Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future

Vice Chairman’s Thoughts – Past and Future

副董事长的思考 —— 过去与未来

To the shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股东们：

I closely watched the 50-year history of Berkshire’s uncommon success under Warren Buffett. And it now seems appropriate that I independently supplement whatever celebratory comment comes from him. I will try to do five things.

我密切关注了沃伦・巴菲特领导下伯克希尔过去 50 年非凡成功的历程。现在，我觉得由我独立补充他可能发表的任何庆祝性评论是合适的。我将尝试做五件事：

1. Describe the management system and policies that caused a small and unfixably-doomed commodity textile business to morph into the mighty Berkshire that now exists,【描述使一个规模小且注定衰败的商品纺织企业转变为如今强大的伯克希尔的管理体系和政策，】
2. Explain how the management system and policies came into being,【解释该管理体系和政策是如何形成的，】
3. Explain, to some extent, why Berkshire did so well,【在一定程度上解释伯克希尔为何如此成功，】
4. Predict whether abnormally good results would continue if Buffett were soon to depart, and【预测如果巴菲特即将离任，异常出色的业绩是否会持续】
5. Consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.【思考伯克希尔过去 50 年的卓越成果是否在其他地方具有可借鉴的意义。】

The management system and policies of Berkshire under Buffett (herein together called “the Berkshire system”) were fixed early and are described below:

在巴菲特领导下，伯克希尔的管理体系和政策（以下统称 “伯克希尔体系”）很早就确定下来，具体如下：

1. Berkshire would be a diffuse conglomerate, averse only to activities about which it could not make useful predictions.【伯克希尔将成为一个多元化的企业集团，只回避那些无法做出有用预测的业务活动。】
2. Its top company would do almost all business through separately incorporated subsidiaries whose CEOs would operate with very extreme autonomy.【其母公司几乎所有业务都通过独立注册的子公司开展，这些子公司的首席执行官将拥有极大的自主权。】
3. There would be almost nothing at conglomerate headquarters except a tiny office suite containing Chairman, a CFO, and a few assistants who mostly helped the CFO with auditing, internal control, etc.【集团总部除了一个小办公室套间外几乎没有别的，里面有董事长、首席财务官和几个主要协助首席财务官进行审计、内部控制等工作的助手。】
4. Berkshire subsidiaries would always prominently include casualty insurers. Those insurers as a group would be expected to produce, in due course, dependable underwriting gains while also producing substantial “float” (from unpaid insurance liabilities) for investment.【伯克希尔的子公司将始终显著包括财产保险公司。预计这些保险公司作为一个整体，将在适当的时候产生可靠的承保利润，同时还能产生大量用于投资的 “浮存金”（来自未支付的保险负债）。】
5. There would be no significant system-wide personnel system, stock option system, other incentive system, retirement system, or the like, because the subsidiaries would have their own systems, often different.【不会有重要的全系统人事制度、股票期权制度、其他激励制度、退休制度等，因为子公司将有自己的制度，且往往各不相同。】
6. Berkshire’s Chairman would reserve only a few activities for himself.【伯克希尔董事长只为自己保留少数活动：】
   1. He would manage almost all security investments, with these normally residing in Berkshire’s casualty insurers.【他将管理几乎所有证券投资，这些投资通常由伯克希尔的财产保险公司持有。】
   2. He would choose all CEOs of important subsidiaries, and he would fix their compensation and obtain from each a private recommendation for a successor in case one was suddenly needed.【他将挑选重要子公司的所有首席执行官，确定他们的薪酬，并从每个人那里私下获取一份继任者推荐，以防突然需要。】
   3. He would deploy most cash not needed in subsidiaries after they had increased their competitive advantage, with the ideal deployment being the use of that cash to acquire new subsidiaries.【在子公司增强了竞争优势后，他将部署子公司不需要的大部分现金，理想的部署是用这些现金收购新的子公司。】
   4. He would make himself promptly available for almost any contact wanted by any subsidiary’s CEO, and he would require almost no additional contact.【他将随时为任何子公司首席执行官想要的几乎任何联系提供帮助，并且几乎不要求额外的联系。】
   5. He would write a long, logical, and useful letter for inclusion in his annual report, designed as he would wish it to be if he were only a passive shareholder, and he would be available for hours of answering questions at annual shareholders’ meetings.【他将撰写一封长而合乎逻辑且有用的信，纳入年度报告，就像他作为一个被动股东所希望的那样，并且在年度股东大会上花数小时回答问题。】
   6. He would try to be an exemplar in a culture that would work well for customers, shareholders, and other incumbents for a long time, both before and after his departure.【他将努力成为一种文化的典范，这种文化在他离任前后很长一段时间内都能很好地服务于客户、股东和其他在职人员。】
   7. His first priority would be reservation of much time for quiet reading and thinking, particularl that which might advance his determined learning, no matter how old he became; and【他的首要任务是预留大量时间用于安静阅读和思考，特别是那些可能促进他不断学习的内容，无论他年龄多大；】
   8. He would also spend much time in enthusiastically admiring what others were accomplishing.【他还将花大量时间热情赞赏他人的成就。】
7. New subsidiaries would usually be bought with cash, not newly issued stock.【新的子公司通常用现金购买，而不是新发行股票。】
8. Berkshire would not pay dividends so long as more than one dollar of market value for shareholders was being created by each dollar of retained earnings.【只要留存收益每创造一美元的市场价值超过一美元，伯克希尔就不会支付股息。】
9. In buying a new subsidiary, Berkshire would seek to pay a fair price for a good business that the Chairman could pretty well understand. Berkshire would also want a good CEO in place, one expected to remain for a long time and to manage well without need for help from headquarters.【在收购新子公司时，伯克希尔将寻求为一项董事长能够充分理解的好业务支付合理价格。伯克希尔还希望有一位优秀的首席执行官在位，预计其能长期留任并在无需总部帮助的情况下管理好公司。】
10. In choosing CEOs of subsidiaries, Berkshire would try to secure trustworthiness, skill, energy, and love for the business and circumstances the CEO was in.【在选择子公司首席执行官时，伯克希尔将努力确保其值得信赖、有能力、有精力，并且热爱所在的业务和环境。】
11. As an important matter of preferred conduct, Berkshire would almost never sell a subsidiary.【作为一种重要的优先行为，伯克希尔几乎从不出售子公司。】
12. Berkshire would almost never transfer a subsidiary’s CEO to another unrelated subsidiary.【伯克希尔几乎从不将子公司的首席执行官调往另一个不相关的子公司。】
13. Berkshire would never force the CEO of a subsidiary to retire on account of mere age.【伯克希尔从不因年龄原因强迫子公司首席执行官退休。】
14. Berkshire would have little debt outstanding as it tried to maintain (i) virtually perfect creditworthiness under all conditions and (ii) easy availability of cash and credit for deployment in times presenting unusual opportunities.【伯克希尔几乎没有未偿还债务，因为它试图在所有情况下保持（i）几乎完美的信誉，以及（ii）在出现不寻常机会时能够轻松获得现金和信贷用于部署。】
15. Berkshire would always be user-friendly to a prospective seller of a large business. An offer of such a business would get prompt attention. No one but the Chairman and one or two others at Berkshire would ever know about the offer if it did not lead to a transaction. And they would never tell outsiders about it.【伯克希尔对大型企业的潜在卖家总是友好的。对这样一家企业的收购要约将得到迅速关注。如果要约没有促成交易，除了董事长和伯克希尔的一两个人之外，没有人会知道这个要约。而且他们永远不会告诉外人。】

Both the elements of the Berkshire system and their collected size are quite unusual. No other large corporation I know of has half of such elements in place.【伯克希尔体系的要素及其整体规模都相当不寻常。据我所知，没有其他大公司具备一半这样的要素。】

How did Berkshire happen to get a corporate personality so different from the norm?【伯克希尔为何会形成如此与众不同的企业性格呢？】

Well, Buffett, even when only 34 years old, controlled about 45% of Berkshire’s shares and was completely trusted by all the other big shareholders. He could install whatever system he wanted. And he did so, creating the Berkshire system.【嗯，巴菲特在年仅 34 岁时就控制了伯克希尔约 45% 的股份，并且得到了所有其他大股东的完全信任。他可以建立任何他想要的体系。于是他就这样做了，创建了伯克希尔体系。】

Almost every element was chosen because Buffett believed that, under him, it would help maximize Berkshire’s achievement. He was not trying to create a one-type-fits-all system for other corporations. Indeed, Berkshire’s subsidiaries were not required to use the Berkshire system in their own operations. And some flourished while using different systems.【几乎每个要素的选择都是因为巴菲特相信，在他的领导下，这将有助于伯克希尔实现最大化的成就。他并不是试图为其他公司创建一个通用的体系。事实上，伯克希尔的子公司在自己的运营中并不需要采用伯克希尔体系。而且有些子公司在使用不同体系的情况下也蓬勃发展。】

What was Buffett aiming at as he designed the Berkshire system?

巴菲特在设计伯克希尔体系时的目标是什么呢？

Well, over the years I diagnosed several important themes:

嗯，多年来我总结出几个重要主题：

1. He particularly wanted continuous maximization of the rationality, skills, and devotion of the most important people in the system, starting with himself.【他特别希望从自己开始，持续最大化体系中最重要人员的理性、技能和奉献精神。】
2. He wanted win/win results everywhere–in gaining loyalty by giving it, for instance.【他希望处处实现双赢结果 —— 例如，通过给予忠诚来获得忠诚。】
3. He wanted decisions that maximized long-term results, seeking these from decision makers who usually stayed long enough in place to bear the consequences of decisions.【他希望做出能最大化长期结果的决策，从通常在任足够长时间以承担决策后果的决策者那里寻求这些决策。】
4. He wanted to minimize the bad effects that would almost inevitably come from a large bureaucracy at headquarters.【他希望尽量减少总部庞大官僚机构几乎不可避免带来的不良影响。】
5. He wanted to personally contribute, like Professor Ben Graham, to the spread of wisdom attained.【他希望像本杰明・格雷厄姆教授一样，为传播所获得的智慧做出个人贡献。】

When Buffett developed the Berkshire system, did he foresee all the benefits that followed? No. Buffett stumbled into some benefits through practice evolution. But, when he saw useful consequences, he strengthened their causes.

当巴菲特发展伯克希尔体系时，他预见到了随之而来的所有好处吗？不。巴菲特是通过实践演进偶然发现了一些好处。但是，当他看到有用的结果时，他加强了其成因。

Why did Berkshire under Buffett do so well?

为什么在巴菲特领导下伯克希尔做得如此之好呢？

Only four large factors occur to me:

我想到了四个主要因素：

1. The constructive peculiarities of Buffett,【巴菲特的建设性特质，】
2. The constructive peculiarities of the Berkshire system,【伯克希尔体系的建设性特质，】
3. Good luck, and【运气好】
4. The weirdly intense, contagious devotion of some shareholders and other admirers, including some in the press.【一些股东和其他崇拜者（包括一些媒体人士）异常强烈且具有感染力的忠诚】

I believe all four factors were present and helpful. But the heavy freight was carried by the constructive peculiarities, the weird devotion, and their interactions.

我相信这四个因素都存在且有帮助。但主要因素是建设性特质、异常的忠诚及其相互作用。

In particular, Buffett’s decision to limit his activities to a few kinds and to maximize his attention to them, and to keep doing so for 50 years, was a lollapalooza. Buffett succeeded for the same reason Roger Federer became good at tennis.

特别是，巴菲特决定将自己的活动限制在少数几种并最大限度地关注它们，并且持续 50 年这样做，这是一个巨大的成功因素。巴菲特成功的原因与罗杰・费德勒擅长网球的原因相同。

Buffett was, in effect, using the winning method of the famous basketball coach, John Wooden, who won most regularly after he had learned to assign virtually all playing time to his seven best players. That way, opponents always faced his best players, instead of his second best. And, with the extra playing time, the best players improved more than was normal.

实际上，巴菲特使用了著名篮球教练约翰・伍登的获胜方法，伍登在学会将几乎所有上场时间分配给他的七名最佳球员后，经常获胜。这样，对手总是面对他的最佳球员，而不是次佳球员。而且，由于额外的上场时间，最佳球员的进步比正常情况更多。

And Buffett much out-Woodened Wooden, because in his case the exercise of skill was concentrated in one person, not seven, and his skill improved and improved as he got older and older during 50 years, instead of deteriorating like the skill of a basketball player does.

而且巴菲特比伍登更胜一筹，因为在他的情况下，技能的运用集中在一个人身上，而不是七个人，并且他的技能在 50 年里随着年龄增长不断提高，而不是像篮球运动员的技能那样逐渐衰退。

Moreover, by concentrating so much power and authority in the often-long-serving CEOs of important subsidiaries, Buffett was also creating strong Wooden-type effects there. And such effects enhanced the skills of the CEOs and the achievements of the subsidiaries.

此外，通过将如此多的权力和权威集中在重要子公司长期任职的首席执行官手中，巴菲特也在那里创造了强大的伍登式效应。这些效应提高了首席执行官的技能和子公司的成就。

Then, as the Berkshire system bestowed much-desired autonomy on many subsidiaries and their CEOs, and Berkshire became successful and well known, these outcomes attracted both more and better subsidiaries into Berkshire, and better CEOs as well.

然后，随着伯克希尔体系赋予许多子公司及其首席执行官非常渴望的自主权，并且伯克希尔变得成功和知名，这些结果吸引了更多更好的子公司加入伯克希尔，也吸引了更好的首席执行官。

And the better subsidiaries and CEOs then required less attention from headquarters, creating what is often called a “virtuous circle.”

而更好的子公司和首席执行官则需要总部更少的关注，从而形成了通常所说的 “良性循环”。

How well did it work out for Berkshire to always include casualty insurers as important subsidiaries?

伯克希尔一直将财产保险公司作为重要子公司，结果如何呢？

Marvelously well. Berkshire’s ambitions were unreasonably extreme and, even so, it got what it wanted.

非常好。伯克希尔的野心异常极端，但即便如此，它也得到了它想要的。

Casualty insurers often invest in common stocks with a value amounting roughly to their shareholders’ equity, as did Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries. And the S&P 500 Index produced about 10% per annum, pre-tax, during the last 50 years, creating a significant tailwind.

财产保险公司通常像伯克希尔的保险子公司一样，用大约相当于股东权益价值的资金投资普通股。在过去 50 年里，标准普尔 500 指数每年税前回报率约为 10%，创造了显著的助力。

And, in the early decades of the Buffett era, common stocks within Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries greatly outperformed the index, exactly as Buffett expected. And, later, when both the large size of Berkshire’s stockholdings and income tax considerations caused the index-beating part of returns to fade to insignificance (perhaps not forever), other and better advantage came. Ajit Jain created out of nothing an immense reinsurance business that produced both a huge “float” and a large underwriting gain. And all of GEICO came into Berkshire, followed by a quadrupling of GEICO’s market share. And the rest of Berkshire’s insurance operations hugely improved, largely by dint of reputational advantage, underwriting discipline, finding and staying within good niches, and recruiting and holding outstanding people.

而且，在巴菲特时代的早期几十年里，伯克希尔保险子公司持有的普通股大幅跑赢指数，正如巴菲特所预期的那样。后来，当伯克希尔股票持仓规模巨大和所得税因素导致跑赢指数的回报部分变得微不足道（也许不是永远）时，其他更好的优势出现了。阿吉特・贾恩从零开始创建了一个巨大的再保险业务，产生了巨额 “浮存金” 和大量承保利润。然后整个 GEICO 并入伯克希尔，其市场份额随后增长了三倍。伯克希尔的其他保险业务也大幅改善，这主要得益于声誉优势、承保纪律、找到并坚守良好的细分市场以及招聘和留住优秀人才。

Then, later, as Berkshire’s nearly unique and quite dependable corporate personality and large size became well known, its insurance subsidiaries got and seized many attractive opportunities, not available to others, to buy privately issued securities. Most of these securities had fixed maturities and produced outstanding results.

后来，随着伯克希尔几乎独特且相当可靠的企业性格和大规模广为人知，其保险子公司获得并抓住了许多有吸引力的机会，购买私人发行的证券，这些机会是其他人无法获得的。这些证券大多有固定期限，并产生了出色的结果。

Berkshire’s marvelous outcome in insurance was not a natural result. Ordinarily, a casualty insurance business is a producer of mediocre results, even when very well managed. And such results are of little use. Berkshire’s better outcome was so astoundingly large that I believe that Buffett would now fail to recreate it if he returned to a small base while retaining his smarts and regaining his youth.

伯克希尔在保险方面的出色结果并非自然产生的。通常情况下，即使管理得很好，财产保险业务也只能产生平庸的结果，而且这种结果没什么用。伯克希尔更好的结果如此惊人，以至于我认为，如果巴菲特回到一个小的基础上，同时保留他的智慧并恢复青春，他现在也无法重现这一结果。

Did Berkshire suffer from being a diffuse conglomerate? No, its opportunities were usefully enlarged by a widened area for operation. And bad effects, common elsewhere, were prevented by Buffett’s skills.

伯克希尔作为一个多元化的企业集团是否受到了影响呢？没有，其运营领域的扩大有效地增加了机会。而且，其他地方常见的不良影响被巴菲特的技能所避免。

Why did Berkshire prefer to buy companies with cash, instead of its own stock? Well, it was hard to get anything in exchange for Berkshire stock that was as valuable as what was given up.

为什么伯克希尔更喜欢用现金收购公司，而不是用自己的股票呢？嗯，用伯克希尔的股票很难换到与付出价值相当的东西。

Why did Berkshire’s acquisition of companies outside the insurance business work out so well for Berkshire shareholders when the normal result in such acquisitions is bad for shareholders of the acquirer?

为什么伯克希尔收购保险业务以外的公司对伯克希尔股东来说效果如此之好，而通常此类收购对收购方股东来说结果不佳呢？

Well, Berkshire, by design, had methodological advantages to supplement its better opportunities. It never had the equivalent of a “department of acquisitions” under pressure to buy. And it never relied on advice from “helpers” sure to be prejudiced in favor of transactions. And Buffett held self-delusion at bay as he underclaimed expertise while he knew better than most corporate executives what worked and what didn’t in business, aided by his long experience as a passive investor. And, finally, even when Berkshire was getting much better opportunities than most others, Buffett often displayed almost inhuman patience and seldom bought. For instance, during his first ten years in control of Berkshire, Buffett saw one business (textiles) move close to death and two new businesses come in, for a net gain of one.

嗯，伯克希尔有意地拥有方法上的优势来补充其更好的机会。它从来没有一个面临收购压力的 “收购部门”。它也从不依赖肯定会偏向交易的 “助手” 的建议。而且巴菲特在声称自己缺乏专业知识的同时避免了自欺欺人，因为他作为一名被动投资者的长期经验使他比大多数企业高管更清楚什么在商业中有效，什么无效。最后，即使伯克希尔比大多数公司有更好的机会，巴菲特也常常表现出近乎超人的耐心，很少进行收购。例如，在他控制伯克希尔的头十年里，巴菲特看到一个业务（纺织业）濒临死亡，有两个新业务进入，净增一个业务。

What were the big mistakes made by Berkshire under Buffett? Well, while mistakes of commission were common, almost all huge errors were in not making a purchase, including not purchasing Walmart stock when that was sure to work out enormously well. The errors of omission were of much importance. Berkshire’s net worth would now be at least $50 billion higher if it had seized several opportunities it was not quite smart enough to recognize as virtually sure things.

在巴菲特领导下，伯克希尔犯了哪些大错误呢？嗯，虽然主动犯错很常见，但几乎所有巨大的错误都是没有进行收购，包括没有购买沃尔玛的股票，而购买沃尔玛股票肯定会带来巨大的成功。这些遗漏的错误非常重要。如果伯克希尔抓住了几个它不够聪明未能认识到几乎肯定会成功的机会，其净资产现在至少会高出 500 亿美元。

The next to last task on my list was: Predict whether abnormally good results would continue at Berkshire if Buffett were soon to depart.

我清单上的倒数第二项任务是：预测如果巴菲特即将离任，伯克希尔异常出色的业绩是否会继续。

The answer is yes. Berkshire has in place in its subsidiaries much business momentum grounded in much durable competitive advantage.

答案是会。伯克希尔的子公司在很大程度上具有基于持久竞争优势的业务发展势头。

Moreover, its railroad and utility subsidiaries now provide much desirable opportunity to invest large sums in new fixed assets. And many subsidiaries are now engaged in making wise “bolt-on” acquisitions.

此外，其铁路和公用事业子公司现在提供了大量理想的机会，可以将大笔资金投资于新的固定资产。而且许多子公司现在正在进行明智的 “附加” 收购。

Provided that most of the Berkshire system remains in place, the combined momentum and opportunity now present is so great that Berkshire would almost surely remain a better-than-normal company for a very long time even if (1) Buffett left tomorrow, (2) his successors were persons of only moderate ability, and (3) Berkshire never again purchased a large business.

只要伯克希尔体系的大部分保持不变，目前的发展势头和机会如此之大，即使（1）巴菲特明天离开，（2）他的继任者能力一般，（3）伯克希尔再也不收购大型企业，伯克希尔在很长一段时间内几乎肯定仍将是一家优于平均水平的公司。

But, under this Buffett-soon-leaves assumption, his successors would not be “of only moderate ability.” For instance, Ajit Jain and Greg Abel are proven performers who would probably be under-described as “world-class.” “World-leading” would be the description I would choose. In some important ways, each is a better business executive than Buffett.

但是，在巴菲特即将离开的假设下，他的继任者不会 “能力一般”。例如，阿吉特・贾恩和格雷格・阿贝尔都是经验证的出色执行者，将他们描述为 “世界级” 可能都低估了。我会选择 “世界领先” 来形容他们。在某些重要方面，他们每个人都是比巴菲特更好的企业高管。

And I believe neither Jain nor Abel would (1) leave Berkshire, no matter what someone else offered or (2) desire much change in the Berkshire system.

而且我相信贾恩和阿贝尔都不会（1）离开伯克希尔，无论别人提供什么条件，或者（2）希望对伯克希尔体系进行太多改变。

Nor do I think that desirable purchases of new businesses would end with Buffett’s departure. With Berkshire now so large and the age of activism upon us, I think some desirable acquisition opportunities will come and that Berkshire’s $60 billion in cash will constructively decrease.

我也不认为随着巴菲特的离开，理想的新业务收购就会结束。随着伯克希尔现在规模如此之大且激进主义时代的到来，我认为一些理想的收购机会将会出现，伯克希尔的 600 亿美元现金将建设性地减少。

My final task was to consider whether Berkshire’s great results over the last 50 years have implications that may prove useful elsewhere.

我的最后一项任务是思考伯克希尔过去 50 年的卓越成果是否在其他地方具有可借鉴的意义。

The answer is plainly yes. In its early Buffett years, Berkshire had a big task ahead: turning a tiny stash into a large and useful company. And it solved that problem by avoiding bureaucracy and relying much on one thoughtful leader for a long, long time as he kept improving and brought in more people like himself.

答案显然是肯定的。在巴菲特早期领导伯克希尔时，它面临着一项重大任务：将一小笔资金变成一家大型且有用的公司。它通过避免官僚主义并长期依赖一位深思熟虑的领导者来解决这个问题，这位领导者不断改进并引进更多像他一样的人。

Compare this to a typical big-corporation system with much bureaucracy at headquarters and a long succession of CEOs who come in at about age 59, pause little thereafter for quiet thought, and are soon forced out by a fixed retirement age.

将此与典型的大公司体系相比，后者总部有很多官僚机构，一连串的首席执行官大约在 59 岁时上任，此后很少停下来安静思考，并且很快就因固定退休年龄而被迫离职。

I believe that versions of the Berkshire system should be tried more often elsewhere and that the worst attributes of bureaucracy should much more often be treated like the cancers they so much resemble. A good example of bureaucracy fixing was created by George Marshall when he helped win World War II by getting from Congress the right to ignore seniority in choosing generals.

我认为伯克希尔体系的版本应该在其他地方更多地被尝试，并且官僚主义的最坏属性应该更多地被视为它们非常相似的癌症来对待。乔治・马歇尔就是一个很好的例子，他在赢得第二次世界大战时，从国会获得了在选择将军时无视资历的权力，从而纠正了官僚主义问题。

Sincerely,

诚挚地，

Charles T. Munger

查尔斯・T・芒格