BerkshireHathaway Letters 2024

Posted Mar 17, 2025 Updated Mar 29, 2025

By Luxin 90 min read

BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC.

伯克希尔哈撒韦公司

To the Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔・哈撒韦公司的股东们：

This letter comes to you as part of Berkshire’s annual report. As a public company, we are required to periodically tell you many specific facts and figures.

这封信是作为伯克希尔年度报告的一部分寄给你们的。作为一家上市公司，我们被要求定期向你们告知许多具体的事实和数据。

“Report,” however, implies a greater responsibility. In addition to the mandated data, we believe we owe you additional commentary about what you own and how we think. Our goal is to communicate with you in a manner that we would wish you to use if our positions were reversed – that is, if you were Berkshire’s CEO while I and my family were passive investors, trusting you with our savings.

然而，“报告” 意味着更大的责任。除了规定的数据之外，我们认为还应该向你们提供更多关于你们所拥有的资产以及我们的想法的评论。我们的目标是以一种如果角色互换，我们希望你们会采用的方式与你们沟通 —— 也就是说，如果你们是伯克希尔的首席执行官，而我和我的家人是被动投资者，将我们的积蓄托付给你们，在这种情况下我们希望你们采用的沟通方式。

This approach leads us to an annual recitation of both good and bad developments at the many businesses you indirectly own through your Berkshire shares. When discussing problems at specific subsidiaries, we do, however, try to follow the advice Tom Murphy gave to me 60 years ago: “praise by name, criticize by category.”

这种方式使我们每年都要向你们讲述，通过持有的伯克希尔股票间接拥有的众多企业所取得的好的和不好的发展情况。不过，在讨论特定子公司的问题时，我们尽量遵循汤姆・墨菲 60 年前给我的建议：“表扬具体到人，批评笼统归类。”

Mistakes – Yes, We Make Them at Berkshire

错误 —— 没错，我们在伯克希尔也会犯错

Sometimes I’ve made mistakes in assessing the future economics of a business I’ve purchased for Berkshire – each a case of capital allocation gone wrong. That happens with both judgments about marketable equities – we view these as partial ownership of businesses – and the 100% acquisitions of companies.

有时，我在评估为伯克希尔收购的企业未来的经济状况时会犯错 —— 每一个都是资本配置失误的案例。这种情况既会发生在对可交易股票的判断上 —— 我们将这些股票视为对企业的部分所有权 —— 也会发生在对企业 100% 的收购中。

At other times, I’ve made mistakes when assessing the abilities or fidelity of the managers Berkshire is hiring. The fidelity disappointments can hurt beyond their financial impact, a pain that can approach that of a failed marriage.

还有些时候，我在评估伯克希尔所聘用的管理人员的能力或忠诚度时会犯错。忠诚度方面的失望所造成的伤害，可能超出其财务影响，这种痛苦可能堪比一场失败的婚姻。

A decent batting average in personnel decisions is all that can be hoped for. The cardinal sin is delaying the correction of mistakes or what Charlie Munger called “thumb-sucking.” Problems, he would tell me, cannot be wished away. They require action, however uncomfortable that may be.

在人事决策方面，能期望达到一个不错的成功率就很不错了。最主要的错误是延误对错误的纠正，或者像查理・芒格所说的 “犹豫不决”。他会告诉我，问题不会凭空消失。无论多么令人不适，都需要采取行动。

During the 2019-23 period, I have used the words “mistake” or “error” 16 times in my letters to you. Many other huge companies have never used either word over that span. Amazon, I should acknowledge, made some brutally candid observations in its 2021 letter. Elsewhere, it has generally been happy talk and pictures.

在 2019 年至 2023 年期间，我在给你们的信中使用了 “错误” 或 “失误” 这两个词 16 次。在同一时期，许多其他大型公司从未使用过这两个词中的任何一个。我应该承认，亚马逊在其 2021 年的信中做了一些非常坦诚的表述。而在其他公司，通常都是一些乐观的言论和画面。

I have also been a director of large public companies at which “mistake” or “wrong” were forbidden words at board meetings or analyst calls. That taboo, implying managerial perfection, always made me nervous (though, at times, there could be legal issues that make limited discussion advisable. We live in a very litigious society.)

我也曾担任过一些大型上市公司的董事，在这些公司的董事会会议或分析师电话会议上，“错误” 或 “失误” 是禁词。这种禁忌暗示着管理层的完美无缺，这总是让我感到不安（不过，有时可能存在法律问题，使得进行有限的讨论是明智之举。我们生活在一个诉讼盛行的社会）。

At 94, it won’t be long before Greg Abel replaces me as CEO and will be writing the annual letters. Greg shares the Berkshire creed that a “report” is what a Berkshire CEO annually owes to owners. And he also understands that if you start fooling your shareholders, you will soon believe your own baloney and be fooling yourself as well.

我现在 94 岁了，不久之后格雷格・阿贝尔将接替我担任首席执行官，并会撰写年度信函。格雷格认同伯克希尔的信条，即一份 “报告” 是伯克希尔首席执行官每年对股东应尽的责任。而且他也明白，如果你开始欺骗你的股东，你很快就会相信自己的鬼话，也开始欺骗自己。

Pete Liegl – One of a Kind

皮特・利格尔 —— 独一无二的人

Let me pause to tell you the remarkable story of Pete Liegl, a man unknown to most Berkshire shareholders but one who contributed many billions to their aggregate wealth. Pete died in November, still working at 80.

让我暂停一下，给你们讲讲皮特・利格尔的非凡故事。大多数伯克希尔的股东都不认识他，但他为股东们的总财富贡献了数十亿美元。皮特于 11 月去世，享年 80 岁，当时他仍在工作。

I first heard of Forest River – the Indiana company Pete founded and managed – on June 21, 2005. On that day I received a letter from an intermediary detailing relevant data about the company, a recreational vehicle (“RV”) manufacturer. The writer said that Pete, the 100% owner of Forest River, specifically wanted to sell to Berkshire. He also told me the price that Pete expected to receive. I liked this no-nonsense approach.

我第一次听说森林河公司 —— 印第安纳州的一家由皮特创立并管理的公司 —— 是在 2005 年 6 月 21 日。那天，我收到了一位中介的来信，详细介绍了这家休闲车（“RV”）制造商的相关数据。写信人说，森林河公司的唯一所有者皮特特别希望将公司卖给伯克希尔。他还告诉我皮特期望的售价。我喜欢这种直截了当的方式。

I did some checking with RV dealers, liked what I learned and arranged a June 28th meeting in Omaha. Pete brought along his wife, Sharon, and daughter, Lisa. When we met, Pete assured me that he wanted to keep running the business but would feel more comfortable if he could assure financial security for his family.

我向一些休闲车经销商做了些调查，对了解到的情况很满意，并安排了 6 月 28 日在奥马哈会面。皮特带着他的妻子莎伦和女儿丽莎一起来了。我们见面时，皮特向我保证，他想继续经营这家公司，但如果能确保家人的经济保障，他会更安心。

Pete next mentioned that he owned some real estate that was leased to Forest River and had not been covered in the June 21 letter. Within a few minutes, we arrived at a price for those assets as I expressed no need for appraisal by Berkshire but would simply accept his valuation.

皮特接着提到，他拥有一些租给森林河公司的房地产，这在 6 月 21 日的信中没有提到。几分钟内，我们就这些资产的价格达成了一致，因为我表示伯克希尔不需要进行评估，会直接接受他的估值。

Then we arrived at the other point that needed clarity. I asked Pete what his compensation should be, adding that whatever he said, I would accept. (This, I should add, is not an approach I recommend for general use.)

然后我们谈到了另一个需要明确的问题。我问皮特他的薪酬应该是多少，并补充说无论他说什么，我都会接受。（我应该补充一点，我不建议普遍采用这种方式。）

Pete paused as his wife, daughter and I leaned forward. Then he surprised us: “Well, I looked at Berkshire’s proxy statement and I wouldn’t want to make more than my boss, so pay me $100,000 per year.” After I picked myself off the floor, Pete added: “But we will earn X (he named a number) this year, and I would like an annual bonus of 10% of any earnings above what the company is now delivering.” I replied: “OK Pete, but if Forest River makes any significant acquisitions we will make an appropriate adjustment for the additional capital thus employed.” I didn’t define “appropriate” or “significant,” but those vague terms never caused a problem.

皮特停顿了一下，他的妻子、女儿和我都倾身向前。然后他让我们大吃一惊：“嗯，我看了伯克希尔的委托声明，我不想挣得比我的老板还多，所以每年给我 10 万美元的薪水吧。” 我好不容易回过神来，皮特又补充道：“但我们今年会赚到 X（他说了一个数字），如果公司的盈利超过现在的水平，我希望能得到超出部分 10% 的年度奖金。” 我回答说：“好的，皮特，但如果森林河公司进行了任何重大收购，我们会对因此使用的额外资本做出适当调整。” 我没有定义 “适当” 或 “重大”，但这些模糊的用词从未引发过问题。

The four of us then went to dinner at Omaha’s Happy Hollow Club and lived happily ever after. During the next 19 years, Pete shot the lights out. No competitor came close to his performance.

然后，我们四个人去奥马哈的欢乐谷俱乐部吃晚餐，此后一直相处融洽。在接下来的 19 年里，皮特干得极为出色。没有竞争对手能企及他的业绩。

Every company doesn’t have an easy-to-understand business and there are very few owners or managers like Pete. And, of course, I expect to make my share of mistakes about the businesses Berkshire buys and sometimes err in evaluating the sort of person with whom I’m dealing.

并非每家公司都有易于理解的业务模式，也很少有像皮特这样的所有者或管理者。当然，我预料在伯克希尔收购企业方面我会犯一些错误，有时在评估与我打交道的人时也会出错。

But I’ve also had many pleasant surprises in both the potential of the business as well as the ability and fidelity of the manager. And our experience is that a single winning decision can make a breathtaking difference over time. (Think GEICO as a business decision, Ajit Jain as a managerial decision and my luck in finding Charlie Munger as a one-of-a-kind partner, personal advisor and steadfast friend.) Mistakes fade away; winners can forever blossom.

但无论是在企业的潜力方面，还是在管理者的能力和忠诚度方面，我也收获过许多惊喜。而且我们的经验是，一个正确的决策随着时间推移能带来惊人的改变。（想想政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）这个商业决策，阿吉特・杰恩（Ajit Jain）这个用人决策，以及我有幸找到查理・芒格这位独一无二的合作伙伴、个人顾问和挚友。）错误会逐渐被淡忘，而成功的决策则会不断开花结果。

One further point in our CEO selections: I never look at where a candidate has gone to school. Never!

在选择首席执行官方面，我还有一点要说明：我从不看候选人毕业于哪所学校。从不！

Of course, there are great managers who attended the most famous schools. But there are plenty such as Pete who may have benefitted by attending a less prestigious institution or even by not bothering to finish school. Look at my friend, Bill Gates, who decided that it was far more important to get underway in an exploding industry that would change the world than it was to stick around for a parchment that he could hang on the wall. (Read his new book, Source Code.)

当然，有很多优秀的管理者毕业于名校。但也有很多像皮特这样的人，他们可能受益于就读没那么有名的院校，甚至都没费心完成学业。看看我的朋友比尔・盖茨，他认为在一个将改变世界的蓬勃发展的行业中起步，远比在学校耗时间拿一张可以挂在墙上的文凭重要得多。（可以读一读他的新书《源代码》。）

Not long ago, I met – by phone – Jessica Toonkel, whose step-grandfather, Ben Rosner, long ago ran a business for Charlie and me. Ben was a retailing genius and, in preparing for this report, I checked with Jessica to confirm Ben’s schooling, which I remembered as limited. Jessica’s reply: “Ben never went past 6th grade.”

不久前，我通过电话结识了杰西卡・图恩克尔，她的继祖父本・罗斯纳曾长期为查理和我经营一家企业。本是个零售天才，在准备这份报告时，我向杰西卡核实本的受教育情况，我记得他学历有限。杰西卡回复说：“本只读到六年级。”

I was lucky enough to get an education at three fine universities. And I avidly believe in lifelong learning. I’ve observed, however, that a very large portion of business talent is innate with nature swamping nurture.

我有幸在三所优秀的大学接受过教育。而且我坚信终身学习。然而，我发现很大一部分商业才能是与生俱来的，天赋的作用远超后天培养。

Pete Liegl was a natural.

皮特・利格尔就是个天才。

Last Year’s Performance

去年的业绩

In 2024, Berkshire did better than I expected though 53% of our 189 operating businesses reported a decline in earnings. We were aided by a predictable large gain in investment income as Treasury Bill yields improved and we substantially increased our holdings of these highly-liquid short-term securities.

2024 年，伯克希尔的表现超出了我的预期，尽管在我们 189 家运营企业中，有 53% 的企业盈利出现下滑。由于美国国债收益率提高，并且我们大幅增持了这些高流动性的短期证券，投资收益取得了可预见的大幅增长，这对我们很有帮助。

Our insurance business also delivered a major increase in earnings, led by the performance of GEICO. In five years, Todd Combs has reshaped GEICO in a major way, increasing efficiency and bringing underwriting practices up to date. GEICO was a long-held gem that needed major repolishing, and Todd has worked tirelessly in getting the job done.Though not yet complete, the 2024 improvement was spectacular.

我们的保险业务盈利也大幅增长，这主要得益于政府雇员保险公司（GEICO）的表现。在五年时间里，托德・库姆斯（Todd Combs）对政府雇员保险公司进行了重大改革，提高了运营效率，并更新了承保业务模式。政府雇员保险公司一直是一颗未经雕琢的宝石，需要大力打磨，而托德不知疲倦地完成了这项工作。虽然改革尚未完全结束，但 2024 年取得的进展非常显著。

In general, property-casualty (“P/C”) insurance pricing strengthened during 2024, reflecting a major increase in damage from convective storms. Climate change may have been announcing its arrival. However, no “monster” event occurred during 2024. Someday, any day, a truly staggering insurance loss will occur – and there is no guarantee that there will be only one per annum.

总体而言，2024 年财产和意外伤害保险（P/C）的定价有所提高，这是因为对流风暴造成的损失大幅增加。气候变化或许已经显现。不过，2024 年没有发生 “重大” 灾害事件。总有一天，任何一天，都会发生真正巨大的保险理赔损失，而且无法保证每年只发生一次。

The P/C business is so central to Berkshire that it warrants a further discussion that appears later in this letter.

财产和意外伤害保险业务对伯克希尔至关重要，在这封信后面我还会进一步讨论。

Berkshire’s railroad and utility operations, our two largest businesses outside of insurance, improved their aggregate earnings. Both, however, have much left to accomplish.

伯克希尔的铁路和公用事业业务是我们保险业务之外的两大主要业务，其总盈利有所改善。不过，这两项业务仍有很多工作要做。

Late in the year we increased our ownership of the utility operation from about 92% to 100% at a cost of roughly $3.9 billion, of which $2.9 billion was paid in cash with a balance in Berkshire “B” shares.

去年年底，我们以约 39 亿美元的成本将公用事业业务的持股比例从约 92% 提高到 100% ，其中 29 亿美元以现金支付，其余部分以伯克希尔 “B” 股支付。

All told, we recorded operating earnings of $47.4 billion in 2024. We regularly – endlessly, some readers may groan – emphasize this measure rather than the GAAP-mandated earnings that are reported on page K-68.

总体而言，2024 年我们的运营收益为 474 亿美元。我们经常 —— 有些读者可能会厌烦 —— 强调这一指标，而不是 K - 68 页上按照美国通用会计准则（GAAP）规定报告的收益。

Our measure excludes capital gains or losses on the stocks and bonds we own, whether realized or unrealized. Over time, we think it highly likely that gains will prevail – why else would we buy these securities? – though the year-by-year numbers will swing wildly and unpredictably. Our horizon for such commitments is almost always far longer than a single year. In many, our thinking involves decades. These long-termers are the purchases that sometimes make the cash register ring like church bells.

我们的衡量指标不包括我们所持股票和债券的资本利得或损失，无论是已实现的还是未实现的。从长远来看，我们认为盈利的可能性非常大 —— 不然我们为什么要购买这些证券呢？—— 尽管每年的数据会大幅波动且难以预测。我们进行这类投资的期限几乎总是远远超过一年。在很多情况下，我们考虑的是几十年。这些长期投资有时能带来丰厚的回报。

Here’s a breakdown of the 2023-24 earnings as we see them. All calculations are after depreciation, amortization and income tax. EBITDA, a flawed favorite of Wall Street, is not for us.

以下是我们眼中 2023 - 2024 年的收益明细。所有计算均扣除了折旧、摊销和所得税。息税折旧摊销前利润（EBITDA）是华尔街偏爱的一个有缺陷的指标，我们并不采用。

	2024（百万美元）	2023（百万美元）
保险承保业务（Insurance-underwriting）	9,020	5,428
保险投资收益（Insurance-investment income）	13,670	9,567
伯灵顿北方圣太菲铁路公司（BNSF）	5,031	5,087
伯克希尔哈撒韦能源公司（Berkshire Hathaway Energy）	3,730	2,331
其他受控业务（Other controlled businesses）	13,072	13,362
非受控业务（Non-controlled businesses*）	1,519	1,750
其他（Other**）	1,395	(175)
运营收益（Operating earnings）	47,437	37,350

Includes certain businesses in which Berkshire had between a 20% and 50% ownership such as Kraft Heinz, Occidental Petroleum and Berkadia.

包括伯克希尔持股比例在 20% 至 50% 之间的某些企业，如卡夫亨氏公司、西方石油公司和伯克迪亚公司。

** Includes foreign currency exchange gains of approximately $1.1 billion in 2024 and approximately $211 million in 2023 produced by our usage of non-U.S. dollar-denominated debt.

包括 2024 年约 11 亿美元和 2023 年约 2.11 亿美元的外汇收益，这些收益是我们使用非美元计价债务所产生的。

Surprise, Surprise! An Important American Record is Smashed

惊喜，惊喜！一项重要的美国纪录被打破了

Sixty years ago, present management took control of Berkshire. That move was a mistake – my mistake – and one that plagued us for two decades. Charlie, I should emphasize, spotted my obvious error immediately: Though the price I paid for Berkshire looked cheap, its business – a large northern textile operation – was headed for extinction.

六十年前，现任管理层接管了伯克希尔公司。那是一个错误 —— 我的错误 —— 并且这个错误困扰了我们二十年。我要强调的是，查理当时就立刻发现了我这个明显的错误：尽管我收购伯克希尔时的价格看起来很便宜，但它的业务 —— 一家位于北方的大型纺织企业 —— 正走向消亡。

The U.S. Treasury, of all places, had already received silent warnings of Berkshire’s destiny. In 1965, the company did not pay a dime of income tax, an embarrassment that had generally prevailed at the company for a decade. That sort of economic behavior may be understandable for glamorous startups, but it’s a blinking yellow light when it happens at a venerable pillar of American industry. Berkshire was headed for the ash can.

最不可思议的是，美国财政部早已收到了关于伯克希尔命运的无声警告。1965 年，这家公司一分钱的所得税都没交，而这种令人尴尬的情况在过去十年里一直普遍存在于该公司。对于那些光鲜亮丽的初创企业来说，这种经济表现或许还能理解，但当这种情况发生在美国工业的老牌支柱企业身上时，就是一个危险的信号了。伯克希尔正走向衰败。

Fast forward 60 years and imagine the surprise at the Treasury when that same company – still operating under the name of Berkshire Hathaway – paid far more in corporate income tax than the U.S. government had ever received from any company – even the American tech titans that commanded market values in the trillions.

快进到六十年后，想象一下当美国财政部发现还是这家公司 —— 仍然以伯克希尔哈撒韦的名字运营 —— 缴纳的企业所得税远远超过美国政府从任何一家公司收到的数额时，会有多么惊讶吧，即便是那些市值高达数万亿美元的美国科技巨头。

To be precise, Berkshire last year made four payments to the IRS that totaled $26.8 billion. That’s about 5% of what all of corporate America paid. (In addition, we paid sizable amounts for income taxes to foreign governments and to 44 states.)

确切地说，伯克希尔去年向美国国税局（IRS）分四次缴纳了总计 268 亿美元的税款。这大约占了美国所有企业纳税总额的 5%。（此外，我们还向外国政府和美国 44 个州缴纳了相当数额的所得税。）

Note one crucial factor allowing this record-shattering payment: Berkshire shareholders during the same 1965-2024 period received only one cash dividend. On January 3, 1967, we disbursed our sole payment – $101,755 or 10¢ per A share. (I can’t remember why I suggested this action to Berkshire’s board of directors. Now it seems like a bad dream.)

请注意一个促成这一创纪录纳税额的关键因素：在 1965 年至 2024 年的同一时期内，伯克希尔的股东只收到过一次现金股息。1967 年 1 月 3 日，我们进行了唯一一次分红 ——101,755 美元，即每股 A 股 10 美分。（我不记得当时为什么要向伯克希尔董事会提议进行这次分红了。现在看来，那就像一场噩梦。）

For sixty years, Berkshire shareholders endorsed continuous reinvestment and that enabled the company to build its taxable income. Cash income-tax payments to the U.S. Treasury, miniscule in the first decade, now aggregate more than $101 billion . . . and counting.

六十年来，伯克希尔的股东一直支持持续再投资，这使得公司得以积累应纳税所得额。向美国财政部缴纳的现金所得税，在最初十年里微不足道，如今累计已超过 1010 亿美元…… 而且这个数字还在不断增加。

Huge numbers can be hard to visualize. Let me recast the $26.8 billion that we paid last year.

巨额数字往往很难让人有直观的感受。让我换一种方式来描述我们去年缴纳的 268 亿美元税款。

If Berkshire had sent the Treasury a $1 million check every 20 minutes throughout all of 2024 – visualize 366 days and nights because 2024 was a leap year – we still would have owed the federal government a significant sum at yearend. Indeed, it would be well into January before the Treasury would tell us that we could take a short breather, get some sleep, and prepare for our 2025 tax payments.

如果伯克希尔在 2024 年全年每 20 分钟就给美国财政部寄去一张 100 万美元的支票 —— 想象一下 366 个日日夜夜，因为 2024 年是闰年 —— 即便如此，到年底我们仍会欠联邦政府一大笔钱。实际上，要到 1 月下旬，财政部才会告诉我们可以稍作喘息，睡上一觉，然后准备缴纳 2025 年的税款。

Where Your Money Is

你的钱都投在了哪里

Berkshire’s equity activity is ambidextrous. In one hand we own control of many businesses, holding at least 80% of the investee’s shares. Generally, we own 100%. These 189 subsidiaries have similarities to marketable common stocks but are far from identical. The collection is worth many hundreds of billions and includes a few rare gems, many good-but-far-from-fabulous businesses and some laggards that have been disappointments. We own nothing that is a major drag, but we have a number that I should not have purchased.

伯克希尔的股权投资活动是多方面的。一方面，我们拥有许多企业的控制权，至少持有被投资企业 80% 的股份。通常情况下，我们持有 100% 的股份。这 189 家子公司与可交易的普通股有相似之处，但又绝非完全相同。这些子公司的总价值高达数千亿美元，其中包括一些罕见的优质企业，许多表现良好但远称不上卓越的企业，还有一些令人失望的落后企业。我们没有任何一项投资会成为重大拖累，但也有一些是我本不该收购的。

In the other hand, we own a small percentage of a dozen or so very large and highly profitable businesses with household names such as Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola and Moody’s. Many of these companies earn very high returns on the net tangible equity required for their operations. At yearend, our partial-ownership holdings were valued at $272 billion. Understandably, really outstanding businesses are very seldom offered in their entirety, but small fractions of these gems can be purchased Monday through Friday on Wall Street and, very occasionally, they sell at bargain prices.

另一方面，我们持有十几家规模庞大且利润丰厚的知名企业的少量股份，比如苹果、美国运通、可口可乐和穆迪等。这些公司中的许多在其运营所需的有形净资产上都能获得非常高的回报率。到去年年底，我们持有的这些部分股权的价值为 2720 亿美元。可以理解的是，真正出色的企业很少会整体出售，但这些优质企业的少量股份在周一至周五都可以在华尔街买到，而且偶尔还能以优惠的价格购入。

We are impartial in our choice of equity vehicles, investing in either variety based upon where we can best deploy your (and my family’s) savings. Often, nothing looks compelling; very infrequently we find ourselves knee-deep in opportunities. Greg has vividly shown his ability to act at such times as did Charlie.

在选择股权投资工具时，我们没有偏见，无论是哪种类型的投资，我们都会基于能最有效地运用你们（以及我家族）的积蓄的原则来进行。很多时候，没有什么投资看起来特别有吸引力；极少情况下，我们会发现自己面临大量的投资机会。格雷格已经充分展现了他在这种时候果断行动的能力，就像查理当年一样。

With marketable equities, it is easier to change course when I make a mistake. Berkshire’s present size, it should be underscored, diminishes this valuable option. We can’t come and go on a dime. Sometimes a year or more is required to establish or divest an investment. Additionally, with ownership of minority positions we can’t change management if that action is needed or control what is done with capital flows if we are unhappy with the decisions being made.

对于可交易的股票来说，当我犯错时，改变投资方向相对更容易。但应该强调的是，伯克希尔目前的规模削弱了这种宝贵的灵活性。我们不能轻易地进进出出。有时，建立或减持一项投资需要一年甚至更长时间。此外，对于少数股权的投资，如果需要更换管理层或者我们对资本流动的决策不满意时，我们无法决定管理层的去留，也无法控制资本的使用方式。

With controlled companies, we can dictate these decisions, but we have far less flexibility in the disposition of mistakes. In reality, Berkshire almost never sells controlled businesses unless we face what we believe to be unending problems. An offset is that some business owners seek out Berkshire because of our steadfast behavior. Occasionally, that can be a decided plus for us.

对于拥有控制权的公司，我们可以决定这些事情，但在处理错误投资时，我们的灵活性要小得多。实际上，除非我们认为这些公司面临着无法解决的问题，否则伯克希尔几乎从不出售拥有控制权的企业。不过，作为补偿，一些企业主会因为我们坚定的投资态度而主动寻求与伯克希尔合作。有时候，这对我们来说是一个明显的优势。

Despite what some commentators currently view as an extraordinary cash position at Berkshire, the great majority of your money remains in equities. That preference won’t change. While our ownership in marketable equities moved downward last year from $354 billion to $272 billion, the value of our non-quoted controlled equities increased somewhat and remains far greater than the value of the marketable portfolio.

尽管一些评论人士目前认为伯克希尔的现金储备处于极高水平，但你们的绝大部分资金仍然投资于股票。这种投资偏好不会改变。虽然我们持有的可交易股票的价值去年从 3540 亿美元降至 2720 亿美元，但我们持有的非上市受控股权的价值有所增加，并且仍然远高于可交易股票投资组合的价值。

Berkshire shareholders can rest assured that we will forever deploy a substantial majority of their money in equities – mostly American equities although many of these will have international operations of significance. Berkshire will never prefer ownership of cash-equivalent assets over the ownership of good businesses, whether controlled or only partially owned.

伯克希尔的股东可以放心，我们将永远把他们的绝大部分资金投资于股票 —— 主要是美国股票，尽管其中许多公司会有重要的国际业务。伯克希尔永远不会优先选择持有现金等价资产，而放弃拥有优质企业，无论是完全控制的企业还是仅持有部分股权的企业。

Paper money can see its value evaporate if fiscal folly prevails. In some countries, this reckless practice has become habitual, and, in our country’s short history, the U.S. has come close to the edge. Fixed-coupon bonds provide no protection against runaway currency.

如果财政政策过于愚蠢，纸币的价值可能会蒸发。在一些国家，这种鲁莽的做法已经习以为常，而在美国短暂的历史中，也曾接近过这种边缘。固定票面利率的债券无法抵御货币失控贬值的风险。

Businesses, as well as individuals with desired talents, however, will usually find a way to cope with monetary instability as long as their goods or services are desired by the country’s citizenry. So, too, with personal skills. Lacking such assets as athletic excellence, a wonderful voice, medical or legal skills or, for that matter, any special talents, I have had to rely on equities throughout my life. In effect, I have depended on the success of American businesses and I will continue to do so.

然而，只要企业提供的商品或服务受到本国公民的需求，企业以及拥有所需才能的个人通常都能找到应对货币不稳定的方法。个人技能也是如此。由于缺乏诸如卓越的运动天赋、美妙的歌喉、医学或法律技能，或者任何特殊才能，我一生都不得不依赖股票投资。实际上，我一直依赖美国企业的成功，并且还会继续这样做。

One way or another, the sensible – better yet imaginative – deployment of savings by citizens is required to propel an ever-growing societal output of desired goods and services. This system is called capitalism. It has its faults and abuses – in certain respects more egregious now than ever – but it also can work wonders unmatched by other economic systems.

无论如何，要推动社会不断增加生产人们所需的商品和服务，就需要公民以明智的 —— 甚至更理想的是富有想象力的 —— 方式来配置储蓄。这种体系就叫做资本主义。它有自身的缺陷和弊端 —— 在某些方面，如今的问题比以往任何时候都更为严重 —— 但它也能创造出其他经济体系无法比拟的奇迹。

America is Exhibit A. Our country’s progress over its mere 235 years of existence could not have been imagined by even the most optimistic colonists in 1789, when the Constitution was adopted and the country’s energies were unleashed.

美国就是一个典型的例子。美国仅仅存在了 235 年，它所取得的进步即使是在 1789 年美国宪法通过、国家活力得到释放时最乐观的殖民者也无法想象。

True, our country in its infancy sometimes borrowed abroad to supplement our own savings. But, concurrently, we needed many Americans to consistently save and then needed those savers or other Americans to wisely deploy the capital thus made available. If America had consumed all that it produced, the country would have been spinning its wheels.

的确，美国在建国初期有时会从国外借款来补充本国的储蓄。但与此同时，我们需要许多美国人持续进行储蓄，然后还需要这些储蓄者或其他美国人明智地配置由此产生的资本。如果美国把生产出来的所有东西都消耗掉了，这个国家就会停滞不前。

The American process has not always been pretty – our country has forever had many scoundrels and promoters who seek to take advantage of those who mistakenly trust them with their savings. But even with such malfeasance – which remains in full force today – and also much deployment of capital that eventually floundered because of brutal competition or disruptive innovation, the savings of Americans has delivered a quantity and quality of output beyond the dreams of any colonist.

美国的发展历程并不总是一帆风顺的 —— 我们国家一直都有很多无赖和骗子，他们试图利用那些错误地将自己的储蓄托付给他们的人。但是，尽管存在这种不当行为 —— 而且这种行为在今天依然猖獗 —— 同时也有很多资本配置最终因为激烈的竞争或颠覆性的创新而失败，美国人的储蓄还是带来了数量和质量都远超任何殖民者梦想的产出。

From a base of only four million people – and despite a brutal internal war early on, pitting one American against another – America changed the world in the blink of a celestial eye.

美国从最初仅有 400 万人口起步 —— 而且还经历了一场残酷的内战，美国人自相残杀 —— 却在转瞬之间改变了世界。

In a very minor way, Berkshire shareholders have participated in the American miracle by foregoing dividends, thereby electing to reinvest rather than consume. Originally, this reinvestment was tiny, almost meaningless, but over time, it mushroomed, reflecting the mixture of a sustained culture of savings, combined with the magic of long-term compounding.

在一个很小的方面，伯克希尔的股东们通过放弃股息参与到了美国的奇迹之中，他们选择了再投资而非消费。起初，这种再投资微不足道，几乎没有什么意义，但随着时间的推移，它迅速增长，这反映了持续的储蓄文化以及长期复利的神奇力量相结合的结果。

Berkshire’s activities now impact all corners of our country. And we are not finished. Companies die for many reasons but, unlike the fate of humans, old age itself is not lethal. Berkshire today is far more youthful than it was in 1965.

如今，伯克希尔的业务活动影响着美国的各个角落。而且我们还远未停下脚步。企业的消亡有很多原因，但与人类的命运不同，衰老本身并不会致命。如今的伯克希尔比 1965 年时要年轻得多。

However, as Charlie and I have always acknowledged, Berkshire would not have achieved its results in any locale except America whereas America would have been every bit the success it has been if Berkshire had never existed.

然而，正如查理和我一直承认的那样，伯克希尔如果不在美国，是不可能取得如今的成就的，而美国即使没有伯克希尔的存在，也依然会取得现在这样的成功。

So thank you, Uncle Sam. Someday your nieces and nephews at Berkshire hope to send you even larger payments than we did in 2024. Spend it wisely. Take care of the many who, for no fault of their own, get the short straws in life. They deserve better. And never forget that we need you to maintain a stable currency and that result requires both wisdom and vigilance on your part.

所以，谢谢你，美国政府（山姆大叔）。有朝一日，伯克希尔的股东们希望能给你缴纳比 2024 年更多的税款。请明智地使用这些钱。照顾好那些很多并非自身过错却在生活中遭遇不幸的人。他们理应得到更好的待遇。永远不要忘记，我们需要你维持货币的稳定，而这需要你保持智慧和警惕。

Property-Casualty Insurance

财产 - 意外险业务

P/C insurance continues to be Berkshire’s core business. The industry follows a financial model that is rare – very rare – among giant businesses.

财产 - 意外险业务仍然是伯克希尔的核心业务。在大型企业中，这个行业所遵循的财务模式非常罕见 —— 极其罕见。

Customarily, companies incur costs for labor, materials, inventories, plant and equipment, etc. before – or concurrently with – the sale of their products or services. Consequently, their CEOs have a good fix on knowing the cost of their product before they sell it. If the selling price is less than its cost, managers soon learn they have a problem. Hemorrhaging cash is hard to ignore.

通常情况下，企业在销售产品或服务之前 —— 或者与此同时 —— 会产生劳动力、原材料、库存、厂房和设备等方面的成本。因此，企业的首席执行官们在销售产品之前就能很好地了解产品的成本。如果销售价格低于成本，管理者很快就会发现问题。现金的大量流失是难以忽视的。

When writing P/C insurance, we receive payment upfront and much later learn what our product has cost us – sometimes a moment of truth that is delayed as much as 30 or more years. (We are still making substantial payments on asbestos exposures that occurred 50 or more years ago.)

在承保财产 - 意外险时，我们会提前收到保费，而要很久之后才会知道我们的产品成本是多少 —— 有时要等上 30 年甚至更久才能真相大白。（我们仍在为 50 多年前发生的石棉暴露事件支付巨额赔款。）

This mode of operations has the desirable effect of giving P/C insurers cash before they incur most expenses but carries with it the risk that the company can be losing money – sometimes mountains of money – before the CEO and directors realize what is happening.

这种运营模式有一个可取之处，那就是让财产 - 意外险公司在产生大部分费用之前就能获得现金，但同时也带来了一种风险，即在首席执行官和董事们意识到发生了什么之前，公司可能已经在亏损了 —— 有时是巨额亏损。

Certain lines of insurance minimize this mismatch, such as crop insurance or hail damage in which losses are quickly reported, evaluated and paid. Other lines, however, can lead to executive and shareholder bliss as the company is going broke. Think coverages such as medical malpractice or product liability. In “long-tail” lines, a P/C insurer may report large but fictitious profits to its owners and regulators for many years – even decades. The accounting can be particularly dangerous if the CEO is an optimist or a crook. These possibilities are not fanciful: History reveals a large number of each species.

某些保险险种可以将这种时间错配的影响降到最低，比如农作物保险或冰雹灾害保险，在这些险种中，损失会很快得到报告、评估和赔付。然而，其他险种可能会让公司在走向破产的过程中，让管理层和股东还沉浸在幸福之中。想想医疗事故保险或产品责任保险这类险种。在 “长尾” 险种中，一家财产 - 意外险公司可能会连续多年 —— 甚至数十年 —— 向其所有者和监管机构报告巨额但虚假的利润。如果首席执行官是个盲目乐观的人或者是个骗子，这种会计处理方式可能会极其危险。这些可能性并非凭空想象：历史上有大量这样的例子。

In recent decades, this “money-up-front, loss-payments-later” model has allowed Berkshire to invest large sums (“float”) while generally delivering what we believe to be a small underwriting profit. We make estimates for “surprises” and, so far, these estimates have been sufficient.

在最近几十年里，这种 “先收保费，后付赔款” 的模式使得伯克希尔能够投资大量资金（“浮存金”），同时总体上实现了我们认为数额较小的承保利润。我们会对 “意外情况” 做出预估，到目前为止，这些预估还是足够的。

We are not deterred by the dramatic and growing loss payments sustained by our activities. (As I write this, think wildfires.) It’s our job to price to absorb these and unemotionally take our lumps when surprises develop. It’s also our job to contest “runaway” verdicts, spurious litigation and outright fraudulent behavior.

我们不会因为业务活动中持续增加的巨额赔款而退缩。（在我写这篇文章时，想想野火造成的损失。）我们的职责是合理定价以承受这些损失，并在意外情况发生时冷静地接受现实。我们的职责还包括对 “不合理的” 判决、无理诉讼和公然的欺诈行为提出抗辩。

Under Ajit, our insurance operation has blossomed from an obscure Omaha-based company into a world leader, renowned for both its taste for risk and its Gibraltar-like financial strength. Moreover, Greg, our directors and I all have a very large investment in Berkshire in relation to any compensation we receive. We do not use options or other one-sided forms of compensation; if you lose money, so do we. This approach encourages caution but does not ensure foresight.

在阿吉特的领导下，我们的保险业务从一家位于奥马哈的默默无闻的公司发展成为了世界领先的企业，以其对风险的偏好和坚如磐石的财务实力而闻名。此外，格雷格、我们的董事们以及我个人在伯克希尔的投资都远远超过了我们所获得的任何报酬。我们不使用期权或其他单方面有利于我们的薪酬形式；如果你亏损了，我们也会亏损。这种方式鼓励我们保持谨慎，但并不能保证我们有先见之明。

P/C insurance growth is dependent on increased economic risk. No risk – no need for insurance.

财产 - 意外险业务的增长依赖于经济风险的增加。没有风险 —— 就不需要保险。

Think back only 135 years when the world had no autos, trucks or airplanes. Now there are 300 million vehicles in the U.S. alone, a massive fleet causing huge damage daily. Property damage arising from hurricanes, tornadoes and wildfires is massive, growing and increasingly unpredictable in their patterns and eventual costs.

回想仅仅 135 年前，那时世界上还没有汽车、卡车或飞机。而现在，仅在美国就有 3 亿辆汽车，如此庞大的车队每天都造成巨大的损失。飓风、龙卷风和野火造成的财产损失规模巨大，而且还在不断增加，其发生模式和最终成本也越来越难以预测。

It would be foolish – make that madness – to write ten-year policies for these coverages, but we believe one-year assumption of such risks is generally manageable. If we change our minds, we will change the contracts we offer. During my lifetime, auto insurers have generally abandoned one-year policies and switched to the six-month variety. This change reduced float but allowed more intelligent underwriting.

为这些险种承保 10 年期的保单是愚蠢的 —— 甚至可以说是疯狂的，但我们认为，一般来说，承担一年期的此类风险是可控的。如果我们改变主意，我们会改变所提供的保险合同。在我的有生之年，汽车保险公司普遍放弃了一年期保单，转而采用 6 个月期的保单。这种改变减少了浮存金，但使得承保更加明智。

No private insurer has the willingness to take on the amount of risk that Berkshire can provide. At times, this advantage can be important. But we also need to shrink when prices are inadequate. We must never write inadequately-priced policies in order to stay in the game. That policy is corporate suicide.

没有哪家私人保险公司愿意承担像伯克希尔所能承担的那么大的风险。有时候，这种优势可能至关重要。但当价格不合适时，我们也必须缩小业务规模。我们绝不能为了留在市场上而承保价格不合理的保单。这种做法无异于企业自杀。

Properly pricing P/C insurance is part art, part science and is definitely not a business for optimists. Mike Goldberg, the Berkshire executive who recruited Ajit, said it best: “We want our underwriters to daily come to work nervous, but not paralyzed.”

合理地为财产 - 意外险定价，一部分靠艺术，一部分靠科学，而且这绝对不是盲目乐观者能从事的业务。迈克・戈德堡，那位招募阿吉特进入伯克希尔的高管，说得非常好：“我们希望我们的承保人员每天来上班时都保持紧张，但又不至于被吓瘫。”

All things considered, we like the P/C insurance business. Berkshire can financially and psychologically handle extreme losses without blinking. We are also not dependent on reinsurers and that gives us a material and enduring cost advantage. Finally, we have outstanding managers (no optimists) and are particularly well-situated to utilize the substantial sums P/C insurance delivers for investment.

综合考虑各方面因素，我们看好财产-意外险业务。伯克希尔在财务和心理层面都能从容应对极端损失。而且，我们不依赖再保险公司，这为我们带来了显著且持久的成本优势。最后，我们拥有杰出的管理层（他们绝非盲目乐观者），并且特别适合利用财产-意外险业务产生的巨额资金进行投资。

Over the past two decades, our insurance business has generated $32 billion of after-tax profits from underwriting, about 3.3 cents per dollar of sales after income tax. Meanwhile, our float has grown from $46 billion to $171 billion. The float is likely to grow a bit over time and, with intelligent underwriting (and some luck), has a reasonable prospect of being costless.

在过去的二十年里，我们的保险业务通过承保实现了320亿美元的税后利润，相当于每1美元保费收入在扣除所得税后能产生约3.3美分的利润。与此同时，我们的浮存金从460亿美元增长到了1710亿美元。随着时间的推移，浮存金可能会略有增长，通过明智的承保策略（再加上一些运气），有很大的可能性实现零成本。

Berkshire Increases its Japanese Investments

伯克希尔增加对日本的投资

A small but important exception to our U.S.-based focus is our growing investment in Japan.

我们的投资主要集中在美国，但对日本的投资不断增加，这是一个虽小但重要的例外。

It’s been almost six years since Berkshire began purchasing shares in five Japanese companies that very successfully operate in a manner somewhat similar to Berkshire itself. The five are (alphabetically) ITOCHU, Marubeni, Mitsubishi, Mitsui and Sumitomo. Each of these large enterprises, in turn, owns interests in a vast array of businesses, many based in Japan but others that operate throughout the world.

自伯克希尔开始买入五家日本公司的股票以来，已经过去了近六年。这五家公司的运营模式与伯克希尔自身有一定相似之处，并且取得了巨大的成功。按字母顺序排列，它们分别是伊藤忠商事株式会社（ITOCHU）、丸红株式会社（Marubeni）、三菱商事株式会社（Mitsubishi）、三井物产株式会社（Mitsui）和住友商事株式会社（Sumitomo）。这五家大型企业各自在众多业务领域拥有权益，其中许多业务位于日本，还有一些业务遍布全球。

Berkshire made its first purchases involving the five in July 2019. We simply looked at their financial records and were amazed at the low prices of their stocks. As the years have passed, our admiration for these companies has consistently grown. Greg has met many times with them, and I regularly follow their progress. Both of us like their capital deployment, their managements and their attitude in respect to their investors.

2019年7月，伯克希尔首次买入这五家公司的股票。我们只是查看了它们的财务记录，就对其股票的低价感到震惊。随着时间的推移，我们对这些公司的赞赏之情与日俱增。格雷格与它们进行了多次会面，我也会定期关注它们的进展。我们都欣赏它们的资本配置方式、管理团队以及对投资者的态度。

Each of the five companies increase dividends when appropriate, they repurchase their shares when it is sensible to do so, and their top managers are far less aggressive in their compensation programs than their U.S. counterparts.

这五家公司都会在适当的时候增加股息，在合理的情况下回购自己的股票，而且它们的高管薪酬方案远没有美国同行那么激进。

Our holdings of the five are for the very long term, and we are committed to supporting their boards of directors. From the start, we also agreed to keep Berkshire’s holdings below 10% of each company’s shares. But, as we approached this limit, the five companies agreed to moderately relax the ceiling. Over time, you will likely see Berkshire’s ownership of all five increase somewhat.

我们对这五家公司的持股是长期投资，并且我们致力于支持它们的董事会。从一开始，我们就同意将伯克希尔在每家公司的持股比例控制在10%以下。但当我们接近这一上限时，这五家公司同意适度提高这一上限。随着时间的推移，你可能会看到伯克希尔在这五家公司的持股比例都会有所增加。

At yearend, Berkshire’s aggregate cost (in dollars) was $13.8 billion and the market value of our holdings totaled $23.5 billion.

截至去年年底，伯克希尔的总投资成本（以美元计）为138亿美元，而我们持有的这些股票的总市值达到了235亿美元。

Meanwhile, Berkshire has consistently – but not pursuant to any formula – increased its yen-denominated borrowings. All are at fixed rates, no “floaters.” Greg and I have no view on future foreign exchange rates and therefore seek a position approximating currency-neutrality. We are required, however, under GAAP rules to regularly recognize in our earnings a calculation of any gains or losses in the yen we have borrowed and, at yearend, had included $2.3 billion of after-tax gains due to dollar strength of which $850 million occurred in 2024.

与此同时，伯克希尔一直在稳步增加日元计价的借款，但并非按照任何固定公式进行。所有借款均为固定利率，没有浮动利率借款。格雷格和我对未来的外汇汇率没有看法，因此我们力求实现货币中性的头寸。然而，根据美国通用会计准则（GAAP）的规定，我们需要定期在收益中确认所借入日元的任何损益计算。截至去年年底，由于美元走强，我们已计入了23亿美元的税后收益，其中8.5亿美元是在2024年实现的。

I expect that Greg and his eventual successors will be holding this Japanese position for many decades and that Berkshire will find other ways to work productively with the five companies in the future.

我预计，格雷格及其继任者将持有这些日本股票数十年，并且伯克希尔未来将找到其他与这五家公司进行有效合作的方式。

We like the current math of our yen-balanced strategy as well. As I write this, the annual dividend income expected from the Japanese investments in 2025 will total about $812 million and the interest cost of our yen-denominated debt will be about $135 million.

我们也看好目前日元平衡策略的财务状况。在我撰写这封信时，预计2025年来自日本投资的年度股息收入总计约为8.12亿美元，而我们日元计价债务的利息成本约为1.35亿美元。

The Annual Gathering in Omaha

奥马哈年度股东大会

I hope you will join us in Omaha on May 3rd. We are following a somewhat changed schedule this year, but the basics remain the same. Our goal is that you get many of your questions answered, that you connect with friends, and that you leave with a good impression of Omaha. The city looks forward to your visits.

我希望你能在5月3日来奥马哈参加我们的活动。今年的日程安排略有变化，但基本内容保持不变。我们的目标是让你能够得到许多问题的答案，与朋友们相聚，并对奥马哈留下美好的印象。这座城市期待着你的到来。

We will have much the same group of volunteers to offer you a wide variety of Berkshire products that will lighten your wallet and brighten your day. As usual, we will be open on Friday from noon until 5 p.m. with lovable Squishmallows, underwear from Fruit of the Loom, Brooks running shoes and a host of other items to tempt you.

我们将有和往年大致相同的志愿者团队，为你提供各种各样的伯克希尔产品，这些产品会让你的钱包变瘪，但也会让你心情愉悦。和往常一样，我们将在周五中午12点至下午5点开放，届时会有可爱的Squishmallows毛绒玩具、 Fruit of the Loom的内衣、布鲁克斯（Brooks）跑鞋以及其他众多商品等你来选购。

Again, we will have only one book for sale. Last year we featured Poor Charlie’s Almanack and sold out – 5,000 copies disappeared before the close of business on Saturday.

同样，我们今年仍将只出售一本书。去年我们主推的是《穷查理宝典》（Poor Charlie’s Almanack），结果全部售罄 —— 5000本在周六活动结束前就销售一空。

This year we will offer 60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway. In 2015, I asked Carrie Sova, who among her many duties managed much of the activity at the annual meeting, to try her hand at putting together a light-hearted history of Berkshire. I gave her full reign to use her imagination, and she quickly produced a book that blew me away with its ingenuity, contents and design.

今年我们将推出《伯克希尔·哈撒韦60年》（60 Years of Berkshire Hathaway）。2015年，我让卡丽·索娃（Carrie Sova）尝试撰写一部轻松有趣的伯克希尔历史。卡丽身兼数职，其中一项重要工作是管理年度股东大会的大部分事务。我让她充分发挥想象力，她很快就写出了一本书，其创意、内容和设计都让我惊叹不已。

Subsequently, Carrie left Berkshire to raise a family and now has three children. But each summer, the Berkshire office force gets together to watch the Omaha Storm Chasers play baseball against a Triple A opponent. I ask a few alums to join us, and Carrie usually comes with her family. At this year’s event, I brazenly asked her if she would do a 60th Anniversary issue, featuring Charlie’s photos, quotes and stories that have seldom been made public.

后来，卡丽离开伯克希尔去组建家庭，现在她已经有了三个孩子。但每年夏天，伯克希尔的员工都会聚在一起，观看奥马哈风暴追逐者队（Omaha Storm Chasers）与美国职棒小联盟3A级球队的棒球比赛。我会邀请几位前员工参加，卡丽通常会带着家人一起来。在今年的活动中，我厚着脸皮问她是否愿意推出60周年纪念版，收录查理的照片、名言和鲜为人知的故事。

Even with three young children to manage, Carrie immediately said “yes.” Consequently, we will have 5,000 copies of the new book available for sale on Friday afternoon and from 7 a.m. to 4 p.m. on Saturday.

尽管要照顾三个年幼的孩子，卡丽还是立刻答应了。因此，我们将在周五下午以及周六上午7点至下午4点出售5000本新书。

Carrie refused any payment for her extensive work on the new “Charlie” edition. I suggested she and I co-sign 20 copies to be given to any shareholder contributing $5,000 to the Stephen Center that serves homeless adults and children in South Omaha. The Kizer family, beginning with Bill Kizer, Sr., my long-time friend and Carrie’s grandfather, have for decades been assisting this worthy institution. Whatever is raised through the sale of the 20 autographed books, I will match.

卡丽拒绝为她在新版“查理版”书籍上的大量工作收取任何报酬。我提议我们俩共同签名20本书，送给任何向斯蒂芬中心（Stephen Center）捐款5000美元的股东。该中心为奥马哈南部的无家可归者及其子女提供帮助。基泽（Kizer）家族，从我的老朋友、卡丽的祖父老比尔·基泽（Bill Kizer, Sr.）开始，几十年来一直在帮助这个有意义的机构。通过出售这20本签名书筹集到的任何款项，我都会进行等额匹配。

Becky Quick will cover our somewhat re-engineered gathering on Saturday. Becky knows Berkshire like a book and always arranges interesting interviews with managers, investors, shareholders and an occasional celebrity. She and her CNBC crew do a great job of both transmitting our meetings worldwide and archiving much Berkshire-related material. Give our director, Steve Burke, credit for the archive idea.

贝基·奎克（Becky Quick）将在周六报道我们经过些许调整的活动。贝基对伯克希尔了如指掌，她总是能安排与管理层、投资者、股东以及偶尔的名人进行有趣的访谈。她和她的美国全国广播公司财经频道（CNBC）团队在将我们的会议向全球转播以及存档大量与伯克希尔相关的资料方面做得非常出色。这个存档的想法要归功于我们的董事史蒂夫·伯克（Steve Burke）。

We will not have a movie this year but rather will convene a bit earlier at 8 a.m. I will make a few introductory remarks, and we will promptly get to the Q&A, alternating questions between Becky and the audience.

今年我们不会播放电影，而是会提前一点，在上午8点开始会议。我会做一些开场发言，然后我们将立即进入问答环节，由贝基和现场观众轮流提问。

Greg and Ajit will join me in answering questions and we will take a half-hour break at 10:30 a.m. When we reconvene at 11:00 a.m., only Greg will join me on stage. This year we will disband at 1:00 p.m. but stay open for shopping in the exhibit area until 4:00 p.m.

格雷格和阿吉特将和我一起回答问题，我们将在上午10点30分休息半小时。当我们在上午11点重新开会时，只有格雷格会和我一起上台。今年我们将在下午1点结束会议，但展览区的购物区将开放至下午4点。

You can find the full details regarding weekend activities on page 16. Note particularly the always-popular Brooks run on Sunday morning. (I will be sleeping.)

你可以在第16页找到关于周末活动的详细信息。特别要注意周日早上总是很受欢迎的布鲁克斯跑步活动。（我会在睡觉。）

My wise and good-looking sister, Bertie, of whom I wrote last year, will be attending the meeting along with two of her daughters, both good-looking as well. Observers all agree that the genes producing this dazzling result flow down only the female side of the family. (Sob.)

我那位聪明又漂亮的姐姐伯蒂（Bertie），我去年在信里提到过她，今年将和她的两个女儿一起参加会议，她的两个女儿也都很漂亮。大家都认为，这种令人惊艳的外貌基因只在家族的女性一方传承。（唉！）

Bertie is now 91 and we talk regularly on Sundays using old-fashion telephones for communications. We cover the joys of old age and discuss such exciting topics as the relative merits of our canes. In my case, the utility is limited to the avoidance of falling flat on my face.

伯蒂现在已经91岁了，我们每周日都会用老式电话聊天。我们会聊一聊老年生活的乐趣，也会讨论一些有趣的话题，比如我们的拐杖哪个更好用。就我而言，拐杖的作用仅限于防止我摔个狗啃泥。

But Bertie regularly one-ups me by asserting that she enjoys an additional benefit: When a woman uses a cane, she tells me, men quit “hitting” on her. Bertie’s explanation is that the male ego is such that little old ladies with canes simply aren’t an appropriate target. Presently, I have no data to counter her assertion.

但伯蒂总是能胜过我，她声称自己用拐杖还有额外的好处：她告诉我，当一个女人使用拐杖时，男人就不会再对她“献殷勤”了。伯蒂的解释是，男性的自尊心很强，拄着拐杖的老太太显然不是合适的目标。目前，我没有数据来反驳她的说法。

But I have suspicions. At the meeting I can’t see much from the stage, and I would appreciate it if attendees would keep an eye on Bertie. Let me know if the cane is really doing its job. My bet is that she will be surrounded by males. For those of a certain age, the scene will bring back memories of Scarlett O’Hara and her horde of male admirers in Gone with the Wind.

但我心存疑虑。在会议上，我在台上看不到太多情况，如果参会者能帮我留意一下伯蒂，我将不胜感激。如果拐杖真的起到了作用，请告诉我。我打赌她会被一群男士包围。对于一定年龄段的人来说，这场景会让人想起《乱世佳人》中斯嘉丽·奥哈拉（Scarlett O’Hara）和她那群男性追求者。

The Berkshire directors and I immensely enjoy having you come to Omaha, and I predict that you will have a good time and likely make some new friends.

伯克希尔的董事们和我都非常欢迎你来奥马哈参加活动，我预计你会度过一段愉快的时光，还可能结交一些新朋友。

February 22, 2025

2025年2月22日

Warren E. Buffett

沃伦·E·巴菲特

Chairman of the Board

董事会主席

Berkshire’s Performance vs. the S&P 500

伯克希尔与标普500指数的表现对比

年份（Year）	伯克希尔每股账面价值年度变化百分比（Annual Percentage Change in Per-Share Market Value of Berkshire）	标普500指数（含股息）年度变化百分比（Annual Percentage Change in S&P 500 with Dividends Included）
1965	49.5%	10.0%
1966	(3.4%)	(11.7%)
1967	13.3%	30.9%
1968	77.8%	11.0%
1969	19.4%	(8.4%)
1970	(4.6%)	3.9%
1971	80.5%	14.6%
1972	8.1%	18.9%
1973	(2.5%)	(14.8%)
1974	(48.7%)	(26.4%)
1975	2.5%	37.2%
1976	129.3%	23.6%
1977	46.8%	(7.4%)
1978	14.5%	6.4%
1979	102.5%	18.2%
1980	32.8%	32.3%
1981	31.8%	(5.0%)
1982	38.4%	21.4%
1983	69.0%	22.4%
1984	(2.7%)	6.1%
1985	93.7%	31.6%
1986	14.2%	18.6%
1987	4.6%	5.1%
1988	59.3%	16.6%
1989	84.6%	31.7%
1990	(23.1%)	(3.1%)
1991	35.6%	30.5%
1992	29.8%	7.6%
1993	38.9%	10.1%
1994	25.0%	1.3%

Note: Data are for calendar years with these exceptions: 1965 and 1966, year ended 9/30; 1967, 15 months ended 12/31.

注释：数据为日历年数据，但以下情况除外：1965年和1966年，财年截止9月30日；1967年，15个月，截止12月31日。