What's Coming：The Changing Domestic and World Orders Under the Trump Administration
What’s Coming: The Changing Domestic and World Orders Under the Trump Administration
即将发生之事：特朗普政府下的国内与世界秩序的变化
Ray Dalio 2024-11-26
瑞 达里奥 2024-11-26
Now that the nightmare scenario of a close Trump loss and ensuing fight over the election has been taken off the table by a decisive Trump-led rightist sweep over Harris’s leftist alternative and a number of his key appointments have been announced, a picture of what is likely to happen is emerging. I want to make clear that the picture I am painting is meant to be as accurate as possible without any biased opinions of good or bad, because accuracy is what’s most important for making decisions in the best possible way.
既然特朗普以微弱劣势输掉选举以及随后围绕选举展开争斗的噩梦场景已因特朗普领导的右派势力对哈里斯所代表的左派势力的决定性胜利而不复存在，且他的一些关键任命也已公布，那么一幅可能发生之事的图景正在浮现。我想明确的是，我所描绘的这幅图景旨在尽可能准确，不带有任何好坏的偏见性观点，因为准确性对于以最佳方式做出决策至关重要。
The picture that I see is one of 1) a giant renovation of government and the domestic order aimed at making it run more efficiently, which will include an internal political war to convert that vision into reality, and 2) an “America first” foreign policy and preparation for external war with China, which is perceived to be America’s greatest threat. The most recent analogous period is the 1930s, when such an approach emerged in several countries.
我所看到的图景是：其一，对政府和国内秩序进行大规模革新，旨在使其更高效地运转，这将包括一场内部政治斗争，以将这一愿景变为现实；其二，奉行 “美国优先” 的外交政策，并为与中国的外部战争做准备，中国被视为美国最大的威胁。最近与之类似的时期是 20 世纪 30 年代，当时有几个国家出现了这种情况。
The people Donald Trump is choosing to make this happen with him are: Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, who will run the newly proposed Department of Government Efficiency; Matt Gaetz, who, as Attorney General (if he gets the Senate’s approval), will push the legal limits of what those who are running this new order can do; RFK Jr., who would radically reform the healthcare system, as Secretary of Health and Human Services; and Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence, and Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, who will lead the fight against foreign adversaries. Many, many others—some who might be in government and some who will be outside advisors, like Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, and a few Trump family members—will be on the mission with Trump. They are all win-at-all-cost loyalists to the leader and to the mission of bringing down the so-called “deep state” and replacing it with a new domestic order that they hope will create maximum economic strength and fight foreign enemies.
唐纳德・特朗普选择与他共同推动此事的人包括：埃隆・马斯克和维韦克・拉马斯瓦米，他们将负责新提议的政府效率部；马特・盖茨，若他获得参议院批准出任司法部长，将推动那些运作新秩序之人在法律允许范围内的极限；小罗伯特・肯尼迪，若担任卫生与公众服务部长，将对医疗保健系统进行彻底改革；马尔科・卢比奥担任国务卿，图尔西・加巴德担任国家情报总监，皮特・赫格塞思担任国防部长，他们将领导对抗外部敌人的斗争。还有许多其他人，有些可能在政府任职，有些将担任外部顾问，如塔克・卡尔森、史蒂夫・班农以及一些特朗普的家族成员，他们都将与特朗普一同执行这一使命。他们都是不惜一切代价效忠于领袖以及推翻所谓 “深层政府”、代之以新国内秩序这一使命的人，他们希望新秩序能创造最大的经济实力并对抗外敌。
Once these people are in place, the same appointment approach will likely be used to purge the government of those accused of being part of the “deep state,” who are not aligned with and loyal to the mission. This will extend to all parts of the government system including those that were previously thought to be less politically/ideologically controlled, such as the military, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Interior, and “Schedule F” government employees (a job classification that President-elect Trump wants to reintroduce to reclassify certain government jobs to remove civil service protections). Most all appointed positions that the president (in conjunction with the Republican-controlled Senate, House, and the Department of Justice) can control will be controlled, to have people aligned with President Trump and his new domestic order in place. In the process of doing this, most everyone in and out of government will be viewed as either an ally or an enemy, and all powers at the disposal of Donald Trump and allies will be used to beat the enemies who are standing in the way of their reforms. I think they will almost certainly have a big impact on changing the domestic and world orders. What will they look like?
一旦这些人就位，很可能会采用同样的任命方式来清除政府中那些被指为 “深层政府” 一部分、与该使命不一致且不忠诚的人。这将延伸至政府系统的所有部门，包括那些此前被认为较少受政治 / 意识形态控制的部门，如军队、司法部、联邦调查局、证券交易委员会、美联储、食品药品监督管理局、疾病控制与预防中心、国土安全部、内政部以及 “F 表” 政府雇员（候任总统特朗普希望重新引入的一种职位分类，以重新划分某些政府职位，取消公务员保护）。总统（与共和党控制的参议院、众议院以及司法部协同）所能控制的几乎所有任命职位都将被掌控，以确保人员与特朗普总统及其新国内秩序保持一致。在这一过程中，政府内外的大多数人都将被视为盟友或敌人，唐纳德・特朗普及其盟友将动用一切可支配的权力来击败那些阻碍其改革的敌人。我认为他们几乎肯定会对国内和世界秩序的改变产生重大影响。那会是怎样的影响呢？
The Changing Domestic Order（变化中的国内秩序）
It is now clear that Donald Trump and those he is choosing will reform government and the country like a corporate raider engaging in a hostile takeover of an inefficient company, making huge reforms to it by changing the people, slashing costs, and infusing it with new technologies. Think of Gordon Gekko and the perspective he conveyed in his “greed is good” speech, while recognizing that this is coming from the president of the United States, who is going to take that approach to the central government and the entire country. As mentioned, the most recent analogous historical cases were the hard-rightist states in the 1930s. To be clear, I am not saying that Trump and those in his government are fascist or will behave as fascist leaders did in many respects; what I am saying is that, in order to understand those who are now taking control with nationalistic, protectionist, top-down, government-led economic and social policies, and who have little tolerance for internal opposition and are embroiled in international great powers conflicts, it is worth understanding how those states with analogous policies in the 1930s behaved.
现在很明显，唐纳德・特朗普及其所选择的人将像企业掠夺者对低效公司进行敌意收购那样对政府和国家进行改革，通过更换人员、削减成本和注入新技术来进行大规模改革。想想戈登・盖柯以及他在 “贪婪是好事” 演讲中所传达的观点，同时要认识到这是来自美国总统，他将把这种方式应用于中央政府和整个国家。如前所述，最近类似的历史案例是 20 世纪 30 年代的极右翼国家。需要明确的是，我并不是说特朗普及其政府是法西斯主义者，或在许多方面会表现得像法西斯领导人；我想说的是，为了理解那些如今带着民族主义、保护主义、自上而下、政府主导的经济和社会政策掌控局面，对内部反对派几乎零容忍且卷入国际大国冲突的人，了解 20 世纪 30 年代那些有着类似政策的国家的表现是很有价值的。
The economic renovation of the country will, in all likelihood, come via industrial policies that are designed to improve productivity and efficiency without much worry given to the people or issues— such as taking care of the environment, addressing climate change, remediating poverty, or encouraging diversity, equity, and inclusion—that could stand in the way of these things happening. Certain key areas (including the areas that I think are most important, which are education and debt management) will likely be neglected (and would have also been neglected by the Democrats). For as long as the Trump-Musk partnership lasts, they will be the main designers and implementers of this new domestic order.
该国的经济革新极有可能通过产业政策来实现，这些政策旨在提高生产率和效率，而不太担心诸如环境保护、应对气候变化、消除贫困或鼓励多样性、公平和包容等可能阻碍这些事情发生的人或问题。某些关键领域（包括我认为最重要的教育和债务管理领域）很可能会被忽视（民主党也可能会忽视这些领域）。只要特朗普 - 马斯克的合作关系持续下去，他们将是这一新国内秩序的主要设计者和实施者。
These policies may well be great for Wall Street and some tech and most businesses that are plagued by regulations and worried about increased taxes. While these entities have been previously restrained in many ways from doing deals, they will be much freer from government constraints. These changes will be great for financial deal makers, banks, and asset managers because they will have more freedom and more money and credit, because capital controls will be eased and the Fed will be pressured to make money easier. These policies will be great for pro-Trump tech companies because they will be allowed to grow and operate in largely unrestrained ways. These policies will also be good for lawyers, who will be busy too. I am already seeing big changes in these people’s plans to do much more under the Trump Administration than they could have done under a Democratic government. Also, AI won’t be as regulated, and tariffs will be used to simultaneously raise tax money and protect domestic producers. If the Fed continues in its path to cut interest rates (which I don’t think it should do), that will also shift a lot of cash that is saved in money market funds and other deposits into other markets, which will be stimulative to markets and the economy.
这些政策对华尔街、一些受监管困扰且担心增税的科技公司和大多数企业可能极为有利。虽然这些实体此前在很多方面受到限制无法达成交易，但它们将从政府的约束中获得更大自由。这些变化对金融交易商、银行和资产管理者来说是好事，因为他们将拥有更多自由、更多资金和信贷，因为资本管制将放松，美联储将面临放宽货币政策的压力。这些政策对支持特朗普的科技公司也有好处，因为它们将被允许在基本不受限制的情况下发展和运营。这些政策对律师也有好处，他们也会很忙。我已经看到这些人在特朗普政府下的计划有了重大变化，他们能做的比在民主党政府下多得多。此外，人工智能的监管将不会那么严格，而且关税将被用于同时增加税收和保护国内生产者。如果美联储继续降息（我认为它不应该这样做），那也将把大量存于货币市场基金和其他存款中的现金转移到其他市场，这将对市场和经济产生刺激作用。
Also, the realization that the United States is in an economic war and a geopolitical war, and could find itself in a military war, with China as well as with others like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, will have big effects on domestic security and domestic policies. For example, ensuring that the U.S. will have acceptable amounts of all key technologies will lead to policies for these technologies to be made in the U.S. (e.g., 20% of the most advanced chips will have to be produced in the U.S. by 2030) or made in allied countries, which will require the central government to have strong and insist on well-implemented energy and regulatory policies that enable these changes to be made.
此外，认识到美国正处于与中国以及俄罗斯、伊朗、朝鲜等国的经济战、地缘政治战，且可能陷入军事战争，这将对国内安全和国内政策产生重大影响。例如，确保美国拥有可接受数量的所有关键技术，将导致出台要求这些技术在美国（例如，到 2030 年 20% 的最先进芯片必须在美国生产）或盟国生产的政策，这将要求中央政府制定强有力且执行良好的能源和监管政策，以实现这些变革。
The Changing International World Order（变化中的国际世界秩序）
The international world order will change from a) the existing tattered remains of the post-World War II system that was created by the U.S. and its allies, in which there are/were generally agreed-upon global standards of behavior, rules, and governing organizations like the UN, WTO, International Court of Justice, IMF, World Bank, etc. to b) a more fragmented world order, in which the United States will pursue an “America First” policy with clear categorizations of allies, enemies, and nonaligned countries, as there will be greater amounts of economic and geopolitical war and a greater-than-ever chance of military war in the next 10 years. In other words, we are now coming to the end of an era led by the United States, in which countries tried to work out together how to be with each other through multinational organizations with guiding principles and rules, and into a more self-interested, law-of-the-jungle-type order with the United States being one of the two biggest players and China the other— and the fight being largely the classic one of capitalism versus communism (in their contemporary versions).
国际世界秩序将从以下情况发生转变：a) 二战后由美国及其盟友创建的现存的、已破败的国际秩序，在该秩序下，通常有全球公认的行为标准、规则以及像联合国、世界贸易组织、国际法院、国际货币基金组织、世界银行等管理组织；b) 一个更加碎片化的世界秩序，在未来 10 年，美国将奉行 “美国优先” 政策，明确划分盟友、敌人和不结盟国家，因为经济和地缘政治战争将更加频繁，军事战争的可能性也将比以往任何时候都大。换句话说，我们正走向美国主导时代的末期，在这个时代，各国试图通过有指导原则和规则的跨国组织来共同探讨如何相处，而现在正进入一个更加自私自利、弱肉强食的秩序，美国是两大主要参与者之一，中国是另一个，而这场斗争在很大程度上是当代版本的资本主义与共产主义之间的经典对抗。
So, concepts of morality and ethics that were shaped by American views of what is moral and ethical will be much less relevant, as the United States will no longer be the world leader in proposing and enforcing these principles. Allies and enemies will be chosen more on the basis of tactical considerations like what the deals will be. The question of which side countries are on will be most important. China will be treated as the primary enemy because it is both the most powerful and the most ideologically opposed, while Russia, North Korea, and Iran are also enemies. In fact, China is widely considered the United States’ single greatest threat, even a greater threat than the domestic threats. As for other countries, I won’t now digress into an explanation of where they stand, but I will say that they all are now categorized as allies and enemies to varying degrees, and this will be a guide for dealing with them. I will, however, say that detailed plans are now being worked out for dealing with each major country and each major subject area. All countries will be given great pressures and possibilities to change their domestic orders to be aligned with, rather than opposed to, the Trump-U.S. leadership and order, and if they don’t get on our side, they will encounter negative consequences. This conflict between the two great powers will create opportunities, most importantly business opportunities, for neutral nonaligned countries.
因此，由美国对道德和伦理的看法所塑造的道德伦理观念将变得不那么重要，因为美国将不再是提出和执行这些原则的世界领导者。盟友和敌人的选择将更多地基于诸如交易条件等战术考虑。各国站在哪一方将至关重要。中国将被视为主要敌人，因为它既是最强大的，也是在意识形态上最对立的，而俄罗斯、朝鲜和伊朗也是敌人。事实上，中国被广泛认为是美国最大的单一威胁，甚至比国内威胁更大。至于其他国家，我现在暂不详细说明它们的立场，但我要说的是，它们现在都在不同程度上被划分为盟友和敌人，这将成为与它们打交道的指南。不过，我要说的是，目前正在制定针对每个主要国家和每个主要议题领域的详细计划。所有国家都将面临巨大压力和可能性，需要改变其国内秩序，使其与特朗普领导的美国及其秩序保持一致，而非对立，如果它们不站在我们这边，就会面临负面后果。这两个大国之间的冲突将为中立的不结盟国家创造机会，最重要的是商业机会。
This change in this world-order dynamic will also have big implications for the developing world (or the “Global South” as it’s now called), and therefore the whole world, because it contains roughly 85% of the world’s population and will likely go its own way, because the U.S. will no longer lead a common world order based on certain ideals and other countries won’t necessarily want to follow the U.S. The U.S. and China will be competing for allies, with China generally believed to be in a much better position to win over nonaligned countries because China is more important economically and does a better job exerting its soft power. Given these changes in the world order, nonaligned countries that 1) are financially strong—i.e., have good income statements and balance sheets, 2) have internal order and capital markets that facilitate people and the country to be productive, and 3) are not in an international war will benefit.
这种世界秩序动态的变化也将对发展中国家（现称 “全球南方”）产生重大影响，进而影响整个世界，因为发展中国家约占世界人口的 85%，且可能会自行其是，因为美国将不再基于某些理想引领共同的世界秩序，而其他国家也不一定愿意追随美国。美国和中国将竞争盟友，人们普遍认为中国在争取不结盟国家方面更具优势，因为中国在经济上更重要，且更善于发挥其软实力。鉴于世界秩序的这些变化，那些 1) 财务状况良好，即有良好的损益表和资产负债表；2) 有内部秩序和资本市场，能促进人民和国家提高生产力；3) 未卷入国际战争的不结盟国家将受益。
More Specifically, to Elaborate, There Will Be…
更具体地说，将会有……
…More government influence to achieve the government’s objectives, even if that comes at the expense of our free-market, profit-seeking system, with debates between the conservatives who favor this top-down direction and those who favor the free market more. Along these lines, we should expect more government influence on private markets to achieve the government’s objectives. This is needed to achieve the grand plan to reshape the economy and prepare for war. So, we should keep in mind that cost efficiency and national security achieved by the government working with national-champion companies is the primary objective, not profit-making alone, because profit making won’t achieve those goals. We should pay attention to policy shifts that will drive what areas of the economy will benefit most (e.g., the energy and minerals sectors that support the AI technology sector). While there will be free-market winners, there are obvious cases where the best companies in the United States are not good enough to give the United States what is needed (e.g., in advanced semiconductors), so key relationships with aligned foreign producers (e.g., TSMC in Taiwan) to produce in the U.S. are needed to minimize all dependencies on foreign adversaries. Besides the need to domestically produce essential technologies, there is the need to domestically produce steel, autos, and many other essential items. That will mean more onshoring and friendshoring. There is also a recognized sabotage risk of being cut off in a number of ways that will have to be dealt with.
…… 政府为实现其目标将施加更大影响，即使这会牺牲我们的自由市场、逐利体系，支持这种自上而下方向的保守派与更倾向自由市场的人之间将产生争论。 沿着这些思路，我们应该预期政府会对私人市场施加更大影响以实现其目标。这是实现重塑经济和备战的宏伟计划所必需的。因此，我们应该记住，政府与国家冠军企业合作实现的成本效益和国家安全是首要目标，而不仅仅是盈利，因为盈利无法实现那些目标。我们应该关注政策转变，这些转变将推动哪些经济领域最受益（例如，支持人工智能技术领域的能源和矿产部门）。虽然会有自由市场的赢家，但显然美国有些最好的公司还不足以满足美国的需求（例如在先进半导体领域），因此需要与结盟的外国生产商（例如台湾的台积电）建立关键关系，以便在美国生产，将对外国对手的所有依赖降至最低。除了需要在国内生产关键技术外，还需要在国内生产钢铁、汽车和许多其他必需品。这将意味着更多的制造业回流美国以及友岸外包。此外，还需认识到在诸多方面存在被切断供应的破坏风险，必须加以应对。
…A massive deregulatory push in support of cost-efficient production.
…… 大规模的去监管推动，以支持高效生产。
…Immigration and deportation actions, with the initial emphasis being on closing the border and deporting undocumented immigrants with criminal records.
…… 移民和驱逐行动，最初的重点将是关闭边境并驱逐有犯罪记录的无证移民。
…Trade and tariff reform.
…… 贸易和关税改革。
…Challenges in assembling and working with U.S. allies. Japan is our most important ally in the geopolitical conflict with China, so what is now happening there politically is important. Other allies are the U.K. and Australia, but they are not great powers. Europe is weak, has its hands full with its own problems, and doesn’t have a dog in this fight, while it has Russia on its doorstep and can’t fight it without the U.S.’s NATO support. Most other countries don’t want to get into the fight, as what is being fought for by the United States isn’t as important to them as it is to the United States, and they have more economic dependencies on China than on the U.S. The nonaligned Global South rising powers—which, along with China and Russia, are members of BRICS—are countries to pay attention to.
…… 与美国盟友集结和合作的挑战。日本是我们在与中国的地缘政治冲突中最重要的盟友，因此日本目前的政治动态很重要。其他盟友包括英国和澳大利亚，但它们并非大国。欧洲实力较弱，自身问题缠身，在这场斗争中无足轻重，而且其家门口有俄罗斯，没有美国的北约支持就无法与之对抗。大多数其他国家不想卷入这场斗争，因为美国为之奋斗的目标对它们来说不如对美国那么重要，而且它们对中国的经济依赖比对美国的更大。不结盟的全球南方新兴强国，连同中国和俄罗斯，都是金砖国家的成员，这些国家值得关注。
…The high economic costs of being the dominant world power—i.e., of having the most important technologies, a strong military, and being able to provide soft power—will be greater than the profit-making approach can provide, so how that economic reality will be handled will need to be worked out.
…… 作为世界主导力量，拥有最重要的技术、强大的军事力量以及能够提供软实力的高昂经济成本，将超过盈利所能提供的，因此需要解决如何应对这一经济现实的问题。
…The need to lower taxes to keep the electorate happy and to keep money in the hands of those who are most productive. Trump and his advisors believe that a lower corporate tax rate than currently exists (around 20%) will raise total taxation and raise productivity. That perspective is good for the markets.
…… 需要降低税收以取悦选民，并将资金留在最具生产力的人手中。特朗普及其顾问认为，将公司税率降至低于目前水平（约 20%）将增加总税收并提高生产率。这种观点对市场有利。
…Significant reforms of the healthcare system.
…… 医疗保健系统的重大改革。
There is a very limited time—the first 100 days and then the first two years—to get these difficult-to-do things done, so there will have to be vicious prioritization. We don’t yet know what will be prioritized and how successful the new administration will be when the force of its aspirations meets the relatively immovable object of the entrenched system. It certainly will be an interesting and important time, so let’s stay in touch.
…… 完成这些困难之事的时间非常有限 —— 前 100 天，然后是前两年，因此必须进行严格的优先级排序。我们尚不清楚哪些将被优先考虑，以及当新政府的抱负遭遇根深蒂固的体制这一相对难以撼动的障碍时，其会有多成功。这肯定将是一个有趣且重要的时期，所以让我们保持关注。
The views expressed in this article are mine and not necessarily Bridgewater’s.
本文所表达的观点仅代表我个人，不一定代表桥水基金的观点 。