds to purchase lottery tickets or “hot” stocks).
作家们发现，想象他们的目标读者是很有用的，而且他们通常希望吸引大量读者。在伯克希尔，我们的目标读者范围更窄：是那些将自己的积蓄托付给伯克希尔且不期望转售的投资者（他们的态度类似于那些为了购买农场或出租房产而储蓄的人，而不像那些喜欢用多余资金购买彩票或 “热门” 股票的人）。
Over the years, Berkshire has attracted an unusual number of such “lifetime” shareholders and their heirs. We cherish their presence and believe they are entitled to hear every year both the good and bad news, delivered directly from their CEO and not from an investor-relations officer or communications consultant forever serving up optimism and syrupy mush.
多年来，伯克希尔吸引了数量异常多的此类 “终身” 股东及其继承人。我们珍视他们的支持，并认为他们有权每年直接从首席执行官（而不是从投资者关系官员或永远只传达乐观信息和甜言蜜语的公关顾问那里）听到好消息和坏消息。
In visualizing the owners that Berkshire seeks, I am lucky to have the perfect mental model, my sister, Bertie. Let me introduce her.
在想象伯克希尔所追求的股东类型时，我很幸运有一个完美的榜样，那就是我的妹妹伯蒂。让我来介绍一下她。
For openers, Bertie is smart, wise and likes to challenge my thinking. We have never, however, had a shouting match or anything close to a ruptured relationship. We never will.
首先，伯蒂很聪明、睿智，喜欢挑战我的思维。然而，我们从未发生过争吵，甚至从未接近过关系破裂。我们永远也不会。
Furthermore, Bertie, and her three daughters as well, have a large portion of their savings in Berkshire shares. Their ownership spans decades, and every year Bertie will read what I have to say. My job is to anticipate her questions and give her honest answers.
此外，伯蒂和她的三个女儿将大部分积蓄都投资在了伯克希尔的股票上。她们的持股跨越了几十年，每年伯蒂都会阅读我要说的话。我的工作就是预想到她的问题并给她诚实的答案。
Bertie, like most of you, understands many accounting terms, but she is not ready for a CPA exam. She follows business news – reading four newspapers daily – but doesn’t consider herself an economic expert. She is sensible – very sensible – instinctively knowing that pundits should always be ignored. After all, if she could reliably predict tomorrow’s winners, would she freely share her valuable insights and thereby increase competitive buying? That would be like finding gold and then handing a map to the neighbors showing its location.
伯蒂和你们大多数人一样，理解许多会计术语，但她还没准备好参加注册会计师考试。她关注商业新闻 —— 每天阅读四份报纸 —— 但并不认为自己是经济专家。她很明智 —— 非常明智 —— 本能地知道应该忽视那些所谓的专家。毕竟，如果她能可靠地预测明天的赢家，她会免费分享她的宝贵见解，从而加剧竞争购买吗？那就像找到了金子，然后把地图交给邻居，告诉他们金子的位置一样。
Bertie understands the power – for good or bad – of incentives, the weaknesses of humans, the “tells” that can be recognized when observing human behavior. She knows who is “selling” and who can be trusted. In short, she is nobody’s fool.
伯蒂理解激励措施的力量 —— 无论是好是坏 —— 人类的弱点，以及在观察人类行为时可以识别的 “迹象”。她知道谁在 “推销”，谁可以信任。简而言之，她不是傻瓜。
So, what would interest Bertie this year?
那么，今年什么会让伯蒂感兴趣呢？
Operating Results, Fact and Fiction
经营业绩，事实与虚构
Let’s begin with the numbers. The official annual report begins on K-1 and extends for 124 pages. It is filled with a vast amount of information – some important, some trivial.
让我们从数字开始。官方年度报告从 K - 1 页开始，长达 124 页。其中包含了大量信息 —— 有些重要，有些琐碎。
Among its disclosures many owners, along with financial reporters, will focus on page K-72. There, they will find the proverbial “bottom line” labeled “Net earnings (loss).” The numbers read $90 billion for 2021, ($23 billion) for 2022 and $96 billion for 2023.
在众多披露信息中，许多股东以及财经记者会关注 K - 72 页。在那里，他们会找到标有 “净利润（亏损）” 的所谓 “底线”。数字显示 2021 年为 900 亿美元，2022 年为（230 亿美元），2023 年为 960 亿美元。
What in the world is going on?
这到底是怎么回事？
You seek guidance and are told that the procedures for calculating these “earnings” are promulgated by a sober and credentialed Financial Accounting Standards Board (“FASB”), mandated by a dedicated and hard-working Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and audited by the world-class professionals at Deloitte & Touche (“D&T”). On page K-67, D&T pulls no punches: “In our opinion, the financial statements . . . . . present fairly, in all material respects (italics mine), the financial position of the Company . . . . . and the results of its operations . . . . . for each of the three years in the period ended December 31, 2023 . . . . .”
你寻求解释，被告知这些 “收益” 的计算程序是由严肃且有资质的财务会计准则委员会（“FASB”）制定的，由敬业努力的证券交易委员会（“SEC”）强制执行，并由德勤（“D&T”）的世界级专业人员审计。在 K - 67 页，德勤毫不含糊地表示：“我们认为，财务报表…… 在所有重大方面公允地反映了公司的财务状况…… 以及其在截至 2023 年 12 月 31 日的三年中每年的经营成果……”
So sanctified, this worse-than-useless “net income” figure quickly gets transmitted throughout the world via the internet and media. All parties believe they have done their job – and, legally, they have.
如此神圣化后，这个比无用还糟糕的 “净利润” 数字迅速通过互联网和媒体传遍全世界。各方都认为他们完成了自己的工作 —— 从法律上讲，他们确实完成了。
We, however, are left uncomfortable. At Berkshire, our view is that “earnings” should be a sensible concept that Bertie will find somewhat useful – but only as a starting point – in evaluating a business. Accordingly, Berkshire also reports to Bertie and you what we call “operating earnings.” Here is the story they tell: $27.6 billion for 2021; $30.9 billion for 2022 and $37.4 billion for 2023.
然而，我们感到不安。在伯克希尔，我们认为 “收益” 应该是一个合理的概念，伯蒂会发现它在评估企业时有些用处 —— 但只是一个起点。因此，伯克希尔也向伯蒂和你们报告我们所谓的 “营业收益”。它们是这样的：2021 年为 276 亿美元；2022 年为 309 亿美元；2023 年为 374 亿美元。
The primary difference between the mandated figures and the ones Berkshire prefers is that we exclude unrealized capital gains or losses that at times can exceed $5 billion a day. Ironically, our preference was pretty much the rule until 2018, when the “improvement” was mandated. Galileo’s experience, several centuries ago, should have taught us not to mess with mandates from on high. But, at Berkshire, we can be stubborn.
强制规定的数字与伯克希尔偏好的数字之间的主要区别在于，我们排除了未实现的资本利得或损失，这些有时每天可能超过 50 亿美元。具有讽刺意味的是，在 2018 年强制规定 “改进” 之前，我们的偏好基本上就是规则。几个世纪前伽利略的经历应该教会我们不要随意改动来自高层的指令。但是，在伯克希尔，我们可以很固执。
Make no mistake about the significance of capital gains: I expect them to be a veryimportant component of Berkshire’s value accretion during the decades ahead. Why else would we commit huge dollar amounts of your money (and Bertie’s) to marketable equities just as I have been doing with my own funds throughout my investing lifetime?
不要误解资本利得的重要性：我预计在未来几十年里，它们将成为伯克希尔价值增长的一个非常重要的组成部分。不然的话，我为什么要把你们（和伯蒂）的大量资金投入到有价证券中呢？就像我在整个投资生涯中用自己的资金所做的那样。
I can’t remember a period since March 11, 1942 – the date of my first stock purchase – that I have not had a majority of my net worth in equities, U.S.-based equities. And so far, so good. The Dow Jones Industrial Average fell below 100 on that fateful day in 1942 when I “pulled the trigger.” I was down about $5 by the time school was out. Soon, things turned around and now that index hovers around 38,000. America has been a terrific country for investors. All they have needed to do is sit quietly, listening to no one.
我不记得从 1942 年 3 月 11 日 —— 我第一次购买股票的日子 —— 以来有哪段时间我的大部分净资产没有投资于股票，而且是美国股票。到目前为止，一切都还不错。1942 年那个决定性的日子，当道琼斯工业平均指数跌破 100 点时，我 “扣动了扳机”。到放学时，我大约亏了 5 美元。很快，情况好转了，现在该指数徘徊在 38000 点左右。对投资者来说，美国是一个了不起的国家。他们所需要做的就是静静地坐着，不听任何人的。
It is more than silly, however, to make judgments about Berkshire’s investment value based on “earnings” that incorporate the capricious day-by-day and, yes, even year-by-year movements of the stock market. As Ben Graham taught me, “In the short run the market acts as a voting machine; in the long run it becomes a weighing machine.”
然而，仅仅根据包含股票市场每日 —— 甚至每年 —— 反复无常波动的 “收益” 来判断伯克希尔的投资价值是非常愚蠢的。正如本・格雷厄姆教给我的：“在短期内，市场是一台投票机；从长期来看，它是一台称重机。”
What We Do
我们的业务是什么
Our goal at Berkshire is simple: We want to own either all or a portion of businesses that enjoy good economics that are fundamental and enduring. Within capitalism, some businesses will flourish for a very long time while others will prove to be sinkholes. It’s harder than you would think to predict which will be the winners and losers. And those who tell you they know the answer are usually either self-delusional or snake-oil salesmen.
我们在伯克希尔的目标很简单：我们希望拥有全部或部分具有良好经济基础且持久的企业。在资本主义制度下，有些企业会繁荣很长时间，而另一些则会成为无底洞。预测哪些会是赢家和输家比你想象的要难。那些告诉你他们知道答案的人通常要么是自欺欺人，要么是江湖骗子。
At Berkshire, we particularly favor the rare enterprise that can deploy additional capital at high returns in the future. Owning only one of these companies – and simply sitting tight – can deliver wealth almost beyond measure. Even heirs to such a holding can – ugh! – sometimes live a lifetime of leisure.
在伯克希尔，我们特别青睐那些未来能够以高回报率配置额外资本的稀有企业。仅仅拥有其中一家这样的公司 —— 并且稳坐不动 —— 就能带来几乎无法估量的财富。甚至这样一家公司的继承人也能 —— 呃！—— 有时过上一辈子悠闲的生活。
We also hope these favored businesses are run by able and trustworthy managers, though that is a more difficult judgment to make, however, and Berkshire has had its share of disappointments.
我们也希望这些受青睐的企业由有能力且值得信赖的经理管理，不过这是一个更难做出的判断，而且伯克希尔也有过不少失望的经历。
In 1863, Hugh McCulloch, the first Comptroller of the United States, sent a letter to all national banks. His instructions included this warning: “Never deal with a rascal under the expectation that you can prevent him from cheating you.” Many bankers who thought they could “manage” the rascal problem have learned the wisdom of Mr. McCulloch’s advice – and I have as well. People are not that easy to read. Sincerity and empathy can easily be faked. That is as true now as it was in 1863.
1863 年，美国第一任审计长休・麦卡洛克给所有国家银行发了一封信。他的指示中包括这样一个警告：“永远不要和无赖打交道，指望能防止他欺骗你。” 许多认为自己可以 “管理” 无赖问题的银行家已经认识到了麦卡洛克先生建议的智慧 —— 我也是如此。人不是那么容易看透的。真诚和同理心很容易被伪装。现在和 1863 年一样。
This combination of the two necessities I’ve described for acquiring businesses has for long been our goal in purchases and, for a while, we had an abundance of candidates to evaluate. If I missed one – and I missed plenty – another always came along.
长期以来，我所描述的收购企业的这两个必要条件的结合一直是我们购买的目标，而且有一段时间，我们有大量的候选企业可供评估。如果我错过了一个 —— 我错过了很多 —— 总会有另一个出现。
Those days are long behind us; size did us in, though increased competition for purchases was also a factor.
那些日子早已一去不复返了；规模限制了我们，尽管购买竞争的加剧也是一个因素。
Berkshire now has – by far – the largest GAAP net worth recorded by any American business. Record operating income and a strong stock market led to a yearend figure of $561 billion. The total GAAP net worth for the other 499 S&P companies – a who’s who of American business – was $8.9 trillion in 2022. (The 2023 number for the S&P has not yet been tallied but is unlikely to materially exceed $9.5 trillion.)
伯克希尔现在拥有 —— 远远超过 —— 美国任何企业记录的最大 GAAP 净资产。创纪录的营业收入和强劲的股票市场使年终数字达到 5610 亿美元。标准普尔其他 499 家公司（美国企业界的名人录）在 2022 年的 GAAP 净资产总额为 8.9 万亿美元。（标准普尔 2023 年的数字尚未统计，但不太可能大幅超过 9.5 万亿美元。）
By this measure, Berkshire now occupies nearly 6% of the universe in which it operates. Doubling our huge base is simply not possible within, say, a five-year period, particularly because we are highly averse to issuing shares (an act that immediately juices net worth).
按照这个标准，伯克希尔现在在其运营的领域中占据了近 6% 的份额。在比如说五年内将我们庞大的基数翻倍是根本不可能的，特别是因为我们非常不愿意发行股票（这一行为会立即增加净资产）。
There remain only a handful of companies in this country capable of truly moving the needle at Berkshire, and they have been endlessly picked over by us and by others. Some we can value; some we can’t. And, if we can, they have to be attractively priced. Outside the U.S., there are essentially no candidates that are meaningful options for capital deployment at Berkshire. All in all, we have no possibility of eye-popping performance.
在美国，只有少数几家公司能够真正对伯克希尔产生重大影响，而且它们已经被我们和其他人反复挑选过了。有些我们可以估值；有些我们不能。而且，如果我们可以，它们的价格必须有吸引力。在美国以外，基本上没有对伯克希尔有意义的资本配置候选公司。总之，我们不可能有惊人的表现。
Nevertheless, managing Berkshire is mostly fun and always interesting. On the positive side, after 59 years of assemblage, the company now owns either a portion or 100% of various businesses that, on a weighted basis, have somewhat better prospects than exist at most large American companies. By both luck and pluck, a few huge winners have emerged from a great many dozens of decisions. And we now have a small cadre of long-time managers who never muse about going elsewhere and who regard 65 as just another birthday.
然而，管理伯克希尔大多是有趣的，而且总是很有意思。从积极的方面来看，经过 59 年的整合，公司现在拥有各种企业的部分或全部股权，这些企业加权平均来看，前景比大多数美国大公司要好一些。凭借运气和勇气，在众多决策中出现了几个巨大的赢家。而且我们现在有一小批长期经理，他们从不考虑去其他地方，并且把 65 岁仅仅看作是又一个生日。
Berkshire benefits from an unusual constancy and clarity of purpose. While we emphasize treating our employees, communities and suppliers well – who wouldn’t wish to do so? – our allegiance will always be to our country and our shareholders. We never forget that, though your money is comingled with ours, it does not belong to us.
伯克希尔受益于一种不寻常的目标一致性和清晰度。虽然我们强调要善待员工、社区和供应商 —— 谁不想这样做呢？—— 但我们的忠诚永远是对我们的国家和股东。我们永远不会忘记，虽然你们的钱和我们的钱混在一起，但它不属于我们。
With that focus, and with our present mix of businesses, Berkshire should do a bit better than the average American corporation and, more important, should also operate with materially less risk of permanent loss of capital. Anything beyond “slightly better,” though, is wishful thinking. This modest aspiration wasn’t the case when Bertie went all-in on Berkshire – but it is now.
有了这个重点，以及我们目前的业务组合，伯克希尔应该会比美国普通公司做得稍好一些，更重要的是，也应该在永久资本损失的风险方面大幅降低。不过，超出 “稍好一些” 的任何期望都是不切实际的。当伯蒂全力投资伯克希尔时，情况并非如此 —— 但现在是了。
Our Not-So-Secret Weapon
我们的秘密武器
Occasionally, markets and/or the economy will cause stocks and bonds of some large and fundamentally good businesses to be strikingly mispriced. Indeed, markets can – and will – unpredictably seize up or even vanish as they did for four months in 1914 and for a few days in 2001. If you believe that American investors are now more stable than in the past, think back to September 2008. Speed of communication and the wonders of technology facilitate instant worldwide paralysis, and we have come a long way since smoke signals. Such instant panics won’t happen often – but they will happen.
偶尔，市场和 / 或经济会导致一些大型且基本面良好的企业的股票和债券价格出现惊人的错误定价。事实上，市场可能 —— 而且将会 —— 像 1914 年的四个月和 2001 年的几天那样不可预测地停滞甚至消失。如果你认为美国投资者现在比过去更稳定，回想一下 2008 年 9 月。通信速度和技术奇迹促进了全球瞬间瘫痪，自烟雾信号以来我们已经走了很长的路。这种瞬间恐慌不会经常发生 —— 但它们会发生。
Berkshire’s ability to immediately respond to market seizures with both huge sums and certainty of performance may offer us an occasional large-scale opportunity. Though the stock market is massively larger than it was in our early years, today’s active participants are neither more emotionally stable nor better taught than when I was in school. For whatever reasons, markets now exhibit far more casino-like behavior than they did when I was young. The casino now resides in many homes and daily tempts the occupants.
伯克希尔能够立即以巨额资金和确定的业绩应对市场停滞，这可能会为我们偶尔提供大规模的机会。尽管股票市场比我们早期大得多，但今天的活跃参与者在情绪稳定性和教育程度上并不比我上学时更好。无论出于什么原因，市场现在表现出比我年轻时更多的赌场式行为。赌场现在存在于许多家庭中，每天都在诱惑着居住者。
One fact of financial life should never be forgotten. Wall Street – to use the term in its figurative sense – would like its customers to make money, but what truly causes its denizens’ juices to flow is feverish activity. At such times, whatever foolishness can be marketed will be vigorously marketed – not by everyone but always by someone.
金融生活中的一个事实永远不应被忘记。华尔街 —— 用其比喻意义来说 —— 希望它的客户赚钱，但真正让其居民兴奋的是狂热的活动。在这种时候，任何愚蠢的东西只要能被推销出去，就会被大力推销 —— 不是每个人都会这样做，但总会有人这样做。
Occasionally, the scene turns ugly. The politicians then become enraged; the most flagrant perpetrators of misdeeds slip away, rich and unpunished; and your friend next door becomes bewildered, poorer and sometimes vengeful. Money, he learns, has trumped morality.
偶尔，场面会变得很丑陋。政客们会变得愤怒；最公然的不法行为实施者会逃脱，变得富有且不受惩罚；而你的隔壁邻居会变得困惑、更穷，有时还会心怀怨恨。他会明白，金钱胜过了道德。
One investment rule at Berkshire has not and will not change: Never risk permanent loss of capital. Thanks to the American tailwind and the power of compound interest, the arena in which we operate has been – and will be – rewarding if you make a couple of good decisions during a lifetime and avoid serious mistakes.
伯克希尔的一条投资规则从未改变，也不会改变：永远不要冒永久资本损失的风险。多亏了美国的顺风和复利的力量，只要你在一生中做出几个正确的决策并避免严重的错误，我们所处的这个领域一直是 —— 而且将是 —— 有回报的。
I believe Berkshire can handle financial disasters of a magnitude beyond any heretofore experienced. This ability is one we will not relinquish. When economic upsets occur, as they will, Berkshire’s goal will be to function as an asset to the country – just as it was in a very minor way in 2008-9 – and to help extinguish the financial fire rather than to be among the many companies that, inadvertently or otherwise, ignited the conflagration.
我相信伯克希尔能够应对前所未有的金融灾难。这种能力是我们不会放弃的。当经济动荡发生时，就像它们会发生的那样，伯克希尔的目标将是成为国家的一项资产 —— 就像它在 2008 - 2009 年以非常小的方式所做的那样 —— 并帮助扑灭金融大火，而不是成为众多无意中或其他原因引发大火的公司之一。
Our goal is realistic. Berkshire’s strength comes from its Niagara of diverse earnings delivered after interest costs, taxes and substantial charges for depreciation and amortization (“EBITDA” is a banned measurement at Berkshire). We also operate with minimal requirements for cash, even if the country encounters a prolonged period of global economic weakness, fear and near-paralysis.
我们的目标是现实的。伯克希尔的实力来自于扣除利息成本、税收以及大量折旧和摊销费用后的多样化收益流（“EBITDA” 在伯克希尔是被禁止使用的衡量标准）。即使国家遭遇长期的全球经济疲软、恐惧和近乎瘫痪的情况，我们的运营对现金的需求也非常小。
Berkshire does not currently pay dividends, and its share repurchases are 100% discretionary. Annual debt maturities are never material.
伯克希尔目前不支付股息，其股票回购完全由公司自行决定。年度债务到期额从未重大。
Your company also holds a cash and U.S. Treasury bill position far in excess of what conventional wisdom deems necessary. During the 2008 panic, Berkshire generated cash from operations and did not rely in any manner on commercial paper, bank lines or debt markets. We did not predict the time of an economic paralysis but we were always prepared for one.
你的公司还持有远远超过传统观念认为必要的现金和美国国库券头寸。在 2008 年恐慌期间，伯克希尔从运营中产生现金，并且在任何方面都不依赖商业票据、银行信贷额度或债务市场。我们没有预测到经济瘫痪的时间，但我们一直为此做好准备。
Extreme fiscal conservatism is a corporate pledge we make to those who have joined us in ownership of Berkshire. In most years – indeed in most decades – our caution will likely prove to be unneeded behavior – akin to an insurance policy on a fortress-like building thought to be fireproof. But Berkshire does not want to inflict permanent financial damage – quotational shrinkage for extended periods can’t be avoided – on Bertie or any of the individuals who have trusted us with their savings.
极端的财政保守主义是我们对那些与我们共同拥有伯克希尔的人做出的公司承诺。在大多数年份 —— 实际上在大多数十年里 —— 我们的谨慎可能被证明是不必要的行为 —— 就像为一座被认为防火的堡垒式建筑购买保险一样。但伯克希尔不想给伯蒂或任何信任我们并将储蓄托付给我们的人带来永久性的财务伤害 —— 长期的市值缩水是无法避免的。
Berkshire is built to last.
伯克希尔是为了长久存在而构建的。
Non-controlled Businesses That Leave Us Comfortable
让我们安心的非控股企业
Last year I mentioned two of Berkshire’s long-duration partial-ownership positions – Coca-Cola and American Express. These are not huge commitments like our Apple position. Each only accounts for 4-5% of Berkshire’s GAAP net worth. But they are meaningful assets and also illustrate our thought processes.
去年我提到了伯克希尔的两个长期部分持股头寸 —— 可口可乐和美国运通。这些不像我们在苹果公司的头寸那样是巨额投资。每个只占伯克希尔 GAAP 净资产的 4 - 5%。但它们是有意义的资产，也说明了我们的思考过程。
American Express began operations in 1850, and Coca-Cola was launched in an Atlanta drug store in 1886. (Berkshire is not big on newcomers.) Both companies tried expanding into unrelated areas over the years and both found little success in these attempts. In the past – but definitely not now – both were even mismanaged.
美国运通于 1850 年开始运营，可口可乐于 1886 年在亚特兰大的一家药店里推出。（伯克希尔不太喜欢新公司。）多年来，这两家公司都试图向不相关领域扩张，但在这些尝试中都收效甚微。在过去 —— 但绝对不是现在 —— 它们甚至都被管理不善。
But each was hugely successful in its base business, reshaped here and there as conditions called for. And, crucially, their products “traveled.” Both Coke and AMEX became recognizable names worldwide as did their core products, and the consumption of liquids and the need for unquestioned financial trust are timeless essentials of our world.
但每家公司在其核心业务上都取得了巨大成功，并根据情况需要进行了一些调整。而且，至关重要的是，它们的产品 “畅销全球”。可口可乐和美国运通及其核心产品在全球都成为了知名品牌，液体消费和对无可置疑的金融信任的需求是我们世界永恒的必需品。
During 2023, we did not buy or sell a share of either AMEX or Coke – extending our own Rip Van Winkle slumber that has now lasted well over two decades. Both companies again rewarded our inaction last year by increasing their earnings and dividends. Indeed, our share of AMEX earnings in 2023 considerably exceeded the $1.3 billion cost of our long-ago purchase.
2023 年，我们没有买卖过美国运通或可口可乐的一股股票 —— 延续了我们自己长达二十多年的 “瑞普・凡・温克尔式沉睡”。去年这两家公司再次通过增加收益和股息回报了我们的不作为。事实上，我们在 2023 年从美国运通获得的收益份额远远超过了我们多年前购买时的 13 亿美元成本。
Both AMEX and Coke will almost certainly increase their dividends in 2024 – about 16% in the case of AMEX – and we will most certainly leave our holdings untouched throughout the year. Could I create a better worldwide business than these two enjoy? As Bertie will tell you: “No way.”
美国运通和可口可乐几乎肯定会在 2024 年增加股息 —— 美国运通大约会增加 16%—— 而且我们几乎肯定会在全年保持持股不变。我能创造出比这两家公司更好的全球业务吗？正如伯蒂会告诉你的：“不可能。”
Though Berkshire did not purchase shares of either company in 2023, your indirect ownership of both Coke and AMEX increased a bit last year because of share repurchases we made at Berkshire. Such repurchases work to increase your participation in every asset that Berkshire owns. To this obvious but often overlooked truth, I add my usual caveat: All stock repurchases should be price-dependent. What is sensible at a discount to business-value becomes stupid if done at a premium.
虽然伯克希尔在 2023 年没有购买这两家公司的股票，但由于我们在伯克希尔进行的股票回购，你们对可口可乐和美国运通的间接所有权去年略有增加。这种回购有助于增加你们在伯克希尔所拥有的每一项资产中的权益。对于这个明显但经常被忽视的事实，我要加上我通常的警告：所有股票回购都应该取决于价格。在低于企业价值时进行回购是明智的，如果在溢价时进行则是愚蠢的。
The lesson from Coke and AMEX? When you find a truly wonderful business, stick with it. Patience pays, and one wonderful business can offset the many mediocre decisions that are inevitable.
从可口可乐和美国运通身上得到的教训是什么？当你找到一家真正出色的企业时，坚持持有。耐心是有回报的，一家出色的企业可以抵消许多不可避免的平庸决策。
This year, I would like to describe two other investments that we expect to maintain indefinitely. Like Coke and AMEX, these commitments are not huge relative to our resources. They are worthwhile, however, and we were able to increase both positions during 2023.
今年，我想描述另外两项我们预计会无限期持有的投资。像可口可乐和美国运通一样，这些投资相对于我们的资源来说并不巨大。然而，它们是值得的，而且我们在 2023 年增加了这两个头寸。
At yearend, Berkshire owned 27.8% of Occidental Petroleum’s common shares and also owned warrants that, for more than five years, give us the option to materially increase our ownership at a fixed price. Though we very much like our ownership, as well as the option, Berkshire has no interest in purchasing or managing Occidental. We particularly like its vast oil and gas holdings in the United States, as well as its leadership in carbon-capture initiatives, though the economic feasibility of this technique has yet to be proven. Both of these activities are very much in our country’s interest.
到年底，伯克希尔拥有西方石油公司 27.8% 的普通股，并拥有认股权证，在五年多的时间里，这些认股权证使我们有权以固定价格大幅增加我们的所有权。虽然我们非常喜欢我们的所有权以及这个选择权，但伯克希尔无意购买或管理西方石油公司。我们特别看好其在美国的大量油气储备，以及其在碳捕集举措方面的领导地位，尽管这项技术的经济可行性尚未得到证实。这两项活动都非常符合我们国家的利益。
Not so long ago, the U.S. was woefully dependent on foreign oil, and carbon capture had no meaningful constituency. Indeed, in 1975, U.S. production was eight million barrels of oil-equivalent per day (“BOEPD”), a level far short of the country’s needs. From the favorable energy position that facilitated the U.S. mobilization in World War II, the country had retreated to become heavily dependent on foreign – potentially unstable – suppliers. Further declines in oil production were predicted along with future increases in usage.
不久前，美国严重依赖外国石油，碳捕集也没有重要的支持群体。事实上，1975 年，美国的石油日产量为 800 万桶油当量（“BOEPD”），远远低于国家的需求。美国从二战动员时有利的能源地位倒退，变得严重依赖外国 —— 潜在不稳定的 —— 供应商。预计石油产量还会进一步下降，而用量会增加。
For a long time, the pessimism appeared to be correct, with production falling to five million BOEPD by 2007. Meanwhile, the U.S. government created a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (“SPR”) in 1975 to alleviate – though not come close to eliminating – this erosion of American self-sufficiency.
长期以来，这种悲观情绪似乎是正确的，到 2007 年石油产量降至 500 万桶 BOEPD。与此同时，美国政府在 1975 年建立了战略石油储备（“SPR”），以缓解 —— 尽管远未消除 —— 美国自给自足能力的这种侵蚀。
And then – Hallelujah! – shale economics became feasible in 2011, and our energy dependency ended. Now, U.S. production is more than 13 million BOEPD, and OPEC no longer has the upper hand. Occidental itself has annual U.S. oil production that each year comes close to matching the entire inventory of the SPR. Our country would be very – very – nervous today if domestic production had remained at five million BOEPD, and it found itself hugely dependent on non-U.S. sources. At that level, the SPR would have been emptied within months if foreign oil became unavailable.
然后 —— 哈利路亚！——2011 年页岩经济变得可行，我们的能源依赖结束了。现在，美国的石油日产量超过 1300 万桶，欧佩克不再占据上风。西方石油公司本身每年在美国的石油产量几乎与整个 SPR 的库存相当。如果国内产量仍保持在 500 万桶 BOEPD，并且美国发现自己严重依赖非美国来源，那么今天我们国家会非常 —— 非常 —— 紧张。在那种水平下，如果外国石油供应中断，SPR 将在几个月内耗尽。
Under Vicki Hollub’s leadership, Occidental is doing the right things for both its country and its owners. No one knows what oil prices will do over the next month, year, or decade. But Vicki does know how to separate oil from rock, and that’s an uncommon talent, valuable to her shareholders and to her country.
在维基・霍卢布的领导下，西方石油公司正在为其国家和所有者做正确的事情。没有人知道未来一个月、一年或十年内石油价格会如何变化。但维基知道如何从岩石中分离石油，这是一种罕见的才能，对她的股东和国家都很有价值。
Additionally, Berkshire continues to hold its passive and long-term interest in five very large Japanese companies, each of which operates in a highly-diversified manner somewhat similar to the way Berkshire itself is run. We increased our holdings in all five last year after Greg Abel and I made a trip to Tokyo to talk with their managements.
此外，伯克希尔继续持有对五家大型日本公司的被动和长期权益，每家公司的运营方式都高度多元化，有点类似于伯克希尔本身的运营方式。在格雷格・阿贝尔和我前往东京与他们的管理层交谈后，我们去年增加了对这五家公司的持股。
Berkshire now owns about 9% of each of the five. (A minor point: Japanese companies calculate outstanding shares in a manner different from the practice in the U.S.) Berkshire has also pledged to each company that it will not purchase shares that will take our holdings beyond 9.9%. Our cost for the five totals ¥1.6 trillion, and the yearend market value of the five was ¥2.9 trillion. However, the yen has weakened in recent years and our yearend unrealized gain in dollars was 61% or $8 billion.
伯克希尔现在每家公司持有约 9% 的股份。（一个小细节：日本公司计算流通股的方式与美国的做法不同。）伯克希尔还向每家公司承诺，不会购买使我们的持股超过 9.9% 的股份。这五家公司的总成本为 1.6 万亿日元，年底的市值为 2.9 万亿日元。然而，近年来日元贬值，我们年底的未实现美元收益为 61%，即 80 亿美元。
Neither Greg nor I believe we can forecast market prices of major currencies. We also don’t believe we can hire anyone with this ability. Therefore, Berkshire has financed most of its Japanese position with the proceeds from ¥1.3 trillion of bonds. This debt has been very well-received in Japan, and I believe Berkshire has more yen-denominated debt outstanding than any other American company. The weakened yen has produced a yearend gain for Berkshire of $1.9 billion, a sum that, pursuant to GAAP rules, has periodically been recognized in income over the 2020-23 period.
格雷格和我都不相信我们能够预测主要货币的市场价格。我们也不相信我们能雇到有这种能力的人。因此，伯克希尔用 1.3 万亿日元债券的收益为其大部分日本头寸提供了资金。这笔债务在日本很受欢迎，我相信伯克希尔的日元计价债务比任何其他美国公司都多。日元贬值使伯克希尔在年底获得了 19 亿美元的收益，根据 GAAP 规则，这笔收益在 2020 - 2023 年期间定期计入收入。
In certain important ways, all five companies – Itochu, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo – follow shareholder-friendly policies that are much superior to those customarily practiced in the U.S. Since we began our Japanese purchases, each of the five has reduced the number of its outstanding shares at attractive prices.
在某些重要方面，这五家公司 —— 伊藤忠商事、丸红株式会社、三菱商事、三井物产和住友商事 —— 都遵循比美国通常做法友好得多的股东政策。自从我们开始购买日本股票以来，这五家公司都以有吸引力的价格减少了其流通股数量。
Meanwhile, the managements of all five companies have been far less aggressive about their own compensation than is typical in the United States. Note as well that each of the five is applying only about 1⁄3 of its earnings to dividends. The large sums the five retain are used both to build their many businesses and, to a lesser degree, to repurchase shares. Like Berkshire, the five companies are reluctant to issue shares.
与此同时，这五家公司的管理层在自身薪酬方面远没有美国典型企业那么激进。还要注意的是，这五家公司仅将约三分之一的收益用于股息。它们保留的大量资金用于发展众多业务，在较小程度上用于回购股票。和伯克希尔一样，这五家公司也不愿意发行股票。
An additional benefit for Berkshire is the possibility that our investment may lead to opportunities for us to partner around the world with five large, well-managed and well-respected companies. Their interests are far more broad than ours. And, on their side, the Japanese CEOs have the comfort of knowing that Berkshire will always possess huge liquid resources that can be instantly available for such partnerships, whatever their size may be.
对伯克希尔来说，另一个好处是我们的投资可能会为我们带来在全球与五家大型、管理良好且备受尊敬的公司合作的机会。它们的利益比我们广泛得多。而且，对日本的首席执行官们来说，他们欣慰地知道伯克希尔将始终拥有巨大的流动性资源，可以立即用于任何规模的此类合作。
Our Japanese purchases began on July 4, 2019. Given Berkshire’s present size, building positions through open-market purchases takes a lot of patience and an extended period of “friendly” prices. The process is like turning a battleship. That is an important disadvantage which we did not face in our early days at Berkshire.
我们于 2019 年 7 月 4 日开始购买日本股票。鉴于伯克希尔目前的规模，通过公开市场购买建立头寸需要很大的耐心和一段长时间的 “友好” 价格。这个过程就像转动一艘战舰。这是我们在伯克希尔早期没有面临的一个重要劣势。
The Scorecard in 2023
2023 年的业绩表现
Every quarter we issue a press release that reports our summarized operating earnings (or loss) in a manner similar to what is shown below. Here is the full-year compilation:
每个季度我们都会发布一份新闻稿，以类似于如下所示的方式报告我们的汇总营业收益（或亏损）。以下是全年的汇总：
1
2
3
(in $ millions)
单位：百万美元
2023 2022 Insurance-underwriting【保险承保业务】 ......................$ 5,428 $ (30) Insurance-investment income【保险投资收益】 ................. 9,567 6,484 Railroad【铁路业务】 ........................................ 5,087 5,946 Utilities and energy【公用事业和能源业务】 ................... 2,331 3,904 Other businesses and miscellaneous items【其他业务和杂项】 ...14,937 14,549 Operating earnings【营业收益】 ............................. $ 37,350 $30,853
At Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 6, 2023, I presented the first quarter’s results which had been released early that morning. I followed with a short summary of the outlook for the full year: (1) most of our non-insurance businesses faced lower earnings in 2023; (2) that decline would be cushioned by decent results at our two largest non-insurance businesses, BNSF and Berkshire Hathaway Energy (“BHE”) which, combined, had accounted for more than 30% of operating earnings in 2022; (3) our investment income was certain to materially grow because the huge U.S. Treasury bill position held by Berkshire had finally begun to pay us far more than the pittance we had been receiving and (4) insurance would likely do well, both because its underwriting earnings are not correlated to earnings elsewhere in the economy and, beyond that, property-casualty insurance prices had strengthened.
在 2023 年 5 月 6 日的伯克希尔年度大会上，我介绍了当天早上发布的第一季度业绩。随后我对全年前景做了一个简短总结：（1）我们的大多数非保险业务在 2023 年面临收益下降；（2）这种下降将由我们最大的两个非保险业务 BNSF 和伯克希尔・哈撒韦能源（“BHE”）的不错业绩所缓冲，这两家公司在 2022 年合计占营业收益的 30% 以上；（3）我们的投资收益肯定会大幅增长，因为伯克希尔持有的巨额美国国库券头寸终于开始给我们带来比以前微薄收益多得多的回报；（4）保险业务可能会表现良好，既因为其承保收益与经济其他领域的收益不相关，而且除此之外，财产意外险价格已经上涨。
Insurance came through as expected. I erred, however, in my expectations for both BNSF and BHE. Let’s take a look at each.
保险业务如预期般表现出色。然而，我对 BNSF 和 BHE 的预期都出现了错误。让我们分别来看一下。
Rail is essential to America’s economic future. It is clearly the most efficient way – measured by cost, fuel usage and carbon intensity – of moving heavy materials to distant destinations. Trucking wins for short hauls, but many goods that Americans need must travel to customers many hundreds or even several thousands of miles away. The country can’t run without rail, and the industry’s capital needs will always be huge. Indeed, compared to most American businesses, railroads eat capital.
铁路对美国的经济未来至关重要。以成本、燃料使用和碳强度衡量，它显然是将重物运往远方最有效的方式。卡车运输在短途运输中占优势，但美国人所需的许多货物必须运往数百甚至数千英里外的客户手中。没有铁路，国家无法运转，而且这个行业的资本需求总是巨大的。事实上，与大多数美国企业相比，铁路消耗资本。
BNSF is the largest of six major rail systems that blanket North America. Our railroad carries its 23,759 miles of main track, 99 tunnels, 13,495 bridges, 7,521 locomotives and assorted other fixed assets at $70 billion on its balance sheet. But my guess is that it would cost at least $500 billion to replicate those assets and decades to complete the job.
BNSF 是覆盖北美的六大铁路系统中最大的一个。我们的铁路在资产负债表上以 700 亿美元的价值拥有 23759 英里的主线轨道、99 条隧道、13495 座桥梁、7521 台机车和其他各种固定资产。但我猜复制这些资产至少需要 5000 亿美元，而且需要几十年才能完成这项工作。
BNSF must annually spend more than its depreciation charge to simply maintain its present level of business. This reality is bad for owners, whatever the industry in which they have invested, but it is particularly disadvantageous in capital-intensive industries. At BNSF, the outlays in excess of GAAP depreciation charges since our purchase 14 years ago have totaled a staggering $22 billion or more than $11⁄2 billion annually. Ouch! That sort of gap means BNSF dividends paid to Berkshire, its owner, will regularly fall considerably short of BNSF’s reported earnings unless we regularly increase the railroad’s debt. And that we do not intend to do.
BNSF 每年必须支出超过其折旧费用才能仅仅维持其现有业务水平。无论投资者投资于哪个行业，这种现实对他们来说都是不利的，但在资本密集型行业中尤其不利。自我们 14 年前收购以来，BNSF 超出 GAAP 折旧费用的支出总计惊人的 220 亿美元，即每年超过 15 亿美元。哎呀！这种差距意味着 BNSF 支付给其所有者伯克希尔的股息将经常远远低于其报告收益，除非我们定期增加铁路的债务。而我们不打算这样做。
Consequently, Berkshire is receiving an acceptable return on its purchase price, though less than it might appear, and also a pittance on the replacement value of the property. That’s no surprise to me or Berkshire’s board of directors. It explains why we could buy BNSF in 2010 at a small fraction of its replacement value.
因此，伯克希尔从其收购价格中获得了可接受的回报，尽管比看起来的要少，而且从资产的重置价值来看回报也很少。这对我和伯克希尔的董事会来说并不奇怪。这就解释了为什么我们能在 2010 年以其重置价值的一小部分收购 BNSF。
North America’s rail system moves huge quantities of coal, grain, autos, imported and exported goods, etc. one-way for long distances and those trips often create a revenue problem for back-hauls. Weather conditions are extreme and frequently hamper or even stymie the utilization of track, bridges and equipment. Flooding can be a nightmare. None of this is a surprise. While I sit in an always-comfortable office, railroading is an outdoor activity with many employees working under trying and sometimes dangerous conditions.
北美的铁路系统单向长距离运输大量煤炭、谷物、汽车、进出口货物等，而这些行程往往会给回程运输带来收入问题。天气条件极端，经常阻碍甚至阻碍轨道、桥梁和设备的使用。洪水可能是一场噩梦。这些都不足为奇。当我坐在总是舒适的办公室里时，铁路运营是一项户外工作，许多员工在艰苦有时甚至危险的条件下工作。
An evolving problem is that a growing percentage of Americans are not looking for the difficult, and often lonely, employment conditions inherent in some rail operations. Engineers must deal with the fact that among an American population of 335 million, some forlorn or mentally-disturbed Americans are going to elect suicide by lying in front of a 100-car, extraordinarily heavy train that can’t be stopped in less than a mile or more. Would you like to be the helpless engineer? This trauma happens about once a day in North America; it is far more common in Europe and will always be with us.
一个日益严重的问题是，越来越多的美国人不愿意从事一些铁路运营中艰苦且往往孤独的工作条件。工程师们必须面对这样一个事实，在 3.35 亿美国人中，一些孤独或精神错乱的美国人会选择躺在一列 100 节车厢、极其沉重且无法在一英里或更远距离内停下的火车前自杀。你愿意成为那个无助的工程师吗？这种创伤在北美每天大约发生一次；在欧洲更为常见，而且这种情况将永远存在。
Wage negotiations in the rail industry can end up in the hands of the President and Congress. Additionally, American railroads are required to carry many dangerous products every day that the industry would much rather avoid. The words “common carrier” define railroad responsibilities.
铁路行业的工资谈判最终可能会由总统和国会来处理。此外，美国铁路每天必须运输许多铁路行业宁愿避免的危险产品。“公共承运人” 这个词定义了铁路的责任。
Last year BNSF’s earnings declined more than I expected, as revenues fell. Though fuel costs also fell, wage increases, promulgated in Washington, were far beyond the country’s inflation goals. This differential may recur in future negotiations.
去年，由于收入下降，BNSF 的收益下降幅度超过了我的预期。尽管燃料成本也下降了，但华盛顿颁布的工资增长远远超过了国家的通胀目标。这种差异在未来的谈判中可能会再次出现。
Though BNSF carries more freight and spends more on capital expenditures than any of the five other major North American railroads, its profit margins have slipped relative to all five since our purchase. I believe that our vast service territory is second to none and that therefore our margin comparisons can and should improve.
尽管 BNSF 运输的货物比北美其他五大铁路公司都多，在资本支出上也比它们都多，但其利润率自我们收购以来相对于这五家公司都有所下滑。我相信我们广阔的服务区域是首屈一指的，因此我们的利润率比较应该而且能够得到改善。
I am particularly proud of both BNSF’s contribution to the country and the people who work in sub-zero outdoor jobs in North Dakota and Montana winters to keep America’s commercial arteries open. Railroads don’t get much attention when they are working but, were they unavailable, the void would be noticed immediately throughout America.
我特别为 BNSF 对国家的贡献以及那些在北达科他州和蒙大拿州零下的户外工作以保持美国商业动脉畅通的人们感到骄傲。铁路在正常运行时不会引起太多关注，但如果没有它们，整个美国会立即注意到这个空缺。
A century from now, BNSF will continue to be a major asset of the country and of Berkshire. You can count on that.
一百年后，BNSF 仍将是国家和伯克希尔的一项重要资产。这一点你可以相信。
Our second and even more severe earnings disappointment last year occurred at BHE. Mostof its large electric-utility businesses, as well as its extensive gas pipelines, performed about as expected. But the regulatory climate in a few states has raised the specter of zero profitability or even bankruptcy (an actual outcome at California’s largest utility and a current threat in Hawaii). In such jurisdictions, it is difficult to project both earnings and asset values in what was once regarded as among the most stable industries in America.
我们去年第二个也是更严重的收益失望来自 BHE。其大多数大型电力公用事业业务以及广泛的天然气管道业务表现基本符合预期。但几个州的监管环境引发了零盈利能力甚至破产的担忧（这是加利福尼亚州最大的公用事业公司的实际结果，也是夏威夷目前面临的威胁）。在这些司法管辖区，很难预测曾经被视为美国最稳定行业之一的收益和资产价值。
For more than a century, electric utilities raised huge sums to finance their growth through a state-by-state promise of a fixed return on equity (sometimes with a small bonus for superior performance). With this approach, massive investments were made for capacity that would likely be required a few years down the road. That forward-looking regulation reflected the reality that utilities build generating and transmission assets that often take many years to construct. BHE’s extensive multi-state transmission project in the West was initiated in 2006 and remains some years from completion. Eventually, it will serve 10 states comprising 30% of the acreage in the continental United States.
一个多世纪以来，电力公用事业公司通过各州承诺的固定股本回报率（有时对卓越表现有少量奖金）筹集了巨额资金来为其增长融资。通过这种方式，为可能几年后才需要的容量进行了大规模投资。这种前瞻性的监管反映了公用事业公司建设发电和输电资产往往需要多年才能完成的现实。BHE 在西部广泛的跨州输电项目于 2006 年启动，仍需数年才能完成。最终，它将为占美国大陆面积 30% 的 10 个州提供服务。
With this model employed by both private and public-power systems, the lights stayed on, even if population growth or industrial demand exceeded expectations. The “margin of safety” approach seemed sensible to regulators, investors and the public. Now, the fixed-but-satisfactoryreturn pact has been broken in a few states, and investors are becoming apprehensive that such ruptures may spread. Climate change adds to their worries. Underground transmission may be required but who, a few decades ago, wanted to pay the staggering costs for such construction?
随着私营和公共电力系统都采用这种模式，即使人口增长或工业需求超出预期，灯也能一直亮着。“安全边际” 方法对监管机构、投资者和公众来说似乎是明智的。现在，在一些州，固定但令人满意的回报协议已经被打破，投资者开始担心这种破裂可能会蔓延。气候变化加剧了他们的担忧。可能需要地下输电，但几十年前，谁愿意为这样的建设支付惊人的成本呢？
At Berkshire, we have made a best estimate for the amount of losses that have occurred. These costs arose from forest fires, whose frequency and intensity have increased – and will likely continue to increase – if convective storms become more frequent.
在伯克希尔，我们对已经发生的损失金额做了一个最佳估计。这些成本来自森林火灾，其频率和强度已经增加 —— 而且可能会继续增加 —— 如果对流风暴变得更加频繁。
It will be many years until we know the final tally from BHE’s forest-fire losses and can intelligently make decisions about the desirability of future investments in vulnerable western states. It remains to be seen whether the regulatory environment will change elsewhere.
要知道 BHE 森林火灾损失的最终数字还需要很多年，并且才能明智地决定在易受影响的西部各州未来投资的可取性。其他地方的监管环境是否会改变还有待观察。
Other electric utilities may face survival problems resembling those of Pacific Gas and Electric and Hawaiian Electric. A confiscatory resolution of our present problems would obviously be a negative for BHE, but both that company and Berkshire itself are structured to survive negative surprises. We regularly get these in our insurance business, where our basic product is risk assumption, and they will occur elsewhere. Berkshire can sustain financial surprises but we will not knowingly throw good money after bad.
其他电力公用事业公司可能面临类似太平洋天然气和电力公司以及夏威夷电力公司的生存问题。对我们目前问题的没收性解决方案显然对 BHE 不利，但该公司和伯克希尔本身的结构都能够承受负面意外。我们在保险业务中经常遇到这些情况，我们的基本产品就是承担风险，而且这种情况也会在其他地方发生。伯克希尔可以承受财务意外，但我们不会明知故犯地把钱投入到不良投资中。
Whatever the case at Berkshire, the final result for the utility industry may be ominous: Certain utilities might no longer attract the savings of American citizens and will be forced to adopt the public-power model. Nebraska made this choice in the 1930s and there are many public-power operations throughout the country. Eventually, voters, taxpayers and users will decide which model they prefer.
无论伯克希尔的情况如何，公用事业行业的最终结果可能是不祥的：某些公用事业公司可能不再吸引美国公民的储蓄，将被迫采用公共电力模式。内布拉斯加州在 20 世纪 30 年代做出了这个选择，全国有许多公共电力运营机构。最终，选民、纳税人和用户将决定他们更喜欢哪种模式。
When the dust settles, America’s power needs and the consequent capital expenditure will be staggering. I did not anticipate or even consider the adverse developments in regulatory returns and, along with Berkshire’s two partners at BHE, I made a costly mistake in not doing so.
当尘埃落定，美国的电力需求以及随之而来的资本支出将是惊人的。我没有预见到甚至没有考虑到监管回报的不利发展，而且我和伯克希尔在 BHE 的两个合伙人犯了一个代价高昂的错误，没有这样做。
Enough about problems: Our insurance business performed exceptionally well last year, setting records in sales, float and underwriting profits. Property-casualty insurance (“P/C”) provides the core of Berkshire’s well-being and growth. We have been in the business for 57 years and despite our nearly 5,000-fold increase in volume – from $17 million to $83 billion – we have much room to grow.
关于问题就说这么多：我们的保险业务去年表现异常出色，在销售额、浮存金和承保利润方面都创下了纪录。财产意外险（“P/C”）是伯克希尔幸福和成长的核心。我们从事这个业务已经 57 年了，尽管我们的业务量增长了近 5000 倍 —— 从 1700 万美元增长到 830 亿美元 —— 但我们仍有很大的增长空间。
Beyond that, we have learned – too often, painfully – a good deal about what types of insurance business and what sort of people to avoid. The most important lesson is that our underwriters can be thin, fat, male, female, young, old, foreign or domestic. But they can’t be optimists at the office, however desirable that quality may generally be in life.
除此之外，我们已经 —— 往往是痛苦地 —— 学到了很多关于应该避免哪些类型的保险业务和什么样的人的知识。最重要的教训是，我们的承保人可以是瘦的、胖的、男的、女的、年轻的、老的、外国的或国内的。但他们在办公室里不能是乐观主义者，无论这种品质在生活中通常多么可取。
Surprises in the P/C business – which can occur decades after six-month or one-year policies have expired – are almost always negative. The industry’s accounting is designed to recognize this reality, but estimation mistakes can be huge. And when charlatans are involved, detection is often both slow and costly. Berkshire will always attempt to be accurate in its estimates of future loss payments but inflation – both monetary and the “legal” variety – is a wild card.
P/C 业务中的意外 —— 可能在六个月或一年期保单到期几十年后才出现 —— 几乎总是负面的。这个行业的会计制度旨在认识到这一现实，但估计错误可能很大。而且当涉及到骗子时，发现往往既缓慢又昂贵。伯克希尔将始终努力准确估计未来的赔款支出，但通货膨胀 —— 无论是货币通货膨胀还是 “法律” 通货膨胀 —— 都是一个不确定因素。
I’ve told the story of our insurance operations so many times that I will simply direct newcomers to page 18. Here, I will only repeat that our position would not be what it is if Ajit Jain had not joined Berkshire in 1986. Before that lucky day – aside from an almost unbelievably wonderful experience with GEICO that began early in 1951 and will never end – I was largely wandering in the wilderness, as I struggled to build our insurance operation.
我已经多次讲述了我们保险业务的故事，所以我将简单地引导新读者查看第 18 页。在这里，我只想重复，如果不是阿吉特・贾恩在 1986 年加入伯克希尔，我们的地位不会是现在这样。在那个幸运的日子之前 —— 除了 1951 年初开始并永远不会结束的与 GEICO 的几乎难以置信的美妙经历 —— 我在努力建立我们的保险业务时基本上是在黑暗中摸索。
Ajit’s achievements since joining Berkshire have been supported by a large cast of hugely-talented insurance executives in our various P/C operations. Their names and faces are unknown to most of the press and the public. Berkshire’s lineup of managers, however, is to P/C insurance what Cooperstown’s honorees are to baseball.
阿吉特自加入伯克希尔以来的成就得到了我们各个 P/C 业务中一大批极具才华的保险高管的支持。他们的名字和面孔大多数媒体和公众都不知道。然而，伯克希尔的经理阵容对于 P/C 保险来说，就像库珀斯敦的名人堂入选者对于棒球一样。
Bertie, you can feel good about the fact that you own a piece of an incredible P/C operation that now operates worldwide with unmatched financial resources, reputation and talent. It carried the day in 2023.
伯蒂，你可以为拥有一家令人难以置信的 P/C 业务的一部分而感到高兴，这家业务现在在全球运营，拥有无与伦比的财务资源、声誉和人才。它在 2023 年发挥了重要作用。 奥马哈有什么特别之处？
What is it with Omaha?
Come to Berkshire’s annual gathering on May 4, 2024. On stage you will see the three managers who now bear the prime responsibilities for steering your company. What, you may wonder, do the three have in common? They certainly don’t look alike. Let’s dig deeper.
来参加 2024 年 5 月 4 日伯克希尔的年度大会吧。在舞台上，你将看到现在承担着引领公司主要责任的三位经理。你可能会想，这三个人有什么共同点呢？他们看起来肯定不一样。让我们深入探究一下。
Greg Abel, who runs all non-insurance operations for Berkshire – and in all respects is ready to be CEO of Berkshire tomorrow – was born and raised in Canada (he still plays hockey). In the 1990s, however, Greg lived for six years in Omaha just a few blocks away from me. During that period, I never met him.
格雷格・阿贝尔，他负责伯克希尔的所有非保险业务 —— 在各方面都已准备好明天成为伯克希尔的首席执行官 —— 他在加拿大出生和长大（他仍然打曲棍球）。然而，在 20 世纪 90 年代，格雷格在奥马哈生活了六年，离我只有几个街区。在那段时间里，我从未见过他。
A decade or so earlier, Ajit Jain, who was born, raised and educated in India, lived with his family in Omaha only a mile or so from my home (where I’ve lived since 1958). Both Ajit and his wife, Tinku, have many Omaha friends, though it’s been more than three decades since they moved to New York (in order to be where much of the action in reinsurance takes place).
大约十年前，阿吉特・贾恩在印度出生、长大并接受教育，他和家人住在奥马哈，离我自 1958 年以来一直居住的家只有一英里左右（阿吉特和他的妻子廷库在奥马哈有很多朋友，尽管他们搬到纽约已经三十多年了，因为那里是再保险业务的主要活动中心）。
Missing from the stage this year will be Charlie. He and I were both born in Omaha about two miles from where you will sit at our May get-together. In his first ten years, Charlie lived about a half-mile from where Berkshire has long maintained its office. Both Charlie and I spent our early years in Omaha public schools and were indelibly shaped by our Omaha childhood. We didn’t meet, however, until much later. (A footnote that may surprise you: Charlie lived under 15 of America’s 45 presidents. People refer to President Biden as #46, but that numbering counts Grover Cleveland as both #22 and #24 because his terms were not consecutive. America is a very young country.)
今年舞台上将缺少查理。他和我都出生在奥马哈，离你将在我们五月聚会上坐的地方大约两英里。在他的头十年里，查理住在离伯克希尔长期办公地点大约半英里的地方。查理和我早年都在奥马哈的公立学校上学，我们的奥马哈童年给我们留下了不可磨灭的印记。然而，我们直到很久以后才见面。（一个可能让你惊讶的脚注：查理在美国 45 位总统中的 15 位任期内生活过。人们称拜登总统为第 46 位，但这个编号把格罗弗・克利夫兰算作第 22 位和第 24 位，因为他的任期不是连续的。美国是一个非常年轻的国家。）
Moving to the corporate level, Berkshire itself relocated in 1970 from its 81 years of residence in New England to settle in Omaha, leaving its troubles behind and blossoming in its new home.
从公司层面来看，伯克希尔本身于 1970 年从其在新英格兰居住了 81 年的地方迁至奥马哈，摆脱了麻烦，在新的家园蓬勃发展。
As a final punctuation point to the “Omaha Effect,” Bertie – yes that Bertie – spent her early formative years in a middle-class neighborhood in Omaha and, many decades later, emerged as one of the country’s great investors.
作为 “奥马哈效应” 的最后一个标点符号，伯蒂 —— 就是那个伯蒂 —— 在奥马哈的一个中产阶级社区度过了她早期的成长岁月，几十年后，她成为了美国伟大的投资者之一。
You may be thinking that she put all of her money in Berkshire and then simply sat on it. But that’s not true. After starting a family in 1956, Bertie was active financially for 20 years: holding bonds, putting 1⁄3 of her funds in a publicly-held mutual fund and trading stocks with some frequency. Her potential remained unnoticed.
你可能会认为她把所有的钱都投入到了伯克希尔，然后就一直持有。但事实并非如此。1956 年组建家庭后，伯蒂在财务上活跃了 20 年：持有债券，将三分之一的资金投入到一家公开上市的共同基金，并频繁交易股票。她的潜力一直未被发现。
Then, in 1980, when 46, and independent of any urgings from her brother, Bertie decided to make her move. Retaining only the mutual fund and Berkshire, she made no new trades during the next 43 years. During that period, she became very rich, even after making large philanthropic gifts (think nine figures).
然后，在 1980 年，46 岁的伯蒂在没有哥哥任何催促的情况下决定采取行动。她只保留了共同基金和伯克希尔的股票，在接下来的 43 年里没有进行新的交易。在那段时间里，她变得非常富有，即使在进行了巨额慈善捐赠（想想九位数）之后。
Millions of American investors could have followed her reasoning which involved only the common sense she had somehow absorbed as a child in Omaha. And, taking no chances, Bertie returns to Omaha every May to be re-energized.
数百万美国投资者本可以遵循她的推理，这只涉及她在奥马哈童年时不知如何吸收的常识。而且，为了保险起见，伯蒂每年五月都会回到奥马哈重新充电。
So what is going on? Is it Omaha’s water? Is it Omaha’s air? Is it some strange planetary phenomenon akin to that which has produced Jamaica’s sprinters, Kenya’s marathon runners, or Russia’s chess experts? Must we wait until AI someday yields the answer to this puzzle?
那么这是怎么回事呢？是奥马哈的水吗？是奥马哈的空气吗？是某种类似于造就了牙买加短跑运动员、肯尼亚马拉松选手或俄罗斯国际象棋大师的奇怪行星现象吗？我们必须等到人工智能有一天给出这个谜题的答案吗？
Keep an open mind. Come to Omaha in May, inhale the air, drink the water and say “hi” to Bertie and her good-looking daughters. Who knows? There is no downside, and, in any event, you will have a good time and meet a huge crowd of friendly people.
保持开放的心态。五月来奥马哈，呼吸这里的空气，饮用这里的水，向伯蒂和她漂亮的女儿们问好。谁知道呢？这样做没有坏处，而且无论如何，你都会玩得很开心，还会遇到一大群友好的人。
To top things off, we will have available the new 4th edition of Poor Charlie’s Almanack. Pick up a copy. Charlie’s wisdom will improve your life as it has mine.
更棒的是，我们将推出新版的《穷查理宝典》。拿一本吧。查理的智慧会像改善我的生活一样改善你的生活。
February 24, 2024
2024 年 2 月 24 日
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特
Chairman of the Board
董事会主席