Berkshire – Past, Present and Future
Berkshire – Past, Present and Future
In the Beginning
开端
On May 6, 1964, Berkshire Hathaway, then run by a man named Seabury Stanton, sent a letter to its shareholders(股东) offering to buy 225,000 shares(股) of its stock(股票) for $11.375 per share(每股). I had expected(预期) the letter; I was surprised by the price.
1964 年 5 月 6 日，当时由西伯里・斯坦顿（Seabury Stanton）经营的伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司向股东发出一封信，提出以每股 11.375 美元的价格回购 225,000 股股票。我对这封信有所预期，但对价格感到惊讶。
Berkshire then had 1,583,680 shares outstanding(流通股). About 7% of these were owned by Buffett Partnership Ltd. (“BPL”), an investing entity(投资实体) that I managed and in which I had virtually(几乎) all of my net worth(净资产). Shortly before the tender offer(邀约收购) was mailed(邮寄、发出), Stanton had asked me at what price BPL would sell its holdings. I answered $11.50, and he said, “Fine, we have a deal.” Then came Berkshire’s letter, offering an eighth of a point less. I bristled at(对…感到愤怒、生气) Stanton’s behavior(行为) and didn’t tender.
当时伯克希尔有 1,583,680 股流通股。其中约 7% 由巴菲特合伙有限公司（Buffett Partnership Ltd.，简称 “BPL”）持有，这是我管理的一个投资实体，我几乎将全部净资产都投入其中。在收购要约寄出前不久，斯坦顿问我 BPL 会以什么价格出售其持有的股份。我回答 11.50 美元，他说：“好，成交。” 然后伯克希尔的信来了，出价低了八分之一点。我对斯坦顿的行为感到愤怒，没有接受要约。
That was a monumentally(极大的、不朽的、纪念碑的) stupid decision（决定）.
那是一个极其愚蠢的决定。
Berkshire was then a northern(北方的、北部的) textile(纺织) manufacturer(制造商) mired(陷入、深陷于…) in a terrible business. The industry(行业) in which it operated(操作、此处指经营、运作) was heading south(向南走，比喻手法，此处指下坡路), both metaphorically(比喻) and physically(物理). And Berkshire, for a variety of reasons(各种各样的原因), was unable(不能) to change course(方向).
当时的伯克希尔是一家陷入困境的北方纺织制造商。它所处的行业在走下坡路，无论是象征意义上还是实际地理位置上（行业重心南移）。而且由于种种原因，伯克希尔无法改变方向。
That was true even though(尽管) the industry’s problems had long been widely understood(广为人知). Berkshire’s own Board(董事会) minutes(会议纪要) of July 29, 1954, laid out(lay out 过去式，把某事物清晰地阐述、说明、罗列) the grim(严峻的、冷酷的、糟糕的) facts: “The textile industry in New England started going out of business(短语，意味停业、歇业、倒闭) forty years ago. During the war years(在战争年代) this trend(趋势、趋向) was stopped. The trend must continue until supply and demand(短语，供给和需求、供求、供需) have been balanced.”
尽管行业问题早已广为人知，但情况依然如此。伯克希尔 1954 年 7 月 29 日的董事会会议记录就列出了严峻的事实：“新英格兰的纺织业在四十年前就开始衰落。战争期间这一趋势停止了。但这一趋势必须继续，直到供需平衡。”
About a year after that board meeting, Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates(伙伴、同事，此处为联合) and Hathaway Manufacturing – both with roots in the 19th Century – joined forces(联合，携手合作), taking the name we bear(拥有) today. With its fourteen plants(植物、工厂，此处为工厂) and 10,000 employees, the merged company became the giant(巨头、大企业、大公司) of New England textiles. What the two managements(管理层) viewed as a merger agreement(合并协议), however, soon morphed into(演变成，变成) a suicide pact(自杀契约，比喻用法). During the seven years following the consolidation(合并), Berkshire operated at an overall loss(总体亏损), and its net worth shrunk(shrink的过去式，此处为缩水、减少) by 37%.
在那次董事会会议大约一年后，伯克希尔精纺协会（Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates）和哈撒韦制造公司（Hathaway Manufacturing）—— 两者都起源于 19 世纪 —— 合并，采用了我们今天使用的名称。合并后的公司拥有 14 家工厂和 10,000 名员工，成为新英格兰纺织业的巨头。然而，两家管理层视为合并协议的东西，很快变成了一份自杀契约。在合并后的七年里，伯克希尔总体亏损经营，净资产缩水了 37%。
Meanwhile(同时), the company closed nine plants, sometimes using the liquidation(清算、清理，通常用于商业、金融领域) proceeds(所得款项) to repurchase shares(回购股票). And that pattern(模式、方式) caught my attention(引起了我的注意).
与此同时，公司关闭了九家工厂，有时用清算所得回购股票。这种模式引起了我的注意。
I purchased BPL’s first shares of Berkshire in December 1962, anticipating(期望、预期) more closings and more repurchases. The stock was then selling for $7.50, a wide discount from per-share working capital(营运资本) of $10.25 and book value(账面价值) of $20.20. Buying the stock at that price was like picking up a discarded(废弃的) cigar butt(雪茄屁股) that had one puff(一口) remaining(剩余) in it. Though the stub(残端、残余部分，这里比喻成雪茄屁股) might be ugly and soggy(湿软的、潮湿的), the puff would be free. Once that momentary(短暂的) pleasure was enjoyed, however, no more could be expected.
1962 年 12 月，我购买了 BPL 的第一批伯克希尔股票，预期会有更多工厂关闭和更多回购。当时股票售价为 7.50 美元，远低于每股 10.25 美元的营运资金和 20.20 美元的账面价值。以那个价格购买股票就像捡起一个只剩一口可抽的丢弃雪茄烟头。尽管烟头可能又丑又湿，但这一口是免费的。然而，享受完那短暂的乐趣后，就不能再期望更多了。
Berkshire thereafter(在此之后) stuck to the script(遵循计划): It soon closed another two plants, and in that May 1964 move, set out to repurchase shares with the shutdown proceeds. The price that Stanton offered was 50% above the cost of our original purchases. There it was – my free puff, just waiting for me, after which I could look else where for other discarded butts.
此后，伯克希尔按部就班：很快又关闭了两家工厂，并在 1964 年 5 月的行动中，着手用关闭工厂的收益回购股票。斯坦顿提供的价格比我们最初购买成本高出 50%。机会就在那里 —— 我的免费一口烟，就在等着我，之后我就可以去别处寻找其他丢弃的烟头了。
Instead(相反), irritated by(被…激怒、因…生气) Stanton’s chiseling(欺骗、诈骗、讨价还价), I ignored his offer and began to aggressively(积极地、激进地、大力地) buy more Berkshire shares.
然而，由于对斯坦顿的讨价还价感到恼怒，我无视了他的报价，开始大量购买更多的伯克希尔股票。
By April 1965, BPL owned 392,633 shares (out of 1,017,547 then outstanding) and at an early-May board meeting we formally(正式地) took control of the company. Through Seabury’s and my childish(幼稚) behavior – after all, what was an eighth of a point to either of us? – he lost his job, and I found myself with more than 25% of BPL’s capital invested in a terrible business about which I knew very little. I became the dog who caught the car(追到汽车的狗，寓意陷入一种看似达成目标却不知如何应对的困境).
到 1965 年 4 月，BPL 拥有 392,633 股（当时流通股为 1,017,547 股），并在 5 月初的一次董事会会议上，我们正式控制了公司。由于西伯里和我的幼稚行为 —— 毕竟，八分之一点对我们俩来说算什么呢？—— 他失去了工作，而我发现自己将 BPL 超过 25% 的资本投入到了一个我知之甚少的糟糕业务中。我成了那只追到汽车却不知如何是好的狗。
Because of Berkshire’s operating losses and share repurchases, its net worth at the end of fiscal 1964(财政的、会计的，此处指1964财年) had fallen(已经跌落、已经下降) to $22 million from $55 million at the time of the 1955 merger. The full $22 million was required by the textile operation: The company had no excess(多余的、过剩的) cash and owed its bank $2.5 million. (Berkshire’s 1964 annual(年度) report is reproduced on pages 130-142.)
由于伯克希尔的经营亏损和股票回购，其 1964 财年末的净资产从 1955 年合并时的 5500 万美元降至 2200 万美元。全部 2200 万美元都被纺织业务占用：公司没有多余现金，还欠银行 250 万美元。（伯克希尔 1964 年年度报告转载于第 130 - 142 页。）
For a time I got lucky: Berkshire immediately(立刻、马上) enjoyed two years of good operating conditions(状况、状态). Better yet(更妙的是), its earnings(赢得、赚的，此处为赚钱) in those years were free of income tax(所得税) because it possessed(拥有) a large loss carry-forward(专业财务用语，亏损结转) that had arisen from the disastrous(灾难性的、极糟糕的) results in earlier years.
有一段时间我很幸运：伯克希尔立即享受了两年的良好经营状况。更妙的是，由于此前多年灾难性的业绩带来了大量的亏损结转，这两年的盈利无需缴纳所得税。
Then the honeymoon(蜜月，比喻手法，形容美好的时期) ended. During the 18 years following 1966, we struggled(挣扎、奋斗、努力) unremittingly(不间断地、坚持不懈地) with the textile business, all to no avail(用处，全部徒劳无功). But stubbornness(固执、执拗) – stupidity? – has its limits. In 1985, I finally threw in the towel(扔毛巾进去，指投降认输) and closed the operation.
然后蜜月期结束了。在 1966 年之后的 18 年里，我们与纺织业务进行了不懈的斗争，但毫无成效。但固执 —— 愚蠢？—— 是有限度的。1985 年，我终于认输，关闭了这项业务。
Undeterred(未被吓住的、未被阻止的、毫不气馁的) by my first mistake of committing much of BPL’s resources to a dying business, I quickly compounded(合成、混合、加重) the error. Indeed, my second blunder(愚蠢或粗心的错误) was far more serious than the first, eventually(最终、终于、到头来) becoming the most costly(代价) in my career(职业生涯).
我没有因为自己犯下的第一个错误（将 BPL 公司的大量资源投入到一个濒临倒闭的业务中）而有所警醒，反而迅速让这个错误变得更加严重。事实上，我的第二个失误远比第一个更为严重，最终成了我职业生涯中代价最为惨重的失误。
Early in 1967, I had Berkshire pay $8.6 million to buy National Indemnity Company (“NICO”), a small but promising(有希望的、有前途的) Omaha-based insurer(保险公司). (A tiny sister company(小型姊妹公司) was also included in the deal.) Insurance(保险) was in my sweet spot(最佳位置、状态、擅长的领域): I understood and liked the industry.
1967 年初，我让伯克希尔公司斥资 860 万美元收购了国民赔偿公司（“NICO”），这是一家位于奥马哈的小型但颇具发展前景的保险公司。（这笔交易还包含了一家规模很小的关联公司。）保险行业正合我心意：我了解且喜爱这个行业。
Jack Ringwalt, the owner of NICO, was a long-time friend who wanted to sell to me – me, personally. In no way was his offer intended for Berkshire. So why did I purchase NICO for Berkshire rather than for BPL? I’ve had 48 years to think about that question, and I’ve yet to come up with a good answer. I simply made a colossal(巨大的、庞大的、极其严重的) mistake.
国民赔偿公司的所有者杰克・林沃尔特是我的一位老朋友，他想把公司卖给我 —— 是卖给我个人。他的出售意向绝非针对伯克希尔公司。那么，我为什么要为伯克希尔公司而不是为多元零售公司（BPL）买下国民赔偿公司呢？48 年来，我一直在思考这个问题，却至今仍没能想出一个好答案。我就是犯了一个极其严重的错误。
If BPL had been the purchaser, my partners and I would have owned 100% of a fine business, destined(命中注定的、注定要发生的) to form the base for building the company Berkshire has become. Moreover(此外、再者), our growth would not have been impeded(阻碍、阻止、此处为停滞) for nearly two decades(十年) by the unproductive funds(无法产生效益的资金) imprisoned(束缚、禁锢) in the textile operation. Finally, our subsequent(随后的、后来的、接着的) acquisitions(收购、获得、购置) would have been owned in their entirety(整体、全部、此处为完全) by my partners and me rather than being 39%-owned by the legacy(遗留) shareholders of Berkshire, to whom we had no obligation(责任、义务). Despite these facts staring me in the face, I opted to marry 100% of an excellent(卓越的、优秀的) business (NICO) to a 61%-owned terrible business (Berkshire Hathaway), a decision that eventually diverted(使转移、使绕道) $100 billion or so from BPL partners to a collection(集合、聚合物、此处为一群) of strangers.
如果当时是多元零售公司（BPL）进行收购的话，我和我的合伙人本可以 100% 拥有一家优质企业，而这家企业注定会成为打造如今这般伯克希尔公司的基石。而且，我们的发展也不会因为纺织业务中那些被束缚住的低效资金而停滞将近 20 年之久。最后，我们后续的收购项目本可以完全由我和我的合伙人所拥有，而不是由伯克希尔的遗留股东持有 39% 的份额，毕竟我们对这些遗留股东本没有什么义务。尽管这些事实就明摆在眼前，我却选择将一家优秀企业（国民赔偿公司，即 NICO）的 100% 股权与一家我们仅持股 61% 的糟糕企业（伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司）结合在一起，这个决定最终导致大约 1000 亿美元从多元零售公司（BPL）的合伙人手中转移到了一群陌生人那里。
One more confession(坦白、工人、忏悔) and then I’ll go on to more pleasant(令人愉悦的) topics(话题、主题): Can you believe that in 1975 I bought Waumbec Mills, another New England textile company? Of course, the purchase price was a “bargain”(特价品、便宜货) based on the assets we received and the projected(此处为动词：预计、计划) synergies(协同效应) with Berkshire’s existing(现行的、目前的、此处已有的) textile business. Nevertheless – surprise, surprise – Waumbec was a disaster(灾难), with the mill having to be closed down not many years later.
再坦白一件事，然后我就接着聊些更让人愉快的话题了：你能相信在 1975 年我收购了沃姆贝克纺织厂（Waumbec Mills）吗？那可是另一家位于新英格兰地区的纺织企业。当然了，基于我们所获得的资产以及与伯克希尔现有纺织业务预计能产生的协同效应来看，收购价格算是 “很划算” 的。然而 —— 令人意外的是 —— 沃姆贝克纺织厂简直就是一场灾难，没过几年就不得不关停了。
And now some good news: The northern textile industry is finally extinct(消亡). You need no longer panic(恐慌的、惊慌的) if you hear that I’ve been spotted(此处作形容词，看见、发现) wandering(漫步、闲逛、徘徊) around New England.
现在来说点好消息：北方的纺织业终于彻底消亡了。要是你听说有人看到我在新英格兰地区四处闲逛，你大可不必惊慌了。
Charlie Straightens Me Out
查理纠正了我
My cigar-butt strategy(策略) worked very well while I was managing small sums(金额、款项). Indeed, the many dozens(几十、几十个) of free puffs I obtained(强调通过努力、购买、研究等方式，此处为获取、得到、取得) in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative(相对) and absolute(绝对) investment performance(投资绩效).
在我管理小额资金时，我的雪茄烟头策略非常有效。事实上，20 世纪 50 年代我获得的几十次免费抽吸使那个十年成为我投资生涯中相对和绝对业绩最好的时期。
Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific(极好的、绝妙的) business and promptly(迅速地、立即) put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains(收益、利润) in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre(平庸的、普通的) companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.
即便在那时，我也对雪茄烟头策略做了一些例外，其中最重要的是 GEICO。1951 年，我与洛里默・戴维森（Lorimer Davidson）进行了一次交谈，他是一位出色的人，后来成为了该公司的首席执行官。得益于这次交谈，我了解到 GEICO 是一家了不起的企业，并立即将我 9800 美元净资产的 65% 投入到其股票中。不过，我早年的大部分收益来自于以低价交易的平庸公司的投资。本・格雷厄姆（Ben Graham）教给了我这种技术，而且它很有效。
But a major(主要的、重要的) weakness in this approach(靠近、接近) gradually(逐步地、渐渐地) became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable(可攀登的) only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.
但这种方法的一个主要弱点逐渐显现出来：雪茄烟头投资策略仅在一定程度上可扩展。对于大额资金来说，它永远不会效果很好。
In addition(除此之外), though marginal(边缘) businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive(吸引力) as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation(基础、根基) on which to build a large and enduring(持久、经久不衰) enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding(苛刻、苛求) criteria(标准) than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory(非常满意的) “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)
此外，尽管以低价购买的边际企业作为短期投资可能有吸引力，但它们不是建立一个大型持久企业的正确基础。选择婚姻伴侣显然需要比约会更严格的标准。（应该指出的是，伯克希尔本来会是一个非常令人满意的 “约会对象”：如果我们接受了西伯里・斯坦顿每股 11.375 美元的收购要约，BPL 在其伯克希尔投资上的加权年回报率将约为 40%。）
It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine(组合) huge size with satisfactory profits(利润). Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless(然而), it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted(预测) that we would hit it off – and we did.
直到 1959 年我才遇到查理・芒格（Charlie Munger），当时他早已离开奥马哈，在洛杉矶安家。我当时 28 岁，他 35 岁。介绍我们认识的奥马哈医生预测我们会合得来 —— 我们确实如此。
If you’ve attended(出息、参加) our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance(广泛的卓越才能), a prodigious(巨大的、惊人的、非凡的) memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”
如果你们参加过我们的年会，就知道查理才华横溢、记忆力惊人，而且有一些坚定的观点。我自己也不是没有主见，我们有时也会意见不合。然而，在 56 年里，我们从未争吵过。当我们意见不同时，查理通常会结束谈话，说：“沃伦，仔细想想，你会同意我的，因为你很聪明，而我是对的。”
What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture(建筑) is among(在。。。中) his passions(喜好). Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer(执业律师) (with his time billed(计费、收费) at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently(与此同时), he designed the house that he lives in today – some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged(不能被挪动、不能被劝服) if he is happy in his surroundings(环境、周遭).) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes(宿舍楼) at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.
你们大多数人不知道的是，查理热爱建筑。尽管他的职业生涯始于一名执业律师（当时他的收费是每小时 15 美元），但查理在 30 多岁时通过在洛杉矶附近设计和建造五个公寓项目赚到了他的第一笔真正的钱。同时，他设计了他至今仍居住的房子 —— 大约 55 年后。（和我一样，如果查理对周围环境满意，就很难改变他的想法。）近年来，查理在斯坦福大学和密歇根大学设计了大型宿舍建筑群，如今，91 岁的他正在从事另一个重大项目。
From my perspective(观点), though, Charlie’s most important architectural(建筑的) feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint(蓝图) he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.
不过，在我看来，查理最重要的建筑成就是设计了今天的伯克希尔。他给我的蓝图很简单：忘掉你所知道的以低价购买一般企业的方法；相反，要以合理的价格购买优秀企业。
Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie’s input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when – ahem – I had attended three). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable(无可辩驳的). Consequently(结果), Berkshire has been built to Charlie’s blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor(总承包商), with the CEOs of Berkshire’s subsidiaries(子公司) doing the real work as sub-contractors(分包商).
改变我的行为并非易事（问问我的家人就知道了）。在没有查理的建议时，我已经取得了一定的成功，所以我为什么要听一个从未在商学院待过一天的律师的话呢（而我 —— 咳咳 —— 上过三所商学院）。但查理从不厌倦向我重复他关于商业和投资的格言，而且他的逻辑无可辩驳。因此，伯克希尔是按照查理的蓝图建立起来的。我的角色是总承包商，而伯克希尔子公司的首席执行官们则作为分包商做实际工作。
The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional(偶尔的、偶然的、临时的) backsliding(倒退、退步) on my part – remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity(机会) then to buy See’s Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.
1972 年对伯克希尔来说是一个转折点（尽管我偶尔也会走回头路 —— 还记得我 1975 年购买沃姆贝克纺织厂（Waumbec Mills）的事吗）。当时我们有机会为蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）收购喜诗糖果（See’s Candy），查理、我和伯克希尔在蓝筹印花公司都有大量股份，后来蓝筹印花公司并入了伯克希尔。
See’s was a legendary(传奇的、传说的) West Coast(西海岸) manufacturer and retailer(零售商) of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about $4 million pre-tax while utilizing(利用、使用、应用) only $8 million of net tangible(有形的) assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet(资产负债表): a broad(广泛的、宽阔的) and durable(持久的) competitive(竞争的) advantage(优势、优点) that gave it significant(重要的、显著的) pricing power. That strength was virtually certain(确定、肯定) to give See’s major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize(实现、成为现实) with only minor amounts of incremental(增加的、递增的) investment. In other words, See’s could be expected to gush(涌出、喷涌) cash for decades to come.
喜诗糖果是一家传奇的西海岸盒装巧克力制造商和零售商，当时每年税前盈利约 400 万美元，而仅使用 800 万美元的有形净资产。此外，该公司有一项巨大的资产未出现在资产负债表上：广泛而持久的竞争优势使其具有显著的定价权。随着时间的推移，这种优势几乎肯定会使喜诗糖果的盈利大幅增长。更好的是，只需少量的增量投资就能实现这些增长。换句话说，预计喜诗糖果在未来几十年将产生大量现金。
The family controlling See’s wanted $30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn’t want to pay more than $25 million and wasn’t all that enthusiastic(热情的、热烈的，此处为热衷的) even at that figure(价格、金额). (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp(因害怕或惊讶倒吸气).) My misguided(误入歧途、指导错误) caution(小心、谨慎) could have scuttled(破坏、阻止、阻挠) a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our $25 million bid(投标、出价).
控制喜诗糖果的家族要价 3000 万美元出售该业务，查理正确地说它值这个价。但我不想出价超过 2500 万美元，即使是这个价格我也不是很热衷。（三倍于有形净资产的价格让我倒吸一口凉气。）我错误的谨慎态度差点使这笔出色的收购泡汤。但幸运的是，卖家决定接受我们 2500 万美元的出价。
To date(目前为止), See’s has earned(赢得、挣得) $1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only $40 million. See’s has thus(因此) been able(能够) to distribute(分配) huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable(可分配的) profits. (Envision(展望、想象) rabbits breeding.) Additionally(此外), through watching See’s in action, I gained(获得、得到) a business education about the value of powerful brands(品牌) that opened my eyes to many other profitable(有利可图的、赢利的、有好处的) investments.
到目前为止，喜诗糖果已实现税前盈利 19 亿美元，而其增长仅需额外投资 4000 万美元。因此，喜诗糖果能够分配大量资金，帮助伯克希尔购买其他企业，而这些企业反过来又产生了大量可分配利润。（想象一下兔子繁殖。）此外，通过观察喜诗糖果的运营，我获得了关于强大品牌价值的商业教育，这让我看到了许多其他有利可图的投资机会。
Even with Charlie’s blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome(令人厌恶的、可怕的、糟糕的) was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate(蒸发) because of foreign competition(竞争、竞争者). And I simply didn’t see that coming.
即使有了查理的蓝图，自沃姆贝克事件以来我也犯了很多错误。最严重的是德克斯特鞋业（Dexter Shoe）。1993 年我们收购该公司时，它有出色的业绩记录，在我看来绝不像一个雪茄烟头企业。然而，由于外国竞争，它的竞争优势很快消失了。而我根本没有预见到这一点。
Consequently, Berkshire paid $433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn’t come close to recording the magnitude(巨大、重大) of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about $5.7 billion. As a financial(财务的、金融的) disaster, this one deserves(值得、应得) a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.
结果，伯克希尔为德克斯特鞋业支付了 4.33 亿美元，而其价值很快归零。然而，通用会计准则（GAAP）会计远未能记录下我错误的严重程度。事实是，我用伯克希尔的股票而不是现金支付给德克斯特鞋业的卖家，而我用于收购的股票现在价值约 57 亿美元。作为一场财务灾难，这一事件理应载入吉尼斯世界纪录。
Several(几个、一些) of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp(无力的、柔软的、跛行，此处为艰难地移动) along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business – which Berkshire most certainly(当然、肯定、无疑) is – for ownership(所有权、产权) of a so-so business irreparably(不可挽回地、不能恢复地) destroys(毁灭、破坏、摧毁) value.
我随后的几个错误也涉及用伯克希尔的股票收购那些盈利注定只能缓慢增长的企业。这种错误是致命的。用一家优秀企业（伯克希尔无疑是优秀企业）的股票去换取一家平庸企业的所有权，会不可挽回地破坏价值。
We’ve also suffered(遭受、受苦、受难) financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.
当伯克希尔所拥有股票的公司犯下这种错误时（有时在我担任董事期间发生），我们也遭受了财务损失。太多时候，首席执行官们似乎忽视了一个基本现实：在收购中你所付出股票的内在价值绝不能超过你所得到企业的内在价值。
I’ve yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-forstock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker’s focus will be on describing “customary” premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions – an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition – or whether the deal will increase the acquirer’s earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his “helpers” will often conjure up fanciful “synergies.” (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I’ve never heard “dis-synergies” mentioned, though I’ve witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms. They should instead be standard practice.
我从未见过投资银行家在向潜在收购方董事会提交换股交易时量化这一至关重要的数学问题。相反，银行家的重点将是描述当前收购中支付的高于市场价格的 “惯例” 溢价 —— 这是一种评估收购吸引力的绝对愚蠢的方式 —— 或者这笔交易是否会增加收购方的每股收益（这本身远不应是决定性因素）。为了达到期望的每股收益数字，气喘吁吁的首席执行官和他的 “助手们” 常常会幻想出奇妙的 “协同效应”。（多年来作为 19 家公司的董事，我从未听到有人提到 “负协同效应”，尽管我在交易完成后目睹了很多这种情况。）在美国的董事会会议室里，对收购进行事后分析，将现实与最初的预测进行诚实比较的情况很少见。它们应该成为标准做法。
I can promise you that long after I’m gone, Berkshire’s CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can’t get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive “fairness” opinion endorsing that swap).
我可以向你保证，在我离开很久之后，伯克希尔的首席执行官和董事会在任何收购中发行股票之前都会仔细计算内在价值。你不能用一张百元大钞换八张十元钞票（即使你的顾问给了你一份昂贵的 “公平性” 意见书认可这种交换）。
Overall, Berkshire’s acquisitions have worked out well – and very well in the case of a few large ones. So, too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their market prices so any gains – including those unrealized – are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire’s subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.
总体而言，伯克希尔的收购取得了不错的成果 —— 在一些大型收购中成果非常好。我们在有价证券投资方面也是如此。后者在我们的资产负债表上始终按市场价格估值，因此任何收益 —— 包括未实现收益 —— 都会立即反映在我们的净资产中。但我们直接收购的企业在资产负债表上从未向上重估价值，即使我们可以以比其账面价值高出数十亿美元的价格出售它们。伯克希尔子公司价值的未记录收益已经变得巨大，并且在过去十年中增长速度特别快。
Listening to Charlie has paid off.
听从查理的建议得到了回报。
Berkshire Today
Berkshire is now a sprawling conglomerate, constantly trying to sprawl further.
伯克希尔现在是一个庞大的企业集团，并且一直在努力进一步扩张。
Conglomerates, it should be acknowledged, have a terrible reputation with investors. And they richly deserve it. Let me first explain why they are in the doghouse, and then I will go on to describe why the conglomerate form brings huge and enduring advantages to Berkshire.
应该承认，企业集团在投资者中声誉不佳。它们活该如此。让我先解释一下它们为什么不受欢迎，然后我将继续描述为什么企业集团形式为伯克希尔带来了巨大而持久的优势。
Since I entered the business world, conglomerates have enjoyed several periods of extreme popularity, the silliest of which occurred in the late 1960s. The drill for conglomerate CEOs then was simple: By personality, promotion or dubious accounting – and often by all three – these managers drove a fledgling conglomerate’s stock to, say, 20 times earnings and then issued shares as fast as possible to acquire another business selling at ten-or-so times earnings. They immediately applied “pooling” accounting to the acquisition, which – with not a dime’s worth of change in the underlying businesses – automatically increased per-share earnings, and used the rise as proof of managerial genius. They next explained to investors that this sort of talent justified the maintenance, or even the enhancement, of the acquirer’s p/e multiple. And, finally, they promised to endlessly repeat this procedure and thereby create ever-increasing per-share earnings.
自我进入商业世界以来，企业集团经历了几个极度流行的时期，其中最愚蠢的时期发生在 20 世纪 60 年代末。当时企业集团首席执行官的做法很简单：通过个性、促销或可疑的会计手段 —— 而且常常是三者兼而有之 —— 这些经理人将一家新兴企业集团的股票推高到，比如说，20 倍市盈率，然后尽快发行股票收购另一家市盈率为 10 倍左右的企业。他们立即对收购采用 “权益结合法” 会计处理，这 —— 在基础业务没有一分钱变化的情况下 —— 自动提高了每股收益，并将这种增长作为管理天才的证明。他们接着向投资者解释说，这种才能证明了维持甚至提高收购方市盈率倍数是合理的。最后，他们承诺不断重复这个过程，从而创造出不断增长的每股收益。
Wall Street’s love affair with this hocus-pocus intensified as the 1960s rolled by. The Street’s denizens are always ready to suspend disbelief when dubious maneuvers are used to manufacture rising per-share earnings, particularly if these acrobatics produce mergers that generate huge fees for investment bankers. Auditors willingly sprinkled their holy water on the conglomerates’ accounting and sometimes even made suggestions as to how to further juice the numbers. For many, gushers of easy money washed away ethical sensitivities.
随着 20 世纪 60 年代的推移，华尔街对这种骗局的热爱愈发强烈。华尔街的居民总是愿意在可疑手段被用来制造每股收益增长时暂时放下怀疑，特别是如果这些手段促成的合并能为投资银行家带来巨额费用。审计师们欣然为企业集团的会计处理洒下圣水，有时甚至就如何进一步美化数字提出建议。对许多人来说，轻易得来的大量金钱冲走了道德敏感性。
Since the per-share earnings gains of an expanding conglomerate came from exploiting p/e differences, its CEO had to search for businesses selling at low multiples of earnings. These, of course, were characteristically mediocre businesses with poor long-term prospects. This incentive to bottom-fish usually led to a conglomerate’s collection of underlying businesses becoming more and more junky. That mattered little to investors: It was deal velocity and pooling accounting they looked to for increased earnings.
由于扩张中的企业集团每股收益的增长来自于利用市盈率差异，其首席执行官必须寻找市盈率较低的企业进行收购。当然，这些企业通常是平庸的企业，长期前景不佳。这种寻求低价股的动机通常导致企业集团旗下的基础业务越来越差。但这对投资者来说并不重要：他们关注的是交易速度和权益结合法会计处理以实现收益增长。
The resulting firestorm of merger activity was fanned by an adoring press. Companies such as ITT, Litton Industries, Gulf & Western, and LTV were lionized, and their CEOs became celebrities. (These once-famous conglomerates are now long gone. As Yogi Berra said, “Every Napoleon meets his Watergate.”)
由此引发的并购热潮被崇拜的媒体推波助澜。像国际电话电报公司（ITT）、利顿工业公司（Litton Industries）、海湾与西方工业公司（Gulf & Western）和林 - 特姆科 - 沃特公司（LTV）等公司被奉为偶像，它们的首席执行官成为名人。（这些曾经著名的企业集团现在都已不复存在。正如尤吉・贝拉（Yogi Berra）所说：“每个拿破仑都会遇到他的水门事件。”）
Back then, accounting shenanigans of all sorts – many of them ridiculously transparent – were excused or overlooked. Indeed, having an accounting wizard at the helm of an expanding conglomerate was viewed as a huge plus: Shareholders in those instances could be sure that reported earnings would never disappoint, no matter how bad the operating realities of the business might become.
当时，各种各样的会计把戏 —— 其中许多明显得可笑 —— 被原谅或忽视。事实上，在一个扩张中的企业集团中有一位会计奇才被视为巨大的优势：在那些情况下，股东可以确信，无论企业的经营现实变得多么糟糕，报告收益永远不会令人失望。
In the late 1960s, I attended a meeting at which an acquisitive CEO bragged of his “bold, imaginative accounting.” Most of the analysts listening responded with approving nods, seeing themselves as having found a manager whose forecasts were certain to be met, whatever the business results might be.
20 世纪 60 年代末，我参加了一次会议，一位收购型首席执行官吹嘘他 “大胆、富有想象力的会计处理”。大多数听他讲话的分析师都点头表示赞许，认为自己找到了一位无论业务结果如何，其预测肯定会实现的经理人。
Eventually, however, the clock struck twelve, and everything turned to pumpkins and mice. Once again, it became evident that business models based on the serial issuances of overpriced shares – just like chain-letter models – most assuredly redistribute wealth, but in no way create it. Both phenomena, nevertheless, periodically blossom in our country – they are every promoter’s dream – though often they appear in a carefully-crafted disguise. The ending is always the same: Money flows from the gullible to the fraudster. And with stocks, unlike chain letters, the sums hijacked can be staggering.
然而，最终，时钟敲响了十二点，一切都变成了南瓜和老鼠。再次证明，基于连续发行高价股票的商业模式 —— 就像连锁信模式一样 —— 肯定会重新分配财富，但绝不会创造财富。尽管如此，这两种现象在我们国家还是会定期出现 —— 它们是每个促销员的梦想 —— 尽管它们常常以精心设计的伪装出现。结局总是一样的：钱从容易上当的人手中流向骗子。而且与连锁信不同的是，在股票市场上被劫持的资金数额可能惊人。
At both BPL and Berkshire, we have never invested in companies that are hell-bent on issuing shares. That behavior is one of the surest indicators of a promotion-minded management, weak accounting, a stock that is overpriced and – all too often – outright dishonesty.
在 BPL 和伯克希尔，我们从未投资于那些一心发行股票的公司。这种行为是一种促销型管理、会计薄弱、股票高估以及 —— 太常见了 —— 彻头彻尾不诚实的最可靠指标之一。
So what do Charlie and I find so attractive about Berkshire’s conglomerate structure? To put the case simply: If the conglomerate form is used judiciously, it is an ideal structure for maximizing long-term capital growth.
那么，查理和我为什么觉得伯克希尔的企业集团结构如此有吸引力呢？简单地说：如果明智地使用企业集团形式，它是实现长期资本增长最大化的理想结构。
One of the heralded virtues of capitalism is that it efficiently allocates funds. The argument is that markets will direct investment to promising businesses and deny it to those destined to wither. That is true: With all its excesses, market-driven allocation of capital is usually far superior to any alternative.
资本主义的一个备受赞誉的优点是它能有效地分配资金。其论点是市场会将投资引导向有前途的企业，而拒绝那些注定要衰落的企业。这是事实：尽管存在种种过度行为，但市场驱动的资本分配通常远远优于其他任何替代方案。
Nevertheless, there are often obstacles to the rational movement of capital. As those 1954 Berkshire minutes made clear, capital withdrawals within the textile industry that should have been obvious were delayed for decades because of the vain hopes and self-interest of managements. Indeed, I myself delayed abandoning our obsolete textile mills for far too long.
然而，资本的合理流动常常存在障碍。正如 1954 年伯克希尔的会议记录所明确显示的，纺织行业内本应明显的资本撤回由于管理层的徒劳希望和自身利益而被推迟了数十年。事实上，我自己也拖延了太久才放弃我们过时的纺织厂。
A CEO with capital employed in a declining operation seldom elects to massively redeploy that capital into unrelated activities. A move of that kind would usually require that long-time associates be fired and mistakes be admitted. Moreover, it’s unlikely that CEO would be the manager you would wish to handle the redeployment job even if he or she was inclined to undertake it.
一位将资本投入到衰退业务中的首席执行官很少会选择将大量资本重新部署到不相关的活动中。这样的举动通常需要解雇长期的同事并承认错误。此外，即使这位首席执行官倾向于承担这项重新部署工作，他或她也不太可能是你希望负责这项工作的经理人。
At the shareholder level, taxes and frictional costs weigh heavily on individual investors when they attempt to reallocate capital among businesses and industries. Even tax-free institutional investors face major costs as they move capital because they usually need intermediaries to do this job. A lot of mouths with expensive tastes then clamor to be fed – among them investment bankers, accountants, consultants, lawyers and such capital-reallocators as leveraged buyout operators. Money-shufflers don’t come cheap.
在股东层面，当个人投资者试图在企业和行业之间重新分配资本时，税收和摩擦成本对他们影响很大。即使是免税的机构投资者在转移资本时也面临着重大成本，因为他们通常需要中介机构来完成这项工作。然后，许多有着昂贵品味的人叫嚷着要分一杯羹 —— 其中包括投资银行家、会计师、顾问、律师以及杠杆收购运营商等资本重新分配者。资金洗牌者可不便宜。
In contrast, a conglomerate such as Berkshire is perfectly positioned to allocate capital rationally and at minimal cost. Of course, form itself is no guarantee of success: We have made plenty of mistakes, and we will make more. Our structural advantages, however, are formidable.
相比之下，像伯克希尔这样的企业集团处于完美的位置，可以以最低的成本合理分配资本。当然，形式本身并不能保证成功：我们犯了很多错误，将来还会犯更多错误。然而，我们的结构优势是巨大的。
At Berkshire, we can – without incurring taxes or much in the way of other costs – move huge sums from businesses that have limited opportunities for incremental investment to other sectors with greater promise. Moreover, we are free of historical biases created by lifelong association with a given industry and are not subject to pressures from colleagues having a vested interest in maintaining the status quo. That’s important: If horses had controlled investment decisions, there would have been no auto industry.
在伯克希尔，我们可以 —— 无需承担税收或太多其他成本 —— 将大量资金从增长机会有限的业务转移到更有前景的其他领域。此外，我们没有因终身与某一特定行业相关联而产生的历史偏见，也不受那些在维持现状方面有既得利益的同事的压力影响。这一点很重要：如果由马控制投资决策，就不会有汽车行业。
Another major advantage we possess is the ability to buy pieces of wonderful businesses – a.k.a. common stocks. That’s not a course of action open to most managements. Over our history, this strategic alternative has proved to be very helpful; a broad range of options always sharpens decision-making. The businesses we are offered by the stock market every day – in small pieces, to be sure – are often far more attractive than the businesses we are concurrently being offered in their entirety. Additionally, the gains we’ve realized from marketable securities have helped us make certain large acquisitions that would otherwise have been beyond our financial capabilities.
我们拥有的另一个主要优势是能够购买优秀企业的部分股权 —— 也就是普通股。这不是大多数管理层可以采取的行动。在我们的历史中，这种战略选择被证明非常有帮助；广泛的选择总是能使决策更加敏锐。股市每天提供给我们的企业 —— 当然是小份额的 —— 往往比同时提供给我们的整个企业更有吸引力。此外，我们从有价证券中获得的收益帮助我们进行了某些大型收购，否则这些收购将超出我们的财务能力。
In effect, the world is Berkshire’s oyster – a world offering us a range of opportunities far beyond those realistically open to most companies. We are limited, of course, to businesses whose economic prospects we can evaluate. And that’s a serious limitation: Charlie and I have no idea what a great many companies will look like ten years from now. But that limitation is much smaller than that borne by an executive whose experience has been confined to a single industry. On top of that, we can profitably scale to a far larger size than the many businesses that are constrained by the limited potential of the single industry in which they operate.
实际上，世界是伯克希尔的牡蛎 —— 这个世界为我们提供了一系列远远超出大多数公司实际所能获得的机会。当然，我们仅限于评估其经济前景的企业。这是一个严重的限制：查理和我无法预测许多公司十年后的样子。但这个限制比那些经验仅限于单一行业的高管所面临的限制要小得多。除此之外，我们能够盈利性地扩大规模，远远超过许多受限于其所在单一行业有限潜力的企业。
I mentioned earlier that See’s Candy had produced huge earnings compared to its modest capital requirements. We would have loved, of course, to intelligently use those funds to expand our candy operation. But our many attempts to do so were largely futile. So, without incurring tax inefficiencies or frictional costs, we have used the excess funds generated by See’s to help purchase other businesses. If See’s had remained a stand-alone company, its earnings would have had to be distributed to investors to redeploy, sometimes after being heavily depleted by large taxes and, almost always, by significant frictional and agency costs.
我之前提到喜诗糖果相对于其适度的资本要求产生了巨额收益。当然，我们很想明智地利用这些资金来扩大我们的糖果业务。但我们多次尝试这样做大多徒劳无功。因此，我们在不产生税收低效或摩擦成本的情况下，利用喜诗糖果产生的多余资金帮助购买了其他企业。如果喜诗糖果一直是一家独立公司，其收益将不得不分配给投资者进行重新部署，有时在被高额税收大幅削减后，而且几乎总是会受到重大摩擦和代理成本的影响。
Berkshire has one further advantage that has become increasingly important over the years: We are now the home of choice for the owners and managers of many outstanding businesses.
伯克希尔还有一个随着时间推移变得越来越重要的优势：我们现在是许多优秀企业的所有者和管理者的首选归宿。
Families that own successful businesses have multiple options when they contemplate sale. Frequently, the best decision is to do nothing. There are worse things in life than having a prosperous business that one understands well. But sitting tight is seldom recommended by Wall Street. (Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.)
拥有成功企业的家族在考虑出售时有多种选择。通常，最好的决定是什么都不做。生活中有比拥有一家自己非常了解的繁荣企业更糟糕的事情。但华尔街很少推荐按兵不动。（不要问理发师你是否需要理发。）
When one part of a family wishes to sell while others wish to continue, a public offering often makes sense. But, when owners wish to cash out entirely, they usually consider one of two paths.
当家族的一部分人希望出售而其他人希望继续经营时，公开上市通常是有意义的。但是，当所有者希望完全套现，他们通常会考虑两种途径之一。
The first is sale to a competitor who is salivating at the possibility of wringing “synergies” from the combining of the two companies. This buyer invariably contemplates getting rid of large numbers of the seller’s associates, the very people who have helped the owner build his business. A caring owner, however – and there are plenty of them – usually does not want to leave his long-time associates sadly singing the old country song: “She got the goldmine, I got the shaft.”
第一种是出售给竞争对手，竞争对手垂涎于从两家公司的合并中榨取 “协同效应” 的可能性。这个买家总是打算解雇大量卖家的员工，而这些员工正是帮助所有者建立业务的人。然而，一个有爱心的所有者 —— 这样的人有很多 —— 通常不想让他的长期同事悲伤地唱着那首古老的乡村歌曲：“她得到了金矿，我得到了矿井。”
The second choice for sellers is the Wall Street buyer. For some years, these purchasers accurately called themselves “leveraged buyout firms.” When that term got a bad name in the early 1990s – remember RJR and Barbarians at the Gate? – these buyers hastily relabeled themselves “private-equity.”
卖家的第二种选择是华尔街买家。多年来，这些买家准确地称自己为 “杠杆收购公司”。当这个词在 20 世纪 90 年代初名声不好时 —— 还记得雷诺兹 - 纳贝斯克（RJR）和《门口的野蛮人》吗？—— 这些买家匆忙将自己重新贴上 “私募股权” 的标签。
The name may have changed but that was all: Equity is dramatically reduced and debt is piled on in virtually all private-equity purchases. Indeed, the amount that a private-equity purchaser offers to the seller is in part determined by the buyer assessing the maximum amount of debt that can be placed on the acquired company.
名字可能变了，但仅此而已：在几乎所有私募股权收购中，股权大幅减少，债务堆积如山。事实上，私募股权买家向卖家提供的价格在一定程度上取决于买家评估可以加在被收购公司上的最大债务额。
Later, if things go well and equity begins to build, leveraged buy-out shops will often seek to re-leverage with new borrowings. They then typically use part of the proceeds to pay a huge dividend that drives equity sharply downward, sometimes even to a negative figure.
后来，如果一切顺利，股权开始增加，杠杆收购公司通常会寻求用新借款重新加杠杆。然后，他们通常会用部分收益支付巨额股息，使股权大幅下降，有时甚至降至负数。
In truth, “equity” is a dirty word for many private-equity buyers; what they love is debt. And, because debt is currently so inexpensive, these buyers can frequently pay top dollar. Later, the business will be resold, often to another leveraged buyer. In effect, the business becomes a piece of merchandise.
事实上，对许多私募股权买家来说，“股权” 是个肮脏的词；他们喜欢的是债务。而且，由于目前债务非常便宜，这些买家经常能够支付高价。之后，企业将被转售，通常会卖给另一个杠杆买家。实际上，企业变成了一件商品。
Berkshire offers a third choice to the business owner who wishes to sell: a permanent home, in which the company’s people and culture will be retained (though, occasionally, management changes will be needed). Beyond that, any business we acquire dramatically increases its financial strength and ability to grow. Its days of dealing with banks and Wall Street analysts are also forever ended.
伯克希尔为希望出售的企业所有者提供了第三种选择：一个永久的家，公司的员工和文化将得以保留（尽管偶尔需要进行管理层变动）。除此之外，我们收购的任何企业都将大幅提高其财务实力和增长能力。它与银行和华尔街分析师打交道的日子也将永远结束。
Some sellers don’t care about these matters. But, when sellers do, Berkshire does not have a lot of competition.
有些卖家不在乎这些事情。但是，当卖家在乎时，伯克希尔没有太多竞争对手。
Sometimes pundits propose that Berkshire spin-off certain of its businesses. These suggestions make no sense. Our companies are worth more as part of Berkshire than as separate entities. One reason is our ability to move funds between businesses or into new ventures instantly and without tax. In addition, certain costs duplicate themselves, in full or part, if operations are separated. Here’s the most obvious example: Berkshire incurs nominal costs for its single board of directors; were our dozens of subsidiaries to be split off, the overall cost for directors would soar. So, too, would regulatory and administration expenditures.
有时专家建议伯克希尔分拆某些业务。这些建议毫无意义。我们的公司作为伯克希尔的一部分比作为独立实体更有价值。一个原因是我们能够在企业之间或新企业中即时转移资金且无需纳税。此外，如果业务分开，某些成本会全部或部分重复。最明显的例子是：伯克希尔为其单一董事会承担名义成本；如果我们的几十家子公司被拆分，董事会的总体成本将飙升。监管和行政支出也会如此。
Finally, there are sometimes important tax efficiencies for Subsidiary A because we own Subsidiary B. For example, certain tax credits that are available to our utilities are currently realizable only because we generate huge amounts of taxable income at other Berkshire operations. That gives Berkshire Hathaway Energy a major advantage over most public-utility companies in developing wind and solar projects.
最后，有时因为我们拥有子公司 B，子公司 A 会有重要的税收效率。例如，我们的公用事业公司目前能够获得某些税收抵免，仅仅是因为我们在伯克希尔的其他业务中产生了大量应税收入。这使得伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（Berkshire Hathaway Energy）在开发风能和太阳能项目方面比大多数公共事业公司具有重大优势。
Investment bankers, being paid as they are for action, constantly urge acquirers to pay 20% to 50% premiums over market price for publicly-held businesses. The bankers tell the buyer that the premium is justified for “control value” and for the wonderful things that are going to happen once the acquirer’s CEO takes charge. (What acquisition-hungry manager will challenge that assertion?)
投资银行家，因为他们的报酬取决于交易，不断敦促收购方为公开上市的企业支付高于市场价格 20% 至 50% 的溢价。银行家告诉买家，溢价是合理的，因为有 “控制权价值”，以及一旦收购方的首席执行官接管将会发生的美妙事情。（渴望收购的经理谁会质疑这种说法呢？）
A few years later, bankers – bearing straight faces – again appear and just as earnestly urge spinning off the earlier acquisition in order to “unlock shareholder value.” Spin-offs, of course, strip the owning company of its purported “control value” without any compensating payment. The bankers explain that the spun-off company will flourish because its management will be more entrepreneurial, having been freed from the smothering bureaucracy of the parent company. (So much for that talented CEO we met earlier.)
几年后，银行家们 —— 面不改色 —— 再次出现，同样真诚地敦促分拆早期的收购，以 “释放股东价值”。分拆当然会剥夺母公司所谓的 “控制权价值”，而没有任何补偿性支付。银行家解释说，分拆后的公司将蓬勃发展，因为其管理层将更具创业精神，摆脱了母公司令人窒息的官僚作风。（我们之前遇到的那位才华横溢的首席执行官就这么被否定了。）
If the divesting company later wishes to reacquire the spun-off operation, it presumably would again be urged by its bankers to pay a hefty “control” premium for the privilege. (Mental “flexibility” of this sort by the banking fraternity has prompted the saying that fees too often lead to transactions rather than transactions leading to fees.)
如果剥离公司后来希望重新收购分拆出去的业务，大概其银行家会再次敦促它为这项特权支付高额的 “控制权” 溢价。（银行业这种 “灵活性” 促使人们说，往往是费用导致了交易，而不是交易导致了费用。）
It’s possible, of course, that someday a spin-off or sale at Berkshire would be required by regulators. Berkshire carried out such a spin-off in 1979, when new regulations for bank holding companies forced us to divest a bank we owned in Rockford, Illinois.
当然，有一天监管机构可能会要求伯克希尔进行分拆或出售。伯克希尔在 1979 年进行了这样一次分拆，当时新的银行控股公司法规迫使我们剥离我们在伊利诺伊州罗克福德拥有的一家银行。
Voluntary spin-offs, though, make no sense for us: We would lose control value, capital-allocation flexibility and, in some cases, important tax advantages. The CEOs who brilliantly run our subsidiaries now would have difficulty in being as effective if running a spun-off operation, given the operating and financial advantages derived from Berkshire’s ownership. Moreover, the parent and the spun-off operations, once separated, would likely incur moderately greater costs than existed when they were combined.
然而，自愿分拆对我们来说毫无意义：我们将失去控制权价值、资本配置灵活性，在某些情况下还会失去重要的税收优势。现在出色管理我们子公司的首席执行官们，如果管理分拆后的业务，将难以像在伯克希尔旗下那样有效，因为他们将失去伯克希尔所有权带来的运营和财务优势。此外，母公司和分拆后的业务一旦分离，可能会产生比合并时更高的成本。
Before I depart the subject of spin-offs, let’s look at a lesson to be learned from a conglomerate mentioned earlier: LTV. I’ll summarize here, but those who enjoy a good financial story should read the piece about Jimmy Ling that ran in the October 1982 issue of D Magazine. Look it up on the Internet.
在我离开分拆这个话题之前，让我们从前面提到的一家企业集团中吸取一个教训：林 - 特姆科 - 沃特公司（LTV）。我在这里简要总结一下，但那些喜欢好的金融故事的人应该阅读 1982 年 10 月《D 杂志》上关于吉米・林（Jimmy Ling）的文章。在互联网上可以查到。
Through a lot of corporate razzle-dazzle, Ling had taken LTV from sales of only $36 million in 1965 to number 14 on the Fortune 500 list just two years later. Ling, it should be noted, had never displayed any managerial skills. But Charlie told me long ago to never underestimate the man who overestimates himself. And Ling had no peer in that respect.
通过大量的公司花架子手段，林在 1965 年将 LTV 的销售额仅为 3600 万美元提升到两年后在《财富》500 强中排名第 14 位。应该指出的是，林从未展示过任何管理技能。但查理很久以前就告诉我，永远不要低估高估自己的人。在这方面，林无人能及。
Ling’s strategy, which he labeled “project redeployment,” was to buy a large company and then partially spin off its various divisions. In LTV’s 1966 annual report, he explained the magic that would follow: “Most importantly, acquisitions must meet the test of the 2 plus 2 equals 5 (or 6) formula.” The press, the public and Wall Street loved this sort of talk.
林的策略，他称之为 “项目重新部署”，是收购一家大公司，然后部分分拆其各个部门。在 LTV 1966 年的年度报告中，他解释了随之而来的神奇之处：“最重要的是，收购必须符合 2 + 2 等于 5（或 6）的公式检验。” 媒体、公众和华尔街都喜欢这种说法。
In 1967 Ling bought Wilson & Co., a huge meatpacker that also had interests in golf equipment and pharmaceuticals. Soon after, he split the parent into three businesses, Wilson & Co. (meatpacking), Wilson Sporting Goods and Wilson Pharmaceuticals, each of which was to be partially spun off. These companies quickly became known on Wall Street as Meatball, Golf Ball and Goof Ball.
1967 年，林收购了威尔逊公司（Wilson & Co.），这是一家大型肉类加工商，也涉足高尔夫设备和制药领域。不久之后，他将母公司拆分为三家企业，威尔逊公司（肉类加工）、威尔逊体育用品公司和威尔逊制药公司，每家公司都将部分分拆。这些公司很快在华尔街被称为 “肉丸子”、“高尔夫球” 和 “傻瓜球”。
Soon thereafter, it became clear that, like Icarus, Ling had flown too close to the sun. By the early 1970s, Ling’s empire was melting, and he himself had been spun off from LTV . . . that is, fired.
此后不久，就像伊卡洛斯一样，林飞得离太阳太近了。到 20 世纪 70 年代初，林的帝国正在瓦解，他本人也被从 LTV 中 “分拆” 出去…… 也就是说，被解雇了。
Periodically, financial markets will become divorced from reality – you can count on that. More Jimmy Lings will appear. They will look and sound authoritative. The press will hang on their every word. Bankers will fight for their business. What they are saying will recently have “worked.” Their early followers will be feeling very clever. Our suggestion: Whatever their line, never forget that 2+2 will always equal 4. And when someone tells you how old-fashioned that math is — zip up your wallet, take a vacation and come back in a few years to buy stocks at cheap prices.
金融市场会周期性地脱离现实 —— 这一点你可以相信。会有更多的吉米・林出现。他们会看起来和听起来很权威。媒体会紧追他们的每一句话。银行家们会争夺他们的业务。他们所说的话最近会 “奏效”。他们的早期追随者会觉得自己非常聪明。我们的建议是：无论他们说什么，永远不要忘记 2 + 2 永远等于 4。当有人告诉你这种数学有多过时的时候 —— 拉上你的钱包拉链，去度假，几年后回来以低价购买股票。
Today Berkshire possesses (1) an unmatched collection of businesses, most of them now enjoying favorable economic prospects; (2) a cadre of outstanding managers who, with few exceptions, are unusually devoted to both the subsidiary they operate and to Berkshire; (3) an extraordinary diversity of earnings, premier financial strength and oceans of liquidity that we will maintain under all circumstances; (4) a first-choice ranking among many owners and managers who are contemplating sale of their businesses and (5) in a point related to the preceding item, a culture, distinctive in many ways from that of most large companies, that we have worked 50 years to develop and that is now rock-solid.
如今，伯克希尔拥有（1）一系列无与伦比的企业，其中大多数现在享有良好的经济前景；（2）一批杰出的经理，除了少数例外，他们异常忠诚于他们所经营的子公司和伯克希尔；（3）盈利来源极其多样化、卓越的财务实力和充足的流动性，我们将在任何情况下保持这些优势；（4）在许多考虑出售企业的所有者和经理中排名第一的选择；（5）与前一点相关的是，一种在许多方面与大多数大公司不同的文化，我们花了 50 年时间发展这种文化，现在它坚如磐石。
These strengths provide us a wonderful foundation on which to build.
这些优势为我们提供了一个很好的发展基础。
The Next 50 Years at Berkshire
伯克希尔未来 50 年
Now let’s take a look at the road ahead. Bear in mind that if I had attempted 50 years ago to gauge what was coming, certain of my predictions would have been far off the mark. With that warning, I will tell you what I would say to my family today if they asked me about Berkshire’s future.
现在让我们展望一下未来。请记住，如果我在 50 年前试图预测未来，我的某些预测肯定会大错特错。有了这个警告，我将告诉你，如果我的家人今天问我伯克希尔的未来，我会怎么说。
- First and definitely foremost, I believe that the chance of permanent capital loss for patient Berkshireshareholders is as low as can be found among single-company investments. That’s because our per-shareintrinsic business value is almost certain to advance over time.
首先，也是最为重要的一点，我认为，对于有耐心的伯克希尔股东来说，遭遇永久性资本损失的可能性，在所有单一公司投资当中是极低的。这是因为我们的每股内在商业价值几乎肯定会随着时间的推移而增长。
This cheery prediction comes, however, with an important caution:If an investor’s entry point into Berkshire stock is unusually high – at a price, say, approachingdouble book value, which Berkshire shares have occasionally reached – it may well be many years before theinvestor can realize a profit. In other words, a sound investment can morph into a rash speculation if itis bought at an elevated price. Berkshire is not exempt from this truth.
然而，这个乐观的预测伴随着一个重要的警告：如果投资者进入伯克希尔股票的价格异常高 —— 比如说，接近两倍账面价值，伯克希尔的股票偶尔会达到这个价格 —— 那么投资者可能需要很多年才能实现盈利。换句话说，如果以高价买入，一项稳健的投资可能会变成鲁莽的投机。伯克希尔也不能免于这个真理。
Purchases of Berkshire that investors make at a price modestly above the level at which the company would repurchase its shares, however, should produce gains within a reasonable period of time. Berkshire’s directors will only authorize repurchases at a price they believe to be well below intrinsic value. (In our view, that is an essential criterion for repurchases that is often ignored by other managements.)
然而，投资者以略高于公司回购股票价格的水平购买伯克希尔股票，应该在合理的时间内产生收益。伯克希尔的董事只会在他们认为价格远低于内在价值时授权回购。（在我们看来，这是回购的一个基本标准，但常常被其他管理层忽视。）
For those investors who plan to sell within a year or two after their purchase, I can offer no assurances, whatever the entry price. Movements of the general stock market during such abbreviated periods will likely be far more important in determining your results than the concomitant change in the intrinsic value of your Berkshire shares. As Ben Graham said many decades ago: “In the short-term the market is a voting machine; in the long-run it acts as a weighing machine.” Occasionally, the voting decisions of investors – amateurs and professionals alike – border on lunacy.
对于那些计划在购买后一两年内出售的投资者，无论买入价格如何，我都不能提供任何保证。在如此短的时间内，股市的波动对你们投资结果的影响可能远远大于伯克希尔股票内在价值的相应变化。正如本・格雷厄姆几十年前所说：“在短期内，市场是一台投票机；从长期来看，它是一台称重机。” 偶尔，投资者（业余和专业的都有）的投票决定近乎疯狂。
Since I know of no way to reliably predict market movements, I recommend that you purchase Berkshire shares only if you expect to hold them for at least five years. Those who seek short-term profits should look elsewhere.
由于我不知道如何可靠地预测市场走势，我建议只有当你预期至少持有伯克希尔股票五年时才购买。那些寻求短期利润的人应该另寻他处。
Another warning: Berkshire shares should not be purchased with borrowed money. There have been three times since 1965 when our stock has fallen about 50% from its high point. Someday, something close to this kind of drop will happen again, and no one knows when. Berkshire will almost certainly be a satisfactory holding for investors. But it could well be a disastrous choice for speculators employing leverage.
另一个警告：不应用借来的钱购买伯克希尔股票。自 1965 年以来，有三次我们的股票从高点下跌了约 50%。总有一天，类似的下跌还会发生，而且没人知道什么时候。对投资者来说，伯克希尔几乎肯定是一个令人满意的投资选择。但对于使用杠杆的投机者来说，这可能是一个灾难性的选择。
- I believe the chance of any event causing Berkshire to experience financial problems is essentially zero. We will always be prepared for the thousand-year flood; in fact, if it occurs we will be selling life jackets to the unprepared. Berkshire played an important role as a “first responder” during the 2008-2009 meltdown, and we have since more than doubled the strength of our balance sheet and our earnings potential. Your company is the Gibraltar of American business and will remain so.
我相信任何导致伯克希尔出现财务问题的事件发生的可能性基本为零。我们将永远为千年一遇的洪水做好准备；事实上，如果洪水发生，我们将向没有准备的人出售救生衣。在 2008 - 2009 年的金融危机中，伯克希尔发挥了重要的 “第一响应者” 作用，自那以后，我们的资产负债表实力和盈利潜力增加了一倍多。你们的公司是美国企业界的直布罗陀，并且将继续如此。
Financial staying power requires a company to maintain three strengths under all circumstances: (1) a large and reliable stream of earnings; (2) massive liquid assets and (3) no significant near-term cash requirements. Ignoring that last necessity is what usually leads companies to experience unexpected problems: Too often, CEOs of profitable companies feel they will always be able to refund maturing obligations, however large these are. In 2008-2009, many managements learned how perilous that mindset can be.
财务持久力要求一家公司在任何情况下都保持三种优势：（1）大量可靠的盈利流；（2）巨额流动资产；（3）近期没有重大现金需求。忽视最后一个必要条件通常会导致公司出现意想不到的问题：盈利的公司的首席执行官常常认为，无论到期债务有多大，他们总是能够偿还。在 2008 - 2009 年，许多管理层明白了这种心态有多危险。
Here’s how we will always stand on the three essentials. First, our earnings stream is huge and comes from a vast array of businesses. Our shareholders now own many large companies that have durable competitive advantages, and we will acquire more of those in the future. Our diversification assures Berkshire’s continued profitability, even if a catastrophe causes insurance losses that far exceed any previously experienced.
以下是我们在这三个关键方面的一贯立场。首先，我们的盈利流巨大，来自众多不同的业务。我们的股东现在拥有许多具有持久竞争优势的大公司，未来我们还会收购更多。我们的多元化确保了伯克希尔的持续盈利能力，即使发生一场灾难导致保险损失远远超过以往任何经历。
Next up is cash. At a healthy business, cash is sometimes thought of as something to be minimized – as an unproductive asset that acts as a drag on such markers as return on equity. Cash, though, is to a business as oxygen is to an individual: never thought about when it is present, the only thing in mind when it is absent.
接下来是现金。在一家健康的企业中，现金有时被视为应尽量减少的东西 —— 作为一种非生产性资产，会拖累诸如股本回报率等指标。然而，现金对企业就像氧气对人一样：当它存在时，人们不会想到它；当它缺失时，它是唯一萦绕在脑海中的东西。
American business provided a case study of that in 2008. In September of that year, many long-prosperous companies suddenly wondered whether their checks would bounce in the days ahead. Overnight, their financial oxygen disappeared.
2008 年美国企业提供了一个这方面的案例研究。在那年 9 月，许多长期繁荣的公司突然担心他们的支票在未来几天是否会被退回。一夜之间，他们的财务氧气消失了。
At Berkshire, our “breathing” went uninterrupted. Indeed, in a three-week period spanning late September and early October, we supplied $15.6 billion of fresh money to American businesses.
在伯克希尔，我们的 “呼吸” 没有中断。事实上，在 9 月下旬到 10 月上旬的三周时间里，我们向美国企业提供了 156 亿美元的新资金。
We could do that because we always maintain at least $20 billion – and usually far more – in cash equivalents. And by that we mean U.S. Treasury bills, not other substitutes for cash that are claimed to deliver liquidity and actually do so, except when it is truly needed. When bills come due, only cash is legal tender. Don’t leave home without it.
我们能够做到这一点是因为我们始终保持至少 200 亿美元 —— 通常远远更多 —— 的现金等价物。我们所说的现金等价物是指美国国库券，而不是其他声称提供流动性但在真正需要时却无法兑现的现金替代品。当票据到期时，只有现金才是法定货币。出门别忘了带它。
Finally – getting to our third point – we will never engage in operating or investment practices that can result in sudden demands for large sums. That means we will not expose Berkshire to short-term debt maturities of size nor enter into derivative contracts or other business arrangements that could require large collateral calls.
最后 —— 谈到我们的第三点 —— 我们永远不会从事可能导致突然需要大笔资金的经营或投资行为。这意味着我们不会让伯克希尔面临大规模短期债务到期的风险，也不会签订可能需要大额抵押品追加的衍生品合同或其他商业安排。
Some years ago, we became a party to certain derivative contracts that we believed were significantly mispriced and that had only minor collateral requirements. These have proved to be quite profitable. Recently, however, newly-written derivative contracts have required full collateralization. And that ended our interest in derivatives, regardless of what profit potential they might offer. We have not, for some years, written these contracts, except for a few needed for operational purposes at our utility businesses.
几年前，我们参与了某些衍生品合同，我们认为这些合同定价严重错误，且只需要很少的抵押品。事实证明这些合同相当有利可图。然而，最近新签订的衍生品合同需要全额抵押。这使我们对衍生品失去了兴趣，无论它们可能提供多大的盈利潜力。除了我们公用事业业务运营所需的少数合同外，我们已经有几年没有签订这些合同了。
Moreover, we will not write insurance contracts that give policyholders the right to cash out at their option. Many life insurance products contain redemption features that make them susceptible to a “run” in times of extreme panic. Contracts of that sort, however, do not exist in the property-casualty world that we inhabit. If our premium volume should shrink, our float would decline – but only at a very slow pace.
此外，我们不会签订给予保单持有人选择现金退保权利的保险合同。许多人寿保险产品包含赎回特征，这使得它们在极度恐慌时期容易遭受 “挤兑”。然而，在我们所处的财产 - 伤亡保险领域不存在这种合同。如果我们的保费收入下降，我们的浮存金会减少 —— 但只会非常缓慢地减少。
The reason for our conservatism, which may impress some people as extreme, is that it is entirely predictable that people will occasionally panic, but not at all predictable when this will happen. Though practically all days are relatively uneventful, tomorrow is always uncertain. (I felt no special apprehension on December 6, 1941 or September 10, 2001.) And if you can’t predict what tomorrow will bring, you must be prepared for whatever it does.
我们保守的原因，可能在一些人看来过于极端，是因为人们偶尔会恐慌，这是完全可以预见的，但何时恐慌却完全不可预测。尽管几乎所有日子都相对平静，但明天总是不确定的。（1941 年 12 月 6 日或 2001 年 9 月 10 日，我都没有感到特别的担忧。）如果你无法预测明天会带来什么，你就必须为任何可能发生的事情做好准备。
A CEO who is 64 and plans to retire at 65 may have his own special calculus in evaluating risks that have only a tiny chance of happening in a given year. He may, in fact, be “right” 99% of the time. Those odds, however, hold no appeal for us. We will never play financial Russian roulette with the funds you’ve entrusted to us, even if the metaphorical gun has 100 chambers and only one bullet. In our view, it is madness to risk losing what you need in pursuing what you simply desire.
一位 64 岁并计划 65 岁退休的首席执行官在评估某一年只有极小发生可能性的风险时，可能有他自己特殊的计算方法。事实上，他可能 99% 的时间都是 “正确” 的。然而，这些几率对我们没有吸引力。我们永远不会用你们托付给我们的资金玩金融俄罗斯轮盘赌，即使这把隐喻的枪有 100 个弹膛且只有一颗子弹。在我们看来，冒着失去你所需要的东西去追求你仅仅想要的东西是疯狂的。
- Despite our conservatism, I think we will be able every year to build the underlying per-share earning power of Berkshire. That does not mean operating earnings will increase each year – far from it. The U.S. economy will ebb and flow – though mostly flow – and, when it weakens, so will our current earnings. But we will continue to achieve organic gains, make bolt-on acquisitions and enter new fields. I believe, therefore, that Berkshire will annually add to its underlying earning power.
尽管我们保守，但我认为我们每年都能够提升伯克希尔的每股潜在盈利能力。这并不意味着运营收益每年都会增加 —— 远非如此。美国经济会有起伏 —— 尽管大多是增长 —— 当经济疲软时，我们当前的收益也会下降。但我们将继续实现有机增长、进行附加收购并进入新领域。因此，我相信伯克希尔每年都会增加其潜在盈利能力。
In some years the gains will be substantial, and at other times they will be minor. Markets, competition, and chance will determine when opportunities come our way. Through it all, Berkshire will keep moving forward, powered by the array of solid businesses we now possess and the new companies we will purchase. In most years, moreover, our country’s economy will provide a strong tailwind for business. We are blessed to have the United States as our home field.
在某些年份，收益增长将是显著的，而在其他年份则会较小。市场、竞争和机会将决定何时机会降临到我们头上。通过这一切，伯克希尔将在我们现有的一系列稳健业务和我们将收购的新公司的推动下不断前进。此外，在大多数年份，我们国家的经济将为企业提供强劲的顺风。我们很幸运能以美国为我们的主场。
- The bad news is that Berkshire’s long-term gains – measured by percentages, not by dollars – cannot be dramatic and will not come close to those achieved in the past 50 years. The numbers have become too big. I think Berkshire will outperform the average American company, but our advantage, if any, won’t be great.
坏消息是，伯克希尔的长期收益 —— 以百分比衡量，而非美元 —— 不会很惊人，也不会接近过去 50 年所取得的收益。数字已经变得太大了。我认为伯克希尔将跑赢美国平均水平的公司，但如果有优势的话，也不会很大。
Eventually – probably between ten and twenty years from now – Berkshire’s earnings and capital resources will reach a level that will not allow management to intelligently reinvest all of the company’s earnings. At that time our directors will need to determine whether the best method to distribute the excess earnings is through dividends, share repurchases or both. If Berkshire shares are selling below intrinsic business value, massive repurchases will almost certainly be the best choice. You can be comfortable that your directors will make the right decision.
最终 —— 可能在 10 到 20 年后 —— 伯克希尔的收益和资本资源将达到一个水平，届时管理层将无法明智地将公司的所有收益进行再投资。到那时，我们的董事会将需要决定分配多余收益的最佳方法是通过股息、股票回购还是两者兼而有之。如果伯克希尔的股票售价低于内在企业价值，大规模回购几乎肯定是最佳选择。你们可以放心，你们的董事会将做出正确的决定。
- No company will be more shareholder-minded than Berkshire. For more than 30 years, we have annually reaffirmed our Shareholder Principles (see page 117), always leading off with: “Although our form is corporate, our attitude is partnership.” This covenant with you is etched in stone.
没有哪家公司会比伯克希尔更以股东为导向。30 多年来，我们每年都重申我们的股东原则（见第 117 页），总是以 “虽然我们的形式是公司，但我们的态度是合伙制” 开头。这个与你们的契约是不可动摇的。
We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out that promise of partnership. None took the job for the money: In an arrangement almost non-existent elsewhere, our directors are paid only token fees. They receive their rewards instead through ownership of Berkshire shares and the satisfaction that comes from being good stewards of an important enterprise.
我们有一个知识渊博且以商业为导向的董事会，随时准备履行合伙制的承诺。他们没有人是为了钱而担任这个职位：在几乎其他地方都不存在的一种安排中，我们的董事只收取象征性的费用。
The shares that they and their families own – which, in many cases, are worth very substantial sums – were purchased in the market (rather than their materializing through options or grants). In addition, unlike almost all other sizable public companies, we carry no directors and officers liability insurance. At Berkshire, directors walk in your shoes.
他们通过持有伯克希尔股票以及成为一家重要企业的优秀管家所获得的满足感来获得回报。他们及其家人所拥有的股票 —— 在许多情况下价值非常可观 —— 是在市场上购买的（而不是通过期权或授予获得的）。此外，与几乎所有其他大型上市公司不同，我们没有董事和高级管理人员责任保险。在伯克希尔，董事们设身处地为你们着想。
To further ensure continuation of our culture, I have suggested that my son, Howard, succeed me as a nonexecutive Chairman. My only reason for this wish is to make change easier if the wrong CEO should ever be employed and there occurs a need for the Chairman to move forcefully. I can assure you that this problem has a very low probability of arising at Berkshire – likely as low as at any public company. In my service on the boards of nineteen public companies, however, I’ve seen how hard it is to replace a mediocre CEO if that person is also Chairman. (The deed usually gets done, but almost always very late.)
为了进一步确保我们文化的延续，我建议我的儿子霍华德（Howard）在我之后担任非执行董事长。我这样希望的唯一原因是，如果雇佣了错误的首席执行官，并且需要董事长采取有力行动时，便于进行变革。我可以向你保证，这个问题在伯克希尔出现的可能性非常低 —— 可能和其他任何上市公司一样低。然而，在我担任 19 家上市公司董事的经历中，我看到了如果一个平庸的首席执行官同时也是董事长，要替换他是多么困难。（事情通常会得到解决，但几乎总是很晚。）
If elected, Howard will receive no pay and will spend no time at the job other than that required of all directors. He will simply be a safety valve to whom any director can go if he or she has concerns about the CEO and wishes to learn if other directors are expressing doubts as well. Should multiple directors be apprehensive, Howard’s chairmanship will allow the matter to be promptly and properly addressed.
如果当选，霍华德将不领薪水，并且除了所有董事所需的时间外，不会在这个职位上花费时间。他将仅仅是一个安全阀，任何董事如果对首席执行官有疑虑，并且想知道其他董事是否也有疑虑，都可以找他。如果有多个董事感到担忧，霍华德的董事长职位将使问题能够得到及时和妥善的处理。
- Choosing the right CEO is all-important and is a subject that commands much time at Berkshire board meetings. Managing Berkshire is primarily a job of capital allocation, coupled with the selection and retention of outstanding managers to captain our operating subsidiaries. Obviously, the job also requires the replacement of a subsidiary’s CEO when that is called for. These duties require Berkshire’s CEO to be a rational, calm and decisive individual who has a broad understanding of business and good insights into human behavior. It’s important as well that he knows his limits. (As Tom Watson, Sr. of IBM said, “I’m no genius, but I’m smart in spots and I stay around those spots.”)
选择合适的首席执行官至关重要，这是伯克希尔董事会会议上花费大量时间讨论的主题。管理伯克希尔主要是一项资本配置工作，同时还要选拔和留住优秀的经理来领导我们的运营子公司。显然，这项工作还需要在必要时更换子公司的首席执行官。这些职责要求伯克希尔的首席执行官是一个理性、冷静和果断的人，对商业有广泛的理解，对人类行为有深刻的洞察力。他知道自己的局限性也很重要。（正如 IBM 的老托马斯・沃森（Tom Watson, Sr.）所说：“我不是天才，但我在某些方面很聪明，我就待在这些方面。”）
Character is crucial: A Berkshire CEO must be “all in” for the company, not for himself. (I’m using male pronouns to avoid awkward wording, but gender should never decide who becomes CEO.) He can’t help but earn money far in excess of any possible need for it. But it’s important that neither ego nor avarice motivate him to reach for pay matching his most lavishly-compensated peers, even if his achievements far exceed theirs. A CEO’s behavior has a huge impact on managers down the line: If it’s clear to them that shareholders’ interests are paramount to him, they will, with few exceptions, also embrace that way of thinking.
品格至关重要：伯克希尔的首席执行官必须全心全意为公司，而不是为自己。（我使用男性代词是为了避免措辞尴尬，但性别绝不应该决定谁成为首席执行官。）他必然会赚取远远超过他可能需要的钱。但重要的是，无论是自负还是贪婪都不应驱使他追求与那些薪酬最高的同行相匹配的薪酬，即使他的成就远远超过他们。首席执行官的行为对下属经理有巨大影响：如果他们清楚地看到他将股东利益置于首位，他们几乎都会接受这种思维方式。
My successor will need one other particular strength: the ability to fight off the ABCs of business decay, which are arrogance, bureaucracy and complacency. When these corporate cancers metastasize, even the strongest of companies can falter. The examples available to prove the point are legion, but to maintain friendships I will exhume only cases from the distant past.
我的继任者还需要具备另一种特殊的力量：抵御企业衰败的三个因素 —— 傲慢、官僚主义和自满。当这些企业毒瘤扩散时，即使是最强大的公司也可能摇摇欲坠。可以证明这一点的例子数不胜数，但为了维护友谊，我将只提及遥远过去的案例。
In their glory days, General Motors, IBM, Sears Roebuck and U.S. Steel sat atop huge industries. Their strengths seemed unassailable. But the destructive behavior I deplored above eventually led each of them to fall to depths that their CEOs and directors had not long before thought impossible. Their one-time financial strength and their historical earning power proved no defense.
在其辉煌时期，通用汽车（General Motors）、IBM、西尔斯罗巴克（Sears Roebuck）和美国钢铁（U.S. Steel）在庞大的行业中占据主导地位。他们的优势似乎坚不可摧。但我上面提到的破坏性行为最终导致他们每一家都陷入了他们的首席执行官和董事们不久前认为不可能的低谷。他们曾经的财务实力和历史盈利记录都无法抵御这种衰败。
Only a vigilant and determined CEO can ward off such debilitating forces as Berkshire grows ever larger. He must never forget Charlie’s plea: “Tell me where I’m going to die, so I’ll never go there.” If our noneconomic values were to be lost, much of Berkshire’s economic value would collapse as well. “Tone at the top” will be key to maintaining Berkshire’s special culture.
只有一个警惕和坚定的首席执行官才能在伯克希尔不断发展壮大的过程中抵御这些削弱力量。他绝不能忘记查理的请求：“告诉我我将在哪里死去，这样我就永远不会去那里。” 如果我们的非经济价值观丧失，伯克希尔的大部分经济价值也将崩溃。“高层的基调” 将是保持伯克希尔特殊文化的关键。
Fortunately, the structure our future CEOs will need to be successful is firmly in place. The extraordinary delegation of authority now existing at Berkshire is the ideal antidote to bureaucracy. In an operating sense, Berkshire is not a giant company but rather a collection of large companies. At headquarters, we have never had a committee nor have we ever required our subsidiaries to submit budgets (though many use them as an important internal tool). We don’t have a legal office nor departments that other companies take for granted: human relations, public relations, investor relations, strategy, acquisitions, you name it.
幸运的是，我们未来的首席执行官成功所需的结构已经牢固确立。伯克希尔现有的非凡的权力下放是官僚主义的理想解药。从运营角度看，伯克希尔不是一家巨型公司，而是一系列大公司的集合。在总部，我们从未设立过委员会，也从未要求我们的子公司提交预算（尽管许多子公司将其作为重要的内部工具使用）。我们没有法律办公室，也没有其他公司认为理所当然的部门：人力资源、公共关系、投资者关系、战略、收购等等。
We do, of course, have an active audit function; no sense being a damned fool. To an unusual degree, however, we trust our managers to run their operations with a keen sense of stewardship. After all, they were doing exactly that before we acquired their businesses. With only occasional exceptions, furthermore, our trust produces better results than would be achieved by streams of directives, endless reviews and layers of bureaucracy. Charlie and I try to interact with our managers in a manner consistent with what we would wish for, if the positions were reversed.
当然，我们有一个积极的审计职能；没必要做个傻瓜。然而，在很大程度上，我们信任我们的经理们以强烈的管家意识经营他们的业务。毕竟，在我们收购他们的企业之前，他们就是这样做的。此外，除了偶尔的例外，我们的信任产生的结果比一连串的指令、无休止的审查和层层官僚机构所能实现的要好。查理和我试图以我们希望如果位置颠倒时别人对待我们的方式与我们的经理互动。
- Our directors believe that our future CEOs should come from internal candidates whom the Berkshire board has grown to know well. Our directors also believe that an incoming CEO should be relatively young, so that he or she can have a long run in the job. Berkshire will operate best if its CEOs average well over ten years at the helm. (It’s hard to teach a new dog old tricks.) And they are not likely to retire at 65 either (or have you noticed?).
我们的董事们认为，我们未来的首席执行官应该来自内部候选人，这些候选人是伯克希尔董事会非常熟悉的。我们的董事们还认为，新上任的首席执行官应该相对年轻，这样他或她就可以在这个职位上长期任职。如果伯克希尔的首席执行官平均任期超过十年，公司将运营得最好。（老狗学不了新把戏。）而且他们也不太可能在 65 岁退休（或者你注意到了吗？）。
In both Berkshire’s business acquisitions and large, tailored investment moves, it is important that our counterparties be both familiar with and feel comfortable with Berkshire’s CEO. Developing confidence of that sort and cementing relationships takes time. The payoff, though, can be huge.
在伯克希尔的企业收购和大规模定制投资举措中，我们的交易对手熟悉并对伯克希尔的首席执行官感到放心是很重要的。建立这种信心和巩固关系需要时间。但回报可能是巨大的。
Both the board and I believe we now have the right person to succeed me as CEO – a successor ready to assume the job the day after I die or step down. In certain important respects, this person will do a better job than I am doing.
董事会和我都相信，我们现在有合适的人来接替我担任首席执行官 —— 一个在我去世或卸任后第二天就准备好承担这项工作的继任者。在某些重要方面，这个人将比我做得更好。
- Investments will always be of great importance to Berkshire and will be handled by several specialists. They will report to the CEO because their investment decisions, in a broad way, will need to be coordinated with Berkshire’s operating and acquisition programs. Overall, though, our investment managers will enjoy great autonomy. In this area, too, we are in fine shape for decades to come. Todd Combs and Ted Weschler, each of whom has spent several years on Berkshire’s investment team, are firstrate in all respects and can be of particular help to the CEO in evaluating acquisitions.
投资对伯克希尔始终至关重要，将由几位专家负责。他们将向首席执行官报告，因为他们的投资决策在很大程度上需要与伯克希尔的运营和收购计划相协调。总体而言，我们的投资经理将享有很大的自主权。在这个领域，我们未来几十年也处于良好状态。托德・库姆斯（Todd Combs）和泰德・韦施勒（Ted Weschler），他们都在伯克希尔的投资团队工作了几年，在各方面都是一流的，在评估收购方面可以为首席执行官提供特别的帮助。
All told, Berkshire is ideally positioned for life after Charlie and I leave the scene. We have the right people in place – the right directors, managers and prospective successors to those managers. Our culture, furthermore, is embedded throughout their ranks. Our system is also regenerative. To a large degree, both good and bad cultures self-select to perpetuate themselves. For very good reasons, business owners and operating managers with values similar to ours will continue to be attracted to Berkshire as a one-of-a-kind and permanent home.
总之，在查理和我离开后，伯克希尔处于理想的发展位置。我们有合适的人在位 —— 合适的董事、经理和这些经理的潜在继任者。我们的文化也深深融入了他们的队伍中。我们的系统也是可再生的。在很大程度上，好的和坏的文化都会自我选择延续下去。出于非常好的理由，与我们价值观相似的企业所有者和运营经理将继续被伯克希尔吸引，将其作为一个独一无二的永久家园。
- I would be remiss if I didn’t salute another key constituency that makes Berkshire special: our shareholders. Berkshire truly has an owner base unlike that of any other giant corporation. That fact was demonstrated in spades at last year’s annual meeting, where the shareholders were offered a proxy resolution:
如果我不赞扬另一个使伯克希尔与众不同的关键群体 —— 我们的股东，那我就是失职了。伯克希尔确实拥有一个不同于其他任何大型公司的股东基础。这一事实在去年的年会上得到了充分证明，当时股东们收到了一项代理决议：
RESOLVED: Whereas the corporation has more money than it needs and since the owners unlike Warren are not multi billionaires, the board shall consider paying a meaningful annual dividend on the shares.
决议：鉴于公司拥有的资金超过其需求，并且由于所有者不像沃伦那样是亿万富翁，董事会应考虑对股票支付有意义的年度股息。
The sponsoring shareholder of that resolution never showed up at the meeting, so his motion was not officially proposed. Nevertheless, the proxy votes had been tallied, and they were enlightening.
提出该决议的股东从未出席会议，因此他的动议未被正式提出。然而，代理投票已经统计完毕，结果很有启发性。
Not surprisingly, the A shares – owned by relatively few shareholders, each with a large economic interest – voted “no” on the dividend question by a margin of 89 to 1.
不出所料，A 类股股东 —— 相对较少的股东，每人都有重大经济利益 —— 以 89 比 1 的比例对股息问题投了 “反对” 票。
The remarkable vote was that of our B shareholders. They number in the hundreds of thousands – perhaps even totaling one million – and they voted 660,759,855 “no” and 13,927,026 “yes,” a ratio of about 47 to 1.
令人瞩目的是我们 B 类股股东的投票。他们有数十万人 —— 甚至可能总数达到一百万 —— 他们投了 660,759,855 张 “反对” 票和 13,927,026 张 “赞成” 票，比例约为 47 比 1。
Our directors recommended a “no” vote but the company did not otherwise attempt to influence shareholders. Nevertheless, 98% of the shares voting said, in effect, “Don’t send us a dividend but instead reinvest all of the earnings.” To have our fellow owners – large and small – be so in sync with our managerial philosophy is both remarkable and rewarding.
我们的董事会建议投 “反对” 票，但公司并未试图以其他方式影响股东。尽管如此，98% 的投票股份实际上表示：“不要给我们股息，而是将所有收益再投资。” 我们的股东 —— 无论大小 —— 与我们的管理哲学如此一致，这既令人瞩目又令人欣慰。
I am a lucky fellow to have you as partners.
有你们作为合作伙伴，我是个幸运的人。
Warren E. Buffett
沃伦・E・巴菲特